Summit success is often a matter of expectations, and, of course, depends on where you sit. For Ukraine, this may not have been as successful as it would want since they didn't get a fast track into NATO. But that was an unrealistic expectation. I didn't expect Turkey to stop blocking Sweden's membership, so my expectations were exceeded and thus huge success. But the summit is more than just one or two decisions, so I am going to review much of the communique and then the Canadian announcements to figure out how many woots does this summit get. Of course, since my pals and I didn't get a chance to go to the expert forum side party this year, there is a cap on the excitement--no NATO family dance party for us.
First, as mentioned above, Ukraine didn't get a superfast track to membership, as having Ukraine join while the war is going on would either mean that NATO invokes Article V--an attack has happened against a member and deserves a collective response--or it does not. In the former case, NATO is now at war with Russia, something that the alliance has rightly been avoiding. In the latter case, Article V gets eroded as it is not used when a member is attacked in a very serious way. This is not just a few loose bombs or artillery shells like when forces in Syria hit Turkey. The question really is how soon after the war would Ukraine become a member, and the answer this time was: very soon. But it was not more definitive because the alliance requires consensus, and that is all that they could agree to. I pushed back on twitter about cowardice or manliness. NATO being at peace while Ukraine has been at war is not great for Ukraine, but the fact that Russia is not hitting the supplies going into Ukraine before they get there is hugely significant. Expanding the war is not good for most folks, and the risk of nuclear war, which is small but real, is not great even for Ukrainians.
Second, Sweden is an unalloyed win for the alliance. It makes defense of the Baltics easier since Sweden sits astride the best ways to reinforce the Baltics in a time of war. It also means that countries leading the NATO missions in the Baltics, looking for more troops to plus up their battlegroups into brigades (going from 1k to at least 3k) have a robust potential donor to beg (force generation is begging in the words of a NATO military official we cited in our book with the ebook version on sale now!). It is also a massive defeat for Russia, as Putin has long wanted to break NATO, but finds his aggressions in Ukraine in 2014 and in 2022 have only strengthened and expanded the alliance. Finland and Sweden would not have asked to join had Russia stayed within its boundaries.
Ok, onto the communique, which represents a lot of homework and bargaining over the past year, with the summit serving as an artificial deadline to get folks to agree, kind of like an academic conference is designed really to get profs to finally finish their papers:
- the formation of the NATO-Ukraine Council. This supplants the old NATO-Russia Council which died due to Russia's aggression. This gives Ukraine much visibility and status and allows the Ukrainians to participate meaningfully in many NATO conversations. It ain't membership, but it is significant.
- Finland is now a member, woot!
- China as a threat--this requires work as some countries (France) want to keep sucking up to China.
- Lots of stuff on Russia, not recognizing Crimea as Russian, etc. Naming Belarus and Iran as complicit (although not China). The language on Russia can't be a partner for now is probably the closest we can get to declaring the NATO Russia Founding Act dead.
- Lots of stuff about supporting Ukraine, that no need to continue with the Membership Action Plan, which means Ukraine is closer to membership and is increasingly integrated.
- Some more language about ISIS and terrorism.
- 2% gets the usual shoutout--making progress but now we recognize that 2% isn't enough.
- More forward defense with regional defense plans, more troops at high readiness, moving from battlegroups to brigades in the east as promised last year.
- Defence Production Action plan--to improve delivery of weapons/ammunition
- Integrated Air and Missile Defense with emphasis on eastern flank--this represents a response to the roles played by drones and missile attacks in Ukraine.
- Continued opposition to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons since nukes are part of NATO's deterrent strategy. Not a surprise.
- No Japan office for NATO since France opposed it. Consensus decision-making can suck... like how do we dump Hungary?
- The standing up of a Maritime Center for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure. This seems in response to Russia primarily monkeying around with cables.
- Cyber got the longest paragraph, I think, with a new Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability to help members respond to cyber attacks.
- Western Balkans get several items--75-78--as tensions are brewing there. Supporting Bosnia's integrity is directly aimed against Bosnian Serb separatism, KFOR continues to operate and has increased its troop numbers due to violence in the Serb-inhabited areas. A reference there to conditions based not calendar driven brings me back to my Joint Staff days concern whether exit/reductions are determined by benchmarks (conditions) or milestones (time).
There was more, but that is the stuff that caught my eye. So, much progress on some of the most important things, hard time getting consensus on NATO becoming relevant in the Pacific despite clearer language about the threat posed by China.
What about Canada? I got asked lots of questions about 2%, and I didn't see anyone put Trudeau in a headlock for not making sufficient progress towards 2%. Nor did I see Canada making a huge stink about Biden's sending of cluster munitions to Ukraine (a post for another day maybe). Canada did take part in several announcements--a blueprint for Latvia's defense, a NATO plan for defending the Baltics, and the like. Trudeau announced sending up to 2,200 Canadian troops to Latvia which is up from the original 450 or so and then 800-1000 that it has been at since last year. He announced $2.6b in spending on the Latvia mission over the next three years including $1.2b. I don't know if this is enough to cover the additional costs of sending the larger numbers of troops who have to be rotated every six months, the costs of more infrastructure (barracks, dining hall, training facilities, etc) for not just the more Canadians but the more NATO folks, etc.
Remember, Canada is the Framework Nation for Latvia, which means it is Canada's responsibility to lead the multinational battlegroup that is now becoming a multinational brigade. That means providing some infrastructure for those who Canada cajoles to stick around (Albania, Czech Republic, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and North Macedonia) and maybe join us (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) to get to 3000+ troops. Given that there are now eight places for NATO to send troops--the three Baltics, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania--so competition will be fierce to get more troops from some of these countries. So, Canada has to make the place welcoming and a good training area--which means plenty of ammunition and other logistical support so they can exercise often.
And no Defence Policy Update. Which is a disappointment--it is very late. When will be the next time where announcing it will be handy for the government? Maybe when parliament is back in session? ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
So, I think Canada did the minimum to keep the criticism down, but perhaps didn't really do enough to set up the Latvia mission for success. I don't think getting to 2% quickly is a realistic expectation, but the government could have made it a bit clearer that Canada would be moving in that general direction. That there have been a heap of commitments made, that the personnel crisis itself needs much money thrown at it, so defence spending should be going up, even if it is not going to increase by 50%.
Overall, the summit went well, the big things happened, the smaller things mostly worked out. Putin's efforts to divide the alliance keep failing, the media's efforts to set unrealistic expectations and Zelensky's first outburst did not really upset things much. I am sure many observers would prefer Trump running around, pushing over the leaders of smaller countries. It would be more entertaining. But we got enough progress on enough items. Is it fast enough? Not for Ukraine. But a consensus-based organization is not going to move that quickly. That NATO will soon have something like 30,000 troops forward deployed is pretty amazing. And definitely not what Putin wants.