Can Militaries Save Us From Democratic Backsliding?

 Last night, I participated in an event organized by the Canadian Embassy in Berlin and the Hertie School on what role do militaries have in arresting democratic backsliding (no, it was not taped).  While I am not an expert in this part of the civil-military relations field, I had views.  Ina Kraft from the Bundeswehr's Center on Military History and Social Science was my partner in crime.

What did I say?  Well, the bottom line up front, as the military likes, was, nope, the militaries of the world can't actively reverse backsliding, but they can try to avoid either being complicit or accelerating the demise of democracy.   In essence, do no harm. The timing, of course, was fantastic, as the attack on democracy in the US accelerates with every day, and the military has been a target of the arsonists under Trump. 

I first highlighted what backsliding usually refers to--the usurpation of power and authority by the executive from the courts and from the legislature, the undermining of the media, and unfairness in the elections.  South Korea is an example of an attempt to seize the power from the legislature, Poland is an example of manipulating the courts.  The US these days is exemplar of pretty much every form of backsliding--disobeying court orders, stealing the spending power from the legislature, attacking the media, undermining elections....  Of course, defining backsliding these ways raises the very question of exactly what do we want the military to do besides .... something!!!

I then went on to discuss the fundamentals of civ-mil--that civilian control of the armed forces is foundational to democracy, often taken for granted, that we don't want to give the military a vote on who governs.  That both we and they want to stay out of partisan politics, and that politicization refers to that very dynamic of either being dragged into or jumping into not just politics (all things military are inherently political, and not just because of Clausewitz).   I pointed out that being loyal to a constitution or to democracy sounds neutral and non-partisan except for when politicization is so rampant even such a statement about the sources of loyalty are pretty partisan:

Milley's statement here was labeled as a swipe at Trump, and, well, yeah, it was, even though it was essentially pretty basic and mundane--the US military swears an oath to the Constitution, not to a person.

My next step was to consider why do we look to the military for help.  First, in many democracies, it is the most respected institution--it performs most highly in surveys.  Of course, that is partly or mostly because it is not seen as attached to one party or another, although again politicization is making a dent in that.  Military officers are also seen as being honorable, motivated by duty to country.  Also, despite what the white supremacist SecDef desires, miltiaries are often more diverse, more representative of society than other actors (and if that diversity is handled well, it improves capability).  And, yes, militaries have power.  Mostly via the weapons they carry, but also via their legitimacy as a national institution.

So, what can/should militaries do?  They can't un-usurp.  They can't take power from the executive and return it to the courts or to the legislature.  They can't free the media.  They can seize power and then hand over power to ... someone.  The record of coups is not great for facilitating democracy.  So, I raised a few other alternatives:

• Don't obey illegal orders.   The lesson of World War II is that "I was just following orders" is not a legitimate excuse, and democratic militaries are told that they are obligated to disobey an illegal order.  
• The question then becomes--what counts as illegal?  Who decides?  There are lawyers all over the place--civilian agencies have lawyers, miltiary units have lawyers.  But lawyers often disagree, so how do you decide which lawyers are correct?
• In my year in the Pentagon long ago, I saw the lawyers for the Secretary of Defense saying different stuff than the Joint Staff's lawyers.  So, this is not theoretical.
• Would invading Canada be illegal?  From international law, almost certainly.  From a US legal perspective, damned if I know as the war powers stuff is contested.  Both Republicans and Democrats have used force without congressional authorization.  Plus it might not be that hard for Trump to get his lackeys in Congress to sign off. 
• Would shooting at protestors be illegal?  Probably....
• How about lawful but awful?  That is, what should the military do if the president wants them to do something that would be really bad but would be legal.  
• Again, invading Canada comes to mind.  Always fun to be talking about such stuff at an event organized by the government of Canada (yes, I do love my academic freedom, good thing I don't teach at Columbia University).  One could imagine the military telling the President that this is a very bad idea.  But then he has the right to be wrong (although that norm is not as well understood or supported as civ-mil folks would like).  So, my best guess is that the US military would slow roll: hey, Mr. President, we need a plan.  Six months later, hey, Mr. President, we need to get a lot of snow tires....
• And then this might be the kind of order that some obey and some don't, which can lead to fighting within the US military.
• Or it could be the military simply refuses to fight, staying in their barracks. There are non-coup options.  
  
•  Avoid being co-opted.   Don't appear in Lafayette Square with the President after protestors are forcefully expelled, for instance.  Make statements before elections that the military has no role--of course, that can be seen as partisan in politicized times.
• Align with the opposition?  Not by fighting alongside but by endorsing.  Oh my.  Possible but would probably damage the military for a generation or two. 

To be clear, there are real limits on what the armed forces can do.  They can't create or reinforce political norms on their own.  Military leaders have no expertise when it comes to domestic politics--Milley demonstrated that in a big way.  

These choices, the politicization of the armed forces, can break a military.  Promotion may not be viewed as a merit thing but about fealty to a person. The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plucked from retirement, will be seen as unqualified and chosen solely because he is MAGA-ish.  The irony here is clear--that these folks complain about DEI but they appoint an unqualified and disqualified SecDef and now Chairman.  Anyhow, if asked to do something truly awful like shooting at protestors or invading Canada (invading Mexico would be bad too but may not be as divisive), the military may break apart.  

Ultimately, the challenge here is that acting disobediently to save democracy can erode democracy.  To be fair to Milley, he faced awful choices.  Ones he shouldn't have had to face--most of the responsibility for the politicization of the US armed forces is on the civilians.  And the same is true in South Korea and other places.

We received a lot of good questions from the sharp Hertie students, other attendees, and moderator Julian Wucherpfennig. Preparing for the event made me think, and I am grateful to Christoph Harig, David Kuehn, and Risa Brooks for helping me get a bit smarter on this part of civ-mil.  And then the presentation by Ina and the Q&A pushed me to think harder.   I got into this business because I like being pushed to think about important, interesting stuff.  I just wish it was not so damned relevant these days.