Responsibility to Protect Indeed: Srebrenica Continued

A Dutch court ruled that Dutch peacekeepers were partially responsible for the deaths of more than 300 Bosnians when the Srebrenica "safe haven" was attacked by Bosnian Serbs in 1995.  This is not anything particularly new as the Netherlands has taken its responsibility in this matter far more seriously than pretty much everyone else.

In 2002, the Dutch government fell after its entire cabinet resigned due to a report on events in Srebrenica seven years earlier.  Can you imagine an American or Canadian or British government reacting to events seven years earlier after a critical report is released?  No.  I didn't think so.  Has anyone in Belgium resigned in the aftermath of Rwanda? 

The Netherlands developed a series of reforms to try to prevent a similar disaster in the future.  Among these reforms are the Article 100 process where the parties in parliament must approve of a letter that explains the purposes and the means of a military deployment before the troops are sent.  This is an incredibly transparent process--pretty handy for the researcher that happens to be in town the week this is going on.  It might mean too much legislative influence on what actually goes into a military deployment (don't send tanks, they are too aggressive looking), but the letter requires a clear statement of purpose, clarity about the rules of engagement and so on.

This latest ruling is consistent with a previous one--that the Netherlands is responsible for those Bosnian Muslims who had been in the UN compound (that the Dutch had been staffing) and who then were expelled.  The courts have ruled that the Dutch are not responsible for those that never made it into the compound. 

As I wrote earlier about a similar case, there is plenty of blame to go around.  Obviously, the actual killers are mostly responsible, with the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia taking those cases, including Ratko Mladic, the commander of the genocidaires.  Canada neatly dodged responsibility, as the Canadians had peacekeepers in Srebrenica before the Dutch but re-deployed because they saw what was going to happen and didn't want to be around.

The United Nations perhaps cannot get sued, but, in my mind, it has more responsibility than anyone besides the Bosnian Serbs in this case.  The Dutch peacekeepers were willing to fight, but needed air support since they were outmanned.  At the time, the NATO planes that could be sent were subject to a dual-key system.  Any decision to drop bombs required approval from both the local NATO representative and the UN Secretary General's special representative, and the UN rep said no. 

The lesson to be learned?  Well, the Dutch learned to always bring their own airpower when they deploy, so that they can get the support they need even if the international organizations say no. That's right--the Netherlands would de-flag their planes and fight under the command of the Dutch if their multilateral bosses were to get in the way.  Which is why we saw something very strange from 2011-2014--the Dutch police training mission included F-16's....

The articles on this suggest that the prospect of lawsuits might cause countries to decline participation in peacekeeping efforts.  Maybe, but there are already enough deterrents to participation in such efforts, including the lesson learned from Somalia and Rwanda--that the "bad guys" may first try to kill the peacekeepers so that they go home. 

What this case really reminds us is that the notion of responsibility to protect carries a very heavy burden, which is perhaps why the reality is that most countries tend not to actually bear the responsibility at all. 

It Was Not Just the Serbs

ICTY--the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia--just handed down some key verdicts sentencing a couple of Croatian generals to significant jail terms and directly implicating Franjo Tudjman in the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from Krajina.  There were not too many good guys in the disintegration of Yugoslavia.  For instance, the Slovenes did not engage in much violence, but must have known that their separatist effort would help to de-stabilize the rest of the country. The conflict empowered the criminals in most of the successor states since they were the ones who could move the goods past the embargoes.

But the folks who were most responsible for the wars were the leaders of Croatia and Serbia--especially Tudjman and Milosevic.  The former died before being tried, the latter while the trial was underway.  Their dueling irredentists--Croatia seeking parts of Bosnia, Serbia seeking parts of both Croatia and Bosnia--fueled the conflict.  Milosevic's nationalism was pretty clearly opportunistic while Tudjman's was sincere.  The latter's entire career was focused on the Croatian nation. 

I don't have definitive proof, but it has always been my suspicion that Serbia's ethnic cleansing was more tactical than strategic while Croatia's was much more strategic.  That is, Serbia kicked other groups out of conquered territories so that they could hold them, but perhaps Croatian folks were generally pursuing a more ethnically homogeneous Croatia.  Perhaps someone can dig through the documents filed at ICTY to ascertain how ad hoc vs how planned these efforts were. 

Of course, the folks on the ground will blame the "Others" no matter what.  Will this erode Tudjman's place in Croatian history?  Probably not that much, but scholars are working on the issue of whether these tribunals really change attitudes.  Certainly, this case will get another look.   For the outsiders, we need to remember that there can be bad guys on both sides, a lesson that is quite relevant today in Libya.