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Gaza in the distance
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I have spent most of my career engaged in the five d's of dodgeball when it comes to the Mideast and especially the Israel-Palestine conflict. Despite starting my career with the international relations of ethnic conflict, I managed a total of one piece of research on the Mideast, and that was more by accident than by design. I got asked to join an edited volume project by a terrific Mideast scholar, Shibley Telhami, after one of my very best job talks (which did not produce a job).
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Bomb shelter next to a kindergarten if I remember correctly
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When I turned to doing civil-military relations, I was asked if I was including Israel in my multi-democracy study, and I said nope. I have a better explanation for that--that as a very militarized society, its' civil-military relations are far less comparable.
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Bus stop, shelter in a town that was probably overrun last weekend
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But on the ethnic conflict side? Maybe I refrained because the one time I raised it as an illustration in a job talk, it did not go well. That lesson was certainly reinforced by the experience of teaching US Foreign Policy the semester the US invaded Iraq. That class quickly divided into pro and anti factions based on how the students identified with one side or the other of the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Perhaps it is because of a conflict between my background/identity and my scholarly work. I often joked that the three things I learned in Hebrew school were: enough Hebrew (barely) to get through my Bar Mitzvah, much about the Holocaust and the history of oppression of the Jews, and that Israel was empty before the Jews got there and everything Israel does is right. The last is the most relevant although the second obviously hits hard when more Jews died in one day due to violence this weekend than any other time since the Holocaust apparently. I definitely was miseducated about the history of Israel. I was also conflicted about my upbringing since I hated Hebrew school (I never fit in or came close), never believed in the religion, and came to realize my identity as Jew is defined by the reality that Nazis would have included me in their roundups no matter what I believe. That is, identity is not defined by oneself but by the interaction of oneself with others, and as long as folks saw me as Jewish, it was less relevant what I believed.
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Open air prison ....
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So, that ambivalence then hits the stuff I have picked up from the work on ethnic conflict. I can see via those lenses that ancient hatred is not really what is going here, but political dynamics in Israel and in the Palestinian community. There is outbidding and pandering to extremists in both, which then feed the outbidding and pandering in the other. Netanyahu feeds Hamas, and Hamas feeds Netanyahu. When I visited in 2019, my first visit, as part of a group tour of IR scholars, I got to see how much has been locked in, that bad decisions beget bad decisions. That Israeli generals told me that the only response to violence is to hit harder than they hit you, as if this were Chicago with the Untouchables fighting Capone. I could see their point of view, but again, it was a path to more violence. I left Israel, like many of those on the trip, sad and frustrated--that the future of Israel and of the Palestinians was bleak--that there was no way out and no one in or near power was interested in finding one. And this happens.
So, I see people saying that an unprovoked Israel deserves all of our support. And I have to recoil a bit, as Israel has done a shit ton of provoking via its empowering of rabid settlers who have encroached on the Mosque and engaged in lots of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank. But I also recoil when I hear folks talk about Hamas being part of anti-colonial struggle, as, yes, the Palestinians do have legitimate grievances, but Hamas is an awful, theocratic, maybe nihilist entity that did truly barbaric things. Yet, I also know that Israel is going to kill a lot of Palestinian kids in Gaza since, yes, the population of Gaza is about 50% under 18. War crimes do not justify war crimes. And more violence is not going cause this conflict to go away.
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Pretty sure those towers are now destroyed
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Both sides need far better governance, actors who don't benefit from the other side being radicalized. But the institutions and dynamics of each are perverse and reinforcing. I hope that Netanyahu pays a high price for letting this happen on his watch, but I seriously doubt that Israeli politics is going to move to the center as a result. The flavors of the more successful parties in Israel are all variants of far right. The left/center was broken by the second Intifada, and I doubt that these events will resurrect them. I know less and understand less the Palestinian side, but I am pretty sure that air strikes are not going to lead to moderates taking power.
So, I have rambled without reaching a clear idea of who should do what. Which is probably fitting. And also explains why I have been reluctant to discuss this stuff--not just a bad job talk in 1993, but because the reality is so difficult, twisted, and painful.
Update:
I got into a conversation with my sister during the weekly family zoom, and she pressed me on when have ethnic conflicts ended peacefully rather than through conquest. I gave the easy answer: South Africa. But that conversation reminded me of the basic rules of ethnic conflict:
- Most ethnic groups, no matter their history, are at peace: violence is rare.
- When there is violence, it ends. No place is constantly at war forever.
- The past constrains choices but does not determine the present. It is up to today's politicians to decide what to do, and the incentives the structures/systems provide influence but do not determine. Agency remains.
Which means it didn't have to be this way, it didn't have to happen this weekend, while there are dynamics locking the parties in, those dynamics can be resisted, and, yes, outsiders could play some role in either exacerbating or ameliorating the nasty dynamics.