Understanding the CAF Crisis: Principals and Agents All The Way Down

One of the central ironies of contemporary civil-military relations is that most modern militaries think one theoretical approach should be applied to them while they apply another to those below them.  Huh?  

The Huntingtonian approach to civ-mil says that professional militaries should be autonomous, that professional soldiers/sailors/aviators/etc can be trusted to do the right thing if trained right.  Militaries love this because it tells themselves that they are the sole experts on military stuff, that civilians should tell them where to fight and then leave it at that.

But military folks don't give that kind of autonomy to those below them.  No, they spend incredible amounts of effort thinking about leadership and management.  Consciously or not, they live principal-agency theory--the idea that any delegation will lead to the agent being given discretion/responsibility knowing more about what they are doing than the principal giving them that responsibility.  So, you need to be careful about which agents you select, how much discretion you give them, how you oversee them, and the incentives to reward good behavior and punish bad.

Why are the Canadian Armed Forces so messed up these days?  Let's take a look via those four pieces of the delegation process:

• Agent selection: who chooses the command staff of the CAF?  The Chief of the Defence Staff is chosen by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, and then the CDS chooses the rest--the head of the army, navy, etc. This can be good--that a CDS can come in and eventually shape the leadership of the force so that they all push in the same direction.  However, it can also be that the CDS chooses his pals, those who have done him favors over the years, etc.  In this crisis, General Jon Vance picked a guy with a checkered record to be Chief of Personnel.   The unanswered question in all of this is why the hell did he do that?  And where was the Minister when the CDS did that?  It raises questions about old boy networks and the importance of connections.
  
• So, step one: fix agent selection.  This is more than just doing 360 reviews, which are helpful at getting junior folks who might be abused to report those leaders who kiss up and kick down.  Will such evals and other testing weigh at all compared to operational performance?  
• Also, of course, don't put folks who recently served in the military in the position to oversee the military.  That is, select the right Minister/Secretary of Defence.
  
• Discretion: how much discretion does the CDS get in picking the command staff?  How much discretion does the CDS get in reforming the CAF?  When Deputy Minister Jody Thomas appeared on our Battle Rhythm podcast last month, she indicated that Vance told her to stay out of the reform effort.  It seems to be the case that Vance had complete freedom to do what he wanted, and, yes, he chose mostly not to implement the Deschamps recommendations.  
• Step two: dump the Huntingtonian approach of giving the CDS so much discretion.  Tell him what he should be doing, whom he should be doing it with, and what is to be expected.  To be clear, this is not micromanagement as it is not a matter of some civilian in Ottawa using a 7000km screwdriver to operate something happening in Kandahar at seven levels lower in the chain of command but it is management--telling the person immediately below you what their job is and then making sure they do it. 
• When researching the Canadian mission in Afghanistan, when I interviewed each commander (including Vance), they all referred to the letter of intent they received from the CDS--that defined their "left and right arcs of fire"--what they could and could not do and what they should aim for.  These letters defined their discretion.  
  
• Discretion should be related to trust--the more you trust an agent, the more discretion you can give.  The less you trust an agent, the less discretion they should have.  The delegation contract is not fixed--it can change as one learns via oversight how things are going.
  
• Oversight: how do you know that the underling is doing what they are supposed to be doing?  Who is responsible for overseeing the agent?  The Minister is the person responsible for overseeing the CDS--there is no one above the CDS besides the Minister and the Prime Minister.  The Minister can use all kinds of other agents to help oversee the CDS--the ombudsman, the Deputy Minister, etc--but the responsibility for keeping informed of what the CDS is doing--whether they are staying within the intent of the Minister--is the Minister's.  
• Step three: stop saying that looking into what the CDS is doing is politicizing anything.  When the ombudsman wants to give you info, take it.  Have your various agents report back about what the other agents are doing so that one has good situational awareness. In my question to the Minister last week, I basically asked--are you going to change how you oversee this to process.  He still seemed to be taking a very passive approach.
• The stylized metaphor for oversight is contrasting fire alarms versus police patrols (h/t to the recently departed Mat McCubbins)--do you set up a passive system where you respond only when the alarm gets pulled?  Oh, and in most fire alarm systems, the media is the one pulling the alarm--is that a desirable way to oversee the CDS?  To respond only when things hit the fan?  Or do you set up a police patrol system where you or your other agents regularly look around for trouble and via their presence--the likelihood of getting caught--discourages unwanted behavior?  So, step three is really about setting up a system of oversight that does not rely on Mercedes Stephenson, Amanda Connolly, and the rest of the media but either uses the agents one has or develop new oversight agents--an Inspector-General?
  
• Incentives: Oversight is not enough--it must be known that good behavior will be rewarded and bad behavior will be punished.  What gets one promoted? What gets one's discretion reduced?  What gets one's career ended early or shunted off to someplace less desirable?  What were the conditions that the Minister told the CDS would get him additional years?  Or that would end his term?  Given the prominence of the personnel file (again, it was moved to the front of the Defence review document even though such a review really should start with threats), you would think that not implementing the Deschamps report would be punished.  That the CDS would be sent off to retirement since he did not fulfill a key part of his mandate.
• Step four: make clear that there will be consequences for not doing what is expected.  This is really important for sending signals to the rest of the force--that the highest in the chain of command will be help accountable--that they will pay a price when they screw up.  
• Incentives are not all or nothing--it is not just about firing, although in this case...  One can also visibly reduce an agent's portfolio or discretion.  Increased oversight is seen as punishment, so do that to send a signal and to impose a cost.

There is obviously much more going on.  This framework only addresses a piece of the puzzle, but it is a key piece.  I can't help but think of Bill Belicheck's mantra right now--do your job.  What is your job?  Well, if you are Minister of National Defence, it is managing the CDS--choosing the right person, shaping their discretion, overseeing what they do with their discretion, and providing sticks and carrots.  If you are the CDS, it means managing the generals and admirals under you who then manage those colonels and captains below them and on and on.