We Have Left the Dodgeball Phase of Trump's World Order: Allies Are Now Acting

 For the entire first Trump term and the second term's first year, America's allies have basically engaged in the five d's of dodgeball: dodge, dip, duck, dive, and dodge.  They have tried to avoid a major break with US, seeking mostly to soothe Trump's ego.  This week may mark the end of that.  First, there is the news of a number of European countries loudly participating in a Danish military exercise in and near Greenland.  Second, Canada just made a deal with China over electric vehicles and canola oil.  These are, as the literature I read long ago and am far from an expert in would say, costly signals.  Let me explain.

In international relations, talk is mostly cheap (although folks do argue cheap talk also matters).  How do we know a country is really committing to a course of action?  They engage in a costly signal--they do something that hurts themselves or risks real costs.  Economic sanctions are often not very costly signals because they signal precisely that a country is not willing to put their own people on the line.  Drone strikes do the same kind of thing, which is why boots on the ground is always seen as so important--they are credible signals.

In these two cases, the actors are risking seriously Trump reactions--they aren't disguising what they are doing.  They may have other interests as well, but they are clearly sticking it to Trump.  

First, let's discuss Greenland.  Sure, most of the Euro troops heading there for exercises may be part of decisions made long before Trump's latest threats, so this may not be a deliberate step this week to create a tripwire to deter American aggression.  But it sure looks like that, doesn't it?  That these countries are loudly sending these troops, that they are signalling that they are putting their troops bodies in the way is a very loud signal that they don't mind offending Trump.  Given all the work done previously to avoid so openly defying and seeking to deny Trump (see the five para NATO summit communique last summer as key example and the 5% bullshit), this is a huge turn for the Europeans.  

Why now?  Maybe they are looking at the US domestic stuff and Venezuela and realizing that Trump is actually serious about Greenland despite the utter stupidity of it all.  Maybe the Danes are terrific diplomats who have used every means at their disposal to get the Europeans on side.  Maybe the 1938 resonance is getting too strong.   Maybe the constant references in the US involvement in Ukraine negotiations of NATO and the US as two separate actors flipped a switch. I am guessing it is because they understand that the moment has come--if Trump aggresses against a NATO member's territory, the alliance is done.  Best to avert that outcome for however long, and maybe NATO's fate will be determined a bit further down the road. 

Second, let's get to Canada-China.  People have been critical of Mark Carney betraying his Elbow's Up campaign promise to fight hard against Trump's coercive tactics and bombastic threats that challenge Canada's very identity.  Well, there are few things that are more Elbow's Up than making a deal with China over EVs.  One key component of the very undisciplined, hardly a doctrine Donald Doctrine is to keep China out of North American markets.  So, this is very much in the face of Trump.  And it is a risky as hell step because the Chinese are shitty trading partners* with whom Canada has had a very fraught relationship.  But diversifying markets when the biggest trading partner is threatening to throw away the key trade agreement becomes more than just a priority but a mission.  Some will say that this will force Trump to toss away NAFTA 2.0 (USMCA or CUSMA or whatever you want to call it).  My take: if someone is punching you in the face whether you accede to their demands or not, then you might as well take the pain and do what is best for yourself.  

The other side of costly signals is restraint.  For coercive diplomacy to work, you have to keep both sides of your promises--to do the painful thing if the other side doesn't do what you want AND to refrain from doing that thing if the other side does what you want.  Trump's behavior was going to lead to these kinds of responses because he never restrained, only escalated.  Kept punching the Europeans and Canadians in the face even as they tried to go along with his unnecessary and unreasonable demands.  

That apparently ended this week.

Next steps?  Oh my.  I am just glad I closed most of my US dollar accounts... 

 

 

 

* I worry about giving into China's coercive diplomacy as well, but at least China is likely to keep a promise for more than a few hours. 

Intro to IR For Trumpers: Power, Soft Power, and Coercive Diplomacy

Back in Trump 1.0, I wrote posts explaining basic stuff like how the NATO 2% thing is not a tax that NATO members pay the US, but an expectation of what they are supposed to spend on their own defense--the equivalent of 2% and now 3.5% of their gross domestic product.

In the past week, I have seen so much dumb and wildly ignorant stuff that I think this might become an ongoing series.  I did already write about how Stephen Miller is a shitty realist, but let's go back to basics. Power is mentioned 13 times in the NYT summary of the interview.  I doubt we would find any President of the past 50 years being so focused on power.  "On topic after topic, he made clear that in his mind, U.S. power is the determining factor — and that previous presidents have been too cautious to make use of it for political supremacy or national profit."

To be clear, all Presidents understand that power is important, but what is it and how does one amass it or lose it?  The basic poli sci definition of power: the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  We tend to focus on stuff we can measure: the size of one's military, how advanced in tech it is, the size of the economy, how dependent others are on it, and so on.  A bully making threats is not by itself powerful.  One of the ingredients of power is one's reputation for using power, so, yes, bullying can increase one's power.  But it can also weaken it.

How so? Bullying can reduce a country's power in several ways:

1. Wasting resources on lesser priorities so that fewer resources are available elsewhere.  A US aircraft carrier near Venezuela is not someplace else--they move but slowly.  Spending ammunition on tiny boats may reduce the available stocks for elsewhere.  Exhausting personnel on tertiary missions may mean less effectiveness in more important places.  
2. Bullying exacerbates the security dilemma--that others will respond by building up their own defenses against American power (speculation this morning about nuclear proliferation is not that wild), may look to other countries to ally with, and so on.  Countries, for instance, are going to find alternatives to US financial instruments so that future US sanctions don't bite as hard.  Trump's sanctions against ICC personnel may ultimate cause Europe to develop email/online alternatives.  If Trump breaks NATO through his aggression against Greenland, the US will have less power.  Greenland would not give the US more power than that which NATO does.  That can be an entire post or three.
3. If bullying fails, if a bullied actor resists, like maybe Denmark, others will see the bully as weak and resist as well.  
4. Then there is soft power, which I have to break out since it is so misunderstood. 

Soft power does not refer to economic sanctions and other less kinetic forms of coercive efforts.  No, it refers to the attactiveness of a model, the persuasiveness of one's ideology and brands, and the like.  The US had much soft power because it was so successful, so attractive in so many ways.  People around the world wanted to buy coca-cola and wear Levis, to imitate Americans.  This mattered not just for those American brands but also because it made it easier for the US to .... get others to do what the US wanted.  It didn't quite make diplomacy to be like pushing on an open door, but it did grease the wheels of many American efforts around the world for decades.  But bullying erodes soft power.  People hate bullies so they then hate anything associated with them.  Trump is destroying American soft power at a rapid rate, as the rest of the world is now finding the US to be gross, grotesque, and absolutely not attractive or a model.  

Final topic for today: coercive diplomacy.  Being coercive and negotiating is not coercive diplomacy.  Coercive diplomacy involves using threats and force in credible ways to get others to change their stances (compellence) or refraining from doing stuff the coercer does not want (deterrence).  The most important but underrated aspect of coercive diplomacy is restraint: that if the target does what you want, you will not do the thing that you have threatened.  If the target is deterred, then they are not attacked.  If the target complies and does the thing they are not attacked.  The problem with Trump and coercive diplomacy (other than everything else) is that his word is not good.  He does not worry about whether his threats or promises are credible.  As an uncertainty engine, Trump simply cannot assure anyone that his next move will be what he says it will be.  Trump is, alas, not a TACO, as he often chickens out but not always.  But when he is successful, he will often demand that an actor, such as a university, to give up more than what he had previously demanded, reminding us of Darth Vader and Lando Calrissian. 

Finally, to go back to the Trump quote about power being the determining factor, a couple more reactions:

a)  impunity is not power
b)  what determines Trump's foreign policy behavior is not either his thirst for power or the American thirst for power, but Trump's ego, resentments (which includes racism and sexism and xenophobia), and greed.  He wants Greenland because it would make him feel good.  That's it.  That's the entirety of it.  It is not about critical minerals or Russian/Chinese interests or ships.  

"When asked why he needed to possess the territory, he said: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.'” 

Sometimes he does not lie.  This is one of those times. 

 

 

 

 

 

Stephen Miller Is Too Much of a Schmuck to be a Lousy Realist: Greenland edition

Stephen Miller is the most powerful and malevolent actor in the Trump Administration other than Trump himself.  His personal history is chock full of hate and resentment.  While most of his rhetoric is nakedly white supremacist and betrays his own family history (a self-hating Jew is an over-used accusation but he is the poster boy), Miller sometimes advances claims based on other reasons.  Which gets us to Greenland.

"Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland. ...The real question is, by what right does Denmark assert control over Greenland? Obviously, Greenland should be part of the United States," he said. 

People are suggesting that Miller is invoking the Melian Dialogue from Thuycidides's History of the Peloponnesian War, where the Athenians provide an ultimatum to the Melians, telling them that the strong do what they want, and the weak do what they must.  First, that is probably giving Miller too much credit--that he is not so thoughtful as to try to invoke the supposedly original Realist text.  Second, the Athenians in this account are not just the bad guys, but they ultimately go on to pay a huge price for this war.  But his language suggests that he is a "Realist" as he is saying the "US is the power of NATO" which entitles it to do what it wants.  

The problem here is that Realism has many flavors and none really work here.  My favorite flavor, Neo-Realism a la Ken Waltz, argues that countries pursue security, which then leads to all kinds of behavior including the security dilemma, where the efforts by one country to unilaterally improve its security, which causes others to respond in kind, so that the first state is left off as or more insecure.  This helps to explain things like arms races.  In this case, how does poaching Greenland improve US security?  At this moment in time, the US already has heaps of access to Greenland, and attacks upon it or through it are already deterred by Denmark's membership in NATO and the US nuclear umbrella.  There is no threat to US from Greenland's status as a dominion of Denmark.  However, seizing Greenland or coercing Denmark into giving it up will weaken US security as it is likely to break NATO--the biggest ally threatening and even warring against one of the most reliable allies will end the alliance.  And this will make the US less secure as it will have less help when the US needs it, it will have greatly increase the chances of a war beyond Ukraine in Europe (American security has always, always been affected by war in Europe going back to the Revolution itself and the War of 1812).  

A more rancid flavor of Realism that focuses on the quest for power also can't explain the Greenland effort. The US will be less powerful after a successful annexation of Greenland.  Yes, the US will have more territory, but it will have face economic sanctions and have fewer allies, which means it will not be as able to exert influence in the world.  That is what power is: the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  

A third way to think about Realism is realpolitik--which focuses on how best to use judiciously one's power to achieve one's ends--more as policy prescription than as grand theory.  How is seizing Greenland a judicious use of power?  This means we have to figure out what are the ends of this, rather than just assuming the accumulation of power or security.  What is the point of annexing Greenland other than Donald Trump's 1970s real estate mindset?  That he would feel better about himself if he expands the territory of his holdings?  And, yes, he does look at the US through a monarchical lens where the US is his real estate holdings and growing that makes him feel more powerful.  But again, alienating powerful countries, and, yes, Europe has much power, even if it is not always harnessed, for a vanity project is not very judicious.

So, there is no way that Miller's and Trump's designs on Greenland match up with any version of realism--the idea is just too dumb and counter-productive.  I would guess that some players within this administration might see the destruction of NATO as a cool consequence of this effort, but that is not driving this train.  

What Realism does tell us is that countries will react to this in ways that are inimical to the American national interest.  However, Trump does not have any conception of the national interest, just his own interests.  What are those?  Greed and resentment and ego.   

Miller? He's Trump's Iago but without a real plan and none of the charm. 

Seven Years of Activities and Research: Presented and Celebrated

Last month, we celebrated seven years of CDSN-ing.  Our seven year grant ends in March,* so we held a Symposium on Monday focusing on our various activities and we filled our annual Year Ahead conference with our research teams presenting the culmination of their reserach projects.

Both days were terrific, and overall, it was a blast, as I learned a lot and I enjoyed how much everyone appreciated all the work we all did over the grant's timeframe.   

Our first day started with a roundtable about partnership, appropriately enough.  We had speakers from across the defence and security community: Caroline Leprince of DND, Cesar Jaramillo formerly of Project Ploughshares, Adam McCauley of CANSOFCOM, and our Visiting Defence Fellow Shawn Guilbault.  We talked about the challenges of bringing together actors with different perspectives, what each needs from and contributes to our partnership, and how we can better bridge the various gaps.

The second session focused on our post-docs--formerly (or still) emerging scholars who spent a year at one of our research centres, receiving mentoring on their research as well as much professional development and networking.  Linna Tam-Seto and Thomas Hughes now co-host our Battle Rhythm podcast, Manu Ramkumar may be doing similar stuff in the future, and Sanjida Amin is our current post-doc.  It was great to hear what they got out of the experience with us, and I am grateful for the insights and energy they brought the CDSN.  

The third session focused on our podcast network.  We started out with just one podcast on someone else's network, and now we have seven programs on the CDSN podcast network.  So, we talked about what each program was trying to achieve and what they learned along the way.  I chatted with Hannah Christensen of the NATO Fieldnotes podcast, Frieda Garcia Castellanos of Bylines and Frontlines from Women in International Security-Canada, and ....  They came to the podcast network in different ways, so it was really interesting to learn what they had picked up and what they wanted to do next.

The fourth session featured the victims of our book workshops--emerging scholars who had their books collaboratively scrubbed by local colleagues and experts the CDSN brought in. Stephanie Martel, Sara Greco, and Thomas Hughes spoke about their experiences with Srdjan Vucetic moderating the panel.   

Our fifth session had our past and present Undergraduate Excellence Scholars discuss their experiences.  Our aim was to include undergrads from historically excluded groups more involved in our network and in the Canadian defence and security community.  Chimdinma Chijioke, Armon Jeffries, Stella-Luna Ha, and Bianca Siem did different things, some were more involved in our stuff, some less so, some have moved on to graduate programs in defence and security, others are now employed in this sector, and some found work elsewhere.  This effort was not part of the original grant, but became a key CDSN activity as we realized we could do more to help foster a diverse, inclusive, and equitable network and community.  These folks proved that our modest investment was well worth it.

The last panel of the day focused on what the CDSN Co-Directors learned from seven years of partnership, research, and my nagging for reporting.  Anessa Kimball, JC Boucher, and Stefanie von Hlatky were instrumental in our success partly because none were shy about telling me and the rest of the team what we could do better/differently, and this roundtable illustrated that nicely.

That evening, we had a wonderful reception that helped to celebrate our accomplishments and continue the networking that has been both vital to our efforts and helpful to the individuals who found us along the way.

The second day of CDSN fest was a twist on our yearly Year Ahead conference.  Usually, we ask our partners in the defence and security community about the issues that most concern them in the near future--the year ahead--and then organize panels around those issues.  This year, we did something different--we had our SSHRC-funded research teams present on some of the stuff they learned over seven years of research.

The first panel was our Operations theme--what is the CAF doing in the world and what are we learned about it.  Alex Moens presented the state of the NATO Field School, which has been his passion project for at least a decade.  Andrea Charron discussed the challenges of US-Canadian relations as it affects continental defence, which spoke nicely with Stéphane Roussel's analysis of the efforts to develop greater autonomy from the US.

The next session was our Civil-Military Relations theme organized and moderated by JC Boucher.  Nik Nanos, a key partner, focused on the trends he found in the polling he has done with us.  Alexandra Richards discussed  her research on how the different generations of Canadians vary in how they see defence and security issues.  Caroline Elie from DND's Public Affairs spoke about the challenges of informing Canadians about defence even as it becomes a very high priority and very salient issue. 

The third session was a keynote speaker: LGen Stephen Kelsey, Vice Chief of the Defence Staff.  He did an excellent job of providing a short talk that gave us lots of time and material to spawn a really fascinating Q&A.  

The fourth session was our Security theme roundtable.  It was interesting to see how much of the focus was on NATO as our original intent with this theme was to ponder a variety of conceptions of security.  Srdjan Vucetic addressed what would endure from Trump's NATO skepticism.  Maxime Philaire presented on defence cooperation beyond treaties.  Anessa Kimball considered the credibility of NATO's new 5% standard on military spending.  

Our last session focused on our military personnel theme, which was really the most timely as their work got underway before the abuse of power crisis that dominated the CAF from 2021 onwards.  Irina Goldenberg addressed the reserves, which has gotten more attention as of late.  Stéfanie von Hlatky discussed the efforts to broaden the CAF to be more inclusive.  Linna Tam-Seto discussed the transition of military people to civilian life.  Joakim Berndtsson addressed the total defence idea that is so real in Sweden and, in my words, pretty imaginary in the Canadian case.  

We had one last CDSN 1.0 dinner to mark the occasion with most co-directors, staff, and myself celebrating seven years of researching, connecting, and amplifying.  We recognized each person's
contribution with a CDSN shirt with an affectionate nickname on the back.  Our post-docs, Manu and Thomas, came up with this one for me and it is perfect:

    

 I am so very grateful to everyone involved in the CDSN--the staff, the co-directors, the students, the partners, the participants, and everyone else.  The seven years flew by because everything was so very interesting and fun and engaging.  I learned a great deal about Canadian defence and security, about partnerships, about administering and leading, about reporting, and much, much more.  Thanks again!

 

 

*  As I mentioned last summer, we have applied for a new grant that would extend the CDSN's life another seven years. Given the relevance of the grant's focus, civil-military relations, and our proven ability to deliver (see above), we feel our chances are very good.  We do have a MINDS network grant that will continue our operations until the end of 2026 and maybe beyond that, but that program is under review. So, our best chance of keeping this thing going is with SSHRC.  

Greenland and NATO: Is It All On the Table?

 With the Danes being super-concerned about American threats about Greenland (imagine if someone was making similar claims about Hawaii or Alaska), folks are talking about Article 5 of the NATO alliance.  So much is misunderstood about this key clause--an attack upon one equals an attack upon all. 

Ooops, that is incomplete: a) it requires consensus, like all NATO decisions of any consequences; b) each country can respond as each deems necessary.

In an intra-alliance spat, such as Greece vs. Turkey, which has happened, NATO can't respond because it can't come to a consensus.  So, the Danes could try to bring the issue to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's decision-making body, but the US would block consensus.  Part b is less relevant in this case (very relevant in a certain book, with a sale on the ebook!).  

Of course, the US hasn't attacked .... yet, so A5 is not relevant at all.  

BUT there is something else here: that any failed attempt to invoke Article 5 could break the alliance.  Any member that has been attacked that fails to get help will have good reason to withdraw--what's the point if help will not come when it is requested?  So, the threat to try to get the alliance to invoke A5 is an attempt to say: if you don't support us, the alliance is dead.

This is why countries, when attacked, haven't tried to invoke Article 5--cyber attack on Estonia, Syria hitting Turkey, Russia breaking sea cables, etc--because a failed effort may be fatal to the alliance.

In semi-normal times, one could look at the Danish hints at A5 discussions* as a way to increase the stakes to get more support.  The problem is: these times aren't normal.  Trump might just leap at an opportunity to break the alliance.  His hostility to it is well known, and his ignorance of how most of it works is also well known.  But if his advisers tell him that initiating a Greenland crisis might be a pathway to breaking NATO, Trump might just grab that chance.  

And then Putin's investment in Trump will pay off in the biggest way possible.

This is all scary and awful, but it is not out of the realm of the possible at this point.  The stakes involved in Greenland, where the US is already getting all the access it needs, are huge.  The very foundations of security in Europe and beyond are at stake.  A much bigger deal, ultimately, then Venezuela, which is already pretty important. 

 

*  Or the Danish PM is referring to NATO to make the obvious point--that there is no need for the US to take over Greenland since it is already under the US security umbrella via Denmark's membership in NATO.  Too bad Trump is a bad faith actor and this bit of reality is irrelevant. 

Dating? In the 21st Century? Yes, Please!

Warning:  In the early days of the Semi-Spew, personal stuff, pop culture, and random stuff made up most of the content.  It is only with the passage of time, exhaustion of various ideas, and, yes, the onset of autocracy that I began blogging almost exclusively about politics and especially the dark times.  

I separated from my ex-wife in May, so I started dating, and since I haven't dated since the early days of the second Reagan Administration, I have very little experience and many thoughts.  Not only has dating changed with online dating, apps, and speed dating, but apparently deep into his middle-ages Steve is very different from desperate teen Steve, including the fact that I am now a trained social scientist.  So, I can't help but think comparatively, to analyze, to generalize, to build theories, and to develop policy implications (well, for me, not for the policymakers).  

And, yes, it is truly a bad idea to blog about dating when one is dating since the women I am dating could find this blog,* so I will step carefully and make this spew less semi and more fully baked.** So, I will not talk about individual women but about the larger patterns or surprises along the way of my still quite short adventure into the unknown.

First, this is really a lot of fun (I am aware that my experience is gendered, more below). Unlike my teen years, there is really no self-imposed pressure.  Back then, damn near everything seemed to ride on whether the girl I was seeking liked me or not, and since few liked me as more than a friend, I was miserable and my self-esteem was in the toilet.  These days, it does not not weigh that much.   It is also really fun because women of my age have really full and interesting lives and experiences (I have dated women as young as 45 and as old as 60ish).  I apparently suck at keeping dates to an hour as each one ends up being a very long and delightful conversation.

Second, at least in my small number of observations, there simply is much less bs and much more clarity. A few of the women I have dated have quickly realized that I am not in the same cycle of life as they are, being so close to the separation, so they just tell me that and move on (the others took four dates to figure that out).  The date may have been fun, but they see that I am not what they are looking for, and that's it.  

Third, while people can lie on their profiles (thus far, I haven't experienced that myself), I have found that dating someone I met via an app provides more info than one I met via speed dating or setup.  Eight minutes is not much time, and then remembering what each woman said on a night where I talked to ten is challenging.  The person setting up with someone had very little info to give me, so I was mostly going in blind. Before a date with someone I met online, I can refer to the app and be reminded of the basics: age, whether they are vegetarians, whether they drink, various interests, and so forth.   For women I met speed-dating, again, just what I can recall--might be their job, whether they have kids, stuff like that.  The other difference is that online dating usually required a week or two or three of chatting before setting up a date, where as the speed dating led to setting up dates as soon as we got the contact info from the speed dating organizers.

Fourth, speaking of dating profiles and lies, it is interesting to see people insist that their pics are recent or that other info they put on their profile is real.... which may be the case, but, then again, I am not sure it provides more credibility than not insisting such things are true.  A case of applying credible commitments and other concepts from poli sci and international relations to dating. 

Fifth, what the fuck is it with crypto?  I had two online matches lead to chatting back and forth, and then the two women raised crypto as an interest.  Since I am crypto-skeptic, I asked to talk about other stuff and ... then that ended the conversation.  So far, the only ghosts have been crypto people.  I guess it is the same with all scams--you don't have to be successful very often, you just need one every once in a while to make a sufficient profit to stay in the grifting business.  From now on, I will simply be the first to end the convo when it comes up.  

Sixth, my quest to find a replacement for ultimate frisbee may end up with a p-sport: pickleball or paddleboard. Those two sports come up more than most in women's profiles, although that might be my confirmation bias at work as I am not paying as much attention to those who mention sports or activities that I am unlikely to pursue, such as hiking. 

Seventh, I have gotten to see more of Ottawa as the women live all over the place and as they have various ideas about things to do that I didn't have in mind.  So, I have been to a baseball game, to a show, to the art museum (which I had meant to do but never got around to), sailing, to a Zombie Run, to a spa, and so on.  This process also inspired me to do things I used to do--go to a comedy show and so forth.

Eighth, I am much more aware that the threat environment is different. Most of the women didn't give me their last names or phone numbers until after a few dates, only one was willing to have me pick them up at all and thus revealing the location of of their home on a second date.  They have to be more cautious because either lots of men are assholes or the few assholes get around a great deal.  On the flip side, none of the women I have been out with raised any alarms at all.  I doubt it is my keen ability to sort.  

Ninth, I have had only one major failed experience.  I tried an organized singles night at a bar.  While I learned that I can detect disinterest pretty well, it was hard to approach women with no introduction at all.  The contrast between the ease and fun of a speed dating event and a singles event at a bar is pretty stark.  It was also a young group so there were few women who were in my range.  And hearing "hey prof".... not great.  Luckily, she was not a student of mine but did go to my program.    While I will be trying more speed dating events and the like in the future, I am not going to be repeating the single's night at a bar experience.

Tenth, rules?  What rules?  My first first date was the most open, wide-ranging conversation I could imagine.  I often don't think I have much of a filter, and then I meet someone who truly has no filter, and I feel positively restrained. This woman asked a lot of questions about my breakup, my sex life, and more, and told me a great deal about all that as it applied to her.  My second first date included a conversation about Gaza, and I thought talking about Israel/Palestine was a no-go area for a first date, just like one should not talk about one's previous relationship.  Each person and thus each pairing is different and I never tried to steer any conversation.  I was and am completely open, and will answer any question (as that first first date proved).  So, yeah, no real rules for what to talk about except--I kept asking questions, not just talking about myself.  My curiosity was and is fully engaged. 

Finally, in a short period of time, I experienced a heap of rejection and it does not phase me in the least.  Match lets you know how many people have seen your profile and it keeps a list of all the people who you have swiped right on--who you wanted to meet....who did not reciprocate, so one can always see how low one's batting average is. I dated a number of women who realized within one and four dates that they weren't into me--some because of no vibe but mostly due to a mismatch of timelines/preferences.  And that is perfectly fine.  I have had fun, my ego/self-esteem has been boosted, and my life is quite interesting a result.  I am learning, I am doing stuff that I wasn't doing before, I am getting out and about.   

I think one reason why folks are so soured on online dating (well, besides women having to deal with a ton of assholes) is that they are trying to find the one, which is damned hard to do.  I have had a more pleasant time as I had a simpler set of goals--to have fun (broadly defined), to learn, to get out.  

And now? Well, so far, so good. Did I have my girlfriend read this before posting?  Yes, yes, I did.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

* One of the things I quickly realized is that having blogged, tweeted, skeeted, podcasted, and been recorded in a number of ways (conferences, media hits, etc) is that women can quickly find out pretty much everything about me.  Unlike some guy who might be catfishing or otherwise being engaged in deception, my cards are out there on the table, face up, so women have a decent idea of what they are getting into.  At least one even looked up my salary on the Ontario sunshine list.  Not sure any found my rate my prof scores.   

 ** Of course, early in my blogging days, I wrote a piece I had long thought about discussing academic politics and I still managed to get another job after that, so maybe I just think I have as much impunity as the typical Trump official?

 

Top Ten Worst Things in the Trump National Security Strategy

 Is this really a bottom ten?  You make the call.  I was offline this weekend so I don't know if anyone has a great analysis of the NSS.  Since I had to read it to answer some questions on the radio, I have some thoughts, and the easiest way to approach this on a Sunday night is to come up with  a top ten list. From least to oh my these guys are the absolute worst.

Bottom line up front: the writers of this doc (not Elbridge Colby, the Undersecretary for Defense Policy, since he is most focused on war with China) are ignorant, arrogant, racist panderers.

Honorable mention: Didn't make the top/bottom ten, but:

References to Trump ending a bunch of wars.  Nope, didn't happen; Peace through strength yet gutting many of the things that provided the US with strength--its educational system, USAID, its competent civil servants who being driven out, the nonpartisan military, etc.  The US is much weaker now that it was on January 19th; the notion of being pro-worker while gutting regulations and undermining unions; its definition of fairness which is anything but fair.  The idea that competence and merit matter as Pete Hegseth, Tulsi Gabbard, Kash Patel, and others have the highest positions despite being both dis and unqualified.  Indeed, there are a lot of projection and bad faith in this document, but that should not surprise anyone.

10.  The complete blindness to the reality that most international institutions and international law were designed by Americans to perpetuate the American interest.   

9.  The assertion of sovereignty while seeking to deny the sovereignty of others--that countries in the Western Hemisphere can't trade with whom they want, that European countries must give their far right more access to power, etc. 

8.  The whole first paragraph of principles is enough to make any IR scholar puke:  "

President Trump’s foreign policy is pragmatic without being “pragmatist,” realistic without being “realist,” principled without being “idealistic,” muscular without being “hawkish,” and restrained without being “dovish.” 

It is meaningless without having any meaning.  And, no, the only principles driving Trump's foreign policy are racism, greed, resentment, and racism.  

7.  The whole concept of reindustrialization.  Who is going to work in deregulated dangerous factories if not new immigrants?   

6.  The focus on oil and gas and coal energy and not wind and solar--not a surprise, but still appalling.   

5.  The repeated references to Soft Power completely misunderstand the concept and shows a tremendous lack of self-awareness.  Soft power refers to the ability to influence others to do things they might otherwise not do (the classic definition of power) because of the popularity and power of one's example, of one's system, culture, values.  During the Cold War, the US had a huge soft power advantage as many people around the world wanted to wear jeans, listen to rock music, watch movies made in Hollywood, shop in markets like those in the US, and the like.  

4.  The civilizational bullshit aimed at West Europe. I talked about this in yesterday's Guns and Butter.  Just out and out white supremacy and fascism as the Trump Regime wants its kin in Europe to gain power. 

3. The document is super contradictory as I have already enumerated, but also includes the whole crap on Europe, ask Europe to do US's bidding.  I talked about this in today's Guns and Butter. You can't expect allies to respond well to your demands if you are seeking to have them overthrown by their far right.

2. Sure, wanting a stable Western Hemisphere makes sense and is no "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine."  The Trump fixation on the Western Hemisphere is actually the greatest threat to destabilize the hemisphere from Greenland to Venezuela.

 1.  Fucked up priority #1. Not only is migration not the most important issue facing the US, but it also helps to amplify this administration's racism, xenophobia, and Great Replacement Bullshit.™.

 

I am just thankful it came out after my US foreign policy class was over.  Yuck. 

Yet More Guns, More Butter

 Heaps of baking today as I spent yesterday at the Diefenbunker, learning more about the Cold War and Canada's role in it.  So, two more episodes of Guns and Butter:

Cream cheese as a central ingredient was a focus today for these recipes, while I talked about the spat between the Democratic officeholders who had served in the military or CIA and Trump over illegal orders. 

• 

  Cinnamon roll 
  blondies

  Cookies and cream cookies 
• Cinnamon roll blondies 
  
• Sparkle sugar cookies.  I just dropped the almond extract since I don't want to trigger any allergies. 
• Maple cinnamon star cookies.  These are not quite done since Sally says they should be frozen before the last step of dipping into melted white chocolate.  So, that will have to wait until just before the delivery date. 

I did a second Guns and Butter reel to talk about the aforementioned dipping challenge, the difficulty of rollout cookies requiring a consistent thickness of dough, and, yes, stupid ways to think about burden-sharing.