Coding Crises in US Civil-Military Relations

Tom Ricks argued recently that there is a fundamental problem in American civil-military relations: “we need presidents willing to listen and learn from dissenting generals -- and generals who know how to dissent in strategic discussions, and are willing to do so.”  Folks on twitter pushed back, arguing that the biggest problem is the perception of veterans as powder kegs, likely simply to explode in rage or become white supremacists.  My friends on twitter were outraged by a NYT column that drew some shaky connections between veterans and white supremacists.  While I don’t entirely agree with Ricks, I think he is closer to the real crisis than my twitter friends.

Why?  Because I care about foreign policy and outcomes in the field.  The frustration with the NYT column is important, to be sure, and we need to be careful about overreacting and under-reacting to the challenges of reintegrating those who engaged in combat (as well as those who served in other capacities) back into civilian life.  Part of the problem here is that we often get confused about what we mean by civil-military relations.  While the general issue of how do the civilians in a society relate to the military can be important, scholars and analysts of defense issues are more concerned with how civilians in government manage the military. 

Government officials have to manage all kinds of government agencies, but traditionally the armed forces are the most critical because they are the most misunderstood and because they happen to have the ability to remove the government.  In advanced democracies, we don’t worry much about coups d’etat.  Indeed, it is a defining characteristic of stable democracy.  Still, managing the military is important and difficult because bad military performance can be catastrophic.  Just as the French in 1940. 

The challenge is that militaries consider themselves experts at the use of force and everyone else as amateurs.  This may be mostly true (less true than it used to be with the development of civilian expertise).   However, because war is politics by other means, to rely on a classic quote by Clausewitz, the decisions made during wars have great political significance.  Which leads to another maxim: war is too important to be left to the generals.  The traditional division of labor of the civilians deciding when to fight and with whom and the military deciding how simply does not work that well in practice.  This can lead to all kinds of tensions between the civilians and military officers, and that is actually quite normal.  The question is how to handle the tensions, which leads us back to Ricks and what he misses.

The job of handling the military in the U.S. does not really belong to the President but to the Secretary of Defence.  Sure, the President chooses the SecDef and is the ultimate commander in chief, but the SecDef is the key conduit between the President and the military.  I worked in Donald Rumsfeld’s Pentagon for a year, and I am now reading Robert Gates’s memoir so I have some opinions about recent SecDef performance.

In short, Rumsfeld was a disaster for American civil-military relations.  He did not listen to his officers much at all, and was not at all willing to “listen and learn from dissenting generals.”  So, the U.S. went to war without a plan for how to deal with success (the missing Phase IV after the fall of Baghdad), the U.S. fired the Iraqi army which was counter to pretty much everything we know about post-war politics, and so on.  Most famously, he got upset at General Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff when he respond honestly to questions in front of a Congressional committee about how big of a force would it take to manage a post-invasion Iraq.  Rummy’s time could clearly be viewed as an on-going crisis in American civil-military relations, and it greatly affected outcomes.

Gates was far more willing to take seriously the feedback he received from American generals.  He reports in the memoir that he consulted the officers and noticed when there were dissenting opinions.  Still, he complains in his memoir of the times that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen would say things in front of Congress that were not in concordance with the messages preferred by the administration.  The difference here is that Gates did not punish Mullen (Rumsfeld essentially sent Shinseki to the doghouse for the rest of his term), although he did admonish him. 

To be honest, I am still trying to figure out Gates.   I think he made a huge mistake: when the Afghan surge happened, he let the Marines up-end much of what had been accomplished to improve unity of command.  They chose to report directly to Central Command rather than ISAF headquarters.  He also let the Marines deploy to the wrong place—Helmand—which was counter to the President’s decision to engage in population-centric counter-insurgency, and the population really was in Kandahar, not Helmand.  So, Gates lets the military do a bit too much, compared to Rumsfeld’s micro-management.

So, to return to Ricks, Secretaries of Defense vary in how they manage the generals under them.  Rummy was obviously at one end of the spectrum of imposing too much.  Gates was perhaps a bit too far the other way.  There is no right way to do it—the armed forces tend to know best how to do what they do but what they do is deeply political with huge implications.  So, Ricks’s advice is right but partially mis-targeted.  The military needs to give its unvarnished views to the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of Defense must listen and then make up his or her own mind.

One last thing: in the American case, there is another actor involved—Congress.  The Armed Services Committees of the House and Senate have an important role to play via oversight.  Which means that generals have to speak truth to that power when asked, even when it is inconvenient for the President and the Secretary of Defense.  Of course, Congressional oversight works best when those on the committee are not just engaged in partisan feuding.  In the not so distant past, Democratic Senators and Representations would hold generals feet to the fire even if the President was a Democrat, and Republicans would do the same even when the President was a Republican.  These days?  Not so much.  And that might just be a real crisis in U.S. civil-military relations. 

SecDef Was Not At My Talk

Secretary of Defense Gates seems to have blasted the allies for trying to get out of Afghanistan as quickly as possible.  I guess he was already on the way to Brussels when I was presenting a talk on the lessons we have learned about caveats, their sources and how to deal with them.  Specifically, countries have developed the policies they have towards their Afghanistan mission due to the varying natures of their political systems, especially whether they have coalition governments or not.  One of the implications of this is that public criticism is not going to do much to change the policies of these governments.  Now, Gates apparently did this at a closed meeting BUT the Pentagon released the transcript of the speech, so it is not as public as shouting it while standing in the Grand Place.  Still, it is unlikely to be helpful. 

Perhaps the Brits and Germans have a similar view of de-surging as the US--starting with a small withdrawal to satisfy the domestic audience.  I am not sure about the pace of withdrawals.  Is Poland really moving that quickly: all out by 2012?  That would be pretty significant since the Poles have been willing to fight in dangerous places with few restrictions.

In sum, I can understand Gates' frustration, but it is unlikely that shaming will work here. 

More Proof That Gates Is a Great SecDef

What a reasonable guy!  Take a look at his views on Wikileaks (from Smallwars Journal which provided the bold, I provide the color):

And clearly the finding that the lack of sharing of information had prevented people from, quote, unquote, “connecting the dots” led to much wider sharing of information, and I would say especially wider sharing of information at the front, so that no one at the front was denied – in one of the theaters, Afghanistan or Iraq – was denied any information that might possibly be helpful to them.
Now, obviously, that aperture went too wide. There’s no reason for a young officer at a forward operating post in Afghanistan to get cables having to do with the START negotiations. And so we’ve taken a number of mitigating steps in the department. I directed a number of these things to be undertaken in August.
First, the – an automated capability to monitor workstations for security purposes. We’ve got about 60 percent of this done, mostly in – mostly stateside.
Second, as I think you know, we’ve taken steps in CENTCOM in September and now everywhere to direct that all CD and DVD write capability off the network be disabled. [SMS: what about USB keys?] We have – we have done some other things in terms of two-man policies – wherever you can move information from a classified system to an unclassified system, to have a two-person policy there.
And then we have some longer-term efforts under way in which we can – and, first of all, in which we can identify anomalies, sort of like credit card companies do in the use of computer; and then finally, efforts to actually tailor access depending on roles. But let me say – let me address the latter part of your question. This is obviously a massive dump of information.
First of all, I would say unlike the Pentagon Papers, one of the things that is important, I think, in all of these releases, whether it’s Afghanistan, Iraq or the releases this week, is the lack of any significant difference between what the U.S. government says publicly and what these things show privately, whereas the Pentagon Papers showed that many in the government were not only lying to the American people, they were lying to themselves.
But let me – let me just offer some perspective as somebody who’s been at this a long time. Every other government in the world knows the United States government leaks like a sieve, and it has for a long time. And I dragged this up the other day when I was looking at some of these prospective releases. And this is a quote from John Adams: “How can a government go on, publishing all of their negotiations with foreign nations, I know not. To me, it appears as dangerous and pernicious as it is novel.”
When we went to real congressional oversight of intelligence in the mid-’70s, there was a broad view that no other foreign intelligence service would ever share information with us again if we were going to share it all with the Congress. Those fears all proved unfounded.
Now, I’ve heard the impact of these releases on our foreign policy described as a meltdown, as a game-changer, and so on. I think – I think those descriptions are fairly significantly overwrought. The fact is, governments deal with the United States because it’s in their interest, not because they like us, not because they trust us, and not because they believe we can keep secrets.
Many governments – some governments deal with us because they fear us, some because they respect us, most because they need us. We are still essentially, as has been said before, the indispensable nation. So other nations will continue to deal with us. They will continue to work with us. We will continue to share sensitive information with one another. Is this embarrassing? Yes. Is it awkward? Yes. Consequences for U.S. foreign policy? I think fairly modest.

Either/Or vs Both

Fred Kaplan has another excellent column addressing the cuts that SecDef Gates wants to make in the defense budget.  The basic point is that Gates is trying to change how the Pentagon operates but not really cut spending much.  Gates wants to change the culture, trying to reduce the number of expensive senior officers, reduce reliance on contractors (woo hoo!) and so forth, and shift savings towards procurement.  That is: reduce overhead and get more stuff.  Kaplan notes that this is probably unsustainable in a time of deep budget deficits where the military is really the heart of the non-mandatory spending.  Kaplan almost makes it seem that Gates is fooling himself into thinking that smaller but steady growth in the defense budget is likely.  Perhaps. Or perhaps Gates is cutting the overhead before he is compelled to cut further into the procurement side of things. 

It is clear that Gates is serious about buying stuff that is necessary and no more.  He is already running into heaps of opposition for cutting F-22 engines from the shopping list and for other cuts, but I don't think Gates is unrealistic.  The defense budget is going to have to go down.  It is just too big at a time where deficits are too big and the foreign threats are relatively small.  The US is spending way more than the rest of the world.  Some of the budget declines will occur "naturally" as the Iraq mission goes away, but we are stuck in Afghanistan for a few more years.  So, the US will have to really re-think how many subs it needs, how many carriers it needs, and so forth.  The number of brigades may be less likely to be cut given how stretched the Army is right now, as the past decade has taught us that war is still labor intensive, revolution in military affairs be damned.

But Kaplan is right, basic questions will need to be asked--what do we need, how many do we need, what tradeoffs need to be faced.  Gates is right--the era of endless money is at an end. 

Waiting Has Its Costs

It seems inevitable that the US military will drop Don't Ask, Don't Tell [DADT].  SecDef Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mullen oppose the status quo, and are seeking to change it.  They face opposition inside the military and inside the Congress, but the requirements of wartime are on their side--that we need qualified people, and sexual orientation should not disqualify them.  So, it is going to happen eventually.  But they have decided to go through an extensive review, including a survey, to make sure to cover their asses do it right. 

What is the cost in waiting and delays?  This.  The conflict between the integrity required for a good officer and the lies required by DADT forced one of the best cadets to leave West Point.  These are precisely the people we need leading the military as it ends two wars and recovers from the breaking point.  Well, tries to recover.  So, the delays mean the loss of more of the future of the Armed Forces.  I understand the politics of the situation requires some caution, but, at this point, I wonder if there are any supporters of DADT who would ever vote for Democrats/Obama anyway.  I guess the change will come shortly after November--after the next set of elections.

It will be late but perhaps not too late. 

When is Social Science Too Social?

Of course, the Pentagon generates heaps of controversy when it surveys the troops on attitudes about gays in the military.  There are several issues in play:

• Should the military care what the troops think?  Truman didn't care when he integrated African-Americans into the military.  I do not recall any surveys as women have gained more and more opportunities in the armed forces.  However, if the survey is less for whether or not versus how, then perhaps it can be justified.  If it is to provide a fig leaf so that SecDef Gates can go ahead and do what is right, then it is a gamble but an interesting one.
• Is this crappy social science?  Perhaps as one does not need to have a complete sample to get decent results.  So, this might suggest the fig leaf explanation may actually be correct.  Are the questions problematic?  Well, survey-writing is always challenging as the questions often shape the likely responses (I am no expert here, and my one attempt at a survey kind of blew up).

One thing we need to keep in mind is not that homophobia is a legitimate barrier to change, but rather most enlisted folks are going to be young and male--and, therefore, likely to have less advanced attitudes about gays and lesbians.  I certainly had homophobic attitudes when I started college, despite being brought up by a mother with liberal values.  If I remember correctly, at that time, I felt that gays and lesbians might be entitled to rights but they were "icky" (word used by the Salon piece).  I got over it at Oberlin as I interacted with actual, rather than mythical, gays and lesbians. 

So, the survey may or may not be a good idea, but the transition will inevitably have some difficulties and controversies along the way.  Given how many Canadian commanders seem unable to follow the basic rules about sex with subordinates and while deployed, these issues will never go away entirely.

Gates Shoots and ....?

Does he score?  SecDef Gates seems to be getting serious about cutting big defense projects and other spending excesses.  Drezner ponders whether he will be successful, given that the interest groups involved have a lot to lose and are quite powerful.  Ricks notes that Gates is also pondering if the US has too many Generals and Admirals.  Regarding the latter, this is not terribly surprising as the past few decades have seen lots of bloat in all kinds of businesses among senior level managers since they make the decisions about who loses jobs and who gets them.  So, we have too many vice-provosts, associate vice presidents, etc.

Anyhow, back to Drezner--defense programs are hard to kill because they are jobs programs to Senators and Representatives.  And big-time lobbyists with heaps of campaign finance are lined up on one side, relatively ambitious but not nearly as well financed groups are on the other side (I interned for Business Executives for National Security one summer between college and grad school).   However, the fiscal pressures are so severe that this may be a crisis that provides for the fracturing of old coalitions and opportunities for significant changes (yes, I have read Gourevitch's Politics in Hard Times).  Rumsfeld did manage to kill the Crusader artillery system.  So, Gates might have a chance, but will he score?  I am pretty doubtful, as the branches of the military will rely on their friends in Congress and the defense industry to protect the big items.  Congress is apparently trying to fund more C-17 cargo planes than DoD wants to buy.  Not surprising. 


If I had to bet, I probably would wager on the defense contractors and not on Gates.  They will be around longer than he will be.

Analogy of the Week, II (or Man Crush part deux)

Not only am I a big fan of Obama, but SecDef Gates is such an improvement over Rumsfeld that I cannot help but gush, even when I don't agree entirely with the decisions. So, I was quite pleased to see this quote:

In his new memoir, Matt Latimer, a Pentagon speechwriter under Mr. Gates’s predecessor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, compares Mr. Gates to the Harvey Keitel character in “Pulp Fiction” — the one who shows up after the grisly killing to wipe away all traces of blood. (from NYT piece)

My students often wonder if I am a realist or a liberal (in IR theory terms), and the real answer, when it comes to policy-making is that I am a pragmatist. So, when I see the SecDef being legitimately lauded as one, I am thrilled.

European Missle Defense continued

In today's NY Times, SecDef Gates explains and defends the decision to change the plans for defending Europe against missiles. The plan now is to deploy ships with anti-missile missiles and then down the road put other interceptors into Europe.

The money quote is:

I am often characterized as “pragmatic.” I believe this is a very pragmatic proposal. I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith. I encountered this in the debate over the Defense Department’s budget for the fiscal year 2010 when I ended three programs: the airborne laser, the multiple-kill vehicle and the kinetic energy interceptor. All were plainly unworkable, prohibitively expensive and could never be practically deployed — but had nonetheless acquired a devoted following.

My love affair with this SecDef continues. While this change might have been handled better, and I do believe that one reason to change the plan is to reduce the anxieties of Russia, which Gates underplays, the basic decision is a sound one.

And while it may not be politically acceptable these days to suggest that one is changing a policy to reduce the threat posed to Russia, it does follow from the logic of the security dilemma and my lectures in Intro to IR this week: that in anarchic system (no world government), countries must rely on themselves and that means if one country arms, then others will react, despite the stated good intentions of the first actor. So, Russia can only look at missiles (even defensive ones) on its borders as a threat and react accordingly. Will Russia consider naval vessels with anti-missile missiles parked in the Black Sea as less of a threat? Thus far, that looks likely.

Anyhow, making policy based on the costs and benefits of the various systems is the right way to go, even if one downplays one of the key benefits. Certainly better than making policy based on "theology."

SecDef Love Continues

Gates Defends Soldier's Pink Undies

Say no more!

My Love Affair with SecDef Gates Continues

From ricks.foreignpolicy.com:

Meanwhile, Defense Secretary Gates revealed on the Today show this morning that there are terrorists on American soil -- and in fact, behind bars. "We have many terrorists in U.S. prisons today. I mean, this started 20 years ago when I was at CIA, and we captured a Hezbollah terrorist who had been involved in killing an American sailor on an aircraft that had been taken hostage in Beirut. We brought him to the United States, put him on trial and put him in prison."

Gates, who is a straight shooter, added, "The truth is, there's a lot of fear-mongering about this."

McChrystal Clear?

Trying to figure out what any decision-maker will do before they start their new job is always a challenge, but ruthless speculation is hardly rare in the blogosphere. So, what are implications of choice of the new commander of the forces in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal?

First, he has been a Special Operator for much of his career, and ran Joint Special Ops Command. The stories thus far about his role are a mix--that he pushed his forces to seek out and kill the insurgent leadership, which I actually have little problem with in the abstract, but he also spent much time in theatre with an overly detailed knowledge of the actions. So, does he micromanage or is he just really smart and keen to have a good understanding of the battlespace?
The biggest concern from this experience is that much of the collateral damage in Afghanistan is caused by air strikes, particularly those called in to support Special Ops. In my conversations with Canadians and others who have worked in Afghanistan, it seems quite clear that the Special Ops side of the war has frequently undermined the rest of the counter-insurgency. On the other hand, Captain Counterinsurgency--Gen. Petraeus--seems to like the guy.

Second, his current posting is as Director of the Joint Staff [DJS]. This position puts the General at a key node between the Joint Staff and the Chairman of the Joint Staff, receiving the politico-military advice from all the various segments of the Joint Staff, including the one I inhabited seven years ago. And this position also requires a fair amount of interaction with the rest of the National Security bureaucracy. So, McChrystal probably has a better grasp of the interactions between military and civilian aspects of counter-insurgency and the larger diplomatic puzzle than most.
On the other hand, two past DJSs, John Abizaid and George Casey, did not do too well in Iraq. Clearly, they inherited a bad situation and had to deal with a Secretary of Defense (Rumsfeld) who inhibited any significant reforms. Still, Abizaid was Tommy Franks's deputy in 2003 and should have insisted on a realistic plan for the post-invasion situation. Again, because Franks slavishly followed Rumsfeld and ignored his subordinates, there was probably little that Abizaid could do, other than resign in protest.

The third bit of knowledge emerging is that McChrystal had a fellowship on the Council of Foreign Relations--the same kind that put me in the Pentagon. The idea is to give policy-makers a year to interact with thinkers and put scholars and others into a policy-making position to learn how it is done. So, McChrystal might have a broader imagination about the possibilities and may be more open to the thoughts of others. I think I am better scholar for that experience, but, then again, Condi Rice had the same fellowship and served in the Joint Staff in her day.
Indeed, one of the key lessons I learned during my year that personalities matter more than political scientists usually assert.

So, we really have no clue as to how this new guy is going to work out. It does show that SecDef Gates is setting the stage, and is not thinking in the short term. It does indicate that there is a better effort to build a team than in the past, where Rummy seemed to pick people who were good at taking orders (the passages in the Woodward books about choosing the Chairman of the Joint Staff were disturbing in the extreme).

So much for speculation.