This weekend, I was in Reston, Virginia for my second IUS--the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Founded by one of the biggest names in the earliest civ-mil era, Morris Janowitz, the IUS is the premiere American gathering of civ-mil scholars. It ultimately led to IUS-Canada and I think the European Research Group on Armed Forces and Society--ERGOMAS--and maybe a few others. Folks were surprised it was only my second, but I started doing civ-mil halfway through my career and it took me a while to figure out the landscape.
And I am glad I did. The civ-mil community and IUS in particular is just a hive of kindness, generosity, and insight. Usually, when I go to a conference, I skip more than a few panel sessions as there are often timeslots where there isn't anything that engages me that much. At IUS, I go to nearly all of the panels I can, and I get a bit frustrated when stuff is cross-scheduled. This year, there were fewer conflicts in the schedule because, alas, far fewer folks attended. Many scholars from outside the US were deterred because of Trump's border madness. Most scholars from American professional military education places--the military academies, war colleges, etc--were either prevented from attending due to the shutdown or Hegseth's anti-academic engagement policies. Some folks from outside the US and from PME places showed up anyway and brought a heap of insight and, yes, fun.
I participated in two panels--the first where I presented my paper about how joining NATO shaped Swedish and Finnish civil-military relations differently--and the second I will discuss further below. I had a lot of fave presentations, but a few stick out. Polina Beliakova of American University is simply one of the sharpest of the next gen of civ-mil scholars. She presented a devastating bit of work--that many scholars keep citing that 3/4s of democracies have been felled by coups but if you take democracy seriously as more than just elections, that finding goes away. Specifically, she focuses on a different coding of democracies, focusing not just on elections but on freedoms of press/association/speech and developed civil societies. This is important because these might be the democratic equivalent of coup-proofing (we study more autocracies and how they coup proof by altering the ethnic balance of the armed forces, by setting up paramilitary organizations, by promoting due to loyalty and not merit, positioning party loyalists [commissars] next to senior military leaders] institutions/strategies dynamics. Polina showed that if you include those kinds of measures, suddenly most of the places counted as democracies drop out, leaving very, very few (2) democracies being felled by coups. Which means we need to look elsewhere for what might cause democracy to end. Insert foreshadowing music here.The second paper on that panel was by private citizen Lindsay Cohn, who has spent much time myth-busting Posse Comitatus. She discussed the origins of PC and showed that it did not really reduce the use of US military forces in the US in law enforcement--it just moved it outside of the South. That is, it was aimed at reducing the enforcement of Reconstruction against the racist people who wanted to deny civil rights to the newly freed Black people. Her larger point is that using the military domestically is a political problem that the courts will not solve for us. I felt for Lindsay and Polina as both were doing vital myth busting that was compared to killing Zombies--that the arguments they were confronting have been attacked multiple times but are hard to kill. Kind of like Huntington's stuff that has done a heap of damage both to civilian control of the military and to the study of civ-mil. I pointed out after the panel that it is not that hard to kill individual Zombies, but it is hard to eradicate the Zombie virus.
As a Brooksian, I should note that Risa Brooks presented a number of papers that all were super insightful and pushed me to think harder about stuff including one on accountability:
The Kori Schake book panel was a heap of fun because Heidi Urben and Peter Feaver and Kori know each other well and like to give each other plenty of friendly grief. Kori's book is a selected history of American civil-military relations (I haven't read it yet as the mail in Canada has been disrupted by strikes and always moves by ox-cart). Heidi gave an incredibly sharp assessment of what the book adds to our understanding and what the book could have addressed better. Peter asked a series of questions, many of which Kori claimed where poli sci and she's an historian (her degree is in Poli Sci). It was just a delightful roundtable that raised a bunch of interesting questions.
The last panel I will highlight was one of the last of the conference: I was on a roundtable on what can we learn about American civ-mil from the comparativists and vice versa. I was the chair and I started the conversation with a few slides. I raised the question of whether the US example is relevant for the rest of the world:
Yes:
- Most folks including most militaries still rely on Huntington
- Most militaries want a heap of autonomy and think the civilians are amateurs
- Military effectiveness is hard to measure
- Principal-agency theory applies everywhere, and all militaries hate it despite the fact that they apply it every single day.
No
- The US model doesn't apply everywhere
- It doesn't apply to the US
- I self-promoted by invoking our recent book
I then suggested that the classic phrase of comparison being the thief joy is wrong. Envy is bad but comparison is joy.
I took inconsistent notes for the rest of the panel (sorry), but some of the key points:
Will the American troops fire on Americans? Maybe, as it depends on such stuff as the ratio of protestors to troops (the bigger the protests, the less likely troops will fire); non-violence begets a non-violent mil response, is the crowd's composition (ethnic/racial) similar to the troops (maybe best for white folks to do the protesting?). They also spoke on how Trump/Hegseth are trying to get an obedient military via ethnic stacking (making the military whiter), loyalty tests, counterbalancing by building up ICE, paying the military when no one else is getting paid, etc.
One scholar focused on militia-state relationships--borrowing from Staniland's work--will Trump's regime suppress the far right militias, contain them, collude, or incorporate. We all voted on incorporating. They also pointed out that we need to look at beyond the military to the ecology of the security sector--the balance of power among the various actors. Maybe the military will be left out of internal security stuff to marginalize it. They reminded us that we civ-mil folks tend to ignore the National Guard (as does the regular military), so we need to think about them.
Another scholar pointed out several lessons/warnings and a question:
- to deal with illegal acts is to take it to court, but this is a political problem, courts won’t save us, need political actors to take political steps—dems in Congress
- how quickly norms can erode, failure of imagination about this regime, envision worst case scenario and then think worse than that
- we focus so much on norms governing the military, we have not thought much about civilian norms, US case shows when civilians violate norms
- we have to have correct concepts on the US case—Posse Comitatus for example. We have to get this stuff straight, duty as a community to ensure that we are not spreading misinformation
Their question: have we lost the thread as a community of civ-mil scholars? What are civ-mil norms for in democracies? The norms serve a political outcome, at what point does the military become complicit for the fall of the republic by hiding behind norms?
Which led to a conversation about what the military should be doing: the senior officers should be talking about what the oath means, that retired officers now have a reason to speak , don't comply in advance, governors should be getting legal advice about their national guard units and tlaking to them.
The entire weekend was full of insight and camaraderie. I am not going to say this community is more supportive, kind, and generous because it has more women in it than other parts of International Security, but I am going to imply that it does... I am lucky to have found this field, mostly by accident. The work is fascinating and relevant, and the people are terrific. It has made the second half of my career not just more interesting and more successful, but much fun as well. The only downside is that IUS is biannual, so the next one is in 2027.









