Great News, Limited Expectations

 The American midterm elections produced amazing results at all levels.  A blue tsunami indeed.  It sends a strong message that Trump and the GOP should heed .... but probably will not.  Since I teach US Foreign Policy and not electoral politics, let me focus on what happens next in the world.

Um, not much.  It is very much the conventional wisdom that lame duck presidents focus on foreign policy because they face fewer constraints, and there is little reason to think that Trump would be more constrained.  He can still make executive agreements, he can still deploy the US military wherever/however he wants, and he can refuse to support allies.  

But let's focus first on how the world will react.  Countries facing Trump now know he has been cut, that he is weaker at home than he thought, so he will have less leverage, and, yes, as Carney suggested, they can wait him out.  Trump will not be able to bully countries as much as he did.  

My views on impeachment have shifted since Trump 1.0--I kept posting a meme saying it wouldn't happen.  Well, it happened and it didn't--that is, Congress twice tried to oust Trump via impeachment and failed both times.  The Dems now have a better shot, they just need to flip 13 Republicans to impeach Hegseth or Kennedy or Vought.  But that is still mighty tough to do.  I think the process is worth it--it is both good and smart--good politics because Congress would be addressing high crimes and misdemeanors and smart because it would force Republican Senators to have to either stand with Trump or stand against him.  But impeachment is not going to rid the administration of awful people.  They might just nail Hegseth who is so awful and so hated.  But most of the rest will be protected by the Republicans in the Senate.  Stephen Miller?  He can't be impeached--he does not sit in a Senate-confirmed spot.  

How about the power of the purse?  In some ways tougher than impeachment as impeachment requires a House majority and 2/3s of the Senate, whereas overcoming vetoes requires 2/3s in both houses.  So, expect to see lots of threats to shutdown the government.  I also wonder if Trump will violate the Constitution by compelling Treasury officials to allocate money that Congress has not appropriated.  I really do not know how this all works, but can't he just keep firing Treasury officials until he finds one that is cooperative?  Money matters and that is the heart of Congress's power--I am just not sure that it will work out well.

Oversight?  Ah, yes, this is the big change.  Each committee is going to dive into the corruption and incompetence and criminal behavior and publicize the hell out of it.  From the bombings off of Venezuela to the end of USAID to the Iran war, there will be heaps of efforts to reveal what the Trump regime has done.  And that will be great for setting up the Dems as the anti-corruption part of 2028.

NATO?  Congress can't compel the US president to deploy troops on behalf of allies.  Nor can it prevent Trump from blocking consensus at the North Atlantic Council.  Congress simply cannot force Trump to be a good ally.  He can even pull out more troops.  He might not be able to formally pull out of NATO (Congress passed a law on that), but he can kill NATO anyhow.  It will be a tough two years, and Putin may very well test this in some way.  

Can Congress stop the Iran war?  No.  The War Powers Act can be invoked, but the hammer for that is refusing to pay for operations, and that will be very hard to do.  And its constitutionality has always been in doubt, so what would this Supreme Court do?  Yes, we are stuck with this court until we have a trifecta so that the Dems can unpack it.  

Congress can refuse to confirm Trump's appointments, not just to the courts, but to positions at DoD, CIA, State, etc.  However, that applies only to the higher levels--the political appointments.  And Trump may be quite ready to appoint acting officials who have dubious legal authority.  Will the Dems hold up confirmation of generals and admirals?  I hope they pay careful attention to efforts to politicize the military, that they don't approve appointments that break precedents--no more retired generals being brought back to be Chairman, for example.  But this will be quite tricky as aspiring lackey GOFOs may not have revealed enough for the Senate Armed Services Committee to challenge. 

Should Trump read into public opinion that he should change his ways?  Absolutely.  Will he?  Probably not. 

I don't want to rain on everyone's parade--we should be elated.  The outcomes are great, better than most imagined.  But we also have to expect Trump to continue to do much to undermine American national security, the US's position in the world, and America's allies while he continues to pander to the autocrats.  Trump may prove to be the lamest duck as he sundowns or he may prove to be the most assertive post-midterm President as he operates beyond the law and norms.   

The Future of War Is Humility?

Pretty good crowd for a last session

We had good reception

 I am in Amsterdam, spending several days at The Future of War conference hosted by the Netherlands Defence Academy and Oxford University.*  It is quadrennial and much has happened apparently since the last one (which I did not attend).  I was very much drinking from the firehose as I only do a small sliver of defense/war stuff--civ-mil--and there is much, much more out there.  I gave my take on oversight over democratic militaries (there isn't much) on one panel and then attended heaps of panels on various topics--hybrid war, the future of SOF, learning from Ukraine/Russia, strategic foreign, Russian active measures against Europe, and more.

• 
  I was volunteered for the last plenary session--what lessons are there from the conference for teaching war.   Here's basically what I said, with some elaboration that time did not allow on the roundtable:I was reminded a bit of a conference long ago when I was in grad school--where I was sent to be a rapporteur for a bunch of talks by phycissts who had all kinds of cool projects but ignored the political ramifications.  It was not so deaf or blind here, but there was a bit of it.  How do our political systems, where most democracies are now fighting populism and far right efforts (and Russian interference, accept riskier strategies?  Who has the guts to take risks when governments are on the edge?  I am reminded of a book that got stuff wrong--Barry Posen's Sources of Military Doctrine.  He argued that militaries mess around via bureaucratic politics until threats get high and then the civilians somehow embody the imperatives of the international system and force appropriate adaptations.  Debbi Avant's diss and first book dismantled that nicely, but here, I just want to suggest that threats are high but the ability to react to them depends on the politics of the places.  France couldn't adapt well in the 1930s as Germany got increasingly menacing because France's domestic politics were a mess.  So, um, deja vu?

• We don't really know that much.  The session on strategic foresight emphasized that it is very contingent.  Indeed, heaps of Clausewitz's friction and such was all around us.   

  

  Best military mural?

• Adaptation is key, of course.  The war in Ukraine has demonstrated so much adaptation by both sides.  One of the sessions addressed the defence industry dynamics--outsiders trying to use Ukrainians to test their weapons and then sell their wares elsewhere, how decentralized innovation is in Ukraine, which presents challenges of scope and scale.  How do we teach imagination and adaptation and how do we organize to facilitate but then harness the sharp ideas from those closer to the battlefield?
• Which leads to how do we do mission command?  How do we delegate. Emilie Berthelsen has a forthcoming European Journal of International Security that I will be looking out for on this stuff.  My bias in all of this is that civs can delegate more to the military folks if they can trust them--which requires a couple of things--greater civilian expertise on military matters and militaries that are comfortable with being overseen and being transparent.  
• I think this group was much more skeptical about the Americans helping out in any crisis compared to, say, the Canadian armed forces.  But, no, they aren't making much progress on being capable sans Americans.
• 
  SOF's moment maybe over--the panel on Special Operations Forces noted that these units are supposed to have strategic effects, but didn't that much in the irregular wars but did have a role.  In conventional, peer to peer wars, unless they are out in the Sahara operating behind enemy lines, they are mostly highly capable assets that are expended on key missions.  That is, they will fight and die for specific tactical efforts.  Given that I have been a critic of the valorization and imitation of SOF, I should be happy about this. But I am not--because I don't want folks to die.
• I missed the keynote on AI as I, well, overslept.  Jet lag caught up to me.  
• 
  There is a debate about whether Ukraine teaches us that maneuver warfare is dead or not--that the terrain and technology makes it hard to exploit success on the battlefield. So, we may be stuck with positional warfare, which means more of a grind and fewer dramatic breakthroughs and quick victories.  I don't know much about this, but I do agree with one of the speakers that the western militaries need to think about this possibility and prepare for it--stockpile heaps of ammo, for instance.  And invest in combat engineering to create and break obstacles.
  

  *  I also attended a meeting focusing on academic exchange with other MA in Defence stuff programs in Europe and am giving a talk tomorrow at the Free University on the Dave/Phil/Steve stuff on legislatures and defence oversight. 

Democratic Separatism: Mostly Sore Losers

 I have been too busy with my current work on civ-mil to go back to the archives of my head, when I studied separatism.  But with the Albertan separation vote losing badly, it is time to go back to my old stuff.  There is a lot of political theory about when separatism is legitimate (see Allen Buchanan's stuff for a start), but my starting point is if the separatism is about being sore losers in an otherwise stable democracy, then the separatist effort has little legitimacy.

What precisely is the core grievance of the Albertan separatists?  Parties closest to them have mostly dominated Alberta, but haven't governed Canada since 2015.  The extreme federalism of Canada means that Albertans can largely govern themselves, that the feds can't really tell them how to run their health care system, their education system, etc.  And oil politics means that Alberta has a lot of power in Canada.  So, again, what is precisely the problem?

We can talk about misinformation/disinformation and how COVID broke people's brains, but the basic reality is that Albertans are secure in their rights.  The feds are not trying to abridge Albertans' rights, and now they have the most conservative  Liberal prime minister in recent history.  The Albertans are largely getting their way, including the end of climate change taxes and very pro-pipeline moves by Carney.  But they are, to use an online phrase, butthurt because the closest party to them keeps losing in national elections.  Whose fault is that?  Mostly the Conservative Party of Canada for agreeing to be led by the most punchable bad faith, Ted Cruz-esque actor who keeps trying to stake stances that make him the Trump of Canada.  So, their animus should be pointed at Poilievre, the CPC leader.

Instead, those voting for separatism are sore losers.  The fundamental definitional dynamic in democracy is accepting losing, figuring out how one can do better, and trying again.  The GOP in the US has completely lost the plot on this so they seek to game elections via voterfraudfraud.  There is much less support for Quebec separatism because they got damn everything they wanted at the bargaining table, and their biggest grievances wouldn't change with separation since the US will still be an English giant next door.  

The big question now is will the losers of the referendum realize that their cause is not popular and seek change through the political system or will they try to stir up shit via more referenda.  I hope for the former but would bet on the latter.

Anyhow, it is a good day to watch sore losers lose again. 

Wackiest Media Hits, Bad Memory Edition

 Yesterday, I had a new kind of media experience: where the interviewer argued with me.  It is one thing to be on a live tv or radio program and engage in a conversation with folks and find points of disagreement.  It is another thing for a reporter to call up, asking for my opinion and then rebut.  Especially when the rebuttal focuses on events in the 1840s and 1910s.

Let me explain.  I was contacted by Alternet, which seems to be a left-wing news site to comment on US-Canadian relations which are most fraught thanks to Trump.  I presented to the interviewer my take that, yes, things are very tense, that Canadian nationalism is activated, and Canadians, like most of the world, hate Trump.

The interviewer clearly had a narrative in mind and I was not going along with it. And to be sure, almost every interviewer has a narrative, but usually they don't spend a lot of time arguing why my point of view doesn't fit.

His point of view: the experience of the Zimmermann telegram plus the politics of the 1840s plus a Trump-encouraged successful secession by Alberta or Quebec would put US and Canada on the brink of war.  Oh my.  We first disagreed over whether the Z telegram caused by itself the US entry into WWI.  Yes, I knew that this captured communication from the Germans to Mexican authorities where the former were encouraging the latter to join their side in WWI, promising to give the former Mexican lands back played a big role in finally pushing the US in the war.  But I suggested that as far as I can recall, it wasn't just that.

Anyhow, the 1840s had Presidential candidate Polk promising to take Canadian territory (before there was a Canada) in the northwest part of the continent: 54'40" or fight referred to the future border of the US.  The interviewer suggested that this was thus a continuity in US politics from then to Trump, as if the past 180 years hadn't happened.  I argued that there was not much of a constituency these days for American northward expansion--that this was not even a key issue in far right politics, unlike opposing NATO in 2016.  

The third part of the premise was also problematic--Alberta and Quebec are not going to secede.  Indeed, Trump's support of their separatism, in true everything Trump touches turns to shit form, has helped reduce support for separatism.  Indeed, I don't think Canadians would be referring to Albertan separatism as potentially treasonous without the Trump support.  The polls show pretty clearly where all of this stands.

Together, the interviewer wanted to suggest that if the US efforts to support Albertan/Quebecois secession would be equivalent to the Zimmermann telegram, with Canada being the US and the US being German in the 21st century edition.  I poo-pooed with extreme prejudice.  Canada won't enter a war with the US if Alberta or Quebec secedes--secession in Canada is peaceful with only a couple of casualties AND the extreme power disparity will deter.

I also argued that Trump's Canada fixation is his and his alone.  That those who seek to replace him as leader of the MAGA cult will fail if they focus on Canada as most Americans just don't care about Canada, not even the far right.  The surveys have shown that while Trump has increased Republican distrust of Canada, that is still only a minority of Repubicans, and is not going to be the focus of an outbidding effort in future primaries.  

And yet the guy kept wanting to rebut me.  Oy.  

 I will have to try and see if I can remember even more batshit media experiences, but this one has to be near or at the top. 

Bad Apples and the Bad Apple Picking Machine

Whenever somebody does something wrong, the easiest thing to say is that, sure, there are a few bad apples.  I am reading Allan English's book right now about the failures of the Canadian Armed Forces to change, and it pushed me to write this, something I have been thinking about for awhile.

Where do bad apples come from?  Is it just the random input that a few get in?  Kind of hard to argue when the bad apples is referring to those at the very top of the military after years of "vetting" and promotions.  

But let's take the analogy seriously.  Bad apples can happen because:

1. just bad luck
2. the apple picking machine is broken
3. the apple picking machine is working in a bad orchard
4. the apple storage/treatment/processing facility makes them rotten.   

I have been thinking lately of #3 as the demise of twitter has also been on my mind.  Sure, it is run by the world's richest Nazi, but governments and other organizations can't seem to quit it.  This summer, when pushed, a government official said that they use twitter for recruiting.  And that was the most horrifying thing I heard.  Because who is on twitter now?  Bots (some silenced thanks to our Ukrainian friends), Nazis, and those who are comfortable hanging out in a Nazi bar.  So, if one uses twitter as a platform for recruiting, it is more likely these days that some of those recruited will be far right assholes than if one looked elsewhere for recruits.  It is just a math thing at this point.

I will say that while most of the blame is usually focused on bad luck, the CAF and similar orgs will think about recruiting--that far right people are eager to serve to learn skills they can use in the race war they are hoping to make happen.  So, except for the US Secretary of Defense, Nazi tattoos can be disqualifying.  The one that seems to be overlooked the most is #4--that there is something about the organization that radicalizes people.  We know that prison can do that, but I'd like for the various militaries to think seriously that maybe some folks enter their organizations and then become radicalized.  

Anyhow, this weekend of awesome apple pie and apple crisp (we cut up too many apples for just one deep dish pie recipe) has had me thinking of picking and processing my fave fruit.  Enjoy this apple season--go to the right orchards and be choosy and then take care of them when you get home.  Bad apples do a lot of damage so let's be careful out there. 

Retired Military Chief Launches Book: The Town Shows Up

Last night, my girlfriend and I attended the book launch of Gen. (ret) Wayne Eyre.  It was a very interesting night.  The actual speechifying was short, as Eyre identified and thanked a bunch of people in the room who were part of his career journey.  Eyre was known as the accidental CDS as he became the chief when his predecessor lost his position due to a credible accusation of sexual misconduct (that McDonald thought he was exonerated after the investigators said everyone was too drunk that night to prosecute demonstrated that McDonald was ill-suited for the job).  Taking the position with little preparation for the job, no handover by his predecessor, was immensely challenging, and I look forward to reading his take on that moment.  

I first met Eyre at an event at Queens University--the annual Kingston International Security Conference.  He was fresh off his tour in Korea and was just starting to be Army Chief.  Since then, I had many formal and informal meetings with him, including his appearing on the BattleRhythm podcast, interviewing him for my current project about Canada sans US, a phone call where he wanted to correct me about something I said on a different podcast episode (I was wrong because the government had not yet released its new policy, so my podcast became a venue for that announcement), standing next to him at the NATO summit in DC when Canada announced a lot more defence spending, and other events in Ottawa.  

I was not shy in these conversations about raising questions about his handling of the post, but to be clear, I have a heap of respect for how he served in that job.  The moment and the times were both quite challenging.  The sudden promotion, being CDS when a series of senior officers were disgraced, serving as chief as the world became much more threatening.  One of his most impressive characteristics was to be able to admit mistakes and course-correct as he went along.  He was thoughtful about the conflicting responsibilities he faced--to be an advocate for the Canadian Armed Forces but to respect civilian leadership and keep the CAF out of partisan politics.  Over the course of his tour, he became more outspoken about defence spending, which I found to be problematic.  

The book has already made a big splash as Eyre commented on his experiences with Justin Trudeau. Both in his comments to me as he signed my copy of the book and to the crowd, he indicated that the stories took things out of context.  For me, I am wondering how much of a violation of civ-mil norms it was, given that the document Eyre supervised as Chief of the Defence Staff about the responsibilities of the military profession, Fighting Spirit, includes retired officers (see text to the right).  I hope to find the time in the next few days to read the CDS chapters of his book so that I can evaluate this for myself.  

Despite the occasional disagreement with Eyre, I have immense respect for him. I have met all but one CDS since I started doing Canadian defence stuff in the mid 2000's--I have had amazing access here--Henault, Hillier, Natynczyk, Lawson, Vance, Eyre, and now Carignan.  Given the challenges, his very impressive learning curve, and his serious efforts to grapple with the conflicting imperatives of civil-military relations, I have come to see him as the best CDS during my time in Canada. I may or may not maintain that opinion after reading his book.  I lost a bit of respect for Robert Gates after reading his memoir, so we shall see.    

I was kind of surprised at how many people I knew at the event, although my girlfriend was not.  She gets that the defence community in Canada is pretty small.  So, she got to be introduced to the foreign minister/former defence minister Anita Anand, Senator Rebecca Patterson, Army Chief Mike Wright, former Ambassador Women, Peace, and Security (and cookie fan) Jacqueline O'Neill, and many others, and we had a delightful conversation with Jennifer Eyre, whom I met at a previous event. That Eyre got such great turnout, including the best Minister of National Defence of the past 20 years, says much about Eyre and how he treated the people around him.

Along the way, I learned about some new policy changes that may or may not improve civilian control of the military--something I will be looking into in the days ahead.  More on that sometime soon, I hope.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Carney, the NYT, and an American Attack

 I was traveling when this story broke, so I did some media, but haven't addressed it here.  What was Mark Carney thinking when he discussed how he had to consider the "extreme tail" possibility of a US military attack against Canada?  

Carney was being honest--it is the responsibility of a leader to think a bit about all of the possibilities even very unlikely ones if they have the potential to be devastating.  So, of course, as it has been reported, folks at Canada's Department of National Defence have had to think a bit about what an American attack would look like (more on that below).  As retired LGen Leslie put it, the military plans, it is what they do.  The US had plans in the 1920s for attacking Canada in case of a conflict with the UK.  But leaders aren't always honest, so why answer the question.   He could have demurred or deflected.

Carney is very deliberate in his messaging.  His Davos speech got picked up widely as it was clear in many ways (and not clear in many others) but mostly it said that Canada was not going to be pushed around by Trump and that Canada was not going to operate as if the situation was normal.  It was a very costly signal--that he and everyone else knew that saying this stuff would antagonize Trump who is incredibly thin-skinned.  Sending that signal to the Canadian public has paid dividends as his popularity has been boosted by his anti-Trump stances (giving him cover to do all kinds of unpopular things domestically--he is the most right-wing Liberal politician in recent history and it is not close).  Sending that signal to Europe and Asia made it clear that Canada is ready to do some business even if it upsets Trump.  Sending that signal to the US was part of the larger bargaining process as well.  

Stepping away from the bargaining table took that speech and tripled down on it--it was not just a costly signal but a costly act, as the trade war has intensified.  Again, it sends signals far and wide, that Canada's stance is for real.  

Yet Americans haven't taken seriously the 51st state bullshit.  By speaking out about how Canada has had to contemplate an American attack in an American newspaper, he tells Americans that Canadians are taking this quite seriously.  In addition, as the economic pain of various sectors of the American economy increases due to the trade war, this also helps to remind Americans who to blame.  Oh, and Carney had this interview in late September.  Too early to be an October surprise for the midterms but definitely midterm adjacent.  Is this an attempt to tell Americans that they should try to restrain Trump via voting Dem in the midterms?  Again, Carney is deliberate, so he is aware that saying this at this time would be read this way even if this message is not his intent.   

So, yeah, I think Carney is putting his thumb on the scale of the American election.  Given how the Trump administration has tried to encourage separatism in Quebec and Alberta (and actually hurting their respective causes since he is so incredibly toxic in Canada), this move is very much quite fair.  Of course, Trump won't see it that way since he thinks Canada should just roll over.  He keeps saying Canada is nasty... for protecting itself.  

On the whole attack thing, I am not privy to what the DND/CAF people have been gaming out, but I would guess that the extreme tail risks would include:

• hybrid attacks a la the Russians--jamming, cutting cables, drone overflights, etc.
• threat of and then actual use of air power. 
• use of special forces to try to seize Carney just as the US seized Venezuela's president and, yes, what Putin tried to do in 2022 in Ukraine.
• deployment of airborne to seize Ottawa airport as part of an effort to land troops in the capital. 
• symbolic or not so symbolic deployment of forces from Fort Lewis in Washington and Fort Drum in New York.  

There are probably other possibilities, bu there are the ones that come to my mind.  Canada is vulnerable to all of this, and any of these would impose much pain on Canada.  But none of them would be painless for the US, and several of them might just risk a major crisis in US civil-military relations.  It is one think to hit boats in the Caribbean or strike a long time antagonist (via air and sea power only) like Iran.  It is another thing to attack an ally that fought and bled alongside Americans in Afghanistan and elsewhere.  Trump and Hegseth are not smart enough to realize that one could issue an order that might be too far, but that would be one "center of gravity" that the Canadians would be targeting--how to get the American military to refuse orders to attack Canada.  Something to think about.  Maybe write about some other day.

I don't think Trump will use military force against Canada--it is extremely unlikely.  But Trump creates uncertainty about everything, and he has done plenty of incredibly dumb, self-destructive stuff.  So, one cannot simply rely on reason and cost/benefit calculations to deter Trump from doing dumb stuff.  Which means, yes, Canadian officials have to think about it.  They certainly watched the coercion aimed against Greenland.  They also watched Trump back down and take a deal that didn't change a damned thing.  

Anyhow, let's hope he gets distracted by some other squirrel.