Zeitenwende All Over the World!

 Two years ago, Olaf Scholtz, the German Chancellor, announced that we were at a moment of Zeitenwende in the aftermath of Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine (2014 was the start, 2022 was much deeper with greater intensity and more far-reaching aims).  The term refers to a watershed moment, a rupture, a turning point that ushers out the old way of thinking and ushers in a new one.  That alters the ideational foundations of foreign/defense policy and grand strategy.  I am lucky enough to be in Berlin and at the Hertie School as they held an event aimed at seeking to understand whether this was just a German thing or whether other parts of Europe were also changing their worldviews/mindsets.  The public event was advertised thusly.

For the Germans, a key was that rather than thinking that there is no security in Europe if it is not cooperative security with Russia, now the thinking is that there is no security in Europe if it is not cooperative security against Russia.  The big question, of course, is whether there have been changes not just in thoughts but in deeds.  And, yes, Germany is doing stuff it had not done before: spending at least for now more than 2% of its GDP on defense, sending arms to a war zone, reduction of energy dependence on Russia, etc.  But does it have a clear idea of what the new world view is?  Not so sure.  

The panelists from all over Europe were asked a bunch of questions by the organizers including: has your country or region had a zeitenwende, if so, what is it, when was it?  How is the match between the governing elites and the public on attitudes about all of this?  We folks in the audience asked whatever questions that came to us (yes, I tended to ask civ-mil questions).  And hanging over all of this was Trump potentially winning in November and the meaning of that--can there be a European NATO (with a Canadian appendage?)*

Since we had three workshop panels and one public panel essentially covering most of Europe, I am not going to repeat everything I learned.  I did learn a lot and will remember some of it.  But here are some of the highlights:

• The Baltics and Poland did not have a change in worldviews in 2022, but could simply say "we told you so," as their views towards Russia and European security were either formed around 2007-8 with Russia's cyberattack on Estonia and war with Georgia or... always saw NATO and European security as against Russia not with Russia.  UK was also in this camp, more or less, and is better able to respond as it has reduced the dependence on Russian capital in the financial sector.
  
• France has made some significant policy shifts, but providing extended deterrence if Trump pulls back the US commitment is not going to happen.  
• Lots of lag--several countries want to make adaptations but implementation is slow.  I got some knowing laughs at lunch today when I said that everyone's procurement was broken in different ways--kind of the way every snowflake is different.
• Everybody has recruitment/retention issues in their militaries--Canada is far from alone in that.
• Germany is trying to find the old playbooks from the Cold War--how did West Germany contract with the US and others about the long term bases--providing schools and infrastructure and the like--as they need to know for their plan to have such bases in Lithuania.  Yes, they are moving not just a brigade of troops but their families as the US, UK, Canada, and others did during the Cold War. This contrasts sharply with the Canadian strategy of shipping troops in and out every six months.  It shows how long term and how serious the Germans are.  Significant up front costs but probably less expensive in the long run.
• Carlo Masala's public talk started the three known unknowns that frame thinking--will Russians win in Ukraine, what will happen in the US election, what will be the future of EU/will the far right gain more ground?  
• Speaking of Trump, there is still some wishful thinking in Europe--that Trump will not follow through if elected. I kept telling folks that he wouldn't have sent forces to help an invaded ally before and he certainly won't do so in the future.
• Sweden and Finland had public opinion flip after 2022 invasion, so, yes, some zeitenwende here.  But an interesting contrast as for Finland, neutrality was a strategy, but for Sweden, it was an identity.  
• Poland having nuclear thoughts?  Irony is that this almost makes Mearsheimer right as he predicted that Germany would develop nukes after NATO falls apart after the end of the Cold War.  Instead, after the end of the after the cold war, due to the possibility of American withdrawal, Poland, not Germany, is now pondering proliferation.  Much talk in that part of the world about whether the Russian timeline for invading Poland/Baltics is 2-3 years or more like 5-7.  And yeah, I don't think that is likely, but it is easy for me to say from distant Canada.  One thing is clear in Poland--no one is wondering where the money will come from as they move beyond 2% to 3.5% or more.
• The Baltics convo started with a reminder that Trump was so ignorant he thought World War I started there and not in the Balkans.  
• The NATO-Founding Act is not dead enough.  It no longer restricts conventional deployments (see German permanent basing in Lithuania above), but it does restrict the nuke stuff.  Which enrages the Baltics who think that agreement is dead, dead, dead.
• Ethnic politics is alive in the Balkans as the various stances of countries towards Russia-Ukraine is complicated by the ethnic politics within.  Three cheers for my first ten years of research!  Serbia is pro-Russia, the Serb entity in Bosnia is pro-Russia.  This leads to actors in the region that are not pro-NATO. Of course, those that benefited from NATO intervention are pro-NATO--Albania, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia.  This discussion raised another complication from a Trump victory--NATO is still in Kosovo.  But probably would not be if Trump is President again.  
• Romania's relations with Ukraine did go through a big swing from tensions over old territorial claims to friendship as they both are threatened by Russia.
• A side discussion mines floating in the Black Sea reminded me that the consequences of this war will outlast the war, just as the Germans at the conference reminded me that construction workers discover a old bomb from WWII in Berlin every couple of weeks.
• Why is Hungary such an outlier in all things these days?  Mostly because it wants to be exactly that.  Since there is no real competition domestically, Orban can fixate on foreign policy and wants to pull Europe in his direction.  I had forgotten about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, but, of course, an optimally obnoxious nationalist country such as Hungary (see the Steve and Bill book) would want to keep that tension alive.  
• The challenge of potential Ukrainian membership in the EU is mostly about the fact that Ukraine is big--it would have a major impact on the distribution of agricultural benefits/competition and also specific sectors like transit.  So, Portugal and Spain (and others) are more concerned about the economic impact of Ukraine joining the EU than any implications regarding Russia or anything else.
• Greece is in surprisingly good shape.  Its spending on defense is now more focused on modernizing the force, it is attempting rapprochement with Turkey, and is even participating in the US-led op in the Red Sea (if I heard correctly).  Greek support for Ukraine is ahead of where the public is. 
  

Some big themes drawn by the organizers at the end:

• Distance matters--those closer to Russia either already had shifted their stances and were in "I told you so" mode or flipped quite dramatically, changing decades of orientation (Finland/Sweden).  Those furthest away and least energy dependent on Russia didn't really have to shift.
• Everyone is holding their breath for the next zeitenwende--if Trump gets elected---what happens with NATO (Steve says it essentially dies or becomes far weaker with Europe plus Canadsa)?  
• Some ZW was a matter of time--some revolutions in thinking started with Crimea in 2014, some started in 2022, some started in 2007-08.  And some have not had a major re-thinking.

The only Canadian content was injected by... me.   During the lunch on the second day, I got some questions about whether there has been a Canadian zeitenwende, and I basically said no.  That would require some real hard thinking on Canada's role in the world and how it has changed and what should be the Canadian response.  And, no, this Canadian government is not doing that thinking (nor would a Conservative one lead by PP).  Instead, as someone asked me: is Canadian foreign policy diaspora politics, I pretty much said yes.

It was a great event for me.  First, I came to Europe in part to get European perspectives on the state of play, and this I got in a big way. Second, I met a number of people who I hope to interview for my current project, so I am a bit less anxious about getting to talk to the right people and enough of them.  I have plenty of time between this three month trip and next year's, but always good to have a more in-person, human connection with the sharp folks on the stuff I am studying.  Third, it was just fascinating.  I got into IR because this stuff engages me, and this conference did so.  Finally, the folks involved--the organizers and the speakers--are simply nice, sharp folks, and so it was fun.