Iranian Nuclear Deal

I am trying to figure out whether deferring Iran's nuclear ambitions is the better part of the deal or the reality that Netanyahu's best efforts to derail it failed.  It may not be a perfect deal (this suggests it is mighty good), but perfection is the enemy of the good enough.  And in that, diplomacy is like academic writing.  If you want something perfect, it ain't ever going to happen.  But is it good enough?  Probably.  The arms control agreements with the USSR didn't solve the relationship, but they managed the relationship.  And that is not bad.  For similar views see this piece by Fred Kaplan.

Drezner and Farley had a good few tweets on this:

What this deal won't stop Iran from doing: 1) Threaten Israel 2) Arm proxies 3) Repress Iranians. What no #IranDeal was gonna do: see above.
— Daniel Drezner (@dandrezner) April 3, 2015

@dandrezner I would amend and add "What no #seriesofheavyairstrikesonIran was going to do: see above"
— Robert Farley (@drfarls) April 3, 2015

I cannot help but think that Netanyahu's opposition made it easier for the Iranians to accept.  "If Bibi hates this deal that much, it cannot be that bad for us."  And to be clear, it is not just the American right wing that is opposed to this agreement--the Iranians have their own hardliners.  Netanyahu's tantrums in the US demonstrate that Obama was independent from Israel, which removes something that might taint the deal too much for the Iranians.  So, thanks, Bibi, for being the bad cop.