Canadian Troops, American Orders, Bad Headlines

 So, the Economist's headline is creating some noise in Canada: "Canadian soldiers are subject to Donald Trump's Orders."  The article focuses on the many Canadian military personnel who are seconded to the American military, just as they are seconded to the British, Australian, and other armed forces.  It gets right the key nugget--that while operating as if they are American or British or whatever soldiers, sailors, or aviators, they are still subject to Canadian laws and orders.  The big question is what orders they are receiving.

I co-wrote a whole book about this (ebook is on sale!), seeking to understand why the countries operating as part of a NATO mission behaved differently.  They were all under the same commander (an American--the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe--SACEUR), but they followed different rules.  Why?  Because anytime, ANYTIME, a country transfers an individual or a unit to operate in someone else's chain of command, that individual or unit wears two hats--the national hat and the other hat (American or British or multinational such as NATO or UN).  And which hat matters more?  The national one as the individual or unit is ultimately responsible to the national command authority--that the promotion of that individual, the resources of that unit all depend on their homeland.  Any officer obeying a multilateral or other national command in contradiction to their own nation is putting their career, and, yes, their freedom in jeopardy.  This all makes multilateral war difficult (and fun to research).  

So, the good news is that these individuals working in various military jobs within the US military are subject to Canadian laws and orders--that those will always, sorry, trump the American orders.  The bad news is that I am pretty doubtful that the civilians in the Canadian government are playing much of a role in all of this.  The Minister of Defence absolutely can, as he can give orders to the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Chief can then give orders to those below her.  But will the MinDef do that?  Alas, many Canadian MinDefs see their role mostly as cheerleader or supporter of the CAF, not as overseer.  We had one MinDef tell a parliamentary committee that he could not oversee the CDS as that would politicize things--dude, you had one job.  I don't know much about the current MinDef, David McGuinty and his attitude.

What I do know is that the military doesn't think it is the Department of National Defence's job to do oversight--just the Minister's.  I do know Parliament doesn't think it is their job--their lack of interest in oversight inspired this book. So, the Economist article gets a lot of no comments from government.  Not great.  The responses were kind of like Stephen Harper's during the detainee stuff in Afghanistan--sure, prisoners are being beaten, but none of the ones we handed over were.  Sure, sure.  So, the Canadian media should be asking the PM, the MinDef, the CDS, and pretty much everyone else: what instructions are there to prevent Canadians from participating in operations against the American people?

I am guessing they won't get any answers but, as Nemik said, try. 

Caveats Go Hollywood

A few years ago, I got contacted out of the blue by the people who produce Brad Pitt movies.  They were working on a movie about the US effort in Afghanistan, had found an article David Auerswald and I had written. They were looking for interesting material to supplement the stuff they were using from Michael Hasting's work on General McChrystal, and so I ended up having a phone conversation with a producer while he was driving around Los Angeles.








So, I had been eager to see War Machine, the Netflix movie that just dropped this weekend.  Lo and behold, within five minutes, there's a junior officer talking about alliance politics, using a line I had said in many talked (see the slide) about countries not being willing to fight at night or in the snow.

The way the officer sound it sounded exactly the way I talked about it in numerous presentations.  So, I think I conveyed it that way while on the phone.  They could have gotten the line from the book (see to the right), but not the article that they originally mentioned.

Anyhow, I was mighty pleased to see our work appear in a movie.  Not sure it counts as either a citation or policy relevance, but I will take it.

Regarding the movie itself, it tries to have it both ways: tell the McChrystal story and be a fictional take.  So, there is some confusion about what really happened.  For instance, in the movie, Obama blows off McMahon (Brad Pitt as McChyrstal) in Copenhagen.  From what I remember, they did meet and chat there.  For my interests, I was more annoyed by a line later in the movie as McMahon was trying to get more contributions from Europeans (force generation is begging!)--that the Germans would contribute but that their contribution would be restricted to base.  Alas, as Dave and I found and wrote about, this ain't true--the Germans actually made their troops more flexible--able to engage in offensive operations--in 2009 (around the time McChyrstal was doing this stuff) because their parliamentarians had realized that the restrictions had made the German troops targets.

So, I am pleased to see our stuff in a film and that force generation be depicted pretty well, but, of course, the movie took liberties, which is to be expected.  Anyhow, that is my brush with Hollywood until my daughter graduates and starts making movies there.

More on Germany in Article V Scenarios

I briefly discussed the German challenge in my previous post, but a conversation during the coffee break was most helpful in clarifying the confusion.  So, let me try again.

There is a big difference between Article V operations and expeditionary efforts... maybe.  That is, the German cabinet could deploy troops to deal with an attack upon NATO (not just an attack upon Germany) and then consult with Bundestag later.  The problem is that the cabinet may dither because they fear what the parliamentarians might do/say later.  This is akin to the US problem that the public is not as casualty averse as politicians think, but these perceptions of casualty aversion can cause politicians to pull back (Somalia after Blackhawk down). 

This dynamic did appear in Afghanistan in that the Bundestag did not create really tight restrictions for the German troops---the cabinet did, the German defence minister did because of their anticipation about what the Bundestag would and would not accept.

For me, the key concern is that there is still some confusion about Germany's legal constraints--what does Article V mean now as opposed to back in the day?  In the Cold War, NATO defense and Germany's defense were one and the same.  These days, an attack on Latvia or Turkey may not really endanger Germany. 

Which gets to two key dynamics.  First, an article V attack is only an article V attack when NATO agrees (consensus!) that such an attack has taken place.  An ally could be attacked, such as Turkey, and yet the alliance may not agree that it counts as an attack.  Indeed, I use the Turkish case because we have already seen this play out.  Second, article V includes opt out language--each country responds as each deems necessary.  So, still plenty of room to waffle. 

Anyhow, it seems clear to me that any NATO rapid reaction force would not be that rapid, as SACEUR is not being given authority to send troops without consulting the North Atlantic Council and without getting the consent of the countries contributing troops the force.  In other words, thus far, no pre-delegation of authority. 

And this is not just a German challenge--it is true for many/most/all members.  On the bright side, SACEUR can act with his second hat--as US commander of European forces.  But that means having some US troops nearby to throw into the mix. 

And, yes, I am having heaps of flashbacks to the Cold War.  We may not be in the Cold War 2 now, but there are lessons to learn from the past.  Russia is not the Soviet Union, but NATO is NATO. 

Caveats for Sale

I find the Authorization to Use Military Force [AUMF] Obama is trying to sell quite notable for many reasons but particularly because it is the closest thing I have seen in the US to a coalition government-style caveated mandate.  In ye olde book, we found several European countries that would have legislative approval of letters/decisions that specified the length of a mission and what the troops could do. 

This AUMF has a limited time span--three years--which is far longer than those in Europe (and Canada), which are usually anywhere between six months to two years.  Perhaps even more notable--that this AUMF so that there will be no enduring offensive ground operations.  Now that is quite the restriction--caveat ahoy!  I think that is what Stephen Harper had in mind when he sent CANSOF to Iraq--no enduring ground ops.  Instead, he said combat.  Whatevs.

Brian McFadden, NYT

Good times for writers of books on civilian control of troops involved in multilateral military operations.

Trading Risks in Iraq, Maple Flavour

The debate the past few weeks since it was revealed that Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) has pondered the meanings of combat and accompanying.  My friend, Roland Paris, is most concerned about mission creep--that the CANSOF folks doing targeting on/near the front lines may not just lead to firefights but a broader engagement with much more combat.  I am less worried about mission creep because I focus on domestic politics--that any deeper involvement would raise risk for the election next fall. 

The point I want to make today is a simple one (as I have too much work to do pre-ISA to do any complex thinking/writing).  Canada is engaged in a bombing campaign in Iraq.  It seems to be the case that the air campaign has helped to blunt the ISIS offensive, even reversing some of its gains (Kobani is the visible example in Syria, I don't have a handy battle/town to cite for Iraq).  If one is going to do bombing, then risks are there to be managed: do you act to faciliate more accurate targeting, putting some of your troops at risk or do you avoid risks to your troops and thus have less accurate bombing? 

I ask this because I doubt that the CANSOF troops that have approached the front lines, whatever that means, to paint targets just for the fun of it.  Maybe so, but probably because they felt they could do the job better than the Iraqis they are training.  More accurate targeting means two things--more effectiveness from the Canadian and coalition planes above and less (albeit non-zero) risk of hitting civilians on the ground.  While drones and recon planes are handy, having eyes on the ground is generally seen as better.  Indeed, the big German mistake in Kunduz, Afghanistan was in large part because there were no eyes on the ground. 

The CANSOF do have some restrictions (a.k.a. caveats)--they are not engaging in raids or other clearly offensive operations.  They are engaged in combat, as I understand it, since they are painting targets for the planes dropping bombs, whether this leads to them being in firefights on the ground or not.  Anyone insisting that the CANSOF not facilitate the targeting process must ask themselves--would this kind of caveat be aimed at reducing the risks facing the CANSOF?  If so, at the expense of both Iraqis and effectiveness?

Despite my general criticism of caveats, some make sense.  Not engaging in raids makes sense as that significantly increases the risks not just of casualties but of capture.  Which would complicate things greatly.  But a caveat against providing support for the air campaign?  That would not eliminate risk but move it from the CANSOF to the Iraqis in ways that also harm effectiveness.  As such, tis a bad idea.

If Wishes Were Fishes, Coalition Ops Would be Easy

It was interesting to see lessons about coalition war in Afghanistan to be applied to the new/old war in Iraq/Syria.  It was nice to see an appreciation of the difficulties that caveats impose on effectiveness, as countries place limits on what their contingents can do.  That the solution is to engage in minilateralism, leaving out those with significant restrictions, is not surprising ... especially since it was penned by a former Cheney aide.  Such folks tend not to see the tradeoff between legitimacy and effectiveness. 

But an understandable omission.  Less understandable is focusing on inter-agency coordination.  Are we setting up provincial reconstruction teams in Syria/Iraq or this mostly a kinetic exercise?  If the latter, then the whole of government stuff is mostly irrelevant.  Yes, there is a need for coordination among agencies but we are not asking other countries to engage in a whole of government effort, are we?  This is not Afghanistan.

Relying on less capable partners is problematic, but given that the US spends far more on its military, it should also have only less capable partners.  But less does not mean incapable.  And some allies have different capabilities, such as other avenues of intel, better COIN practices, and so on.

The authors harp about intel sharing, but who will the US trust given that many allies in the area have more than one agenda in play?  yeah.

The complaint moves on to command and control.  Absolutely a problem.  The US failed in 2010 when the Marines insisted on their own chain of command.  Expecting allies to give up national control of their contingents is just silly.  The democracies especially are not going to give up civilian control of the military to a foreign power. 

Good luck with the detainee issue. Allies used to trust the U.S. to hold onto those swept up during a peacekeeping operation or conflict, but Guantanmo, Abu Ghraib, rendition and torture made that politically impossible.  So, it is unlikely that "this thorny issue must be handled up front."

The problem I really have with this piece is that it mostly identifies real challenges that are mostly inherent in multilateral warfare and only wishes them away.  No good lessons learned here about mitigating such challenges.  The good news is that it means that the conclusion of our book has not been overcome by events.

White House Down, Red Cards and Shameless Self-Promotion

 Spoilers below:

A Quick Caveat About Caveats

For those wondering about a potential Syrian intervention, there is the classic question of coalition of the willing vs. NATO.  Sarah Kreps and Patricia Weitsman have books on the question of the relative effectiveness of coalitions vs. alliances and why the US chooses one or the other.  Nora Bensahel did some work on this earlier.  There is much to say and to study on this topic, but I just want to say one thing:

Choosing coalitions of the willing so that you don't have to deal with caveats (restrictions a country will impose on how their contingent is used) is a mistake because countries in coalitions of the willing also can and do impose restrictions on how their troops are used.  Just ask the Americans about all of the caveats imposed upon partners deployed in Iraq in 2003-2007.  Yow.

So, if you think going caveat-free is one of the key pro's to relying on a coalition rather than an alliance, think again.

Learning from Lessons Learned Exercise

I spent the past two days at a conference in Fredericton, New Brunswick.  The U of NB's Gregg Centre and the Canadian Force's Combat Training Centre held a two day conference on what the Canadian Army can learn from its Afghanistan experience.  I presented on the lessons about multilateral military operations--drawing from the Dave and Steve book (coming to a bookstore near you late in 2013).

It was a bit different of a crowd.  I have presented my stuff to military audiences before, but these folks were almost entirely Captains and Majors and senior enlisted folks (plus a general or two and some colonels).  So, they had experienced a tour or two (or more) in Afghanistan and perhaps Bosnia, Cyprus and beyond.  They knew countries varied in how they conducted the war, but not about the sources of such variations.  Ta da!

I also learned stuff.  I learned that these folks had far more multinational experience than "joint."  Joint refers to working with other parts of the Canadian Forces, but, outside of helo support (all helos are RCAF), these folks didn't have much interaction with the other services. 

Today's sessions were breakout groups or "syndicates" as they called them.  I chose the multinational one.  Someone raised the idea of multilateral ops as a carpool--that someone is always driving the rest.  Often the US, sometimes the Brits.  The problem with the metaphor is that it gives way too much control to the driver---how many cars do you know move in four directions at once?

It was interesting to see the Marines come up a lot, as they used to have little multilateral experience.  But the Canadians often used them as examples.  Perhaps because, like the Marines, the Canadians pride themselves on adaptability produced by having old/lousy/too little equipment.

I had an interesting conversation with a female FOO.  This would be a forward observation officer--a person that manages the infantry's connection to artillery and air support.  In 2006, Canada had its first female KIA--Nichola Goddard--who had been a FOO.  I wondered if the CF got more protective of their FOOs, female or otherwise, after Goddard's death, but the officer I was talking to said that they were far more protective of the new grunt in the group--an 18 year old kid.  

I realized that knowing acronyms is not sufficient to faking being a military person.  It is necessary but not sufficient.  What you also have to do is say the following things alot:

• sort.  As in: "we need to get x sorted."  Lots of sorting going on.  
• piece.  As in "he was assigned the training piece, she got the int piece (not intel, just int)" and so on.  
• construct as a noun.  As in "the training construct served us well in the short term, but can we build a similar construct somewhere else."  
• enable. Heaps of enable and enablers around.  

One of my contributions I made to the discussion was to point out that referring to the other services constantly as enablers meant that, yes, you might value their role in helping you out (enabling you to do what you need to do), but then you are also making the service feel as if they are secondary to you.  Thus, I was suggesting that if one wants better jointness, better relations among the services, one might want to stop referring to them as enablers.  "Who you calling an enabler?"  Somehow, I doubt that I will change this habit.  I do hope, however, that my stuff on multilateral military operations does enable the CF down the road.  

Finally, they kept calling me sir.  Always feels strange--me a sir?  

Oh, and I learned more than this.  A smart group of interesting people with much experience and have thougth much about it.

Heavy NATO News Week

As things begin to ramp up for the big summit in Chicago in a couple of weeks, heaps of NATO to be found in the news, so some highlights and reactions:

• The French election produced a President, Francois Hollande, who has promised to get his country out of Afghanistan by the end of 2012.  I do not doubt that Hollande will start this process, but complete it?  France has about three thousand soldiers in Afghanistan, and taking out that many is not a trivial exercise, especially if there is any obligation to bring back the stuff they brought with them.  [Update: It looks like I guessed right--Hollande is backtracking since getting troops and their stuff home is hard.]
• France is not a lead nation--not of a province and not of a PRT--so its departure will not create a big gap in terms of leadership and infrastructure.  This contrasts with the Canadian and Dutch departures. 
• France was pretty flexible since Sarkozy became President, so this is still a significant loss especially compared to some other European countries with tighter restrictions.
•  The Visegrad group--Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia--announced they are forming a joint combat force of three thousand troops to be commanded by the Poles and to serve the EU.  I got in a twitter discussion with @Natosource about this because I indicated that I was unimpressed.  Why?  Because the Hungarians had very tight restrictions in Afghanistan, so much so that the small New Zealand detachment in the adjacent province would patrol in the Hungarian sector to get situational awareness.
• Also, I am committed EU skeptic when it comes to security.  While this force might be useful for doing post-conflict stabilization (Bosnia after 2004), I am dubious of the chances of the EU deploying any troops into serious harm's way.  That would require a common foreign policy which the EU has yet to demonstrate any place where there is significant violence.
• The Pentagon refused to support the making of the Avengers movie because its depiction of US-SHIELD relations was seen to be unrealistic.  This is so silly given how many multilateral military operations the US has done over the past two decades, so I can only assume that the movie clearance people did not bother to chat with the Joint Staff folks on the NATO desk (I could probably still find that room....).  Perhaps once they read my next book, they will understand how the US would manage its relationship with SHIELD.

Caveats in Avengers

Wired has a story that indicates that the Pentagon did not support the filming of Avengers because of questions about the US role vis-a-vis SHIELD.  I posted at Duck of Minerva my take on this.

NATO potpourri: Consider Me Confused

Just a fun day to be thinking about NATO.  Actually, every day is a fun day to be thinking about NATO as I start to reach the end of the Dave and Steve book.

Anyhow, just a couple of stories today:

• The former Hungarian Ambassador, Andras Simonyi, addressed the future of NATO as the Chicago summit is on the horizon.  He blasted those countries that did not share the burden adequately and admired partners (Sweden in his Libya example) that did more than members.  This comparison is not surprising except that it comes from an Hungarian official. 
•  Hungary was such a lightweight in Afghanistan that the New Zealanders in the neighboring province would send patrols into the Hungarian sector to find out what was going on since the Hungarians were heavily restricted.  Oh, and the real punchline--the Kiwis had 220 or so troops, so sending a patrol into the Hungarian area of responsibility was not a minor task even if the NZ sector was one of the easiest in Afghanistan (remote, ethnically distinct from Pashtuns, bad past experiences with Taliban. 
• So, the real question is what is Simonyi doing?  Attacking his own country for not doing much in Afghanistan besides showing up?  For not showing up at all during the Libyan campaign?  
• I am seriously confused.  It would be like a Bush administration official snarking at another country for acting unilaterally.  
• The second story is that Turkey's Prime Minister Erdogan spoke about the threat of war with Syria.  Refugee flows and possible attacks across the border are causing Turkey to become more assertive.  This has raised the idea of Turkey invoking Article V of the NATO Treaty--an attack upon is an attack upon all.  Of course, asking and getting are two different things:
• Invoking the article is a political act requiring a decision of the members of the alliance--not just one member saying it was attacked.  Only time A-5 was invoked was after 9/11.  Getting the rest of NATO to agree or enough to agree and the rest to stay silent is mighty hard.
• Indeed, France would likely oppose A-5 for Turkey as the two countries have heaps of tensions over a variety of issues.  Greece, of course, would oppose anything Turkey wants.  Other countries in NATO would likely side with France as they would not want to appear to be obligated to help Turkey while being financially constrained at home.
• Which gets to the second part of A-5: an attack upon one is equal to an attack upon all, and each country responds as it deems necessary.  That A-5 has a huge opt out clause that one can drive a country through [this is where caveats are inherent in NATO].  Some countries did not join in A-5 associated efforts in 2001-2002, such as participating in NATO AWACS planes flying over major American cities/events.
• So, what is Turkey up to, knowing that asking for A-5 is likely to split NATO?  Perhaps pushing NATO to act in a way that would not prompt the same kind of crisis that a debate about Turkey and A-5 might?  

So, today, we have two puzzling cases of actors asking for stuff that they cannot get and the mere asking is pretty controversial.  I don't quite understand.  Do you?

Short Memories and Forgotten Realities

This piece in the German press suggests that Canadians are flummoxed by the German stances in Afghanistan and Libya.  The idea is that the Canadians did lots of heavy lifting and risk-taking and the Germans did not do so much, entirely opting out of Libya.

There is some truth to all of this, but the piece ignores a few key realities:

• Canada did not pay the highest price per capital in Afghanistan.  That would be the Danes, followed by Estonia and then the Brits. 
• More importantly, the Canadians did have significant restrictions on their forces deployed to Afghanistan between 2002 and 2004, and before that in missions elsewhere (Bosnia).  So, Canada is not new to the Caveat game.  
• Yet even more importantly, Canada now has forces in Afghanistan that are far more restricted than the Germans--a training mission that keeps the Forces behind the wire in and near Kabul, Herat and up north.  So, it is kind of funny that a country that pulled out early and only came back to a highly restricted mission is smug about the Germans, especially when:
• The Germans did evolve over time do to more, to risk more.  While German troops are still not operating in the hardest parts of Afghanistan (South and East), the North has gotten more challenging and the folks back in Berlin have given some more discretion to the troops on the ground to engage in combat.  
• However, Germany did not participate in the Libya mission, even pulling out its contribution to NATO's AWACS planes (they compensated by providing more help to the AWACS flying over Afghanistan, but still this was challenging given the leading German role in the NATO AWACS program).

So, Canada did sacrifice a great deal and can be proud of the contributions it made, but this is not particularly good time to be too critical of other countries' caveats and other limitations in Afghanistan.

Live from Southern California!

Ok, not so live, but I just realized that my talk at USC last month was taped and is now online here.  So, if you want to watch/hear a 40 minute talk or so about Caveats and their sources, check it out.  Just no bootlegs, as I am taking every dime I earn off of this to buy a cupcake. 

Whose Boots on What Ground?

Countries often rely on Special Operations Forces [SOF] not just because these folks are capable but because they are covered in secret sauce.  Well, I have had an on-going discussion with some folks on twitter as a result of a statement by the Spanish Minister of Defence:

Spanish Defence Minister Carme Chacon on Tuesday said Spain would withdraw its troops from Libya as soon as Nato formally announced the end of its operations there. “As soon as Nato formally confirms the end of this operation, Spanish assets will be immediately pulled back to Spanish territory,” she told a press conference.  “This means that all the troops that we have today in Libyan territory will be in Spain before October 31,” she added. “The efforts carried out during these seven months have borne fruit,” Chacon said.

Does this mean that Spain had some SOF in Libya or that this was a mistake, as she was referring to the planes flying out of Sardinia and the troops on Sardinia supporting the sorties?  We have no idea since SOF guys can be quiet and secret.

I would be surprised if Spain had SOF on the ground since it never seemed to be enthusiastic about the mission--Spain did not drop bombs on Libya as far as we can tell, unlike the ambivalent Italians that started out refusing to bomb but then got more invested in the outcome, including the deployment of SOF.  Still, sending SOF is somewhat less risky/less costly/more likely for a hesitant country since the secret sauce allows for deniability. 

Update:  This story clarifies the Spanish situation.  Not only no boots but nice rhetoric to suggest that only 30% of the flights were air strikes so that the effort elsewhere (no fly zone,embargo) was heaps of heavy lifting:

The Minister for Defence said that of all the efforts undertaken by NATO on this operation, only 30% of the missions were launched to neutralise terrestrial targets. The remaining 70% of the missions were related to establishing and maintaining the no-fly zone and the naval arms and mercenaries embargo on Libya. "And the Spanish contribution to these objectives was considerable", said Carme Chacón.

What is the Spanish for punching above one's weight?  Insert smiley face here.  So, Spain is quick to announce a withdrawal of forces that did not take part in the kinetic side of things but in a statement that emphasizes the contribution. 

I am back to feeling comfortable about how predictable this is playing out.

Canada Alone?

David Bercuson and Jack Granatstein have written a report on Canada and Afghanistan that is getting much play in the media (and helped to inspire indirectly the previous post about casualty figures), with Bercuson and Granatstein writing op-eds to promote the report.  There is much that one can chew over, but let just take issue with this one recommendation:

"Canadian decision makers should think long and hard before entering into any coalition to which national caveats have been attached."

Hmmm, what can we say about that?  First, and most obviously, Canada units used to be known but CANTBATs instead of CANBATs (Canadian battalions) precisely because they had very severe restrictions on what they could and could not do in Afghanistan, Bosnia and elsewhere.*

* Deep in the report, the authors acknowledge this reality, but then do not let this inconvenience them when making recommendations.

And, guess what?  Canada has them again.  The training mission in Afghanistan is quite constrained "behind the wire."  So, insisting that others have caveats that pose problems for the Canadians (which happened to be the case for a while) ignores the reality that Canada too has controlled its agents in the field pretty directly via blunt instruments like caveats.

Second, if Canada refrains from participating on coalitions where caveats are in play, then when will Canada deploy abroad?  Um, never.  Really, never.  Coalitions of the willing (such as Iraq) had countries that were restricted by caveats.  Even working with the US bilaterally is problematic if we follow this logic, since the US has a big caveat on nearly all of its deployments--that Americans must command.  NATO will always, always, always have countries imposing caveats on their missions since a consensus-based organization cannot insist on complete compliance, nor can any international organization composed of sovereign states. 

So, Canada will only be able to act unilaterally under these rules.  But Canada lacks the capacity to operate by itself except perhaps for relief missions to Haiti. So, is this really a call for Canadian isolationism?  I don't think so, but the implications of a caveat restricting Canadians from working with countries with caveats are pretty clear.

TV Gets Multinational Warfare Right?!

I have been watching Combat Hospital this summer.  It is a relatively cheesy version of M*A*S*H set in Kandahar, but not as funny.  Perhaps more China Beach-esque.  It is a Canadian series picked up in the US by ABC, hence the more visible role by the Canadian folks. 

The basic idea is that it is a jointly run/personned medical facility in Kandahar in 2006, mostly run by Canadians but also with a smattering of Americans, Brits, Aussies (mostly there to party, it seems), and others.  So, a natural plot would be to show tensions among the Canadians and the Americans, particularly given the shared Canadian sense that Americans are reckless cowboys.

So, I was most interested, given my research on many of the challenges of multilateral operations, to watch last night's episode and see a key plot focused on a rather subtle difference in rules--that the Americans don't seem to mind their helo pilots using "go pills" (amphetamines) when they are drowsy whereas the Canadians would rather rest a weary pilot (see this scene via Hulu, if you can) I have no idea if this is true, but this kind of difference in standard operating procedure is certainly one of the challenges facing any multinational unit, just as each country operating in the skies over Libya has a different targeting process--essentially different rules of engagement--that must be finessed.

As a result of this episode, I can feel as if I was working this summer while watching a decent but not fantastic TV show. 

Poking Allies in the Eye with a Sharp Stick

I am only posting on the SecDef Gates speech on NATO now rather than earlier in the day because I was getting briefings and tours at a Canadian airbase.  The purpose of this trip (five hours from Montreal) was to learn more about the Canadian air folks and ask questions about Libya.  So, it is funny that while I was riding to the base yesterday and then walking around it today that SecDef Gates did his best Rumsfeld imitation and poked the Europeans in their respective eyes with a metapohorical sharp stick. 

“The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. Congress — and in the American body politic writ large — to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own defense,” Mr. Gates said.He was dismissive of some NATO partners as “nations apparently willing and eager for American taxpayers to assume the growing security burden left by reductions in European defense budgets.”

 So, what are my thoughts on this?

• Surprise.  I know that Gates is smarter than this.  Or at least, he knows that trashing his NATO partners will not lead to much increased flexibility on the part of the Germans or the Turks.  I interviewed the US Military Representative at NATO a few months ago and he noted that the US had realized that this method did not work and had become much smarter about trying to persuade the allies to kick in more.
• Frustration.   This is not going to change what the Germans are doing. Merkl has misplayed this, like lots of other things lately, so this public spat is not going to do much.
• Elation. Woohoo!!  My next book (with David Auerswald) matters big time!  What we are writing about regarding Afghanistan is relevant for Libya and for future NATO ops.  The US SecDef says so.  
• Annoyance.  People are going to pickup on Gates's use of irrelevant to suggest that NATO is irrelevant.  It ain't and it is not going to be.  While NATO has some significant problems and will have even more once Europe cuts their defense budgets further, NATO is still the most powerful, competent multilateral defense entity on the planet.  There are three choices: US alone, NATO, or nothing.  More or less.  The really telling fact about NATO's relevance: all NATO countries plus nearly 20 more are in Afghanistan.  Even though some have opted out entirely of the Libyan operation, the alliance does (dare I say it) create some obligations that are costly to break.  The Poles can get away with it this time (and should) because of their significant commitment in Afghanistan.  The Germans cannot so much since they have some key capabilities for the Libyan mission and are being more difficult than usual.  But the NATO imprimatur makes it easier and perhaps even possible for some of the more effective countries to participate--Canada, Norway, Denmark--and for Italy to provide bases.  So, NATO is hardly irrelevant.  

So, there you have it.  My take on Gates, having only read part of the speech.

Flying While Thinking about No Fly Zone

I am traveling today so this post will be short.  I just want to note that caveats and such apply to the Libyan operation as much as to Afghanistan:

Britain and France, for example, are now flying the bulk of the attack missions, with Norway, Denmark and Canada also striking Libyan targets on the ground. But other countries, including the Netherlands, Sweden, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, are taking less aggressive roles, enforcing the no-fly zone over Libya or conducting reconnaissance missions, in a nod to political considerations back home.NYT

This is hardly surprising.  Well, it may be surprising that the Dutch are there at all, given that their sweeping defense cuts will be eliminating all of their tanks.  Perhaps their participation here is partly aimed at justifying to the home crowd the need to keep their current planes (or at least most of them) and invest in the next generation of planes (F-35's).

It should not be surprising that there is a division of labor/responsibility where some countries are willing to engage in striking targets on the ground while others refrain, enforcing only the No Fly Zone.  This has much to do with domestic politics and how these dynamics interact with the various meanings attached to the UN resolutions.

The Danes are keen to support NATO, especially with their former Prime Minister running NATO.  France is demonstrating quite clearly that caveats are a matter of Presidential interest or disinterest.  They were in the club of rations consumers (as opposed to burden bearers) in Afghanistan under Chirac, but Sarkozy has been pushing French participation in NATO since then. 


Regarding the British, coalition government does not seem to be restraining its foreign policy as some (that would be my co-author and  I) would have expected.  Will have to think more about this case.


The debate about the pace of bombing reflects a bit about how countries have different rules of engagement--some are far more willing to risk collateral damage while others are not.  Some countries are eager to participate symbolically in a NATO mission, any and all NATO missions, but not engage in any kind of effort that would be controversial.


One of the amazing things is how many countries are participating at a time of steep budget cuts.  Folks say that NATO does not matter or is entirely ineffective, but it does have a big impact of maxing pressures to participate at some level.  That is, NATO members tend to feel obligated to participate plus domestic audiences are more likely to expect their country to participate in a NATO operation.  On average, it is almost certainly harder to get domestic support for ad hoc missions than for NATO ops.  So, NATO does matter, even if it is not effective as folks would like.  Am I surprised that countries disagree about the pace of the operation?  No.  Anytime there is more than one actor, there will be differences about how an operation is conducted.

Germany Divided

Seems like Merkl's decisions of late have not played well domestically or internationally.  Lots of strange stuff here.  Germany did pull out of the NATO fleet in the Med because its involvement in the embargo would have required a vote in the Bundestag.  But the tale here suggests that winning such a vote might not have been that problematic.  Seems like both parties in the coalition are in revolt against their leaders, suggesting a big mis-read of what would, ahem, fly domestically.  Even the peaceful Greens are criticizing the government for setting German hopes for a permanent UN Security Council seat a decade or two. 

Indeed, one of the strangest parts of this is that the Germans are being good allies by sending more folks to Afghanistan to backfill the allies who need to send airborne surveillance planes to the Med. 

Opposition lawmakers were unimpressed, however. “It’s a perverse logic,” said Wolfgang Gehrcke, foreign affairs spokesman of the Left party, “to exacerbate the war in Afghanistan because one doesn’t want to get involved in a war in Libya.”

I am completely confused.  It would seem to me that the Libya operation could have been one in which the Germans could participate without either casualties or killing (see the Italians for how to fly/sail near but not over Libya), supporting a mission that would potentially prevent flows of refugees towards Germany, and not really do much harm overall.  A new mission like this is going to be more popular than older mission (rally around the flag effects tend to be short-lived).  I was not terribly surprised to see Germany stay in the background, but its more active refusals seem strange. 

Yes, state elections are ahead, but the actions taken by the government and reactions inside and outside seem to be a bad way to go.  Could they have anticipated this reaction?  Maybe if they talked to the backbenchers?