What Is and Is Not Sovereignty

 This is some basic stuff, but I see enough stuff in the media, social and otherwise, getting this stuff wrong.  Indeed, I was on a radio program yesterday, and it was a call-in show where, yes, some of the callers didn't quite understand what is going on with Canada and the EU.

Back in the day, when I was deciding what to do my dissertation on, I noticed that the traditional definition of sovereignty focused on two things--government and territory--that a state was sovereignty if it could claim a hunk of territory and that it had its own government.  I raised questions about why countries interfered more with the government part of that than the territory part until I read more and realized that the international politics of secession was not what people claimed.

Anyway, the key here is mostly the government part--that a sovereignty country is one that has agency--that it can make its own decisions.  That does not mean that such a country is not impacted by other countries, but that the country in question can choose which side of a tradeoff is less problematic.  It also means that delegating to an other institution is a choice and a choice that can be undone.  

My fave example is NATO: Article V can only be invoked if all countries agree, and, even then, no country is forced to do anything.  Each decides exactly how they want to participate.

These days, much talk of a sovereign Canada.  Most of this is about reducing dependency on the US, but one aspect of this stuff does tough on the heart of sovereignty.  In multiple trade discussions, Trump wanted to have a veto on Canada's arrangements with other countries.  That would be reducing Canadian sovereignty, not just raising the costs of one action versus another, but of reducing the ability of Canada to make its own decisions.  

That Canada has rejected this is "nasty" according to Trump, but it is very fundamental.  

International relations is chock full of difficult decisions, and, yes, countries will put pressure on other countries to do what they want.  The very definition of power is to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  But the weaker players can still make decisions to pay the price of resisting.  Canada just did, and, ironically, has gained more stature and more influence.  Carney is lionized in Europe for bucking Trump.  The Davos speech was a start but just talk, costly talk for it did antagonize an always sensitive Trump, but the rejection of the trade deal was a real policy decision.  This deal with the EU, whatever Associate Membership will eventually mean, is symbolic for the moment, but it is also a policy decision--to agree to do something that Trump did not want Canada to do.  

There will be costs, but there will also be benefits.  It was and is up to the Prime Minister of Canada to decide how to weigh them, as Canada remains sovereign.  Even if it is hardly independent economically or militarily. 

Considering the State of American Civil-Military Relations: APSA 2026 Edition

Yesterday, I was on an APSA roundtable with the sharpest minds on US civil-military relations (I did feel like playing the old Sesame street song): Peter Feaver, Heidi Urben, Risa Brooks, Carrie Lee, with Lindsay Cohn serving as moderator (she chimed in during the Q&A).  We all know each other as civ-mil is a great community of very generous scholars.  As a johnny-come-lately (I switched from doing the IR of ethnic conflict to civ-mil after my 2nd book/time in the Pentagon), I greatly appreciate this community.  To be sure, my switch nearly 20 years ago, but I forever felt behind.  Anyhow, I wanted to sum up what these folks said as the consensus was bleak--American civil-military relations is in deep crisis, and whatever problems there were before pale in comparison to what the Trump govt is doing these days.  

I took good but not great notes so I may be getting the views of the panelists wrong--blame me, not them. 

Feaver said:

• this is our moment--that our work and our voices are very relevant now
• what was implicit is now explicit--our understanding of norms of civ-mil depend on assumptions that are now being violated
• the dubious actions of the Trump government are officially legal (more on that below), which presents real challenges
• Chairman Caine made a speech that was a bit out of context but still had the wrong tone---that should just advise the civilians on whether something can be done, not whether it should be done--that there might be consequences (say, bombing Iran?)
• Trump/Hegseth are an overcorrection to the failure to criticize civ-mil under the Dems
• this is a low information environment, produced both deliberately and via incompetence and Congressional failure to do their role

Urben focused on tangible actions to repair US civ-mil, mostly by civilians--building or rebuilding:

• repeal the various authorizations to use military force that allow presidents to use the military in questionable ways without Congressional blessing
• narrow the criteria for domestic deployment so that the insurrection act does not give a government a relatively easy pathway to using troops at home against protestors 
• Congress should constrain executive action, more scrutiny through oversight powers, withhold $, investigate the military advise that has been provided on things like the boat strikes
• Reinstate those admirals and generals Hegseth has fired with backpay (if good enough for those who refused vaccines....), stop doing voice votes for approvals of promotion lists.  [apparently 10% of GOFOs have been fired]
• Create a commission to reinvigorate the military profession. 
• damage too deep for military to do it--restoring Judge Advocate General role, greater protections o senior JAGS, rebuilding institutions that prevent civilian harm, strengthening investigative procedures, improve Professional Military Education, go back to non-awful base names
• work on recruiting and retaining women and minorities

Brooks: 

• biggest concern how homeland security missions undermine civil-military relations/civilian control
• JTF West Hemisphere striking small boats/counternarc missions
• Deployments to city streets
• Northcom 's ops JTF South border 
• effects
• hurts society relations with military--military becomes unpopular
• morale tensions in units
• changes in military's understanding of its appropriate missions.  Hegseth views border as greater threat than China

Saideman:

• The old discussions of whether x moment was a crisis in civ-mil are quant as we now know what a real crisis looks like
• The focus of principal-agent theory will turn to the principals.. 
• I discussed how my effort to develop a list of the incidents where Trump/Hegseth violated the norms of civ-mil led to an effort by four (at least) distinct groups coming together
• Who is doing oversight now?  Not Congress?  OSD (SecDef and his people) are overseeing pushups and gender/race of promotions but not usage of missiles, not rotation of aircraft carriers, etc.  American exceptionalism in how it did oversight over the armed forces is gone.
• that civ-mil crisis in US is going to cause civ-mil crises elsewhere as allied militaries will still focus on working with US military as that becomes toxic in the domestic politics of most democracies.

Lee:

•  blatant norm breaking first time since civil war with President thinking about using military to mess with elections, American military engaging in war crimes (summary executions in Caribbean), tis a 5 alarm emergency
• long term, generational harm with massive selection effect--GOFOs leaving at rapid pace, responding to extraordinarily rapid changes in incentive structures.  
• rapid deprofessionalization, compliance with unlawful orders that violate law of armed confict
• officer corp wants to return to normal, to snap back, but we need a full reckoning
• norms need to be legislated by bipartisan action
• criminal prosecution needed for mil and civs

 

A few general points from this roundtable and conversations this week:

• the whole idea that troops can disobey patently unlawful orders is problematic as the lawyers will generally say something is lawful or questionable but not patently lawful AND the law does not say that patently unlawful is the standard
• lawyer shopping--you can always find a lawyer who says something is ok
• one reason ICE is expanded and military is not doing domestic stuff much is that the military does retain some sense of profession, of professional ethics.  ICE people are not professionals in any sense

Some differences in the panel:

• can you legislate norms?
• what will military think of Dems when they return
• can a future Dem administration cut the military budget?

The big question is what can we as civil-military scholars do?  We need to inform the public and the legislators about what is happening and what is at risk.  We need to make it clear that the consequences of bad civil-military relations will ultimately have electoral consequences (lost wars, excessive casualties, use of military in our streets).  Our community has not been silent, but it also hasn't been that influential. Much work left to do, but listening to these folks taught me a lot.

We received great questions, but I have to run and explore Boston.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

congress

 

The Broken Transmission Belt of Policy: Tariffs Edition

Since Trump returned to power, I have been talking a lot about the broken transmission belt of policy.*  In ordinary times, if a person, firm, or association had a problem, they could complain to their Congressperson or Senator, and that person would put heat on the President to reverse the policy or stop it before the policy took effect.  That is the transmission belt of policy--taking the preferences and concerns of individual and collective interests and connecting them to the actors making the big decisions.

Since Trump came back, that belt has been broken. Very little of what Trump does is popular, much of it is annoying or worse to many voters, firms, and sectors.  But Republican Congresspeople and Senators have largely been unresponsive--they have not pushed for legislative changes and they have not pressured Trump that much.

Why?  Because they range from cowards to co-conspirators.  Mostly, the former.  Trump has two things going for him that help cement his control over the party: a) he is quite willing to throw any member of his party under the proverbial bus and his followers go along with it with Musk's money as a big hammer; and b) MAGA violence is a real threat to Republicans who stray.  My fave example is Joni Ernst, who initially opposed Pete Hegseth's nomination for SecDef since he stood against what she stood for--women serving in combat and fighting sexual assault against women who serve. She folded quickly.

I return to this topic today because the trade war for Canada is terrible for many American companies and sectors.  For instance, Canada is the most important provider of potash to American farmers--85%.  The trade war will have several impacts on Americans and American firms:

• the price of various goods will go up as taxing Canadian imports, yes, increases the prices Americans pay for Canadian goods.  
• the price of various goods will go up as taxing Canadian imports, yes, increases the prices of Canadian goods so American companies that compete with Canadian imports will raise their prices as they face less competition.
• American firms will become less competitive as key inputs for their products will get more expensive--American cars, agriculture, etc. all rely on Canadian inputs.
• American firms that export to Canada will lose business as taxes on their goods--tariffs placed by Canada in relatiation--get more expensive.

In ordinary times, these kinds of folks are important political actors, offsetting those firms who benefit from a protected market--this is the stuff Helen Milner wrote so persuasively long ago. Globalization of production made it less politically attractive to be protectionist.  What has happened?  Trump doesn't care, as he has largely been immune from the impacts of his policies.  Well, his popularity isn't immune, but the GOP whine rather than legislate.  Party discipline, caused by fear and greed, has broken the transmission belt.  I still wonder about the tech firms who seem so important and rely so heavily on foreign markets, but I guess the combo of being too big to regulate or fail and being run by eugenicists and other awful people means they don't care.

Does this mean that things will change if the Dems win back both houses?  I am not so sure, as the transmission belt of policy works if the executive respects the legislature and the Constitution.  Right now, we have Trump's minions defying the very basic rules of the system--not spending money that Congress has allocated.  I am not sure they will stop when the Dems hold some power.  

So, maybe it is not just cowardice and greed that block the transmission belt, but the end of the rule of law?

Anyhow, we shall see if Trump tacos on this, as the trade war is really bad for Americans.  To be clear, the trade war is really bad for Canada, but Carney is only getting more popular as Trump has thoroughly inflamed Canadian nationalism.  Canada is united.  The US?  Not so much. 

 

 

 

 

 

* I thought I had written a post about the broken transmission belt of policy, but I can't seem to find it.

Another Day in Trumpian Foreign Policy: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Maple Victory?

Bargaining with someone of bad faith is likely to go badly.  So, yeah, the US-Canada trade relations were most fraught.*  Because Trump can't keep his word (see his divorces, his bankruptcies, his many bluffs and retreats), Canadian negotiators had to be most wary.  Yet, because of the extreme leverage the US has over Canada--so many jobs in Canada are dependent, one way or another, on trade with the southern neighbor--Prime Minister Carney and his team were willing to make significant compromises.  But when the US made more demands, that blew up the deal apparently.

As I have posted here, since Trump is of bad faith, one should only negotiate over things that you are willing to do anyway.  The best example of this is: sure, put the F-35s in the deal, as Canada was (is?) still going to buy them anyway.  But don't give away much more than that, because Trump will just ask for more.  

The history here is illustrative.  Trump came into office demanding that NAFTA be revised even though it was a pretty good deal, and it reshaped markets in all three countries, making any big change very costly.  So, Mexico and Canada agreed to USMCA or CUSMA or NAFTA 2.0, which didn't really change much but gave Trump the ability to say he made a deal. Which, after all, is mostly what Trump wants--credit for making a deal, no matter what is in the deal.  Then Trump became President again** and decided to coerce Canada into another agreement, this time demanding many things that Carney couldn't really compromise on:

• Dairy access. Supply management is super annoying to me and many Canadians as it means higher prices for eggs, milk, cheese, etc, but the dairy cartel is very powerful here. So, there was no way Carney could give it up, especially for a promise by Trump to .... stop yammering at Canada for a few weeks.  
• Booze. In retaliation for all of Trump's bullshit--the tariffs and the 51st state stuff and the like--the provinces (not the federal government) decided not to buy American wine and liquor for their stores.  Since Ontario owns all of the beer and liquor stores, it happens to be the largest single purchaser of Americcan booze. Or was, until Trump pissed off Conservative premier (governor) Doug Ford.  Federal-provincial relations in Canada are complex, and, I believe the technical term is fucked.  The provinces didn't give the feds info about who got the covid vaccines even though the feds gave the provinces the vaccines.  Anyhow, Carney can't make the provinces change their stances.  However, it would have been fun to see the provinces return to the status quo ante and see most Canadians refusing to buy American booze.  
• Dropping all retaliatory tariffs while the US maintained the right to tariff anytime it felt like.  Disarming oneself while the other side maintains its weapons pointed at you is a non-starter.

Carney would have faced a big blowback had he surrendered on this agreement.  The news was already full of stories about angering compromises on taxing the big tech firms that have been trying to colonize Canada's information space and other areas.  So, yes, he has his own domestic politics that matters a lot.

But again, the core of this is this: if Carney gave in, Trump could at any point hit Canada again and again.  Trump has already been violating past agreements with Canada, so why would anyone think this one is binding?  With the Trumpers, including JD Vance shitting on Canada in the last few days, having no credibility to keep a commitment, Carney could not gamble here.

So, now we are in a trade war.  Americans will pay higher prices for Canadian goods and for goods that compete with Canadian goods (people forget that when tariffs increase the costs of importing, domestic producers will raise their prices to almost match the new prices).  Nice move before the midterms, Donnie.  

And no, Canada is not nasty for protecting its interests. Again, heaps of projection here since Canada's real sin for Trump is that it does not bend the knee.  

*  I am not a trade expert--Meredith Lilly, Jen Robson, Jeni Armstrong, and other sharp minds can speak to the trade stuff.  But I do teach US foreign policy, so I have to think about this stuff.

** One of the less fun parts of the Summer Institute this past week was being asked how Trump could win a second time given all that he did in his first term.  Oy. 

CDSN Meets NDHQ, 2026 Edition

The lighting always sucks in this part of DND,
but this is only place we can do this.

 One of the highlights of every year is the Canadian Defence and Security Network's Summer Institute.  Ripping off SWAMOS and BtG, we organize a weeklong workshop to discuss Canadian defence and security stuff with a mixed audience--roughly one third emerging scholars, one third military folks, and one third government types.  The idea is not just to have all of us discuss and learn about these issues, but to learn how the various folks in the defence and security community think about this stuff.  That the exchanges among the three groups are as important as the stuff they hear from our speakers.  It is the hardest thing we do each year as involves lots of planning, herding academic and non-academic cats, and it is a very intense week for our CDSN team.  It is also perhaps the most rewarding thing we do, as we see the lightbulbs go off and we see connections developing.  

Almost since the start, a day at Canada's defence headquarters has been on the agenda.  It started with a couple of talks and now has grown to a full day of briefings and roundtables.  I am as amazed every year with us getting high-level speakers as our participants are amazed at the quality of my cookies.  In most years, we get a chance to speak with the Deputy Minister of Defence, who as a general rule does not do that much public speaking (DM's across the government tend to not speak up that much, which in this realm, puts them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis the Chief of Defence Staff).  I hadn't met Christiane Fox, so it was great to meet her and get her perspective.  We also met folks from the three elements/environments (what Americans call services), getting a good idea of how the Navy, Army, and Air Force folks are thinking about this moment--about the threats facing Canada, about the injection of money as Mark Carney has pushed far more spending towards defence, and, yes, the Trumpness of it all.

I kept asking the same question because I have a book chapter I need to write--what can the Canadian Armed Forces do without any American assistance.  And the answers, as one of the participants pointed out, illustrated a civ-mil divide that Phil Lagassé pointed out a while back: the military sees the moment as rhetoric and wants to continue business as usual and the civilians are identifying a fundamental break and want to operative differently.  Oh my.  Good for the chapter, bad for Canadian civil-military relations.

I must run off to our fourth day of the Institute, where one of our panels is, indeed, on civ-mil.  

 

More Threat Deflation: Hypersonic Missile Edition

 I keep hearing about the threat of hypersonic missiles, and I keep wondering how this changes things?

 My bias: I am a big believer in mutual assured destruction and a big skeptic of strategic missile defense.

Yes, countries are developing missiles that go much faster.   Does this dramatically increase the threat to North America?  I don't believe it does.  The US has not yet developed a reliable, near 100% system for defending itself against ballistic missiles, so the impact of such hypersonics is ... to hasten our deaths in a nuclear war.  We would die faster.

I have heard some folks say that Canada might get hit by Russian or Chinese hypersonics equipped with conventional warheads during a Taiwan or Baltic scenario to discourage our participation.  Let me point out some of the problems with this:

•  the most obvious is: why should either country care that much about Canadian participation in such a conflict?
• any missiles being flung at Canadian cities (which are almost all near the US) would be seen as an attack on the US.  How confident can Chinese or Russian leaders be that the U.S. would not respond upon launch with a nuclear response?  Remember, a key to nuclear deterrence is that you only need a small risk of the worst thing happening to do deter.  So, can Xi or Putin or whoever be 100% the US wouldn't fire back? 

One of the basics of the nuclear era is that offense is easier/cheaper than defense, so any effort to build up defenses will be a waste of money in an offense/defense arms race.  We are seeing this now with drones versus counter-drone technology--that the US has used up most of its anti-missile missiles and Iran has plenty more cheap drones to send at American ships and other targets.  Maybe there will be a breakthrough for a cheaper way to knock down drones.  And, of course, a few conventional drones leaking through is not a huge deal.  A few nuclear hypersonic missiles will absolutely ruin your day.

So, yes, we should not be pleased that missiles are getting faster, but it does not change the fundamental reality that has existed since the 1960s--mutual assured destruction deters nuclear war.  Does it deter conventional war?  Absolutely in Europe--Putin has not engaged in any conventional attacks despite much temptation.  Does it work in South Asia?  Kind of, sort of.  Yes, India and Pakistan have engaged in conflict, but thus far, none has escalated very far.  The two countries fought several major wars before they each had nuclear weapons. 

Anyhow, I keep seeing all kinds of threats being inflated, but the world is scary enough without exaggerating some of them.  The reality is that climate change and far right subversion of democracy are realities that are hurting people every day, and, no, the military can't help us with those.  So, let's focus on the real threats that are doing real damage, and stop fantasizing about the other stuff. 

 

Holy Round Numbers, Batman!

Not to worry, Robin, for we have multiple Bat-cakes to meet the occasion.  This week, I am celebrating 60 years of ... me.  I have always used birthdays and anniversaries to justify lots of movies, restaurants, and, this year, cakes.  This is an especially round number marking so many things:=

• Leaving middle age for whatever the next thing is: late middle age? 
• Time to start getting discounts.  My girlfriend and I went to a move while on the Saideman family vacation last week (Portland and the Oregon shore were terrific), and we received, unprompted, senior discounts for The Odyssey.  And, to be sure, that was entirely due to my appearance as she is not only five years or so younger, but has nary a gray hair (It seems like it was only a few years ago, younger conference goers were making bets about whether my entirely black hair at the time was real given my entirely white beard).  
• The halfway point--not that I will make it to 120--but that I have been a father for exactly half of my life.  Glad I got to spend time with my daughter last week.
• I am four years past ultimate frisbee, and I still haven't found a suitable replacement.  The recent vacation taught me that my elbow is not a barrier to kayaking, like I thought. So, that plus yoga/pilates may be in my future.
• Tis the second birthday post-separation and first since it was finalized with me living on my own for the last four months.  
• Retirement is now six years ago--close enough to occupy my thinking, far enough way that I have still much left to do as a professor.
• I long ago was considered a senior scholar, but now I am a very senior scholar.  All of my mentors have retired as have a few friends.  
• I survived my fifties although a few friends did not.  

The last point might suggest that I am morose or sad.  While I feel bad about these losses, I do not think I have been happier.  I still love my job as it continues to evolve--learning to teach US foreign policy when the government is autocratic, teaching larger seminars due to budget cuts, shifting research topics a bit less dramatically as I am now firmly ensconced for the duration in civil-military relations, shifting from the CDSN to the CMRN as our second partnership grant is far more comparative and international and more focused on civil-military relations.  I made radical changes to my personal life because I wanted to be happier, and I was successful.  My girlfriend has just been fantastic and even survived a week with a heap of Saidemans quite well.  

The world, of course, sucks mightily with Trump and populists and autocrats dominating our attention and making horrific public policy.  I remain a doomer at this time--I don't think a Dem sweep of the midterms (I will not jinx with a prediction)--will change as much as people hope.  But compartmentalization is a thing that we have gotten good at, so I will focus today on baking: a second cake as I made the rum cake last night and a heap of pitas.  The BBQ is, well, rained out, but I will see how well my home can host a significant sized gathering.

I have to get back to party prep.  Time to cry (cutting onions).   

American Civil-Military Relations Basics: Partisan and Political

 A couple of weeks ago, I got into a running skeet spat because I argued we ought not valorize a military member for protesting the Trump administration while in uniform.  I argued that the US military has long stayed out of politics, and I meant partisan politics, even though it and any govt agency, especially armed ones, are inherently political.

Politics: the basic definition involves the making of decisions affecting the group/society.  Because the military is an arm of government, anything involving it is inherently political even before one invokes Clausewitz's war is politics by other means.

So, yes, the military is always involved in politics.  The use of it, the non-use of it (say on Jan 6th), are political.  Its behavior in the seas off of Venezuela or in the war in Iran are political.

But are they partisan?  Yes, the US military has taken sides in other people's conflicts---supporting the Afghan government against the Taliban, etc, but the US military has almost entirely stayed out of American politics.  Yes, some retired generals ran for office and won (no Admirals, sorry) the Presidency with Ike being the most recent.  Which is not very recent.  The US military has not put its thumb on the scale for any election.

In these dire times, folks were supporting this one officer who publicly protested in uniform.  To be clear, the regulations say he can protest as long as he does not wear his uniform.  Why?  Because, yes, even though this individual is a member of the military, they have the right to free speech.  What they don't have the right to do is make it appear that the military is taking a side in partisan politics.  This officer knew that, knew he was violating the regulations, and will pay a price for that.  This is civil disobedience, which I am normally ok with.  I am not ok with efforts to drag the military into politics, because it is hard to undo.  Yes, Trump is awful, and yes, the military should disobey illegal orders (like firing on civilian boats in the Caribbean), but if we start asking the military to decide who governs, when will that stop?  The best predictor of coups is the history of a country.  The US hasn't had any coups, and that is a major factor helping to prevent coups.  Break that once, and, let's how things go.  And, yes, militaries suck at governing and at engaging in partisan politics.

I finally returned to this conversation due to an incredibly bad argument in a legit outlet (which has also published bad stuff before).  The author is basically saying that the politicization of the military now is nothing new because MacArthur.  And that is just dumb for a number of reasons:

• Mac was an exceptional case where the senior theater commander defied the President on multiple occasions (and, yes, this left the troops on the ground in worse positions)
• This was not a case of the military being dragged into politics (the problem of today) but of a military officer trying to jump into politics (Mac also explored running against FDR in 1944 when he was still commanding troops in the Pacific campaign).  
• Back then, Mac was violating just one big norm. Today, Trump and Hegseth are violating piles of them (the data collection effort continues!) 
• There has been much work of late by civil-military relations scholars directly addressing politicization of the military.  This historian does his best economist imitation and ignores all of it..

To put my cards on the table, I am not an expert on the normative side of civil-military relations--what is a norm violation.  The network I have helped to create, the Civil-Military Relations Network, will be studying both the normative and analytical questions on this topic, but my research agenda is more on the absence or presence of oversight.  So, consult Risa Brooks and Christoph Harig and Pauline Kaurin and the like. But, please don't ask an historian who seems to focus on one event in the 1950s and hasn't considered what has happened since then, either by the US military and the politicians or by the scholars studying this stuff.

Oh, and yes, not all civ-mil folks buy the political/partisan distinction, but I do.