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| Susan is the best ski buddy. And, yes, I continue to wear the spikes so that she can follow me easily. We did run into a woman who had a similar helmet cover. |
International Relations, Ethnic Conflict, Civil-Military Relations, Academia, Politics in General, Selected Silliness
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| Susan is the best ski buddy. And, yes, I continue to wear the spikes so that she can follow me easily. We did run into a woman who had a similar helmet cover. |
While waiting for a delayed flight (some kind of emergency messed up Newark tonight), I got miffed at a smart piece on the state of US-European relations. In the second paragraph, it makes reference to the US Department of War. There is no Department of War. Just because Trump or Hegseth say something does not make it so. As an agency created by Congress--twas a big deal merging Dept of War (yes, that is what it was called way back when as it was the Army's department) and Dept of Navy with a great book on aspects of its creation and consequences by Amy Zegart--can only be renamed with legislation. Despite what he may think, Trump can't legislate.
The Department of War fits into the same category as Gulf of America--just more expensive and dumber. It is more expensive because, yes, these insecure overcompensating actors have spent a heap of money on new letterhead, signs, and the like. Can't have a stupid, counterproductive branding exercise without a heap of branding.
Why is it stupid? Hegseth's justification is that the military is for warfighting, not for defense. Besides the annoying belligerence and, again, faux alpha males peacocking, it is also just wrong. These guys are not overcompensating for having small penii, they are overcompensating for being the bully/cowards that they are. The US military can and does war, but it also defends. Indeed, the most successful exercise of American power since the end of World War II has been the power of the US armed forces deterring aggression and, yes, limiting nuclear proliferation.
On the former, note that no country has conventionally attacked an American ally (a real ally with a treaty and everything, not countries that are referred to as a non-NATO ally--Pakistan doesn't count). South Korea was attacked only after the US mistakenly left it outside of the security perimeter it had established. West Europe remained free despite the Soviet military having far more strength in Europe. Indeed, Putin refuses to hit NATO countries even as they funnel large amounts of weapons to Ukraine, even as Putin seems to have Trump on a leash. Defending other countries via the threat of awesome American military power has been great for the US. The postwar prosperity was built partly on this foundation. The US fought two bloody wars, belatedly, before it provided security guarantees to Europe. Since then? None. So, defending others is good for the US. And note, yes, no country has attacked the US conventionally either.
On the latter, defending other countries via American deterrence--the tripwire of American troops whose deaths could trigger a nuclear response--has also reassured countries so they don't develop their own nuclear weapons. Again, this is the US military providing defense that ultimately improves US security.
And that gets at it--security is not just about fighting. Critically, it is about not fighting. It is about defending via deterrence. So, the Department of Defense is aptly named and good branding. Now, the US military has been used offensively in a number of ways over the decades, but a lot of that didn't go very well--Vietnam (quibble with that and I will bring up Cambodia and Laos) and Iraq to name two. So, perhaps stick with what works?
Most fundamentally, autocrats like to create reality from, well, bullshit. They call a gulf by a different name and demand obedience. Same with this--don't obey the mad ravings of the autocrat. If Trump wants to call it the Dept of War, then serious analysts will call it the Department of Defense until Congress changes it. Many of Trump's executive orders have no basis in law or reality, so let's not give them any legitimacy or support. And it is a really simple decision rule--call things by their legal names.
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| BB Snickerdoodles |
How so, long layover Steve? The classic phrase for this particular form of poker is that you can learn it quickly, but it takes a lifetime to master. The thing about browning butter is that it goes through several stages from melted butter to yellow foam to the foam covering browning beneath it to .... burned butter. So, the hard part is figuring when to take the butter off of the stove and pour into a heat-safe container so that it stops heating.
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| BB Chocolate Chip w caramel bits via Betterbaker |
Next time you want to make a baked good, see if you can find a BB version of it. Join the quest for the perfect brown butter. Even though I feel as if I haven't mastered it, the BB cookies I have made are terrific.
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| BB Cinnamon Rols |
I read and then blueskied about this post by a former general, Mark Hertling, about the Trump Regime politicizing the military. In the course of my skeets, I realized that folks may not get why we civil-military relations scholars talk so much about civ-mil norms. So, a quick civ-mil norm explainer since my flight is delayed.*
First, when we speak of norms, we are basically talking about standards of appropriate behavior. That such standards exist and that they serve us well when respected.
Second, we need norms because laws and policies are inadequate. The relationship between civilian officials and military officers is dynamic, chock full of gray areas, and there is a great need for some trust and respect. But to have trust and respect, people need to have relatively clear ideas of what is good behavior--what is respectful, what is appropriate. We cannot simply legislate civil=military behavior as it violate people's rights. Saying that retired officers cannot speak, for instance, would violate their first amendment rights. Expecting them to speak responsibly is a norm thing.
For instance, the piece linked above is by a retired general who is commenting on contemporary US civ-mil relations. I tend to get uncomfortable about retired senior military officers speaking up as they can be seen as speaking for the active military, whether the active military wants them to or not, and thus gets the military a bit more involved in politics. In this case, I don't mind so much because Hertling is explaining how officer promotion works, and what the impact of inteference in promotion would do to the army.
It is political, of course, as all things involving the military are inherently political, and, yes, it is also partisan. But it is partisan because the government itself is engaged in an effort to politicize promotion, a very partisan move to benefit the Trump Regime and the Republican Party, and not an effort to improve American national security. To fight such partisan efforts may make one appear to be partisan, but to stay silent may make one appear complicit.
See, this stuff is hard to legislate. Good civil-military relations requires both sides to have an idea of what is appropriate and what is not. Interfering in promotions because the SecDef doesn't like one specific colonel who did his job very well but for someone the SecDef doesn't like is really problematic. Congress can't really stop this by making a new law. It could hold hearins that might clarify the norms and how the administration is violating them. Two problems for that right now: the majority in the House and Senate don't care about their constitutional role AND the Trump regime revels in being inappropriate, so no education about norms will limit their behavior. As I keep saying, a man who will lech after his daughter in public really has no shame or sense of appropriateness.
The question then becomes where do these norms come from and how do folks learn what they ought to do? The norms generally come from past behavior--the prior restraint from Washington to Marshall to Ike help to set the model for how best to behave. The historians and political scientists and philosophers and the like outside, and yes, inside professional military education programs, help to clarify the norms and convey them to the next generation.
There have been lively discussions about where the lines are--when is it necessary, if ever, to resign if the civilians don't follow one's advice, should one speak out in public, when should civilians fire military officers, how best to engage in a respectful but unequal dialogue so that the military folks convey the info and recommendations as clearly as they can without publicly boxing in the politicians, and so on. I have been told by senior Canadian military leaders about their conversations with their bosses and how they try to socialize them about what is expected.
If the next generation of the CDSN is funded, the Civil-Military Relations Network will be building a list of civ-mil norm questions for helping to foster better conversations so that both sides can navigate the gray areas. In principal-agent parlance, all delegation relies on some level of trust--the more distrust, the less delegation, the more oversight, the more friction. More trust can produce more delegation with adequate but not intense oversight, which can lead to flexibility and adaptation.
To be clear, this government revels in being inappropriate and transgressive and wants to erode all institutions. If we ever get out of this, we will need to remind folks of how one ought to behave so that the civilians listen to the military and then chose the best course of action for the country and that the military then obeys those orders.
Doing research in this area always makes me think of Oprah and therapists--lots of talk about relationships and trust. Because when one's life is on the line, you want to trust not just the buddy next to you to fire when you need them to do so, but also for the rest of the actors to show up when needed and that the orders make sense and won't waste lives.
*And, yes, I am not an expert on the normative side of civ-mil relations--I study what countries are doing nd why they do it when it comes to oversight. But teaching civ-mil means reading much of the normative stuff and talking about it.
This, of course, misconceives the job description of historians.* The job of historians is not to be cheerleaders for the country. Their job, as far as I can tell, is to understand the past--what has happened, why it has happened. That's it. What do they focus on? Mostly that depends on the curiosity of individual historians, but, of course, there are systemic dynamics: what gets funding, what kinds of stuff department desire in the next generation of job candidates (as if there are tenure track positions for historians these days), and so forth.
The idea that all historians are doing niche stuff focusing on the historical plight of women, of ethnic groups, of Indigenous people is mostly confirmation bias run amok. That is, folks notice the history focused on those who have mostly been left out of the histories, and they don't notice the standard historical work focused on the Canadian government, the men (yes, conventional histories focus on the dudes) who led the country, and so forth. It is apparently the case that there are few spots in history departments for military historians and diplomatic historians. Still, there is all kinds of history being done, but folks tend to focus on the stuff that they see as strange. Well, there's a reason for that--historically excluded groups tend to be excluded from the histories, so when they are the focus, that is new and different. And folks tend to get freaked out by that which is different.
So, part of this is that history as a field is trying to catch up and cover the history that has been mostly omitted (one way to do original research is to study that which is understudied). And that will mean bad news--that is, the history of excluded groups is going to be a history of exclusion and discrimination. Which might not make white straight men feel good--that the folks who held the monopoly of power may not feel great about being reminded how they ruled. Too bad, so sad. Again, the job of historians is to figure out what happened, and that often means discussing bad stuff.
This tendency to think that historians should be telling Canadians stuff that makes them feel good is not that different from how many of our government partners think that the job of academia is to help them tell their story. Nope, our job is to foster better understanding, which is not always a good news story.
* I am not an historian, and historians probably dislike much of my work for not going back far enough or for not relying more on primary documents. But when I see an academic field near mine be wildly mischaracterized/understand, I spew.