Dueling Irredentisms: Always Bad, Never Inevitable

 I am not an international law specialist nor have I extensively studied the Israel-Palestine conflict, but I have written extensively about irredentism--the effort to enlarge one's country to include territories that are considered to be one's own by history and by blood.  So, when I see pictures like this, I get engaged:

The river to the sea, used by either side, is an inherently irredentist phrase: that the lands between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River belong to just one side of this means seeking to get all of the territory of the other.  Palestianians and their supporters have been saying this, and so have Israelis and their allies.  Irredentism does not have to be this maximalist--Russia has claimed just a chunk of Ukraine.  But these claims and efforts are inherently violent--that any effort to change one's boundaries to include territories governed by others will produce war because no country (or quasi-state) surrenders inhabited territory without a fight.  Not Ukraine, not Taiwan, not Israel, and not Palestine.

The thing is: all territory has been occupied by multiple groups, so there will always be competing claims pretty much everywhere on the planet except perhaps Antarctica.  Stuart Kaufman illustrated this nicely at the start of his book on Modern Hatreds:

So, if irredentist claims are possible everywhere, then why isn't there violence everywhere?  Despite the news suggesting otherwise, ethnic violence, including irredentism, is rare.  Ethnic conflicts do end, people do find a way forward without fighting. Remember that the key grievance between Germany and France for ... at least three wars ... was Alsace-Lorraine.  Yet that is not an issue these days.  

It is rare because irredentism is usually very self-destructive.  It didn't work out so well for Nazi Germany and not so well for 1990s Armenia, Croatia, or Serbia.  It has worked out well for China (Tibet), but Taiwan would be another story entirely.  Bill Ayres and I compared the irredentisms that occurred in the 1990s (the aforementioned Armenia, Croatia, and Serbia) and those that did not--Hungary, Romania, and Russia.  We confirmed that irredentism is very costly and self-destructive, but some countries do it anyway--when it benefits the politicians in power.  What is good for the politicians may not be good for the public, which produced our title: For Kin or Country.  Helping the kin abroad is often very bad for the country as war is bad.  Russia is paying a pretty high price for its irredentist campaign against Ukraine, but, thus far, Putin hasn't paid a price himself.  

So, when I see what is going on in Israel and Palestine, my bias is to watch the strategies politicians use to stay in power and see how that intersects with the nationalism of the country. Politics is in part about shaping the nationalism, defining the us, the them, and whether the them can be tolerated.  A central irony we found is that the nationalisms that were more willing to include the thems, the others, in the state, the more able they are to engage in irredentism since any successful expansion will generally lead to more thems as well as us's in the larger state.  Indeed, why do folks often oppose irredentism--a successful campaign would produce the equivalent of a massive wave of immigration, upsetting the balance of domestic politics.  For example, a Greater Albania including Kosovo would likely weaken those who currently hold power in Albania since there are a lot of Kosovars.  

And, yes, this gets to a key dynamic that the Hungarian case revealed--shades of identity, of us-ness.  That for Hungarians in Hungary, they identify with the Hungarians outside of Hungary (due to the Treaty of Trianon in 1920) but only up to a point.  Those Hungarians didn't experience post-1956 Hungary, so they don't have the same experiences and thus are not seen as quite the same.  So, Hungarians in Hungary want the Hungarians outside of Hungary to do well but to stay put--they don't want to share power or their welfare state with them.  

Anyhow, irredentism varies over time and over targets based on who matters to the politicians in power.  Somalia's irredentism from 1960 to 1990 varied depending on who was in power and whose clans they needed for support.  So, Somalia sometimes targeted all three neighbors, despite that being profoundly unwise, because the clans with ties to those in Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia all mattered in the domestic political game. At other times, only those in Ethiopia matters (1976-1977).  

Back to Israel and Palestine: the irredentist efforts of Hamas (it aims to eliminate Israel and govern the entire space) and of Netanyahu (his coalition includes many parties that seek to incorporate the occupied territories, hence the support for the crazed settlers)* reinforce each other, giving each set of politicians more support from those who fear the other.  Not unlike Milosevic and Tudjman being each other's best allies as Tudjman could get Croats to support him because of the threat posed by Milosevic, and Milosevic could do the same to get Serbs to support him.  

Have Hamas and Netanyahu delivered on other public policy issues?  No, they are utter failures, but they are hard to replace when the enemy is at the gates.  The coverage of this war has been quite clear that Netanyahu empowered Hamas to weaken the Palestinian Authority and perhaps also to keep the Israeli public focused on this than his own corruption.

So, what is good for the politicians--war--is bad for the public, but the publics go along with it because they don't see any alternatives.  That people on both sides are talking about claiming territory from the river to the sea is understandable and horrifying, given what it requires--lots more bloodshed. It empowers the worst leaders. It requires incredible leadership by alternative politicians to push in another direction. But until that happens, there won't be peace. BUT if that were to happen, you could have peace. Alas, extremists have killed or marginalized the peacekmakers. So, things are going to be grim. 

We did cover this a bit in the book when we survey the world's irredentist hotspots including Ireland, Kashmir, Taiwan, etc.

Anyhow, the focus should be on the politicians and their incentives. Irredentism is not inevitable, it can be sidelined.  But it can be really hard to stop once it gets started because of the media it generates, the fear it generates, and how the two sides can reinforce each other's worst instincts.

 

*Yes, killing the two state solution is a key part of an irredentist strategy.  Never really thought about that before, but two state solution inherently recognizes limits on expansion, so one must do away with that if one wants to add the desired territories.

Russian Irredentism: Killing the Kin to Save Them

Watching recent events (and inspired by this tweet about Latvia's PM's take on this), I am reminded of the misquoted from the American war in Vietnam: we had to destroy the village in order to save it.  Seems like Putin's Russia is killing the kin in order to save them.  That the attacks on the Russian-speaking parts of Ukraine are hurting those that Russia is supposedly trying to help.  This speaks to a variety of aspects here that I want to address.

First, when a country tries to reclaim supposedly lost territory, the ethnic kin in the lost territory don't have to demand this effort but it does help legitimate (or at least soften the illegitimacy) of the cause. It also might impact the domestic politics of the redeeming country.  In our book, Bill and I found that irredentist foreign policies did not seem to be related to how endangered the kin are (see middle column of the table to the right), but, of course, we didn't consider whether the danger came from the irredentist state.

Second, the plight of the kin (real or imagined) can operate in at least two ways: putting pressure via domestic politics on the leadership of the kin state to do something about it or providing an opportunity for the leadership to focus the domestic audience on this threat to the nation (which includes those outside the country).  That is, it can be a bottom-up or top-down dynamic.  In this case, it is pretty clear it is top-down--that Putin was under little or no pressure to do something about the plight of Russians in the Ukraine.  Instead, among his motives may have been a desire to strengthen Russian nationalism at home by emphasizing the us-ness of Russian speakers within and outside of Russia at the expense potentially of other conceptions of the Russian nation.  But I can't imagine that killing Russian speakers in Ukraine helps the building of domestic support within Russia or to define the Russian nation in ways that abet Putin's desires to stay in power.

This reinforces my conclusion (and my bias) that irredentism does not have to be sincere, and that Russia's irredentism towards Ukraine, besides maybe Crimea*, is entirely insincere.  I never thought that the separatist groups in the Donbass were genuine efforts at greater self-determination but rather created by Russia.  Putin's speech to kick off the war was very much an irredentist appeal--that Ukraine never really existed and has always been Russian, etc.  Despite this speech, I am not so sure he is all that sincere--that he would have been happy in 2013 with a pro-Russia Ukraine, he would have been happy in 2021 with a pro-Russia Crimea-less Ukraine.  I don't think Putin is really motivated to create a Greater Russia despite his apparently longing for the good old Soviet days.  I do think he wants domination--that dominating Ukraine and Belarus and other parts of the former Soviet space would have been sufficient.  

The threat to that domination was never NATO but the European Union.  That is, an alternative, west-leaning model has been a threat to Putin's domination of Russia and much of the former Soviet space.  Again, the timing here is suggestive--2014 when Ukraine starts looking to the EU; 2022 when Ukraine keeps looking westward.

And here is an irony and a stupidity: that Putin, by absorbing Crimea and by taking the eastern regions of Ukraine out of Ukraine's political system, altered the balance of political power in Ukraine.  He removed the most Russia-leaning components, which meant that even if the rest of Ukraine wasn't pissed off, the balance of voters shifted by subtraction, making it more likely to have pro-western leaders.  Putin improved Zelenskyy's chances of getting elected.  When folks talk about California seceding, I push back, saying that would alter the balance of power in the US, making it impossible for the Dems to win at the national level.  Well, Putin did this--he made it far harder for a pro-Russian Ukrainian politician to win just on the numbers, not to mention antagonizing many Ukrainians via his bullying.

This conflict is an intersection of many things: irredentism and other elements of ethnic politics (see the Ukrainian diaspora mobilize), civil-military relations, alliance politics, sanctions, coercive diplomacy, nuclear strategy (stability-instability paradox), and more.  From most perspectives, Putin has screwed up bigtime, including the third classic error of thinking regime change will be easy (don't wager with a Silician when death is on the line is the second).  Which, of course, is not reassuring because there is plenty of room for Putin to get into deeper and deeper trouble, hurting more and more people and risking a wider and wider war. 

* The referendum was a sham, but there did seem to be a fair amount of Crimean Russians who wanted to be in a Greater Russia.

Putin and Ukraine: Irredentism 101

 Irredentism is refers to efforts by groups or countries to reunify lost territories with a homeland.  I wrote a book with Bill Ayres about the irredentism that did and did not occur in the 1990s: Greater Armenia, Greater Croatia, Greater Serbia vs Hungary, Romania, and Russia not pursuing such efforts.  We got to release a paperback edition with a new preface in 2015 thanks to .... Putin's irredentist move where Russia seized Crimea.  Here's what I know about irredentism from my previous work and from other people's work in this area and how these basic rules apply here.

1. Irredentism is always costly for the country engaging in the effort--it generally requires war since countries do not part with their territory without a fight (well, almost always).
2. What is bad for the country may or may not be good for the leader.  Irredentism is a nationalist effort that can tie folks together towards a common identity.  Politicians may use irredentist appeals (whether they follow through on it or not) to refocus the country's nationalism on this cause rather than other aspects (see Hungary and Viktor Orban where Hungary was optimally obnoxious to the neighbors--enough to get support domestically, not enough to risk war).
3. #2 suggests a third rule--Realists have a hard time explaining irredentist efforts because they do not help the country become more secure or even gain more power.  They just gain perhaps some territory and some new citizens.  In the 21st century, this does not help Russia become more powerful or more secure.  Maybe it will make Putin more secure, but that ain't the same thing, is it?
4. Irredentism is driven by domestic political dynamics more than international.  Some would argue that countries engage in irredentism when there is a good opportunity, but I can summon examples where countries not only jump through open windows but also attempt to jump through brick walls.  Somalia engaged in irredentism both when it was relatively stronger than its neighbors and when it was weaker.  Croatia engaged in irredentism even as it was being taken apart by an irredentist war thanks to Serbia.
5. What about these domestic political dynamics?  It is not just pure nationalism since nationalisms are around all the time--it takes a political entrepreneur to push for "reunion" and one has to figure out their game.  And that is where I am mostly stumped since I don't know contemporary Russian politics these days.  All I can say for certain is that the domestic game matters quite a bit.  
6. One thing that enables Putin is that Russia is already a multiethnic country dominated by one group.  This war doesn't change that, and irredentism is easier/more desirable for countries in this position.  In our book, we found that fear or hate of others, xenophobia, can actually inhibit irredentism since a successful irredentist foreign policy is the equivalent of a giant wave of immigration--adding many new others to one's country.  But Russia is not so xenophobic so it can do this without the nationalist backlash (unlike, say, Hungary).   

Update:  7.  Irredentism need not be consistent.  The actor may not claim all disputed/historical territory.  The key is what is digestible--who lives where, how easy are they to rule, what do they do to the domestic political balance of the irredentist state.  In this case, that means maybe Eastern Ukraine gets absorbed formally or informally but perhaps not all of Ukraine.  

Russian irredentism here is more than just imagined since the territory in question used to be part of Russia and there are Russian speakers who may identify with Russia and want to be part of Russia (#notallUkranians or even residents of Eastern Ukraine).  Saddam Hussein's moves against Kuwait were not really irredentism since there was not really a people or land to be be redeemed.

This does not make Russia's moves legitimate at all.  But it does give this a bit more heft within Russia than Poland or Bulgaria.  The Baltics?  Oh my.  The history gives Putin something to play with and he seems to have his own grievances at stake in all of this--resenting the breakup of the Soviet Union.  International law, such as it is, is not on his side.   Conquest is not hip as the Kenyan rep at the UN made clear.  And while the US has committed many awful acts including a pretty illegitimate war in 2003, it has not engaged in conquest lately.  Who has?  Um, China with Tibet and perhaps Taiwan in the near future.  So, rule 6: don't expect the UN to stop this.  

This is a bad move for Russia and the Russian people and much worse for Ukraine.  Whether it pays off politically for Putin is not clear.  Many irredentist efforts are gambles that do not pay off very well.   And, yeah, there was not much anyone could do to deter Putin and Russia in this.  As long as the US/NATO weren't willing to risk WWIII over a non-ally, we had few cards to play.  

In sum, irredentism means war, and it is not easy to deter or prevent.  Ukraine is screwed, and there is not much we can do about it but make it costly.

Irredentism Among Friends? But Of Course

 Last night, just before I went to bed, I saw this:

This is the most bonkers statistic I have seen in a long time. 😳
35% of NATO countries' populations believe there are parts of neighbouring countries that actually belong to them.
35%! And this is not just driven by countries with actual territorial disputes. pic.twitter.com/c99ULDAIEi

— Ulrike Franke (@RikeFranke) December 13, 2020

Bonkers?  As a scholar of irredentism, my professional opinion is no, not bonkers.  Not at all.  Before we start, one iron law of polling is that at least 15-20% of the answers will be nuts.  Now, let's get into the irredentism of it all. 

Irredentism refers to either political movements or countries seeking to return a "lost" territory back to an existing state (unless it is Kurdish-style, which refers essentially to the amalgamation of multiple secessionist groups).  And therein lies the rub--what counts as "lost."  Saddam Hussein considered Kuwait a lost province of Iraq in his rhetoric, but he didn't get much play.  Why?  There was not anyone of Iraqi descent in Kuwait clamoring for reunion.  Crimea?  Absolutely irredentist, as Russians in Crimea wanted to be part of Russia (not all of them), and Russia could claim that Crimea belonged to Russia.  That does not make it legal in international law, but it makes it a specific form of conquest, unlike Kuwait.

The thing is: almost any hunk of territory has belonged to different states depending on the time one chooses AND places teach their histories in ways that remind people of when "we were greater than we are now."  So, of course, some people believe that some territory nearby belongs to them.  The problem develops when the group left behind or the mother country try to do something about it.  

So, taking a look at the survey, most of these results are entirely unsurprising:

• Hungary leads the league in something, finally.  Hungary was one of the cases Bill and I addressed in our book because it seemed to be more engaged in symbolic irredentism than any other non-violent case.  I referred to it as optimally obnoxious, as a series of leaders had a variety of policies that annoyed the neighbors over the actual and imagined plight of the Hungarians abroad.  Hungary lost something like 25% of its territory and a third of its population in the Treaty of Trianon ending its part of World War I.  In part,because because Hungarian is such a distinct language, those left abroad have more or less kept their identities.  That Romanians tend to target the Hungarian minority also "helps."  
• Too bad Romania is not on this list as it would be very high up there since Moldova exists thanks to a pact made by Hitler and Stalin.  The Greater Romania Party's slogan was "We will be everything we once were and more than that" if I remember correctly.
  
• Greece?  Greece has had multiple irredentist claims in pretty much every direction--Cyprus, Turkey, and Macedonia (I am probably forgetting others).  I know less about how Greek governments play up Greek nationalism in the schools, but I would bet a fair amount of money that the former greatness of Greece and its domination of the Med play a decent role.  That and ongoing tensions with Turkey and the history of explusions and such, not to mention the dueling irredentism over Cyprus keep alive the idea that, yes, countries nearby have territory that belongs to Greece.
• Bulgaria--that might be aimed at Macedonia, but we didn't focus on Bulgaria in the book.
• Poland was literally shifted several hundred miles to the west so that the USSR could get hunks of it.  So, this is entirely unsurprising.
• Slovakia?  Not sure where there is directed as the secession from the Czech Republic was pretty easy and I am not sure where Slovakians have been left behind.  
• Spain?  Just one word will do: Gibraltar.
• Italy has a contested border with Slovenia with Slovenes living in Italy and Italians living in Slovenia.  
• France? D'accord. 

That Ukraine and Russia are near the top of the list if we include non-NATO countries is hardly surprising as Russia is definitely less than the Soviet Union, leaving behind 25 million Russians in 1991 and Ukraine just did lose a hunk of territory to Russia--we are back to Crimea.  On the other hand, Swedes have few regrets about giving away Norway in 1905.  

The US and Canada are quite low on this list.  Why?  Well, both are settler countries that took away their territory from the Indigenous peoples of North America.  So, they have minor territorial issues with each other and Canada with Denmark (Hans Island, maybe Greenland), but neither Canadians nor Americans are taught in school about territories taken from each other.  Mexico?  That would another thing entirely.

So, with territorial changes over the generations and public education teaching national histories, this survey is what we should have expected.  Are there grounds for real irredentist conflicts among allies as a result?  Mostly not, but also mostly not because of NATO despite folks arguing that NATO and the EU kept things cool in the 1990s via their membership processes.  Why?  Well, for Bill and I, it is partly about political competition--do parties compete to be the best irredentist--and partly about xenophobia--do folks really want to share their welfare state with "others".  Yes, those co-ethnics abroad are not quite "us" anymore after generations of living apart.  One will still care about the plight of those abroad, but they may not want to include them in the homeland, as that would be akin to a massive wave of immigration.  

Which means the wave of populism across Europe will not lead to more irredentism as its nationalism tends to be of a xenophobic flavor.  

In other words, sweat not about Hungarian irredentism.  Hungary will remain obnoxious but not aggressive.

Israel, Day 2: History, Community, and Settlers

The first full day was quite full (first night post here).  We started with a guided tour of the Rabin museum.  Yitzah Rabin had been a general, a defense minister, and then Prime

I wonder who radicalized his assassin?

Minister who got assassinated by a Jew who was upset at the Oslo Accords.  I had forgotten the context—that he was killed at a rally for the peace agreement.  The museum starts with that rally and that day and then goes through both his personal history and Israel’s over the course of his lifetime.  What stuck out? That the 1973 war made it easier for Israelis to criticize the government and the military; that two weeks or so before the assassination, the opponents of the agreement held a very heated rally where some chanted death to Rabin “blood and fire will drive Rabin out”, that Netanyahu was at that rally.  Oh a notable omission: very little religion in that museum.

We returned to our hotel for a discussion with a very sharp journalist who covers the region.  He discussed the patterns and trends, focusing on four :

1. The successful Iranian effort to broaden and deepen its proxys’ power and position
2. The failure of the Saudis and Egyptians to do the same
3. The conservative bloc—Turkey and others—failing to get stuff done
4. The fall and inevitable return of IS.

His main contention was that the wave of Arab spring was largely spent.  He also the success Russia had in saving Assad, and how the various players are all confused by Trump.  He argued that the US remaining in Syria was good for keeping the Kurds in ok shape.  I was tempted to ask whether Israel was an American proxy or vice versa.  Instead, I asked about different proxy “markets”: that Iran has more success because there is far less competition.

We then met with a mayor of an Arab community, but I also met with jet lag so I don’t have much to report.

Shilo archaeological site

Then we went into the occupied territory to meet a settler who explained the stuff from their perspectives.  This woman was an American transplant with eight kids.  She put the best possible spin on being a settler and effortlessly dodged my question about whether settlers were changing the situation deliberately thru their behaviour.  I found most of her assertions to be problematic, but it was valuable to get this point of view.  We did learn some bible history since her house looks over key historical sites including the pre-Jerusalem capital—Shilo. The key new info was that the Israeli explanation of settling is this:

The land owned by the Jordanian king becomes Israeli state land with the defeat of Jordan in 1967.

The authorities then checked all of the aerial maps to determine spaces that had not been settled—was there a building or agriculture done at some point.  If not, the land is considered to be empty and available.

Then Israel leases the land to settlers for 100 years.  

This is apparently based on Ottoman Turkish law.  Ummm.

The dinner at a winery in this occupied territory was terrific, of course.

Pretty place, this occupied territory.

Lots of interesting discussions among the group.  

Tomorrow we go to the Gaza Strip and then Jerusalem.

Irredentism Redux!

Funny how old research agendas never die--they just find new cases.  Long ago, in a country far away, I used to write about the international relations of ethnic conflict, and my second book focused on irredentism--efforts to unite "lost territories" with one's homeland.  The book with Bill Ayres compared the dogs that barked in the 1990s--Greater Armenia, Greater, Croatia, and Greater Serbia with those that did not--Hungary, Romania, and, oops,  Russia.  We got to provide a new intro for the paperback version of the book (only a penny more expensive than the kindle version!) to cover Russia's renewed romance with irredentism in the 2010s. 

Anyhow, the reason why I raise this now is that I was amused to discover that South Korea has a Ministry of Reunification.  Yep, an office o' irredentism, not unlike the ones I found in Eastern Europe--Hungary's Office of Hungarian Minorities Abroad had a somewhat less overtly irredentist name.  Of course, I am sure there is a dueling office up north.  The Southern version focuses on settling defectors and perhaps imagining what a peaceful reunification would look like.  It is also in charge of N-S negotiations, apparently, when those arise, and, well, arise they have lately.

When I was briefed by many offices in Tokyo two years ago, one of the places we visited was the Office of Territory and Sovereignty (or something like that), which was also an irredentism office, focused on both what Japan has (Senkaku Islands) and what it laid claim to--pieces of the Kuriles the Soviets took and the Russians kept AND the Takeshima Islands (more in a second) that the South Koreans grabbed during the Korean War when Japan had no navy.  

This last dispute was illustrated nicely for me as I have seen signs about the Dokdo Islands (what the Koreans call Takeshima) around town, but most clearly at the War Memorial:

 This display is in the middle of the entry way on the main floor.  My only regret is that I had no one with me to take a picture of me as I stood on the Dodko Islands (no porgs, appparently).

To be clear, the Takeshima/Dodko Islands is not likely to be a center of real conflict (the Senkakus are different story).  But, yes, as if South Korea and Japan needed more irritants.  Indeed, in one interview I had this week, the person was talking about the need for South Korea to adapt to the various threats, such as China and .... Japan.  I didn't push back because I was collecting info, but, jeez, Japan ain't a threat.  But history is really hard to shake around here.  In interviews with military types, they get it that Japan is an ally against China and North Korea. But in the public?  Not so much apparently.

Anyhow, my old nationalism/ethnic conflict stuff may apply here, and I am now thinking of comparing all these offices o' irredentism some day. 

What Do I Know About the Kurdish Situation?

Not much as I haven't studied the Kurds.  McGill Phd David Romano has studied them a great deal, and there are others who are far more expert.  However, I do know something about separatism, referenda and irredentism, so here's what I think:

1. Separatism is not as contagious as advertised. The only folks who really get encouraged by an effort, successful or otherwise, are those who are kin.  Everyone else is far more focused on their own incentives and constraints.  They will learn from the examples elsewhere whatever lessons that support their pre-existing inclinations.  Yes, I was a fan of confirmation bias long before it was cool.
2. The Sunnis will not be pleased.  It is hard enough for two smaller groups to attempt to balance the Shia in whatever semi-democratic institutions, but with Kurds leaving, Sunnis are dwarfed by Shia.  Hard to craft a democracy or anything else that gives Sunnis some chance of not being dominated.  So, yeah, Kurds leaving would screw Sunnis just as Slovenia screwed the Bosnians.  Everything old is new again.
3. Irredentism is not in the cards.  Sure, one could talk about a Greater Kurdistan, but which Kurds get to rule it?  Milton (and Khan) was right: better to reign in hell than serve in heaven.  So, no, despite what Turkey might say, there will be no significant effort at Greater Kurdistan.
4. I am not a fan of secession from advanced democracies--the costs of changing are too high and always underplayed by the secessionists, democracy depends on losers staying in the system, and usually there are ways to get what you need, if not what you want.  But the Kurds have some reasonable grievances, starting with how they can't trust the Shia dominated government of Iraq.  
5. The timing makes sense--Kurdish strength is at an alltime high given that the US, Canada and others have armed and trained the Kurds.  Those efforts are already declining now that ISIS has been mostly removed from the Kurds' neighborhood.  Iraq is still weak due to the ongoing war with ISIS, so now makes sense....
6. But a referendum does not mean independence.  It can mean a process, a bargaining process that can take quite some time.  The question of violence really now depends on what the Iraqi government will do.  Governments generally don't let secessionist regions leave--lots of work on this especially by Monica Toft.
7. Countries will support whichever side they have ethnic ties (article version).  If no ties, then other interests, such as seeking stability will kick in.  The one thing, for damn sure, is that countries will not be deterred by their own vulnerability to separatism.  
8. Turkey will overreact.  Duh.

What does it mean for the war against ISIS?  Damned if I know.  Anyhow, my past work suggests this will be bother better and worse than what the pundits say.  Woot?

Busy Day in Applying Ye Olde Research and Teaching To Today's News

I am doing something I have never really done before: try to write an academic piece for a real deadline.  I have written stuff for conference and workshop deadlines, but I am working right now on a very current piece--the coalition against ISIS--for a journal that has set a deadline for me.  Good and bad, of course.  But as a result, I can only really post some quick hit thoughts on many of thing bits of news today

• Perhaps the most important or least important item might be the announcement that Russia is setting up a new security service.  Now it might be aimed at new threats or whatever, but the proliferation of security services is often viewed by those who study civil-military relations as coup-proofing.  That is, efforts aimed at making it harder for the military to overthrow the government.  Or, in the case of a place like Russia, creating alternative security organizations may be aimed at helping to put down protesters if older agencies are seen as less reliable.  That it happened a day after the Panama Papers indicate that Putin and friends might be a smidge corrupt is probably just a coincidence.   Hmmm.  Very interesting.
• Indonesia just blew up a bunch of foreign fishing boats as part of the larger South China Sea territorial disputes.  The most obvious thing to note: no Chinese boats despite China being the most aggressive violator of pretty much all things territorial in that area.  Is Indonesia conveying strength via this act or weakness via its targeting?  Hmm.
• Things continue not to look good in the Caucuses with Azerbaijan and Armenia set to re-start their 1990s war.  Is it fair to call a country seeking to reverse the irredentism of another country irredentist too?  Sure, as the effort to take back territory that is seen as lost is not really that dependent on the time of the loss.  For Azerbaijan, the loss is quite real and quite recent (much irredentism is based on mythical losses or historically distant ones), so yes, trying to get Nagorno-Karabakh back is irredentism.  However, this sprung from Armenia's irredentist campaign 25 years ago, so only Armenia's excellent PR efforts in the West and, oh, Azerbaijan's tainted authoritarianism make Armenia seem like a victim in all of this.  And, yes, Russia is playing both sides.  I discussed this a bit more yesterday.

Your irredentist tweet of the day. https://t.co/zdyBEsgp3H

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) April 5, 2016

• NATO folks are pushing back against Trump.  NATO clearly is a good investment for the US and the West--deterring Russia, coordinating all kinds of stuff (peacekeeping in Kosovo, counter-terrorism in the Mediterranean, counter-piracy, training in Afghanistan, etc), and on and on.  Robert Keohane was right about at least one thing: once you build an institution, folks want to keep it around to address new problems because setting up institutions is hard.  NATO needs to adapt to the 21st century, but its bugs will remain since they are necessary for the alliance to operate.  Countries have to be able to opt out or impose caveats on missions and operations or else they will not give consent for such efforts.  The US is one of those that insisted on such opt outs, so we have to live with them.   
• Folks are pondering who is more racist: the US or Europeans?  My hot take was: look at some stats.  Intermarriage between (religious, racial, linguistic, whatever) groups is higher where?  What about segregation?  Yes, US is highly segregated but stories about Muslim communities in France and Belgium are suggestive.  As always, I link to old posts about comparative xenophobia.

As always, I miss teaching Intro to IR as I could be talking about all of this stuff to students who are puzzled by this stuff.  Anyhow, I have and will write more about much of this, but for now, this will do.

Irredentism and Its Discontents

The most successful case of 1990s Irredentism is back in the news: Azerbaijan and Armenia are fighting again over the territory that Armenia took from Azerbaijan when the two fell out of the former Soviet Union.  The key territory is Nargono-Karabakh, which was an enclave, more or less, within Azerbaijan, so Armenia not only claim N-K but also conquer territory that constitutes a bridge between N-K and itself.  This conflict has been "frozen" since 1994, meaning that Armenia got to keep what it conquered but that it was not resolved.  So, why unfreeze now?

Perhaps it is no surprise that the dynamics of irredentism would be similar to the dynamics of counter-irredentism.  After all, efforts to bring back the lost territory today by Azerbaijan is irredentism, just as the effort twenty-five years ago by Armenia to take territory historically/ethnically seen as theirs.  Folks have speculated that Azerbaijan may have re-kindled the flames here because its authoritarian regime might be facing some criticism/opposition at home.  This may very much be an effort to rally around the flag.  I am no Azeri expert, but it would not be hard to figure out the pattern of interests within Azerbaijan, the lack of concern about sacrificing international ties for a smidge of nationalist war, and the temptation to do what might be costly as long as the costs are not borne by those who have political influence.  

Even if the Azeris started this round, the Armenians have a heap of responsibility in this stuff as the initial aggressor. However, they have better PR people so they should be ok.

Oh, and, by the way, that force for non-violence resolution of boundary conflicts, Russia, has been playing sides in this, mostly perhaps to foster arms sales.  Russia probably has not caused this particular crisis, but it certainly has enjoyed playing both sides against each other since the early 1990s (yes, before Kosovo, before Libya, before Iraq, etc). 

This conflict, of course, bears watching and not just because I want to sell more paperbacks.  There is a heap of hyperbole about the consequences for the Caucuses.  Not so sure about that, but it will be costly to those in harm's way.

Recognize The Tainted Legitimacy

A list caught my eye this morning: those countries that recognized Crimea's union with Russia:

Reminder of the 14 nations who recognize the Crimean "annexation": pic.twitter.com/UUX7n4jyxV

— Casey Michel (@cjcmichel) June 16, 2015

Hmm, what unifies most of these folks? ah, yes, deep love of self-determination. https://t.co/jYd9EiSSdH

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) June 16, 2015

What do these folks have in common?  Democracy?  Not so much. Friends of the U.S.?  Definitely not so much.  Indeed, hostility to US is a great unifier except there are some folks who might be hostile to the US who are not on this list including Iran. 

How about irredentists?  We have a few: Afghanistan (Pashtuns do not like the Durand line), Armenia, Russia, North Korea (both as supporting irredentism and potential target of irredentism, depending on who rules a united Korea), and Sudan (if it ever tries to bring back the secessionist hunks).


My quick snark was basically suggesting that with friends like these, this particular annexation is not legitimate.  Not only is the list small, but they include mostly countries that are hostile to self-determination if one includes the ability to select one's government in that concept. 

I got some pushback from folks who said this is really about power relations--that Kosovo's recognizers are allies of the US.... And, of course, Kosovo ain't Crimea, but the point is almost valid.  Who has recognized Kosovo other than Facebook?  Over a hundred countries, including many who are not seen as neatly in the American camp.  This list includes many non-democratic states, but includes many democracies, so it does not read quite like a list of countries hostile to democracy, minority rights and the like.

The Crimean Referendum was a sham and remains so.  The list of recognizers, mostly experts on the art of fake elections, underlines the fraud that Russia has been perpetuating.  The implausible denials still work well enough, I guess, but if something quacks like a fraud, walks like a fraud, well, it is a fraud. 

More in the Annals of Bad Saideman Predictions, Ukraine Edition

I wrote this last year with the, um, semi-accurate title: Why Crimea is Likely Limit of Greater Russia.  I basically argued that Greater Russia might not go much further than the annexation of Crimea, yet Russia's aggression continued with the influx of Russian forces into Eastern Ukraine to "support" the separatists there.  Ooops.  Guess I was wrong.

I asserted that Russian nationalists might not want to add hunks of Ukraine beyond Crimea because these hunks would be harder to digest as they are more diverse, would represent even further drain on the Russian economy, and so on.

How could I get this wrong?  Well, actually, I might not be.  Creating frozen conflicts to disturb, distract, and undermine neighbors ain't irredentism but is a frequently tactic in the Russian tool box: Abkhazia, Transnistria (opportunistic thanks to principal-agent problems in mid-1990s Russian military), South Ossetia.  As far as we can tell, Russia's aims towards Eastern Ukraine is not union/annexation but messing with Ukraine's stability.

Of course, this is cold comfort to Ukraine, but might provide the Baltics with a smidge of relief--that Russia may not be trying to re-create the old borders of Russia/Soviet Union pre-1991.  Putin may want to salami slice away at the Baltics, mostly to disrupt NATO, but that is a bit different than Russia borrowing from Saddam Hussein's 1990 strategy of overrunning their territories.

It is up to my readers to figure out if this is an artful artless dodge or a reasonable assessment of my prediction last winter. 

The Dark Timeline Gets Darker: Bibi Returns

I am not a Mideast or Israel expert (I have religiously avoided studying Israel/Palestine in my career--too much literature to read, too much emotion to wade through), but my understanding of ethnic politics leads to a few thoughts that converge with Marc Lynch's tweet yesterday:

I just assumed all along Netanyahu would win since it's worst possible outcome and when in Middle East these days is that not best bet?
— Marc Lynch (@abuaardvark) March 17, 2015

What can we conclude from what happened in this campaign and with this outcome?  Simply that Israel is screwed.  Netanyahu successfully "gambled for resurrection" by running as if Obama was his opponent, by outbidding his opponents in demonizing the Arab voters, and by taking the two-state solution off of the table. 

Give Bibi props as it worked.  And it demonstrates something that we political scientists have known far too well and for too long--that which is good for the short term, that which is good for the politician is often bad, very bad for the country.  Indeed, the Bill and Steve book (which needs to have the new intro be an etch-a-sketch so that we can add new irredentism news these days) is entitled For Kin or Country for a reason. 

No good can come of the stances that Netanyahu took in the last days of the election.  His move to deny a two-state solution was an essentially irredentist one--that Israel will be larger, containing the Jews outside the traditional boundaries and bring in the historical (Biblical, I guess) territories.  The problem, of course, is that this will mean that Israel will continue to contain an ever increasing population that is not Jewish.

People have long pondered whether Israel will remain democratic or Jewish, but that it could not be both.  If a large hunk of the population cannot vote, then Israel will not be truly democratic.  If they can, then they will vote and erode the Jewish character of the state.  The two state solution was a way to avoid this fork in the road.  Instead, Netanyahu pushed on the accelerator and the choice seems have been made last night.

I had a bit of hope, as I thought that the increased Arab vote (those residing in the 1947 boundaries can vote) could be a critical coalition partner that would lure at least one major party to engage in a multi-ethnic appeal.  But Netanyahu has proved, I think, that he can win by going the other way.  It is always hard for the multi-ethnic party to compete with the ethnic outbidder, but not impossible.

It seems like enough of Israel has chosen its destiny.... a very difficult and dangerous future where its most powerful ally is alienated, where the task of governing hostile territories becomes not just part of Israel's past but an integral part of its future, and where the values of many are sacrificed due to fear.  Israelis have often felt friendless before, but now they are governed yet again by someone who is making friendlessness both a strategy and a goal it seems.

Tis a dark timeline indeed.

Sham-tastic Anniversary

While today is Π-day, in just two days, we will be "celebrating" the anniversary of that sham-wow event--the Crimea referendum.  Pretty much everyone, except for those with ties to Russia, saw the referendum as the sham it clearly was.  I wrote a piece that called it the way everyone saw it.  In the aftermath, the EU, the European Parliament, the Group of 7, the UN Security Council (vetoed by Russia, abstained by China), the UN General Assembly, NATO and the Venice Commission condemned it.  Even Russia's relatively stalwart friend Belarus indicated it was not thrilled.

The best way to evaluate the referendum?  By looking at those who supported it. 

• Afghanistan, with its own irredentist aspirations, and still led by a Karzai seeking to piss all over the West.
• Argentina, which saw the Crimea through the Malvinas ... although one could see it the reverse as well.  Oops.
• India opposed unilateral measures against Russia, which makes no sense since the world was anything but unilateral in its opposition.
• Kazakhstan
• Kyrgyzstan
• Venezuela
• The various semi-states that Russia has helped to create at the expense of its neighbors.

Yeah, great company.
So, let's just go to the videotape:


On the bright side, thanks to Vladimir Putin's putsch, Bill and I got the chance to write a new introduction for the new paperback version of For Kin or Country.

Perhaps Putin has disappeared because he is preparing a big party to celebrate the referendum.

Exceptional Exceptionalism

I was out today so I missed an epic rant by Ben Denison about the lousy arguments people use to argue that the Balkans had conflict because of artificial boundaries.  The good news is that we have both Storify and the Storify master, Kelsey Atherton, which means we have this.

The only things I would add to this are:
Boundaries are damn near always "artificial", given that the world did not emerge spontaneously with maps with handy dandy lines dividing people.  Politics among and within groups of people produced these magical lines.  Some of these lines appear more natural than others, but the reality is that most are quite artificial and yet .... conflict is rare.  While most war does involve territorial disputes, most territorial disputes ... do not involve war.  Ooops.  There are many, many quite artificial boundaries over which there is currently little conflict.  But we don't notice the non-events.

Which gets us to another basic reality: the artificiality of borders is pretty constant--borders don't change much--but conflict varies.  And basic social science says you cannot explain some thing that varies with something that is constant (and vice versa).

Indeed, For Kin or Country (the new paperback version with a new intro is coming out this summer) started with the puzzle that there was both more and less violence in Eastern Europe than we expected.  The least legitimate, most artificial border in Europe?  Probably that separating Moldova from Romania as it was drawn by Molotov/Ribbentrop but really Stalin/Hitler.

Anyhow, if anyone says that a conflict happens because of an artificial boundary, you have my permission to run screaming from the room.

Twenty Five Years After the Wall

For those folks who are thirty or thirty five or so or younger, the anniversary of the end of the Berlin Wall may not be as chock full of meaning.  For those of us who are older than that, it was an amazing event as we had taken the division of Europe to be permanent.  In a very short time, we went from landmines and fences and machine guns to damn near all of Europe being "whole and free."  As recent events make clear (Russian irredentism and Hungary's back-tracking), the move towards democracy was not inevitable nor irreversible.

Still, we tend to mark the start of the Cold War by focusing on the inability of the Soviet Union and the West to agree on how to govern post-war Germany.  The temporary division was the product of this inability to agree.  Then this cleavage seemed permanent with guard towers, walls, minefields and the like (mostly on the eastern side due to West German "caveats"!).  So, if the Cold War started with the division of Germany, then its unification, a sanctified act of irredentism, marked the end of what we knew as the Cold War.  While the collapse of the Soviet Union happened two years later, the fall of wall indicated that the Soviet Union was no longer in the business of using force to keep Eastern Europe under its thumb/yoke/etc.

While we have some debates about the conditions under which this happened, one of the striking things of that time is that the US and the rest of West Europe were able to strike a bargain with the Soviet Union to let this and the ensuing democratization of most of Eastern Europe happen.

To be clear, elections were not always a force for stability, as they helped produce nationalist governments within the various pieces of Yugoslavia, which then produced several years of war and ethnic cleansing.  Still, of the countries that once belonged to the Warsaw Pact, all are far better off now than they were in 1989, even the increasingly authoritarian Hungary.  Romania is far better off than anyone could have expected, given its violent regime change, its stunted economic development, and so on.  Bulgaria is hardly perfect as well, with deep corruption.

Of course, the reality is that the fall of the Berlin Wall ultimately moved the line between Us and Them, between Democracy and Something Else, and so on hundreds of miles to the east.  Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and much of the former Soviet Union have not made nearly as much progress when it comes to rule of law, democracy, and the stuff that people in East Germany mostly take for granted these days.  Yes, Russia has had elections since the 1990s, but Putin has made it clear how little of Western democracy really took root.  Ukraine?  Perhaps this new government will be genuinely democratic and bound by the laws, but the previous governments were not so much.   Anyhow, the point here is that a new dividing line emerged when the old one disappeared.  Ukraine now is divided along that line.  We shall see whether it tips on one side or other.

There is now lots of debate about how the West screwed up the end of the Cold War by declaring victory and by imposing itself on Russia.  I am not so sure.  People forget that 1990s Russia looked a whole lot like 1930s Germany--political upheaval, economic dislocations, recently revised boundaries.  There was much effort to bring Russia into Western economic and political institutions, which seems less like occupation and more like welcoming a neighbor.  Of course, we also sent a variety of experts to Russia to tell them how to manage their political and economic systems, so maybe we should apologize for that.

But before people blame the expansion of NATO for Russian behavior, we need to remember a couple of things:

1. Russia was messing around in the countries on its periphery before NATO enlargement got serious.  Transnistria is one example.  Supporting Armenia in its irredentist war against Azerbaijan is another.  Much of Russia's behavior that it claims to be legitimated by NATO's actions in Kosovo pre-date the Kosovo intervention.  Oops.
2. The security dilemma operates a bit different these days.  Yes, when an alliance creeps up on your border, you can get nervous.  In the old days, that meant seeking allies and engaging in arms races.  But when one happens to be the second largest holder of nuclear weapons, one can avoid over-reacting.  
3. It was not NATO membership that led to Russia hacking off Crimea from Ukraine, but enhancing the relationship between the European Union and Ukraine.  Was that worth all of this?  Probably not. 

Yes, the US and its allies are not blameless for where Russia is today and where the divide is.  But Russia has had plenty of choices, much room to maneuver, so the responsibility for making the destabilizing, destructive, and Cold War-renewing decisions is mostly in the hands of Putin and his inner circle.  Which means that the other cold war construct, containment, is already on its way back.

Irredentism is Costly

In For Kin or Country, the basic idea is to explain a set of policies that is always expensive.  When one tries to take the territory of another country, there tends to be a response.  While folks dismissed Obama's line about Putin's moves having a cost, it turns out that he was right.

These costs come, as always, in two forms: political and economic.  Thanks to both our friend the security dilemma and due to the domestic dynamics of the target, there are reactions.  If Russia thought it was being encircled before, it will certainly feel so now.  Some are calling for containment part two (or three or four, I lost count).  Sweden and Finland are far closer to NATO membership now than a year ago.  China may like getting cheaper gas since Russia has to go elsewhere for markets, but I doubt that China is going to invest more in BRIC club.  Europe may be squeamish about embracing containment.  Ok, some parts of Europe may be squeamish, but Russia is living in a different world, where everything is going to be harder.


Economically, the costs are also mounting as this piece suggests.  Inflation, collapse of the currency, recession... these are things that do not make for a happy public.  Or even happy billionaires.

Up is bad, as it reflects the collapse of the ruble.

Of course, as we suggest in the book's title, this is a choice, one that some politicians make when their constituents are not the electorate but key individuals or groups that do not pay the price for the aggression and/or benefit from international isolation.  The problem and the opportunity for Putin is that the beneficiaries are small and those paying the costs are large.  It is harder to get large groups to act, so the small can have more influence... for now.

How sustainable is this?  I don't know.  The initial acts have boosted Putin's popularity, as does any rally around the flag event.  But the costs will erode Putin's standing in the polls.  The big question is when do these costs really hurt those who have some leverage--those in his inner circle or those who have leverage of their own (the military, other plutocrats left out of the inner circle).  I have no idea, but the people who say Putin has been very clever in playing the West need to pay attention to these mounting costs.

Putin has chosen "kin", sacrificing the best interests of his country.  What happens next?  Damned if I know.

Thank You, Comrade Putin

It looks like I am going to owe Vladimir Putin a debt.  How so?  My co-author, Bill Ayres, and I just signed a contract with Columbia University Press to write a new introduction to a paperback version of the 2008 For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism and War.  In that book, we sought to explain the irredentism (the efforts by countries to annex "lost" kin in neighboring territories) that did and did not occur in the 1990s.

Well, Russia was in the "did not" category in the 1990s and is now in the "did" category since then--clearly with Crimea, less clearly with hunks of Georgia.  Of the cases we focused on most clearly, Russia is the one that went from silent dog to barking dog.  Romania?  Had some nationalist dynamics but no real effort to reclaim Moldova.  Hungary?  Has become authoritarian with increased nationalism and moving beyond the optimally obnoxious stage.  Armenia has kept its hunks of Azerbaijan.  Croatian and Serbian irredentism remain quelled by external intervention.  Whether their democratization also reduces their bad neighborly ways is something we have to think about.

Anyhow, our goal is to finish our side of this soon with the aim for a new paperback edition of For Kin or Country by sometime in 2015.  Look for it online (either the paperback or e-book) soon-ish.

Fave Irredentist Stories

A friend asked folks on twitter to share their favorite irredentist stories with me.... So far, no takers, so let me provide a few:

1. At the top, walking into my new job/fellowship on the Joint Staff and being called The Irredentist!  My application for the fellowship discussed the project that became For Kin or Country, so they were wise to my ways.  And I was well placed in the Pentagon as this was, indeed, the office of irredentism with both Croatia and Serbia having recently engaged in "Greater" projects and with Kosovo kind of doing the same (with Macedonia's Albanians). 
2. The time a Hungarian general I was interviewing said: "After a few drinks, everyone is a nationalist."
3. The time that Croatia engaged in an irredentist war in Bosnia undermining its claims of being a victim of Serb irredentism AND proved my point that vulnerability does not deter.
4. That Somalia which exemplified the window of opportunity argument by attacking Ethiopia as it was in the middle of its own revolution/transition had previously attacked when the time was most unopportune--1963 when Ethiopia was much stronger... and when it was already engaged in irredentist efforts aimed at both British and French colonies nearby.
5. The Crimean referendum.  So sham-tastic, it really was so laughable.
6. My favorite irredentist trick question: in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, who are the irredentists?
7. Tried to name the Bill and Steve JOP article: Reuniting: When Does it Feel So Good? after the song but got spiked by the editors who accepted the article but not a fun title.  They probably would not have gone with "Four out of Five irredentists agree...".  Of course, it would probably have had to be nineteen out of twenty irredentists agree for the 95% confidence interval reference.

I am sure fans of Ireland, Kurdistan, Kashmir and others have fun tales to tell?

Peaceful Boundary Changing: Europe is Spiffy?

Dan Drezner's post du jour focuses on the absence of international processes for changing boundaries peaceful and asserts that Europe seems to do this pretty well.  As he poaches on my old territory--the IR of Secession, I cannot but wonder where my citations are poke at some of this.  Overall, the main point is a solid one--that we don't have a mechanism that really facilitates boundary changes peacefully in large part because there is a shared interest in not making secession too easy. 

Dan argues that Europe does this pretty well, pointing at the Czech/Slovak divorce, Montenegro's peaceful referendum/secession, and now Scotland's referendum process.  To be clear, Europe had nothing to do with the first one, as the Czechs and Slovaks agreed to disagree and go their separate ways precisely at the same time that Europe was not being all that helpful/sucessful managing the secessionist/irredentist/boundary changing crises of Yugoslavia.

People forget but the EU in its first few days of EU-ness (having recently transitioned from EEC) tried to manage the Yugoslav crisis.  They sent "ice cream men"--observers in white uniforms--to serve as monitors, and they were utterly irrelevant.  They thought that recognizing the more fit units as states might reduce the violence.  Not only did this hope lack much logic, but the EU violated their own rules.  The Badinter Commission was given the job of recommending which parts of Yugoslavia should be recognized, based on a variety of criteria, and the commission chose Slovenia and Macedonia.  The EU chose then to recognize Slovenia and Croatia--because Croatia had Germany as a friend and Macedonia had Greece as an un-friend.

To be fair, the secession of Montenegro reflected much lessons learned, with the EU serving as a key player pushing for a reasonable process including a 55% majority required qualify for independence.  Note that the Scottish referendum is not being managed by the EU, and as far as I can tell, is still going by 50% plus one (which I cannot stand--a very narrow and potentially temporary basis of support).

Dan ignores the other violent cases that have petered out--Northern Ireland and the Basques.  Which is fine, since they are less violent now.  But again, Europe has little to do with it. What does?  That magic sauce of democracy and economic development.  Canada's own secessionist movement--Quebec--has been similarly non-violent except for a quite token murder in 1970.

How does this work?  Jason Sorens has written much on this, but the basic idea is that if you give people a chance to leave peacefully, via democratic means, they do not need to choose violence, and they then often do not choose to leave.  The benefits of leaving an advanced democracy with a good economy are not so great.  The costs are always downplayed but are quite real.

Both violence and secession are far more popular where people do not have the means to address their grievances through the political system--so they opt out.  What makes Europe different is not the EU but the prevalence of strong democracies and decent economies (even now, when compared to elsewhere).

So, I would focus less on Europe and more on the stuff that has spread--democracy--and on the economics that create incentives/disincentives.

Still, Dan is right that we can think about Europe as a model for peaceful boundary change--but it is less about EUROPE and more about the characteristics of European countries. And, yes, blaming Europe for messing up the boundaries of the rest of the world is fair game.*

* Although to be fair, the Europeans drew many, many boundaries and irredentism is rather rare. 

Confirmation Bias: The Musical

I was chatting with my friend and occasional co-author Bill Ayres (no, not Bill Ayers) about what to do about our 2008 book and the surge of irredentism of late (mostly Russia but now also ISIS's desire to remake the maps of the Mideast), and, of course, I got distracted by popular culture via this question:

Is "Let It Go" a theme song for irredentists or those fighting irredentism?  Let's look at the tape:



The answer is: it could be used by either side.

I don't care
What they're going to say
Let the storm rage on,
The cold never bothered me anyway!

That sounds like an irredentist saying: to heck with the costs, let's unite our lost territory with our homeland!

It's time to see what I can do
To test the limits and break through
No right, no wrong, no rules for me I'm free!

Sounds like Putin, yes?  To heck with the Helsinki Accords and the Budapest Agreement.

On the other hand,

It's funny how some distance
Makes everything seem small
And the fears that once controlled me
Can't get to me at all!

Which makes the concerns about the kin abroad to be almost inconsequential.  Most importantly,

I'm never going back,
The past is in the past!

If the past is in the past, then claims to lost territory are to be left behind as well, eh?

What this obviously shows is that people see what they want to see--confirmation bias essentially.  I wanted to see this song speak to both sides of an irredentist conflict, and viola!

It also indicates that I miss teaching large undergrad classes, as I could have had some fun with Frozen.

Finally, this is a recognition that we (Bill and I) need to figure out why some of the irredentist conflicts remain frozen (Armenia, Serbia, Croatia) while others (Russia, Hungary) have gotten warmer and even quite hot.  Good thing we now have a new assignment--writing an intro to the paperback version of For Kin or Country.