Hard Pass: NATO in the Mideast

Trump had a short line in his speech about Iran about more NATO in the Mideast and has even fancied a new name for NATO: NATOME as in NATO in the mideast.

Nope, it ain't gonna happen (which I have said before).  I am currently in Berlin, doing my last bit of fieldwork for the Dave/Phil/Steve project on comparative civil-military relations--what role do legislatures have?  I had an instructive conversation yesterday that made me feel better about my core beliefs on this.  So, first, let me explain my core beliefs and then what I learned yesterday.

NATO operates by consensus, and I think it is damn near impossible to reach consensus on NATO doing much more in the Mideast.  Currently, NATO is running a training mission in Iraq (as discussed by Stefanie von Hlatky in both ep 15 and earlier episode of Battle Rhythm as she visited there for her research).

Why is consensus highly unlikely?  Let me count the ways:

1. Trump didn't warn the NATO troops in Iraq that their risk levels were about to go way up due to the drone strike on Suleimani.  He essentially placed these folks at much greater risk without any warning.  They are likely to be most displeased, and Justin Trudeau's statements have heaps of this displeasure in between the lines.
2. The Europeans come to this pre-miffed--already upset at how Trump has handled Iran.  They find the JCPOA to be far more attractive than the alternatives, so they see tensions with Iran mostly the fault of Trump.  That Trump has repeatedly threatened European countries and companies with sanctions if they don't go along may not be something that gets much play in the US but gets much play, anger, resentment in Europe.
3. Each member of the alliance has its own domestic politics to consider.   This is especially true for most of Europe where any deployment requires a vote in parliament--only the US and Canadians (maybe Turkey?) seem to be immune from this.   To get any vote through will require the most enthusiastic party to expend tremendous political capital to try to get other coalition partners (most European countries are run by coalition governments) and perhaps others (in some places, the governing coalition tries to get the main opposition parties on board so that there is national backing [and all are implicated, making these things lesser campaign issues]).  Given that Trump is toxic, and voting for such a mission would make a party look like it is standing with Trump, I just don't see it happening.

Maybe that was all in my head, a product of my Trump Derangement Syndrome and confirmation bias.  And then I talked with a Bundestag staffer yesterday.  The topic, of course, was mostly the research project, with me asking questions about how the Defence Committee operates in Germany.  But we got distracted by the on-going discussions about Iran--that many politicians could not talk to me this week because they are busy with extraordinary sessions dedicated to the Iran issue.

It was very clear from that conversation that my basic assumptions and assertions are on target here--that it would be very, very difficult to get Germany to agree to support a NATO decision to extend its efforts in the Mideast.  While Germany has opted out of other NATO operations (Libya), this time not only would other countries also opt out, but I am pretty sure they would fight against NATO deciding to do anything in the first place (more like 2003 than 2011).  Don't expect a consensus on NATO doing more.

So,

More in the Annals of Lousy Allies

I was on TV last night (an hour and 38 minutes into the program) to chat about the US effort in Syria and Iraq, and was lucky enough to be on with some smart people: Bessma Momami of CIGI and Ferry Kerchove of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute.  Evan Solomon, the host of Power and Politics, and his crew were most fixated on an interview they were able to get with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. 

Netanyahu had said that Hamas and ISIS were essentially one and the same, and that militant Islam is a poisoned tree that has sprouts around the world including in North America.  I really wish the CBC had buried this interview because Netanyahu is doing the US and the war effort no favors.

How so?  We were talking about the US attacking ISIS/ISIL in Syria along with five Arab countries.  This is a pretty radical shift since none joined in the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.  This participation by the Saudis in particular help to undercut the ISIS/ISIL theme that the US is attacking Islam.  And then Netanyahu says: yes we are attacking Islam AND he is raising the costs of Arab participation by tying them to Israel.

My co-panelist's accent made it sound like Netanyahu was a troll (Ferry was saying "throw") which would be a pretty accurate description.  Netanyahu also would to crap on pretty much anything that Obama wants to do, so that might be in play here as well.  My comment focused on how Netanyahu was doing something that was hardly unique.  When the US engages in counter-terrorism, as it did in the aftermath of 9/11, countries around the world will label their various opponents terrorists and fellow travelers of the group the US is targeting.  Marc Lynch makes basically the same point here. 

When I was in the Pentagon, the Macedonian Minister of Interior Boskovski set up seven migrants (six Pakistanis, one Indian) and had them killed in an act of "counter-terrorism," apparently to appeal to the US to give Macedonia greater support in its conflict with the Albanian minority.  No one believed it, and the evidence quickly proved that these guys were framed and executed.

I am not saying that Netanyahu is Boskovski.  But they are of the same ilk, combining ideological commitment, hate, and opportunism.  The thing is Hamas is bad, the US does not like it, but it is not the same fight.  Hamas is not the same as ISIS.  And that whole poisoned tree thing is wrong, as the US and Canada have faced very little violence from Muslims in North America.  Not none, but a far lesser threat than ... white supremacists.  Also, ISIS/ISIL presents the greatest threat to Muslims, given how many Muslims they have killed.  So, the real poison in yesterday's conversation is Netanyahu's, who is trying to poison the US relationship with the Arab countries.

Maybe this war is a bad idea, maybe it is just the least bad option.  Whatever.  But in the past, when the US needed the Israelis to be restrained (1991, for example), they did so because it was in their larger self-interest.  These days, Israel and the U.S. are pretty far apart, and it is not just about Obama vs Netanyahu, but the realization that Israeli behavior in the region, including its irredentism in the West Bank, undermines America's interests.

Playing the Middle in a Religious War

One way to look at things in the Mideast* is as a religious war between Sunnis and Shia with the Saudis and Qatar on one side and Iran on another.**  That most of the other actors can be seen as proxies/allies in this fight.  Assad is not Shia, but relies heavily on Iran and Hezbollah.  ISIS is based on a perverted form of Sunni Islam, and has apparently received much support in the recent past from Qatar just as Al Qaeda received much support from Saudis.

*  Take all of this with a grain of salt since I am not an expert on the Mideast.
** Yes, there is more to it with all kinds of ethnicities and tribes and such.  This is not a Clash of Civilizations--too much intra-Sunni and intra-Shia violence to say that big blocs are the only dynamic here.

Which puts the US in the middle.  In Syria, the US wants to defeat ISIS (the Sunnis) without helping Assad (ally of Shia) in Syria.  In Iraq, the US wants a government that has been pro-Shia to become  inclusive government (good luck with that) to defeat ISIS without giving too much help to Iran.  Our allies in this war, who are tepid, are mostly Sunnis who are hardly moderates--Saudi Arabia, Qatar, etc..  When I saw this tweet from the US Dept of State, I had to consider that the effort might be doomed:

De-humanization of women central to ISIL terror campaign. Coalition that fights ISIL must also fight this brutality. http://t.co/WVn4fgD6Hg
— Department of State (@StateDept) September 12, 2014

As much as I would like for treatment of women to be central to the fight, it is as Dan Murphy put it--for domestic consumption and perhaps for the Europeans--but not really central to the strategy.  It does help to illustrate how screwed up all of this is.

To be in the middle of a religious war is a bad thing.  Some (I forget who) have offered up the idea of a new Westphalia--that Iran and Saudi Arabia should/can agree that the religion of a state should be what that state's leadership decides and not be subject to this rivalry.  Good luck with that.  The bright side is that it only took thirty years of war to produce the Treaty of Westphalia, which means we might be halfway there?

The American solution, of course, is to take the state out of it, and let religion be up to individuals.  That, too, is a non-starter.  So, the US is left in the awkward spot of trying to get religious extremists of various sides to be a smidge less extreme, I suppose.  Because the forces of secularism are not going to be coming to the rescue in any of these places.

Our best hope is that the ISIS folks alienate everyone through their beyond the pale barbarism, so that the locals, no matter how objectionable they are to us or us to them, switch sides and support this tepid coalition.  Kind of sounds like Afghanistan, right?  In that case, this should just take thirteen years or so.

Perhaps the theme song for this conflict is:

Canada: OK for Now

Brian McFadden once again delights with his snarky Sunday strip:

Saudis Are Not Buds Anymore?

This NYT piece on the growing divide between the US and Saudi Arabia is shocking .... only in what it omits--that whole 9/11 thing.  Remember way back, long ago, when most of the hijackers were Saudi, when Saudi Arabia's promotion of a particular brand of Islam was rather aggressive, and so on? 

I sure do.  So, we are now at the point where the President of the United States is making foreign policies that do not dovetail with the preferences of Saudi Arabia. Boo frickin' hoo.  Yes, Saudi Arabia is still important even as American dependence on its oil declines.  And we need to be careful not to scare the Saudis too much since they could go out and buy some Pakistani nukes.  Still, American foreign policy is supposed to be about maximizing American national interests, not Saudi Arabia's (and not Israel's).

So, conflict and war may not be in the American nationalist interest.  Just a guess, really, that after more than a decade of multiple wars that perhaps we have learned that violence is not always the answer, that developing imperfect agreements that further American objectives might not be the wrong way to go. 

And if it pisses off the Saudis, then perhaps my enthusiasm for the agreement increases 3 times, kind of like the Grinch's heart.

and yes, this post is another example of this phenomenon:

Humility Seems Like a Good Idea

I awoke this morning to find folks on twitter upset that Susan Rice's review of US Middle East policy excluded large swaths of the US policy apparatus.  Given that I am still in the midst of writing (if in the midst means the piece has been on a shelf for a few years) about how the broken Bush process helped to facilitate really awful decisions, it will be hypocritical of me to say here: the outcome is create, who cares about the process.

Why?  Because the review calls for modesty in US aims in the Middle East and is an effort to make the region much less the focal point of the US foreign policy.  Both make a great deal of sense to me, the non-Mideast expert (I am waiting for Marc Lynch to address this stuff as he is both an expert and someone usually tapped by this White House to consult on such matters).  I have long been frustrated that the Mideast seems to be the part of the world getting the most attention, crowding out damn near everything else.  Sure, Iran is important and so is Israel, but are they more important than China?  Is the threat of nuclear war greater here or in South Asia? 

The second part, modesty, in both means and goals also makes great sense, even if it were not a time of austerity and sequestration.  The use of force has its limits, and the US has experienced heaps of blowback over the years for its interventions.  Getting to democracy is really hard, but should still be a goal but not The Goal.

I do love the take of the critics:

• "Critics say the retooled policy will not shield the United States from the hazards of the Middle East. By holding back, they say, the United States risks being buffeted by crisis after crisis."  As if that has not already been the case since  1973 if not 1956.
• Richard Haas is quoted: “But here [Egypt], the administration is largely silent and seems uncertain as to what to do.”As if there is a right way to proceed.  Really?  Sure, the US policy towards Egypt could be a bit more assertive--more penalties for the coup-sters--but it is a case where any effort the US extends is likely to taint whoever we are trying to help. "Do no harm" seems to be a good starting principle.

“There’s a whole world out there,” Ms. Rice said, “and we’ve got interests and opportunities in that whole world.” 

Indeed.

Talk about a Resource Curse

Canada recently was called a petro-state.  I took some umbrage at that, arguing that this stretches the concept quite a bit given that Canada has an oil sector but the economy is not the oil sector.  For a bit of comparison, check out this piece.  It turns out that Saudi Arabia is a one-commodity country, a banana republic if you will, and with the rise of the US's shale oil (here's the upside of fracking), Saudi Arabia will no longer be able to dictate oil prices.

I think most of us can relish just a bit of schadenfreude at the suffering of the Saudi royal family.  The Saudi record for the past forty years or so has been mixed--supporting an ideology that justifies terrorism but also being more moderate in oil prices and in policies than some of the neighbors. So perhaps it is immature to say "woot!" if the Saudis get a bit marginalized.

All I do know is that if we can reduce the relevance of the Mideast in world politics, that would be a huge victory for not just the US but pretty much everyone, even many of the folks in the Mideast who have suffered from too much American attention.

What's Up With Hizbullah?

One of the advantages of supervising students who do work far afield from one's research is that you can lean on them when you have a question.  I have been puzzled by Hizbullah's recent behavior in/towards Syria, so I asked my former student, Ora Szekely of Clark University, for a guest post.  I hope to exploit invite more of my students to share their perspectives here. 

Ora says:

Last week, Hasan Nasrullah openly declared Hizbullah’s support for the Asad regime in Syria, referring to its fight as Hizbullah’s fight and explicitly calling out the “takfiri” (radical Salafist) influence as a threat to both Lebanon and Syria.   In some ways, this is nothing new – it’s been clear since the onset of the Syrian uprising that Hizbullah is committed to backing the Asad regime. There are a number of reasons for this:  

• Most obviously, Hizbullah badly needs both the arms Syria provides directly and the corridor for Iranian arms it provides indirectly.  The former means it doesn’t want the regime to fall in general, and the latter that it doesn’t want it to lose control of territory in the border region in specific, which is why the battle for Qusayr is so critical.
• Syria has historically exercised a great deal of influence in Lebanese politics, and its backing has benefited Hizbullah, in some ways, some of the time, though not in all ways and not all of the time.
• More broadly, being embedded in the “axis of resistance” is far better for Hizbullah than going it alone, for both practical and symbolic reasons.  Until recently, the major members of this alliance were Hamas, Hizbullah, Iran and Syria.  But Hamas jumped ship last year, leaving the coalition without a significant Palestinian member.  (Reports this week of Palestinian refugees burning Hizbullah aid packages are probably a little exaggerated but are still lousy press for Hizbullah.)  The fall of the Syrian government would leave Iran and Hizbullah isolated and deepen the sense of both as Shi’ite outsiders in the Arab world. 
• In some ways, this is simply politics as usual in Lebanon.  There is a long tradition of Lebanese factions seeking military and political support from outside parties, be it the PLO, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United States, France, or whoever else seems sympathetic. Hizbullah is not the only party in Lebanon taking sides in Syria.  Driving around the Sunni neighborhood of Bab al Tabbaneh in Tripoli last summer, I saw FSA flags on every available surface, often paired with a poster of a local sheikh.  Some Sunni politicians are clearly attempting to link their political fortunes to the popularity of the FSA as a way of improving their own position vis a vis their rivals within the Sunni community.

Is Europe Following the US?

With the US ambivalent about a no-fly zone, is it any surprise that the Europeans cannot agree on such a measure?  The European non-decision could be independent of the US hesitancy, as there are many conflicting interests in play, and this would not be the first time that Europeans disagreed about what to do.  Indeed, I am a card-carrying* Euro-skeptic, given the performance of the EU during the Yugoslav wars, Iraq and elsewhere.

* If my book with Bill Ayres counts as a card, that is.  And if I am carrying it, I suppose.

No real surprise that Germany is not thrilled to take part in such an endeavor.  That Italy is missing from these discussions is not surprising given how full Berlusconi's calendar must be with the young ladies and the court dates that involve the young ladies.  But Italy is the European country most likely to be impacted by this crisis--proximity does suggest it as a probably destination of refugees. 

Combining a policy with an uncertain effect with a continent that is always uncertain is a recipe for hedging, not for an assertive stance.

Half Measures Are Exactly That

Even though a no fly zone would require more than its fan suggest (bombing of anti-aircraft systems, etc), it would still be a half-measure.  It would be doing enough to be involved but not enough to make much of a difference.  It would make the West feel better, but would it tilt the balance on the ground?  No.  Given how ineffective the Libyan air campaign seems to be, a no fly zone would fit the "doing just enough to appear to be doing something" bill.  I am not sure putting in Special Forces to help the rebels would make sense either, but at least it would have a chance of making a difference. 

Just a short rant to counter the theme of the day.

Amateur Hour? British Mis-steps in Libya

I think folks are being unfair to the British SAS about their mission to Libya.  Yes, they got captured with guns, explosives and multiple passports.  It does make them look foolish, but the key is that they didn't kill anyone nor did they get killed.  And they got captured by the folks they wanted to meet, rather than the Libyan government. 

Sure, the rebels did not trust these guys with multiple passports (where the Israelis are cited as providing the model of folks using multiple passports to do nefarious stuff).  But nobody got hurt, no blackmail or ransom seems to have occurred.  So, it looks bad, but they made contact--not an easy thing to do with a rebellion in progress.  These rebels, unlike, say the PLO in the old days, do not have an office at the UN or a Public relations division anywhere. 

Perhaps the UK should not have done this, but one of the possible options in all of this, as someone posted on a military bulletin board (sorry not to have the link), is not to impose a no-fly zone but to re-play Afghanistan, fall of 2001.  That is, send Special Forces types, such as the SAS to work with the rebels to provide them with intel and air support.  I am not saying this is a good idea, but perhaps it makes sense to keep the options open, given that Qaddafi might start winning this thing and killing far more people. 

After all, hope is not a plan (thanks, Mike Lombardi), and being prepared is better than the alternative.

Of course, I don't know the details of this operation, so it still could have been a bad idea, but it is not as obviously stupid as folks are arguing.

Thresholds and Definitions: Civil War or What?

"With escalating hostilities bringing Libya closer to civil war, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s forces struck back at his opponents on three fronts, with special forces, regular army troops and, rebels said, fighter jets."NYT

If this is not a civil war already, what is it?  Well, this is actually a pretty important distinction in the scholarly work on political violence.  It could be just a massacre or mass killing.  The difference in the datasets is that a civil war is a conflict within a state where there are more than 1000 battle deaths AND the weaker side is responsible for at least five percent of the casualties.  The idea is that there is something distinct between a government killing its people and a war between groups for control of the state.  I am sure the NYT folks were not thinking carefully about coding decisions, but from the coder's point of view, the question is: have the regime's opponents been fighting back hard enough to inflict serious casualties. 

Perhaps that is not the right question to ask, but the larger issue is still unsettled: whether this is a mass killing in progress or something else.  It does not take the opposition winning to call this event a civil war, just that they are fighting back.

Lots of folks saying Qaddafi is going to be gone soon or later.  Well, that is true of Fidel Castro or Dan Snyder, too, but there is nothing inevitable about regime change.  And as the other cases in the region remind us, replacing one guy is not equal to a social revolution.  It can be merely a coup.  Too soon to tell what is going to happen here, as repression sometimes works.  Civil wars can go on for years, as well.  I would still bet on Qaddafi losing power, but we, the public/mass media, have gotten way too impatient.  Politics is not like the world of Harry Potter--we cannot simply wave wands and make things change (oh, and it took four years for Harry to defeat the resurrected Voldemort, sorry for the spoiler). 

The US did not jump on this because the administration was more worried about the Americans there than the Libyans.  That might sound ruthless, but the last time I checked, the American government was elected by Americans.  Plus it takes a while to get the assets into theater and get the diplomacy straight.  No aircraft carriers in the Med (I think) means that the options have been limited. 

One last note:  The Russians seem likely to oppose a UN resolution on a no-fly zone:

But as Western powers debate the possible imposition of a so-called no-fly zone — similar to those enforced in Iraq during the rule of Saddam Hussein — Russia ruled out the idea on Tuesday, The Associated Press reported from Geneva, quoting Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov as saying the proposal was “superfluous.”

Which reminds me of my favorite taunt of Canadian students:  the UN Security Council as a source of legitimacy when votes on human rights issues always bump up against the Russian and Chinese vetoes (and the occasional American one). 

Stranger and Stranger

Robert Putman, one of the most prominent political scientists, has a piece in the Wall Street Journal documenting his interaction with Qaddafi.  He had the chance to have a conversation back in 2007.  This was, I guess, when Qaddafi was appearing to be more reasonable, less of a support of terrorism and all around good guy.  Ok, that is a bit much. 

Should we criticize Putnam for conversing with a dictator?  No, I think not.  Putnam was doing what all scholars do most of their lives--engaging their curiosity.  Putnam had a chance to meet one of the most, ahem, interesting politicians of the last forty years.  And he took his wife.  What a date!?  I don't think my wife would join me on such a trip, but I guess I would go as long as it didn't look too much like I was approving of the guy's rule. 

Of course, today such a meeting is anathema as the blood on Qaddafi's hands is far more visible than it was four years ago (not that he didn't have it then).  But I guess Putnam thought he might be able to convince Qaddaffi to let some voluntary associations develop.  Qaddafi didn't yet we see social mobilization and some pretty decent organization around Libya.  Perhaps Putnam was wrong twice--to think that a conversation with Qaddafi might be anything more than just a curiosity moment; and that one needs social capital in the form of voluntary organizations to foster social mobilization (of course, I am being unfair.  If I remember Putnam correctly, you don't need social capital of the kind he discusses for rebellion, just for democracy).

Anyhow, it is a well-written piece about a political scientist dancing with the devil.

Efficacy of Intervention

I am not a scholar of international law nor do I pretend to be one.  Indeed, I tend to be a realist when it comes to International Law: that it is not all that binding.  So, when it comes to doing something about Libya, the question for me is more about what kinds of intervention would have what kinds of benefits/costs.  Is it worth it?  Can we do it?

Marc Lynch has been calling for a no-fly zone, (and so has Nicholas Kristof) but the time for that may have passed.  The conflict is now in the streets of the cities of Libya apparently, so stopping the planes from dropping bombs would have a marginal impact.  Furthermore, it is not clear what this would take.  Yes, the US has an aircraft carrier in the Med, but that would be about it unless the flight distances from Sicily/Malta/Crete (certainly not Egypt/Tunisia) permit planes to hang over/near Libyan airspace.  Plus Libya has anti-aircraft missiles, so would a no-fly zone requirement bombing those?  Remember, when the US was patrolling no-fly zones over Iraq, there would be the occasional bombing mission to take out such missile sites.  And the Standard Operating Procedure for the US is to bomb these sites first before doing anything else. 

The Arabist blog raises good questions about doing something or doing nothing.  "a Qaddafi victory would be absolutely dismal. Firstly, the behavior of regime loyalists in Tripoli suggests that there would be terrible reprisals. Secondly, it would probably many dark years ahead for the people of Libya."  We clearly want Qaddafi and his coterie gone, for the consequences of them sticking around are pretty awful.

But what can be done?  We could plink some tanks, but given that the armed forces of Libya are now divided, how do we know we would be hitting the right ones?  Jumping into a counter-coup/civil war is a very difficult prospect.  It is not clear how the folks on the ground would respond to an American intervention.  And yes, it would be an American one.  NATO is currently out of the picture, no way would the EU be able to step up.  And we are all stretched by the other wars and efforts.

Economic sanctions are clearly called for.  Stopping the flow of military aid (thank you, Germany) is a must.  But anything more than that is pretty hard to do and do well.  There are limits to American power, to the power of international organizations and there are limits to efficacy of force in general.  Yes, we could jump and help the eastern part of Libya secede.

But is that really in the cards?  Given the overstretch of the US military, is this something the US can do with few risks to ourselves and to the folks we would like to protect?

Again, this conflict, like the previous ones, remind us that lots of problems in the world are very, very hard and we do not have a magic wand to make them go away.

Contagion? Yes, Please [updated]

The spread of protests from Tunisia to Egypt and now to Libya and Bahrain raise lots of questions about how contagious are political events like protests.  And these questions force to re-consider some of my oldest and dearest publications.  I argued long ago (here and here) that the outbreak of ethnic conflicts and of separatism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union only seemed to be part of a contagious process.  But the ethnic conflict in each was not directly related to the secessionist conflicts in the others.  Instead, these countries faced a similar shock, the de-legitimation of communism and the onset of political competition, which then, because of similar institutions and divides, caused independent separatist efforts in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

So, to come to a region about which I know little, what does seem to be the case is not so much that there are concrete dynamics that move from one state to another* , but rather there are common issues of unemployment, sclerotic leadership, and corruption. 

* Refugees are the classic pathway by which one ethnic conflict can trigger another.

 This time, the shock is something like the end of Communism--the collapse of a set of ideologies/beliefs that legitimated and perpetuated the rule of these folks: "better me than the Islamist alternative" and other opiates that the dicators used to quell the populace.*

*Again, I am not a Mideast expert, so I am just postulating here.

What Tunisia did and then Egypt was show to the publics that the army might not shoot, that the dictators have been wearing no clothes, and that it takes a lot of guts and mobilization, but then it can work.  But people have to die in the process.  We do not have a body count yet for Egypt but it was supposed to be more than a hundred.  The bodycount in Libya will be far higher, I am afraid.

Getting back to my old arguments about contagion and demonstration effects, I have always believed that demonstration effects do not matter so much because any event will be read in different ways by the various actors, just confirming their existing beliefs.  But these events are so shocking--that the strongest, most apparently stable leader in the Mideast (this would be Mubarak) can fall after 18 days--that it simply cannot be fit into the old boxes in people's heads.  Instead, it opens up those boxes and makes people re-imagine what is possible.  Tunisia may have tipped and influenced Egypt, but it is the Egyptian example that will have the most powerful effect.  But remember this, a spark can only set off a forest fire if the conditions are right.  You are seeing the spread of something in the Mideast precisely because many of these countries are facing very similar economic, political and demographic pressures.

We have not seen the end of this, but if one knows what the economic, political and demographic patterns are in the countries that have faced much dissent, we can probably figure out the limits of this wave of dissent.  It might not be 1989 all over again, but then again, it might be more like 1968 or 1848.

More ducking, covering and re-thinking as events compel.

[Update]  I am not the only one thinking about 1848.  And there has been some twittering about the US doing something about Libya.  The US cannot use Egypt as a base these days due to recent events, so the only thing that NATO/US can really do is a no fly zone enforced by planes from whichever US carrier is in the Mediterranean.  The US Sixth fleet is a significant actor, but its role in a Libyan civil war or repression is limited.  We live in interesting times.

Lessons from Bad Repression and New Media

Andrew Exum, during a visit to Egypt, has been reporting back what he has found.  He has a great take that finesses the: facebook/twitter ended the regime vs. it was all people power.  That is, the social media helped with the networking, but it required real bodies out in the streets to make a difference, not just virtual protesters.  In addition, the regime accelerated its demise by shutting down the web, forcing people to go outside to learn stuff, and by shutting down the cell phones, as nothing pisses folks off like lost access to their community.



Striking stuff in a very succinct package.  Exum, or Abu Muqawama, his alias on twitter and elsewhere, has been clear, interesting and excellent at providing his own perspective and links to useful sites along the way.  Consider this your Sunday morning web-recommendation (perhaps a weekly post, if I can remember every Sunday morning).

Reviewing the Month in Civ-Mil Relations

David Sanger has an interesting piece addressing the key questions concerning the militaries and the dictators they prop up.  As I have been repeating, he starts with the premise that the key is when military has to choose--to shoot at the people or not.  The forces of coercion in Bahrain seem to be making a different choice than the Egyptian military.  As are Libya's. 

The problem for outsiders is that we can guess, expect, hope, predict and so on, but just like war, outcomes are rarely certain.  Sanger focuses more on what the prospect of change means for the military.  That is important, of course, but I think another key factor is the uncertainty of the situation.  Unless a military has a track record of intervening and repressing, it is not clear that the officers at the top have either the resolve or the capability to use force against their people.  These officers do not know whether the guys in the square with the guns will actually fire, and so they are going to be wary.  To try to shoot and to fail risks their positions and perhaps their lives.  They must worry about provoking a civil war, with the military fracturing with some supporting the dissenters and others supporting the government.  So, in my non-Middle East expert eyes, it is not so much what change means, but whether the military elites believe that they can be successful in holding back the tide without destroying their institution.  Yes, the threat of change matters, but they must consider whether they can stop the future and at what cost.

What this article demonstrates best is that the Obama Administration actually tries to figure stuff out and then reacts, rather than trying to impose their dreams on reality, which is, ironically, what Rumsfeld is trying to do with his new memoir.  They have experts on democratic transition on the National Security Council, they ask ahead of events about the possibility of instability and political change in the Mideast, they consider various cases to see if there is a pattern, and they consult experts to assess the situation.  Seems basic, but what a breath of fresh air.

He [Michael McFaul] spent the past few weeks churning out case studies for President Obama and the National Security Council, as it sought lessons about how to influence the confrontations that have engulfed close American allies and bitter adversaries. “There is not one story line or a single model,” said Mr. McFaul, who drew on work he did as a professor at Stanford. “There are many paths to democratic transition, and most of them are messy.”

Sanger finds that in this case the key was the military and its views on Mubarak vs the alternatives:

“You could almost hear them making the calculations in their heads,” said one senior American official who was involved in the delicate negotiations. “Did they want to stick with an aging, sick leader whose likely successor was his own son, who the military didn’t trust? And we just kept repeating the mantra, ‘Don’t break the bond you have with your own people.’ ”

Again, they were also calculating not just what happened if they were successful, but whether they would be successful and at what cost.  Would repression work, what would it do to the military?

Finally, one of the interesting parts of this article is how it so neatly sums up the Saudi perspective:

they [the Egyptian military] ignored the advice of the Saudis, who, in calls to Washington, said that President Hosni Mubarak should open fire if that’s what it took, and that Americans should just stop talking about “universal rights” and back him.

 What does this say about the Saudis?  That they are scared, that they may understand only too well how fragile the legitimacy of their regime is, that they would prefer others to use force openly and brutally so that they do not have to do so.  They would prefer to keep their repression in the form of prevention and not on TV.  Apparently, they do not imagine themselves to be the Chinese--to use force decisively and not only get away with it, but get rich as a result.

Betting on the Mideast

A famous bookie has set the odds on the next domino to fall in the Mideast: Yemen.*  He set the odds at 15/8.  But I have a quibble: what does it mean to fall when the government is already pretty close to a failed state?  Jordan is next at 9/4 and then Algeria at 7/2.  Bahrain is at 8/1 with Saudi Arabia and Syria set at 20/1.  Interesting that Iran, Libya and Sudan are in between.  I have repeatedly stated that I am not a Mideast expert, so I am not sure where I would put my money.  I guess I would put it one Sudan or Libya since the odds are pretty good.  Actually, if I could, I would bet that no other dominoes in the Mideast fall before the end of 2012.  While there is increased protest elsewhere, the protestors are not the only ones learning.  Iran is going to repress its opposition pretty successfully.  I would say the same for the Saudis and the Syrians. 

The bigger problem from a betting perspective is what counts as a revolution?  We don't even know if either Egypt or Tunisia have experienced a real revolution.  Thus far, they could easily be seen as coups.  Not until we see elections and new governments arise with people who do not wear uniforms can we start to think about calling these changes revolutions.  If the bets are on changes in dictators only, then we may have to re-think.  Sudan would start to look as a good bet, given how hard this year is going to be.


Where would you put your money?





HT to Ora Szekely for pointing me to this article. 

Not Much To Say

Long day of interviews at and near Supreme HQ Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium.  Drive back was stressful due to demolished cars on sides of the road (slippery when wet, I guess).  So, check out my twitter feed for a series of links about Egypt and other stuff.  All I can say about Mubarak's speech today is that poker, comedy, and politics are all about timing.  Too little and too late for Mubarak.  Asking the Egyptians for time for him to shepherd the transition is almost laughable.  He is trying to delay, delay, delay and see if the protesters are getting tired.  Not so much:

Leave already, my arm is hurting

Predictably Poor Predictions

Foreign Policy predicted the hot spots but missed out on Tunisia.  Now they have a list of five Arab states* most likely to follow Tunisia's example:  Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Jordan.  The piece focuses on food prices, unemployment, and protests.  These are all good indicators or risk factors, but I would wonder what the coup-proofing strategies of each leader are?  How are the various coercive parts of the government organized?  Recruitment?  Again, the key in these situations, as China so ably demonstrated at Tiananmen Square, is whether the folks with guns will shoot at the protesters.  Collective action is hard enough without real fear that one is going to pay for it and fail. 

Another key factor, shared in common with several of these states, is that semi-reform is pretty dangerous.  Lifting the lid off the pot just a bit but still keeping the heat (repression) on is a recipe for things getting out of control.

I am not a Middle East expert, so I cannot say which countries in the region were snubbed--that should have been on this list and left off. 

Again, I am skeptical about contagion--that an event in one place causes events elsewhere as people learn of the new possibilities.  The question remains--each authoritarian leader develops his (no female dictators in this part of the world, right?) strategies to anticipate efforts to remove him.  Some do it better than others.  Sometimes old strategies lose their effectiveness (see Slobodan Milosevic), sometimes events can serve to mobilize people, but those events are usually domestic ones not something elsewhere.

Still, I must admit that if I was a dictator, I would be a little nervous today.  Of course, enduring dictators are habitually nervous.





*  Another damn slideshow.  Why can't a list of five be on one page?