Extending in Mali: Why the Hell Not?

Apparently, Canada has been asked to stick around in Mali for a few months as getting the replacements in place (Romania) is going to take time, and Canada is trying to demure.  My basic response is this: if it was worth it to go to Mali for a year, it is worth it to stick around for three more months. 

Yes, I understand that the CAF will have to adjust, either by extending the current tour by three months or having a third rotation either for just three months or to shorten the second rotation a bit and then have a three month plus third rotation.  The military might say, and probably did, that this will upset various standard operating procedures.  And I get that.  But the CAF also prides itself on being a flexible force, so which is it?  Flexible or not?  Maybe the CAF is overextended with missions in Ukraine, Iraq, and Latvia, but again, what would it take to extend for three more months?

Because leaving on time here is not as bad as leaving Afghanistan early, but it has a similar effect: burning the political capital that was gained via sending the troops in the first place.  Maybe not all of it, but some of it.  The UN officials who begged Canada to replace the Germans are now scrambling to figure out what happens after Canada leaves--so they aren't happy.  The Germans and other Europeans who felt that Canada was doing them a favor will be unhappy since Canada can't just do a wee bit more, or as I always put it, the least Canada can do.  The Romanians will not be thrilled because they may end up getting pressed to show up earlier, which means more money and more risk.  Is the campaign to get a UN seat over, with Canada declaring no mas?  Of course, folks will say that this is not about a UN seat.... sure, sure.  But not extending for a few months certainly does not help the campaign, whether Canadian officials have or have not recognized that they aren't winning it.

Of course, this fits into a larger pattern of the Trudeau government--dithering and delaying.  It took a long time for Canada to decide to do this mission, just as I argued here that Canada took longer than it should to decide to send troops to Latvia and then longer than I would have liked to actually send them.  For a government that started with a cabinet retreat focusing on deliverology, it does not deliver that great.  [To be honest, I still prefer this government to the alternatives, but I would prefer that it performed with a smidge of alacrity]

A former student pushed back, saying that it didn't make sense to do this since a three month extension would put the mission into the middle of the next election.  I understand there is some risk, but the mission thus far has not made any news at home, and I doubt that it would generate much news during the election.  The Canadian helos might crash or might get shot at, but the mission is quite restricted--Canadian troops are not on the ground except behind the wire.  The mission was designed to be low risk, and low risk it will continue to be.  While it has the potential to be an election issue if something were to happen, the ruthless attempt to avoid all risks tends to create other risks, such as criticism from outside about whether Canada is serious about its role in the world and the opposition picking up on that criticism. 

One of the things I admired about the Canadian officers I interviewed for my work on Afghanistan was that they mostly believed not in avoiding risk but in mitigating or managing it.  I know that politicians are less likely to have that attitude, but, again, the desire to avoid all risk creates different kinds of risk, not the absence of risk.  So, maybe go with the risks you know rather than the ones you do not?

Of course, the government and the CAF might just say:

The New Canadian Mission to Mali: More than Meh?

Yesterday, the government of Canada announced a new peacekeeping effort: sending an Aviation Task Force to Mali.  Ta da!  There has been much impatience in Canada and probably at the UN as Justin Trudeau promised that Canada would return to peacekeeping and, until yesterday, has not.  Indeed, one stat floated around recently--that Canada had the fewest number of peacekeepers in UN operations since the 1950s.  So, does this new mission satisfy?

Well, that depends on what one considers to be "back" or enough or whatever.  The Canadians will be sending six helicopters (2 chinooks and 4 griffons) to do medevac and transport and the personnel needed to maintain them. That's it.  Something around 200-250 CAF members, staying largely on base except for those staffing the helos.  So, it is more than the 40-odd currently deployed but is far under what were the average deployments of yore.

Is the UN satisfied?  Maybe.  They needed someone to replace the Belgians who have replaced the Germans.  Having a helicopter task force is important especially given how "kinetic" things are--160 UN peacekeepers have been killed in Mali, so having helos that can get people to a hospital quickly is quite important.  But it is only 200 troops in a 13k person mission.  So, it fills a need, one that few countries can provide, but it is a small part of the mission. 

Does it satisfy Canadian voters who so heavily identify Canada as a peacekeeping country?  Maybe. Surveys will have to tell us that. 

Does it satisfy the government wanting to do peacekeeping but not risk many lives?  Apparently.  Given that most personnel will likely be confined to a secure base and given that the various violent actors have not been shooting down helicopters before now (as far as I know), the biggest risk is that Canada loses a helo due to accident (which happens fairly often) in some place where there are no friendlies on the ground.  That would be very bad.  So, there is risk, but it is not as risky as sending in a battalion or two to patrol.

Does it satisfy the opposition? Of course not.  They would never be satisfied even though the Conservatives put Canada on the glidepath to 40 or so peacekeepers.  Westminster politics means short memories and opposing things that one supported when one was on the other side. 

Does it satisfy the aspiration to have more women do peacekeeping (the Elsie Initiative)?  Maybe a smidge?  As far as I know, there are women flying Canadian helos, and women involved in the maintenance of helos.  Are women more represented in these military trades than infantry?  Maybe?  My hunch is that is the case, but so far I have received no answers via twitter or from the government.  Even if there are a higher percentage of women in this unit, say 20%, that won't move the needle much since the Canadian task force again is 200 out of 13,000. 

By having such a finite, contained, constrained contribution, Canada makes a "smart plege" by filling a niche capability at relatively low cost and risk.  But if it is obvious to me, it is also obvious to informed observes so does it help Canada in the competition for a Security Council seat?   No.  I haven't heard from insiders, but I have to guess that the Trudea folks have given up on that dream.  If they were as consumed it as I previously thought, the latest budget would have had far more money in the development envelope. 

While I always thought the UN Security Council seat was a pipe dream (beating Norway or Ireland was always going to be very hard, especially entering the game so late), the events of the past six months or so should have snuffed out the dream.  The failure to sign the TPP in Danang not only alienated Abe of Japan but most of ASEAN plus the Aussies were mighty miffed.  Getting the deal eventually done might have soothed things a bit, but the whole thing was not a voting winning venture.  The India trip?  Well, Canada might have picked up Pakistan's vote...  Oy. 

Anyhow, this whole thing fits into the usual category of "the least Canada could do, the most Canada could do."  It has some risk, it is a valued contribution, but it does not move any needles very much.

Canada's Peacekeeping Move--A Hot Take

So, Canada's big commitment to the UN and peacekeeping consists not of a 600 battlegroup put into harm's way but "enablers".  That is, Canada is proposing to provide helicopters,* transport aircraft, a quick reaction force (which could be risky if they are sent to a place where quick reactions are needed), some money, trainers.

* The article lists a helo with some guns on it as an attack helicopter.  No.  If the UN calls it such things, the UN is wrong.  Let's not exaggerate what is being done.

It is probably underwhelming for many observers.  It is clearly a much less dangerous endeavor (although still some risk) than sending troops into a semi-counterinsurgency mission in Mali or a peacekeeping operation in Congo or South Sudan.

Will this make Canada more competitive for the UN Security Council seat?  No.  Sure, helping lots of countries a little might impress many countries, but not putting any skin in the game (a phrase I would have used even before a recent conversation with a retired general where it came up) means not being that impressive. The good news is that Norway has even fewer troops dedicated to PKOs at this time.  The bad news is that Ireland has more, despite having a smaller military.  Norway almost certainly gives more aid as a percentage of their budget than Canada does, so, um, good luck with the seat.

To be clear, it is not just about the seat.  The question is--how does this effort advance Canada's interests in the world?  Does it mean that Canada gets a seat at meetings?  Well, it probably will not be kicked out of this week's meetings in Vancouver....  But it will be at the kids' tables at the next rounds of UN meetings on peacekeeping because being present in small numbers in lots of places will not give it any heft anywhere.  As someone reminded me on twitter, 600 troops in one spot would not have done the trick either.

How do I feel about this?  Lukewarm.  It is a smart move from the standpoint of domestic politics--there will less risk here than doing something more significant.  The Conservatives can't really outbid them on peacekeeping.  The NDP?  They can try, I suppose, but it probably will not get much traction.  Canada will make a contribution, so woot for the international relations side?  Meh.  Will Canada be making a difference?  A modest one, I guess.

Perhaps I will have a less hot but more complete take as this thing gets clearer.

What do you think?

Why Safe Zones are Moronic, Oxy and Otherwise

Ok, that might be a bit strong,* but that's my first reaction to this:

Trump calls for safe zones in Syria.#StronglyEndorse

— ian bremmer (@ianbremmer) December 17, 2016

What is my problem with safe zones?  I have many problems:

1. Safe zones became targets in Bosnia, so that the collection of displaced people made genocide easier--Srebrenica.
2. Safe zones can be used by those we are helping to become bases for the opposition, which again makes them targets.
3. Here is the big one: safe zones would require..... combat.  We might also call it war.  It would require the deployment of tens of thousands of soldiers to create spaces where the Syrian army cannot go AND where the Syrian artillery cannot fire.  How do you prevent Syrian artillery from firing into a safe zone?  Glad you asked.  Either by providing artillery that engages in counter-battery fire or by airstrikes.  How does that work if Russians happen to be near the Syrian artillery?  Are we prepared to kill Russians in order to create AND MAINTAIN safe zones.
4. That last bit is key--it is not just enough to create a space, which again requires war or an agreement, but it needs to be maintained for how long?  
5. Who will do this?  Who will send troops committed to fighting if necessary?  UNPROFOR did so very poorly in large part because the UN was unwilling to approve of the use of force AND countries that had sent troops were concerned about their troops becoming hostages.  So, who sends troops to Syria to create and maintain safe zones, including doing some significant combat?  The US?  Nice to volunteer the US to do this, but the last time the US intervened unilaterally in an Arab state, folks got upset.  The UN?  Nope, not with the Russians having a veto.  NATO?  It is already occupied with the Eastern Front, and many members are busy in Iraq.  Not a lot of spare capacity.  Turkey?  Oh sure, Turkey is easy to work with these days.  Arab countries?  Um, not great partners either. 

So, sure, Trump likes the phrase, but I am sure the US military is not nostalgic for the glory days of safe zones.  I am sure once General SecDef Mattis educates the new President, Trump's enthusiasm will go away.

Anyhow, hope is not a plan, edition 712.

* some credit to Doug Benson who refers to Safe House the movie as being neither Safe nor a House.

The Dark Side of Peacekeeping

When I was on the Joint Staff on the Bosnia desk, we knew that American contractors were participating in the trafficking of women.  That would be Dyncorp, which the US still relies upon for private military contracting.  The wiki page is pretty darned instructive and refers to a woman who blew the whistle on Dyncorp, on the International Police Task Force that was supposed to be training the Bosnian police, and on the UN and NATO for ignoring the human trafficking. 

The woman, Kathryn Bolkovac, was portrayed in the movie, Whistleblower, by Rachel Weisz that I watched last night. They used a fake name for Dyncorp, but I recognized it easily enough.  The movie makes it clear that one of the consequences of deploying peacekeepers, police trainers and others to a post-conflict zone is to create a market for prostitution.  There was plenty of organized crime that developed during the war that then took advantage of the demand and provided the supply via girls and women.  Indeed, the UN Peacekeepers that preceded the NATO mission did much to enrich the criminals. 

While the UN and NATO did not deliberately support human trafficking, they tended to cover it up, apparently, so that their missions would not be tainted.   It was certainly the case that individuals serving in these missions employed the prostitutes and even abetted the organized criminals.  Truly awful for organizations aimed at helping people to tolerate and even abet the impunity of the criminals.

I guess the upside to a highly kinetic war where there is pretty strict gender segregation might mean that there is less of this in Afghanistan, but I would not bet much on it. 

Peacekeeping and Violence

My latest at CIC: Peacekeeping involves violence http://bit.ly/M3q8zm Obvious? Yes.  Needs to be said again and again

What Not to Do in Libya

I pretty much as ignorant about Libya as the next person, so let me just suggest a few generic lessons learned from other conflicts:

• Don't hold elections immediately.  Everyone likes to do so to give the new folks legitimacy, but then it usually means empowering those who might not be the best folks to be empowered (see Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan). 
• Think carefully about the guys with guns on both sides. Biggest mistake in early Iraq was firing the Iraqi military.  Helped to create the insurgency.  There has been a cottage industry in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), so perhaps this time folks who know what they are doing in these areas might not be deliberately excluded?
• Don't expect tribal affiliations to go away.  Folks have been trying to ignore or do away with tribal identification and tribal loyalties in favor of national identities for generations.  Don't expect it to happen quickly or at all.  Relying on extended kin is way too convenient for politicians, particularly if they cannot easily deliver progress.
• Promises are not reality.  The proposed constitution looks great, but it promises everything, including much stuff that cannot be readily delivered--everyone has a good job, for instance.  Don't expect the timelines to stick.
• The international community will not coordinate well.  I have no clue as to which elements of the international community will show up--UN, NATO, EU, UNHCR, World Bank, IMF, African Union (um, never mind), and so on.  But who ever does show up will be plural--heaps of governmental and non-governmental organizations with different mandates, missions, cultures, etc.  Even when they play well together, there are big problems in getting everyone moving in the same direction.  Easy to see multiple countries getting involved, picking favorites and trying to manipulate the situation (China?).  So, don't expect the international community to be as coherent as the word community suggests.
• Don't rely so much on the ex-pats.  They may speak English well, but if they have not been involved in the fighting over the past few months, they probably have limited credibility on the ground with those did risk and lose.
• Don't overestimate the power of the outsiders.  Yes, the outsiders will have money and influence, but between the competition among the outsiders and the need for the folks in the country to pursue their own interests, politics will remain more local than outsiders would like.  The people on the ground will have to live with whatever decisions are made. The outsiders always can go home.

There will be heaps of stuff on what will happen next.  I have no clue.  I just know that we will probably fall into the usual traps and have overblown expectations.  How democratic is Egypt today?

Anyhow, if you have additional lists of do's and don't's, let me know.

Canadians and The Future of the Military, part 2 (or 6)

"An undersized force, comprised almost entirely of under-equipped soldiers from developing countries, can't do everything," writes Laura Seay, a political scientist and Africa specialist at Morehouse College in Atlanta. "The UN in Congo is burdened with an almost impossible task." 

 This quote reveals the contradictions in thinking about UN peacekeeping effort.  Is it that the resources are insufficient or is that the task is "almost impossible."  This article, which posits Congo, as the potential next mission for the Canadian Forces, ignores my quote earlier in the week--that this kind of effort would involve significant combat.  Peacekeeping can work, as the article names a bunch of successful examples, but there are many reasons why the more powerful countries have largely stayed out of the Congo.  Of course, part of it is that these countries are already over-stretched by Afghanistan (and Iraq) and other missions.  But part of it is that Congo is a very, very difficult terrain with very little government capacity.

There are good reasons to intervene there:

Stephen Lewis, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations and former UN special envoy in Africa, believes that Canada could provide crucial assets for the Congo mission.
"The Congo is just desperate for peacekeepers, and Canada is well-suited to make a significant contribution in what is possibly the worst place in the world for women, and one of the worst conflict areas on the planet. It would restore us to the international position that we should hold."

Making a contribution.  Hmmm.  Where have I heard that before?  Possibly the worst place for women?  Sounds familiar?  Worst conflict areas?  Sounds like Afghanistan to me. 

I really don't expect the Harper government to send significant numbers of troops to Congo:

• it would be expensive at a time of budget cutting;
• he has learned that it is easier to control what the military says than what it does, so having it do more goes against Harper's control freak-ness;
• such a mission could become unpopular quite quickly as the CF starts taking casualties and has to kill people;
• none of the big allies will be joining Canada, and despite the article's claims that Canada has heaps of stuff that it can add to the mixture, Canadian Forces are too small and have other limitations that require them to deploy with other capable countries.

Once again, the imagined use of a military seems much more attractive than the current effort.