Is More Disappointing? The New Canadian Defence Budget

 The Carney government has been promising big things when it comes to spending on defence.  The question is whether those promises have been exaggerations or not.  And then where the money goes.  I am not a budget expert--Phil is. But since the MinDef's office sent me their summary, I have opinions besides thinking that the name of the budget, Masters of Our Destiny reminds me of something wildly inappropriate.

First, the trends are impressive but a wee bit deceptive:

Wowza!!  As my accountant/girlfriend pointed out, the money in 2025-26 has been spent, so it is quite real. It  represents an increase in real defence spending by 50%--$44b->$66b.  That is not nothing.  The deceptive part is the "defence and security related spending."  This is something I have been harping on since NATO made its supposed 5% commitment--3.5% on military stuff and 1.5% on ... whatever.  To be clear, this was a bargain--it gave Germany (and others) the ability for the middle/right-wing to tell the left-wing that in exchange for more defence spending, the governments would be committed to more infrastructure stuff.  Like, making the trains run on time (Germans are mighty miffed about the unreliability of their trains). It is a huge fudge factor also aimed at making Trump think he changed the behavior of NATO members.  The key here is that it can give countries the opportunity to invest in dual-use stuff--that making trains more efficient in Germany means improving the ability of Germany to also provide logistical support to the east if things get hot.  

In Canada?  The ability to go from nothing to $48.7b in one year should tell you something--that the government is re-coding stuff that they were already spending as "defence and security-related spending."  It almost certainly does not represent new money going to new things--government just doesn't work that fast to suddenly go from 0 to $49b.  Again, the hint is here--that amount goes from $49b to $58b in give years.  Which could just be ... inflation.  Which means that government of Canada may not actually be doing that much more five years from now on defence-related stuff.  Which is ok if one is not betting/investing anything on more defence-related spending.  Which means that whatever is promised for infrastructure in the Arctic, the perfect example of dual-use, defence-related spending is either not much or is coming from reductions elsewhere.  In this case, more spending is not really more spending.

On the actual defence spending--this is really significant, but as Phil argues, this gets Canada to 2.6%, which makes the NATO glass more than half-full but not completely full. The promise is 3.5%, and the next five years does not get us from where we are soon to all the way there.  This may be the product of honest cost calculations--that procurement is hard so we can't expect miracles.  Or it may reflect competing priorities--more spending but not so much as to cause Canada to get into a debt crisis?

Ok, on to the email from the MND's office (my first one, weee!): 

• "More than $700 billion in combined core defence and broader defence- and security-related expenditures over five years, beginning in 2026-27."  See the figure above--that's roughly $140b a year but much of that is the fake defence-related spending.  So, it is really more like $400b over five years or $80b/year.  Which again is quite significant.

•  "The Budget identifies $7.6 billion over five years, beginning in 2026-27, to extend and expand Operation REASSURANCE. Supports a planned increase in persistently deployed Canadian personnel to up to 2,600.  This funding will be sourced from existing DND resources."  I agree that Canada needs to invest in this effort--the more spent now to create a strong force there, the less we will have to spend in bloodshed later--that deterrence requires a credible capability.  But this raises huge questions.  2600 troops?  First, that number is going to be deceptive--persistently present does not mean based there.  The commitment has been something like 2,200, which has in practice meant something like 1600 plus reinforcements during exercises.  Can the CAF base 2k and then move up to 2,600 during emergencies/exercises?  Maybe, but it will be hard--the army is simply not that big.  Second is the part in red--no new money.  DND has been stretched on operations/readiness (the day to day stuff, not the sexy new equipment stuff or the much earned/needed raises the troops received).  What will the CAF have to cut to cover $7.6b in new costs?  Again, not new money means something gets cut to cover this stuff.  This is in addition to a 10% haircut DND/CAF is getting along with other government agencies on ordinary spending to cut the deficits.  So, the idea that it is raining money on the CAF and DND is quite wrong.
• "Budget 2026 includes several measures to strengthen connectivity, infrastructure, and security in Canada's North." This is the aforementioned defence-related stuff.  Good news but again, not new money.

 To be clear, as Phil notes in his piece, this is more money.  The defence budget is going up and they are spending it on stuff--subs, for instance.  So, that helps the CAF develop some key capabilities.  But I wonder whether enough money will be spent on the day to day stuff--ammunition, exercises/training, spare parts, operations.  More is more and, in this, more is better.  But I can't help but think that the Carney government is exaggerating what they are doing.

I will take a closer look at the budget and ask around to find out how much of that defence-related spending is really new money or just re-coding stuff that was already in the pipeline.  I need to get smart on this as I may be testifying sometime soon on this stuff.

More to come on this from me and certainly from Phil.   

 

 

Great News, Great Expectations

 Earlier today, I wrote about the foreign policy implications of the Blue Tsunami.™   I was just asked by a colleague about whether this is a blip or something enduring.  So, I will put on my ethnic conflict and personal history hats to address that.  

First, the history: when I was in grad school in San Diego in the late 1980s and early 1990s, California was a red state or at most purple.  It was the state of Ronald Reagan, and it had many Republican governors and Senators... and that stopped.  Pete Wilson, whose name is on my diploma, was the last Republican to hold state-wide office with one exception--Arnold Schwarzenegger.*  Under Wilson, there was an effort to prohibit immigrants from using public stuff--schools, hospitals, etc.  It was widely seen as racist, aimed at the Latino population.  While there is more to it, other than Arnold, California has been safely in the hands of the Democrats.

The relevance is this: it is one thing to talk about massive deportation and fighting "open borders."  It is another thing to engage in arbitrary, capricious violence not only against immigrant felons (of which there are not that many) but all immigrants, even those who did it the right way--the Haitians of Springfield, the Afghans, etc.  Unleashing ICE should and probably will not be forgotten by those who had to fear them.  If the debate about prop 187 could turn California's Latino population against the Republicans, shouldn't the past two years (and ultimately will be four years) of ICE persecution do the same?

Second, there is the ethnic politics.  In the aftermath of the 2012 election, members of the GOP establishment looked at the changing demographics of the country and realized that they needed to appeal to Latinos.  Jeb Bush seemed to be the perfect candidate--married to a Latina, fluent in Spanish--but he failed utterly. Instead, there was an outbidding effort in the GOP primaries where candidates competed to be the most hostile to immigrants and the most Islamophobic. Trump won partly due to name recognition but mostly because those who turned out in the primaries who resented the success of Blacks and Latinos and feared what was happening as the US became more diverse, the white supremacists, found Trump to be the most authentic, most aggressive racist.  They weren't wrong.  Trump 2.0 has been even more racist, more white supremacist, more misogynist, more Christian nationalst than Trump 1.0.  The Secretary of Defense literally has Christian nationalist symbols on his body, and the biggest funder of the party is a Great Replacement Theorist and has engaged in Nazi salutes.  

For me the puzzle has always been why any Blacks or Latinos voted from Trump in 2024, but I guess "conservative values" like misogyny and homophobia could take priority over ... joining white supremacists.  Anyhow, the early results indicate that those folks who voted for Trump in 2024 ran away in 2026.  Which means that if the GOP keeps competing in primaries to be the best white supremacists, they may just find themselves losing in the general.  

It could be the case that 2028 will be like 2024, where people forget who did what.  But the difference is that Trump or Vance will be in the White House and they will be wearing the white supremacist, the ICE-ness of it all.  So it will be hard for people to forget. 

Most importantly, what will the 2028 GOP primary look like?  My guess is that some folks will enter, trying to focus on economic issues, but JD Vance and others will be in the mix and will choose the easy way--pandering to the far right assholes who show up in primaries.  Which means that they will be making promises to persecute large swathes of the country, and this time, those targets will actually pay attention to the hate mongering. 

There is obviously more going on--war, inflation, etc.  And I didn't even mention the corruption.  The oversight efforts will produce a barrage of corruption stories, and that will hurt the GOP in 2028. I just hope it stains the party for a few decades.

So, yeah, as long as Trump does not double down on autocracy (and the tsunami may deter it since it shows there is not support for it), and as long as the Dems hold the GOP accountable (the bigger if), I don't think this is a blip.  2028 may be in the same ballpark, although subsequent elections will not be.

Very early to make predictions, of course, but I am used to being wrong ;)

Your thoughts?

 

 

* Arnold won a recall election where the vote was divided and people were not that sure the recall vote would work out.  He won via name recognition and the promise that he would be a reasonable Governor.  He was pretty moderate and won re-election and has been on the outside of the GOP ever since.  He is very much the exception that proves the rule. 

 

Great News, Limited Expectations

 The American midterm elections produced amazing results at all levels.  A blue tsunami indeed.  It sends a strong message that Trump and the GOP should heed .... but probably will not.  Since I teach US Foreign Policy and not electoral politics, let me focus on what happens next in the world.

Um, not much.  It is very much the conventional wisdom that lame duck presidents focus on foreign policy because they face fewer constraints, and there is little reason to think that Trump would be more constrained.  He can still make executive agreements, he can still deploy the US military wherever/however he wants, and he can refuse to support allies.  

But let's focus first on how the world will react.  Countries facing Trump now know he has been cut, that he is weaker at home than he thought, so he will have less leverage, and, yes, as Carney suggested, they can wait him out.  Trump will not be able to bully countries as much as he did.  

My views on impeachment have shifted since Trump 1.0--I kept posting a meme saying it wouldn't happen.  Well, it happened and it didn't--that is, Congress twice tried to oust Trump via impeachment and failed both times.  The Dems now have a better shot, they just need to flip 13 Republicans to impeach Hegseth or Kennedy or Vought.  But that is still mighty tough to do.  I think the process is worth it--it is both good and smart--good politics because Congress would be addressing high crimes and misdemeanors and smart because it would force Republican Senators to have to either stand with Trump or stand against him.  But impeachment is not going to rid the administration of awful people.  They might just nail Hegseth who is so awful and so hated.  But most of the rest will be protected by the Republicans in the Senate.  Stephen Miller?  He can't be impeached--he does not sit in a Senate-confirmed spot.  

How about the power of the purse?  In some ways tougher than impeachment as impeachment requires a House majority and 2/3s of the Senate, whereas overcoming vetoes requires 2/3s in both houses.  So, expect to see lots of threats to shutdown the government.  I also wonder if Trump will violate the Constitution by compelling Treasury officials to allocate money that Congress has not appropriated.  I really do not know how this all works, but can't he just keep firing Treasury officials until he finds one that is cooperative?  Money matters and that is the heart of Congress's power--I am just not sure that it will work out well.

Oversight?  Ah, yes, this is the big change.  Each committee is going to dive into the corruption and incompetence and criminal behavior and publicize the hell out of it.  From the bombings off of Venezuela to the end of USAID to the Iran war, there will be heaps of efforts to reveal what the Trump regime has done.  And that will be great for setting up the Dems as the anti-corruption part of 2028.

NATO?  Congress can't compel the US president to deploy troops on behalf of allies.  Nor can it prevent Trump from blocking consensus at the North Atlantic Council.  Congress simply cannot force Trump to be a good ally.  He can even pull out more troops.  He might not be able to formally pull out of NATO (Congress passed a law on that), but he can kill NATO anyhow.  It will be a tough two years, and Putin may very well test this in some way.  

Can Congress stop the Iran war?  No.  The War Powers Act can be invoked, but the hammer for that is refusing to pay for operations, and that will be very hard to do.  And its constitutionality has always been in doubt, so what would this Supreme Court do?  Yes, we are stuck with this court until we have a trifecta so that the Dems can unpack it.  

Congress can refuse to confirm Trump's appointments, not just to the courts, but to positions at DoD, CIA, State, etc.  However, that applies only to the higher levels--the political appointments.  And Trump may be quite ready to appoint acting officials who have dubious legal authority.  Will the Dems hold up confirmation of generals and admirals?  I hope they pay careful attention to efforts to politicize the military, that they don't approve appointments that break precedents--no more retired generals being brought back to be Chairman, for example.  But this will be quite tricky as aspiring lackey GOFOs may not have revealed enough for the Senate Armed Services Committee to challenge. 

Should Trump read into public opinion that he should change his ways?  Absolutely.  Will he?  Probably not. 

I don't want to rain on everyone's parade--we should be elated.  The outcomes are great, better than most imagined.  But we also have to expect Trump to continue to do much to undermine American national security, the US's position in the world, and America's allies while he continues to pander to the autocrats.  Trump may prove to be the lamest duck as he sundowns or he may prove to be the most assertive post-midterm President as he operates beyond the law and norms.   

The Future of War Is Humility?

Pretty good crowd for a last session

We had good reception

 I am in Amsterdam, spending several days at The Future of War conference hosted by the Netherlands Defence Academy and Oxford University.*  It is quadrennial and much has happened apparently since the last one (which I did not attend).  I was very much drinking from the firehose as I only do a small sliver of defense/war stuff--civ-mil--and there is much, much more out there.  I gave my take on oversight over democratic militaries (there isn't much) on one panel and then attended heaps of panels on various topics--hybrid war, the future of SOF, learning from Ukraine/Russia, strategic foreign, Russian active measures against Europe, and more.

• 
  I was volunteered for the last plenary session--what lessons are there from the conference for teaching war.   Here's basically what I said, with some elaboration that time did not allow on the roundtable:I was reminded a bit of a conference long ago when I was in grad school--where I was sent to be a rapporteur for a bunch of talks by phycissts who had all kinds of cool projects but ignored the political ramifications.  It was not so deaf or blind here, but there was a bit of it.  How do our political systems, where most democracies are now fighting populism and far right efforts (and Russian interference, accept riskier strategies?  Who has the guts to take risks when governments are on the edge?  I am reminded of a book that got stuff wrong--Barry Posen's Sources of Military Doctrine.  He argued that militaries mess around via bureaucratic politics until threats get high and then the civilians somehow embody the imperatives of the international system and force appropriate adaptations.  Debbi Avant's diss and first book dismantled that nicely, but here, I just want to suggest that threats are high but the ability to react to them depends on the politics of the places.  France couldn't adapt well in the 1930s as Germany got increasingly menacing because France's domestic politics were a mess.  So, um, deja vu?

• We don't really know that much.  The session on strategic foresight emphasized that it is very contingent.  Indeed, heaps of Clausewitz's friction and such was all around us.   

  

  Best military mural?

• Adaptation is key, of course.  The war in Ukraine has demonstrated so much adaptation by both sides.  One of the sessions addressed the defence industry dynamics--outsiders trying to use Ukrainians to test their weapons and then sell their wares elsewhere, how decentralized innovation is in Ukraine, which presents challenges of scope and scale.  How do we teach imagination and adaptation and how do we organize to facilitate but then harness the sharp ideas from those closer to the battlefield?
• Which leads to how do we do mission command?  How do we delegate. Emilie Berthelsen has a forthcoming European Journal of International Security that I will be looking out for on this stuff.  My bias in all of this is that civs can delegate more to the military folks if they can trust them--which requires a couple of things--greater civilian expertise on military matters and militaries that are comfortable with being overseen and being transparent.  
• I think this group was much more skeptical about the Americans helping out in any crisis compared to, say, the Canadian armed forces.  But, no, they aren't making much progress on being capable sans Americans.
• 
  SOF's moment maybe over--the panel on Special Operations Forces noted that these units are supposed to have strategic effects, but didn't that much in the irregular wars but did have a role.  In conventional, peer to peer wars, unless they are out in the Sahara operating behind enemy lines, they are mostly highly capable assets that are expended on key missions.  That is, they will fight and die for specific tactical efforts.  Given that I have been a critic of the valorization and imitation of SOF, I should be happy about this. But I am not--because I don't want folks to die.
• I missed the keynote on AI as I, well, overslept.  Jet lag caught up to me.  
• 
  There is a debate about whether Ukraine teaches us that maneuver warfare is dead or not--that the terrain and technology makes it hard to exploit success on the battlefield. So, we may be stuck with positional warfare, which means more of a grind and fewer dramatic breakthroughs and quick victories.  I don't know much about this, but I do agree with one of the speakers that the western militaries need to think about this possibility and prepare for it--stockpile heaps of ammo, for instance.  And invest in combat engineering to create and break obstacles.
  

  *  I also attended a meeting focusing on academic exchange with other MA in Defence stuff programs in Europe and am giving a talk tomorrow at the Free University on the Dave/Phil/Steve stuff on legislatures and defence oversight.