Is It a Civil War? Not Yet

 Things are truly awful in the US, so is this the time to get pedantic?  Well, maybe.  I posted on bluesky that I was more worried about events in Minnesota than in/re Greenland.

 

In the ensuing discussion, I got some pushback--that the US is already in a civil war and any suggestion that it isn't means that I am minimizing what is going on here.  This is giving me flashbacks to the Jan 6 is a coup or not a coup arguments.  In the aftermath, I argued that the events of January 6th were an insurrection and, yes, an autogolpe (self-coup) and not a coup d'etat.  The latter has two dynamics that were not present that day--the involvement of significant elements of the coercive arms of the state (military, secret police, etc) and an effort to change who is in power.  I argued that this put the attention in the wrong places as the focus should have been on the White House and Congress, not the military.

This time?  Why is this not a civil war?  Again, two key ingredients are not yet present with one more important than the other.  First and not quite as important: scale.  Thus far, the violence is quite limited even as it is appalling and awful.  Civil wars are large scale things, and, yes, we social scientists usually use numbers to distinguish between categories of events.  For inter-state wars, we tend to use 1000 battle deaths.  For civil wars, we use all kinds of numbers, but even if we set it as low as 25, I am not sure we are there yet.  Second, and most importantly, civil wars are two-way affairs (or more so, as we saw in Bosnia and Syria and elsewhere), and the violence in the US has been an entirely one-sided thing--the state is engaging in much violence against protestors, but the other side of this, the anti-Trump, anti-ICE forces are not using any significant violence against the government's forces .... thus far.  

Which makes what is happening in Minnesota, Chicago, Portland, Washington, DC, and elsewhere state repression (you can call it state terrorism). And that is truly awful and part of the US becoming an autocracy (although democracies repress as well).  Again, this is important for both social science reasons and accountability reasons.  For political scientists, it allows us to compare this to similar events in the American history and around the world (Tianamen Square?) to note key dynamics and make predictions and policy recommendations.  For accountability, calling it a civil war suggests there are two sides that may have some responsibility here.  And, damn it, we know that this is being entirely driven by Trump and his regime.  The violence is very one-sided, with all of the responsibility for the bloodshed in the hands of Trump, ICE/DHS, and the Republicans (as they hold power in the House, Senate, White House, and Supreme Court).  

Does this mean this is not serious, that I am minimizing the event?  I sure as hell don't think so--when the power of the state is being used to kill and kidnap and deport without any due process, so very capriciously and so much by one ethnic group aimed at others, it is very, very serious indeed.

If people want to use "civil war" for rhetorical purposes, go right ahead.  It is not my job to tell people how they should resist these abuses of power, this persecution, and, yes, these massacres (are massacres a scale thing? I am not sure).  I am not going to tone police folks, but I am also not going to change how I talk about this stuff online.  I seek to analyze, to explain, to compare, and to contrast.  And being consistent with the usual scholarly use of terms is helpful in those efforts. 

The Real Burden-Sharing: The Allies and Afghanistan

 I have always hated the 2% metric--that NATO allies are good ones if they spend the equivalent of 2% of their gross domestic product on their own armed forces.  Input measures always problematic, it was a measure that made bad allies (Greece) look good, and, most importantly, it says nothing of what allies are willing to do with each other.

 What is an alternative metric?  Blood.  And it is very relevant this week as Donald Trump insulted the allies by saying that the US did all of the fighting in Afghanistan while the allies stayed away from the front lines (um, insurgency/counter-insurgency doesn't have front lines like conventional wars, Donnie).  Au contraire, as the allies did much of the fighting in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2009, when the US was distracted by its war of choice in Iraq.  When Obama sent more troops in 2009, then the burden shifted but did not really end until 2014 when NATO essentially pulled out of combat.

Yes, it is true that allies varied in what they were willing to do.  Dave and I literally wrote the book (ebook is on sale) on this as this was our sole focus, unlike other books on NATO and Afghanistan.  I say this not to boast, but just to say that I know whereof I speak on this (ok, a little boastful).  Of course, the facts tell the tale themselves.  This is page four of the Dave and Steve book: 

As you can see, the top five countries, by per capital killed in action from start to 2009, are Estonia (tiny country means tiny denominator means bigger %), Denmark (you know, the folks who own Greenland), Canada (ye olde 51st state), UK, and then .... the US. No accident as Denmark and the UK fought mostly in Helmand, the one of the most dangerous spots in the country (ask the Marines), and Canada fought in Kandahar, one of the other most dangerous places.

Someone else can dig up the post 2009 numbers (see http://www.icasualties.org/App/AfghanFatalities), but the basic pattern will hold--many allies did sacrifice much for America's war.  None of these countries had deep interests in Afghanistan--this was their contribution to the alliance (aside from most staffing AWACS planes over the US in 2001-2) in the aftermath of 9/11 and after the alliance invoked Article V.

But Trump sucks at math and at history (and also has no sense of honor or obligation), so, of course, he gets this wrong.  But we shouldn't.  Oh, and Trump was quite toxic in most of these countries before this week.  Veterans in these, who tend to be right of the center, will absolutely flip on Trump over this.  Which means that it will be very difficult or impossible for politicians in these places to bargain with Trump and to give in to him.

So, the recent past matters, and it is going to bite Donnie on his big behind.
 

Canadian Troops, American Orders, Bad Headlines

 So, the Economist's headline is creating some noise in Canada: "Canadian soldiers are subject to Donald Trump's Orders."  The article focuses on the many Canadian military personnel who are seconded to the American military, just as they are seconded to the British, Australian, and other armed forces.  It gets right the key nugget--that while operating as if they are American or British or whatever soldiers, sailors, or aviators, they are still subject to Canadian laws and orders.  The big question is what orders they are receiving.

I co-wrote a whole book about this (ebook is on sale!), seeking to understand why the countries operating as part of a NATO mission behaved differently.  They were all under the same commander (an American--the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe--SACEUR), but they followed different rules.  Why?  Because anytime, ANYTIME, a country transfers an individual or a unit to operate in someone else's chain of command, that individual or unit wears two hats--the national hat and the other hat (American or British or multinational such as NATO or UN).  And which hat matters more?  The national one as the individual or unit is ultimately responsible to the national command authority--that the promotion of that individual, the resources of that unit all depend on their homeland.  Any officer obeying a multilateral or other national command in contradiction to their own nation is putting their career, and, yes, their freedom in jeopardy.  This all makes multilateral war difficult (and fun to research).  

So, the good news is that these individuals working in various military jobs within the US military are subject to Canadian laws and orders--that those will always, sorry, trump the American orders.  The bad news is that I am pretty doubtful that the civilians in the Canadian government are playing much of a role in all of this.  The Minister of Defence absolutely can, as he can give orders to the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Chief can then give orders to those below her.  But will the MinDef do that?  Alas, many Canadian MinDefs see their role mostly as cheerleader or supporter of the CAF, not as overseer.  We had one MinDef tell a parliamentary committee that he could not oversee the CDS as that would politicize things--dude, you had one job.  I don't know much about the current MinDef, David McGuinty and his attitude.

What I do know is that the military doesn't think it is the Department of National Defence's job to do oversight--just the Minister's.  I do know Parliament doesn't think it is their job--their lack of interest in oversight inspired this book. So, the Economist article gets a lot of no comments from government.  Not great.  The responses were kind of like Stephen Harper's during the detainee stuff in Afghanistan--sure, prisoners are being beaten, but none of the ones we handed over were.  Sure, sure.  So, the Canadian media should be asking the PM, the MinDef, the CDS, and pretty much everyone else: what instructions are there to prevent Canadians from participating in operations against the American people?

I am guessing they won't get any answers but, as Nemik said, try. 

Fearing an American Invasion?

 Oh my, what I would give to live in less interesting times.  I am writing this as Trump rants at Davos, in the aftermath of a truly remarkable speech by Prime Minister Carney (which I will write about later).  I was asked yesterday by a contact on Linkedin to write about the G&M story about the Canadian Armed Forces [CAF] running models regarding a US invasion... and well, yowza.  Today, the same paper had an editorial on that topic.

Yes, US-Canadian relations are in the worst place in living memory.  No, the US is not invading.  FFS.  Sure, the Canadian military modeled this a bit.  Why?  Because that is what militaries do--they plan and they model.  If the US invaded, the CAF would not be able to stop them.  But the US is not up to occupying Canada indefinitely.  Our country is big and it is often quite cold.  An American occupation would not require occupying the entire country--just the major cities and the LOCs (lines of communication).  Both of those present tremendous challenges.

First, Canada has 37 or so million people, which would require an occupation force of ... 3.7 million or so.  The traditional ratio for successful counterinsurgency is 10 to 1.  Of course, the Canadians would not be the Taliban or the various players in Iraq--there would be little suicide terrorism.  Still, managing a large population indefinitely is not easy.  

Second, if the Americans wanted to have access to Canadian resources, it would need to protect the LOCs: roads, the rails, the powerlines connecting the two countries.  Which means a lot more personnel out there. There is only so much drones can do (and drones can be brought down).   

There is a third thing that is even more important: getting the military to do this would be hard.  It is oen thing to knock over a South American country and another to attack a very reliable ally with which the US has much in common and much history.  While the US military has obeyed illegal orders, this might be one step too far.  Of course, it takes a somewhat self-aware politician to realize this....

The big threat is not American invasion--that is a dark fantasy.  The big threat is here and real--American coercion.  Trump has used tariffs and has threatened tariffs, making Canadian goods more expensive in the US, hurting Canadian industry and costing people their jobs.  Trump has threatened to pull out of NAFTA 2.0 (also called USMCA and CUSMA).  He will push Canada via economic threats and via real policies that hurt the Canadian economy, hoping that Canada caves.  The Canadians may not be used to this pain, but Trump has activated Canadian nationalism like nothing else.  While he could try to pick at the seams via Albertan and Quebec separatism, that would require more nuance, consistency, and good policy-makers than Trump can summon.  Indeed, the separatists will be seen as allies or abetters of Trumpism, which will make a big dent in their popularity.  

So, let's not fear an American invasion and fantasize about Canadian IEDs covered in moose poop or maple syrup.  Instead, plan for and become resilient in the face of a trade war, recession, and diminished quality of living.  It will suck, but we can get through it.  My bet is more Americans get killed by ICE than Canadians get killed by the American military.  

Wow, these are dark times.  Just let's not imagine them to be darker still. 

 

 

We Have Left the Dodgeball Phase of Trump's World Order: Allies Are Now Acting

 For the entire first Trump term and the second term's first year, America's allies have basically engaged in the five d's of dodgeball: dodge, dip, duck, dive, and dodge.  They have tried to avoid a major break with US, seeking mostly to soothe Trump's ego.  This week may mark the end of that.  First, there is the news of a number of European countries loudly participating in a Danish military exercise in and near Greenland.  Second, Canada just made a deal with China over electric vehicles and canola oil.  These are, as the literature I read long ago and am far from an expert in would say, costly signals.  Let me explain.

In international relations, talk is mostly cheap (although folks do argue cheap talk also matters).  How do we know a country is really committing to a course of action?  They engage in a costly signal--they do something that hurts themselves or risks real costs.  Economic sanctions are often not very costly signals because they signal precisely that a country is not willing to put their own people on the line.  Drone strikes do the same kind of thing, which is why boots on the ground is always seen as so important--they are credible signals.

In these two cases, the actors are risking seriously Trump reactions--they aren't disguising what they are doing.  They may have other interests as well, but they are clearly sticking it to Trump.  

First, let's discuss Greenland.  Sure, most of the Euro troops heading there for exercises may be part of decisions made long before Trump's latest threats, so this may not be a deliberate step this week to create a tripwire to deter American aggression.  But it sure looks like that, doesn't it?  That these countries are loudly sending these troops, that they are signalling that they are putting their troops bodies in the way is a very loud signal that they don't mind offending Trump.  Given all the work done previously to avoid so openly defying and seeking to deny Trump (see the five para NATO summit communique last summer as key example and the 5% bullshit), this is a huge turn for the Europeans.  

Why now?  Maybe they are looking at the US domestic stuff and Venezuela and realizing that Trump is actually serious about Greenland despite the utter stupidity of it all.  Maybe the Danes are terrific diplomats who have used every means at their disposal to get the Europeans on side.  Maybe the 1938 resonance is getting too strong.   Maybe the constant references in the US involvement in Ukraine negotiations of NATO and the US as two separate actors flipped a switch. I am guessing it is because they understand that the moment has come--if Trump aggresses against a NATO member's territory, the alliance is done.  Best to avert that outcome for however long, and maybe NATO's fate will be determined a bit further down the road. 

Second, let's get to Canada-China.  People have been critical of Mark Carney betraying his Elbow's Up campaign promise to fight hard against Trump's coercive tactics and bombastic threats that challenge Canada's very identity.  Well, there are few things that are more Elbow's Up than making a deal with China over EVs.  One key component of the very undisciplined, hardly a doctrine Donald Doctrine is to keep China out of North American markets.  So, this is very much in the face of Trump.  And it is a risky as hell step because the Chinese are shitty trading partners* with whom Canada has had a very fraught relationship.  But diversifying markets when the biggest trading partner is threatening to throw away the key trade agreement becomes more than just a priority but a mission.  Some will say that this will force Trump to toss away NAFTA 2.0 (USMCA or CUSMA or whatever you want to call it).  My take: if someone is punching you in the face whether you accede to their demands or not, then you might as well take the pain and do what is best for yourself.  

The other side of costly signals is restraint.  For coercive diplomacy to work, you have to keep both sides of your promises--to do the painful thing if the other side doesn't do what you want AND to refrain from doing that thing if the other side does what you want.  Trump's behavior was going to lead to these kinds of responses because he never restrained, only escalated.  Kept punching the Europeans and Canadians in the face even as they tried to go along with his unnecessary and unreasonable demands.  

That apparently ended this week.

Next steps?  Oh my.  I am just glad I closed most of my US dollar accounts... 

 

 

 

* I worry about giving into China's coercive diplomacy as well, but at least China is likely to keep a promise for more than a few hours. 

Intro to IR For Trumpers: Power, Soft Power, and Coercive Diplomacy

Back in Trump 1.0, I wrote posts explaining basic stuff like how the NATO 2% thing is not a tax that NATO members pay the US, but an expectation of what they are supposed to spend on their own defense--the equivalent of 2% and now 3.5% of their gross domestic product.

In the past week, I have seen so much dumb and wildly ignorant stuff that I think this might become an ongoing series.  I did already write about how Stephen Miller is a shitty realist, but let's go back to basics. Power is mentioned 13 times in the NYT summary of the interview.  I doubt we would find any President of the past 50 years being so focused on power.  "On topic after topic, he made clear that in his mind, U.S. power is the determining factor — and that previous presidents have been too cautious to make use of it for political supremacy or national profit."

To be clear, all Presidents understand that power is important, but what is it and how does one amass it or lose it?  The basic poli sci definition of power: the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  We tend to focus on stuff we can measure: the size of one's military, how advanced in tech it is, the size of the economy, how dependent others are on it, and so on.  A bully making threats is not by itself powerful.  One of the ingredients of power is one's reputation for using power, so, yes, bullying can increase one's power.  But it can also weaken it.

How so? Bullying can reduce a country's power in several ways:

1. Wasting resources on lesser priorities so that fewer resources are available elsewhere.  A US aircraft carrier near Venezuela is not someplace else--they move but slowly.  Spending ammunition on tiny boats may reduce the available stocks for elsewhere.  Exhausting personnel on tertiary missions may mean less effectiveness in more important places.  
2. Bullying exacerbates the security dilemma--that others will respond by building up their own defenses against American power (speculation this morning about nuclear proliferation is not that wild), may look to other countries to ally with, and so on.  Countries, for instance, are going to find alternatives to US financial instruments so that future US sanctions don't bite as hard.  Trump's sanctions against ICC personnel may ultimate cause Europe to develop email/online alternatives.  If Trump breaks NATO through his aggression against Greenland, the US will have less power.  Greenland would not give the US more power than that which NATO does.  That can be an entire post or three.
3. If bullying fails, if a bullied actor resists, like maybe Denmark, others will see the bully as weak and resist as well.  
4. Then there is soft power, which I have to break out since it is so misunderstood. 

Soft power does not refer to economic sanctions and other less kinetic forms of coercive efforts.  No, it refers to the attactiveness of a model, the persuasiveness of one's ideology and brands, and the like.  The US had much soft power because it was so successful, so attractive in so many ways.  People around the world wanted to buy coca-cola and wear Levis, to imitate Americans.  This mattered not just for those American brands but also because it made it easier for the US to .... get others to do what the US wanted.  It didn't quite make diplomacy to be like pushing on an open door, but it did grease the wheels of many American efforts around the world for decades.  But bullying erodes soft power.  People hate bullies so they then hate anything associated with them.  Trump is destroying American soft power at a rapid rate, as the rest of the world is now finding the US to be gross, grotesque, and absolutely not attractive or a model.  

Final topic for today: coercive diplomacy.  Being coercive and negotiating is not coercive diplomacy.  Coercive diplomacy involves using threats and force in credible ways to get others to change their stances (compellence) or refraining from doing stuff the coercer does not want (deterrence).  The most important but underrated aspect of coercive diplomacy is restraint: that if the target does what you want, you will not do the thing that you have threatened.  If the target is deterred, then they are not attacked.  If the target complies and does the thing they are not attacked.  The problem with Trump and coercive diplomacy (other than everything else) is that his word is not good.  He does not worry about whether his threats or promises are credible.  As an uncertainty engine, Trump simply cannot assure anyone that his next move will be what he says it will be.  Trump is, alas, not a TACO, as he often chickens out but not always.  But when he is successful, he will often demand that an actor, such as a university, to give up more than what he had previously demanded, reminding us of Darth Vader and Lando Calrissian. 

Finally, to go back to the Trump quote about power being the determining factor, a couple more reactions:

a)  impunity is not power
b)  what determines Trump's foreign policy behavior is not either his thirst for power or the American thirst for power, but Trump's ego, resentments (which includes racism and sexism and xenophobia), and greed.  He wants Greenland because it would make him feel good.  That's it.  That's the entirety of it.  It is not about critical minerals or Russian/Chinese interests or ships.  

"When asked why he needed to possess the territory, he said: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.'” 

Sometimes he does not lie.  This is one of those times. 

 

 

 

 

 

Stephen Miller Is Too Much of a Schmuck to be a Lousy Realist: Greenland edition

Stephen Miller is the most powerful and malevolent actor in the Trump Administration other than Trump himself.  His personal history is chock full of hate and resentment.  While most of his rhetoric is nakedly white supremacist and betrays his own family history (a self-hating Jew is an over-used accusation but he is the poster boy), Miller sometimes advances claims based on other reasons.  Which gets us to Greenland.

"Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland. ...The real question is, by what right does Denmark assert control over Greenland? Obviously, Greenland should be part of the United States," he said. 

People are suggesting that Miller is invoking the Melian Dialogue from Thuycidides's History of the Peloponnesian War, where the Athenians provide an ultimatum to the Melians, telling them that the strong do what they want, and the weak do what they must.  First, that is probably giving Miller too much credit--that he is not so thoughtful as to try to invoke the supposedly original Realist text.  Second, the Athenians in this account are not just the bad guys, but they ultimately go on to pay a huge price for this war.  But his language suggests that he is a "Realist" as he is saying the "US is the power of NATO" which entitles it to do what it wants.  

The problem here is that Realism has many flavors and none really work here.  My favorite flavor, Neo-Realism a la Ken Waltz, argues that countries pursue security, which then leads to all kinds of behavior including the security dilemma, where the efforts by one country to unilaterally improve its security, which causes others to respond in kind, so that the first state is left off as or more insecure.  This helps to explain things like arms races.  In this case, how does poaching Greenland improve US security?  At this moment in time, the US already has heaps of access to Greenland, and attacks upon it or through it are already deterred by Denmark's membership in NATO and the US nuclear umbrella.  There is no threat to US from Greenland's status as a dominion of Denmark.  However, seizing Greenland or coercing Denmark into giving it up will weaken US security as it is likely to break NATO--the biggest ally threatening and even warring against one of the most reliable allies will end the alliance.  And this will make the US less secure as it will have less help when the US needs it, it will have greatly increase the chances of a war beyond Ukraine in Europe (American security has always, always been affected by war in Europe going back to the Revolution itself and the War of 1812).  

A more rancid flavor of Realism that focuses on the quest for power also can't explain the Greenland effort. The US will be less powerful after a successful annexation of Greenland.  Yes, the US will have more territory, but it will have face economic sanctions and have fewer allies, which means it will not be as able to exert influence in the world.  That is what power is: the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  

A third way to think about Realism is realpolitik--which focuses on how best to use judiciously one's power to achieve one's ends--more as policy prescription than as grand theory.  How is seizing Greenland a judicious use of power?  This means we have to figure out what are the ends of this, rather than just assuming the accumulation of power or security.  What is the point of annexing Greenland other than Donald Trump's 1970s real estate mindset?  That he would feel better about himself if he expands the territory of his holdings?  And, yes, he does look at the US through a monarchical lens where the US is his real estate holdings and growing that makes him feel more powerful.  But again, alienating powerful countries, and, yes, Europe has much power, even if it is not always harnessed, for a vanity project is not very judicious.

So, there is no way that Miller's and Trump's designs on Greenland match up with any version of realism--the idea is just too dumb and counter-productive.  I would guess that some players within this administration might see the destruction of NATO as a cool consequence of this effort, but that is not driving this train.  

What Realism does tell us is that countries will react to this in ways that are inimical to the American national interest.  However, Trump does not have any conception of the national interest, just his own interests.  What are those?  Greed and resentment and ego.   

Miller? He's Trump's Iago but without a real plan and none of the charm.