First Reactions to the Arbour Report

Today, the Arbour Report is being released--the review that was requested by the previous Minister of National Defence to address the sexual misconduct crisis in the CAF.  The recommendations is all we "stakeholders" received.  The rest of the report will drop soon.  So, I went through the 48 recommendations (update: the full report is here).  I am not an expert on either sexual misconduct or gender and the military, so I looked at it from the view of how it affects civil-military relations and civilian control of the military.  With that in mind, here are my initial reactions and summary.

Appropriately, much of the focus is on recruitment, selection, promotion, education, and training which are some of the key processes that will affect who is in the CAF and the incentives they face once in.  The big item that might get a heap of news: the possibility of replacing/eliminating the Royal Military Colleges which have been key locales for where the apples become systematically rotten--that the colleges are taking the new generation of officers and generating the wrong set of beliefs/attitudes/sense of appropriateness.  This would be a big change.  I am not sure where I stand on that.  The recommendations focused on quickening recruitment with a greater probationary period aimed at providing a greater ability to release people who are incompatible with the values that they want to instill.  For instance, racists and misogynists should be identified before joining the CAF but there should be greater opportunities to kick them out early in their career.

I think the stuff I can't really talk about is what is missing--the experts on this stuff will have a clearer idea of what is omitted.  Having said that, while there are some hints of instilling civilian control of the military, there is not direct discussion of improving civilian control of the military.  There are limited recommendations for the civilian end of things--how the Department has to change its culture, maybe by limiting how many ex-military serve in DND, especially at the highest levels (DM, Minister, etc).  

What else might be missing?  No new inspector-general, not much focus on the abuse of power crisis that is beyond sexual misconduct.  Some of the recommendations get at this indirectly--changes in promotions of senior officers--not sure what I am looking for in this.

I think folks will be happy to see a more mature attitude towards sex--recommendation #4 seems to change the fraternization rules so that members of the CAF can have relationships as long as they let their superiors know.  The big question will be whether the chain of command can handle that well.  The key is that it does provide discretion rather than zero tolerance.  It highlights the importance of power imbalances leading to a presumption of relationships not being consensual with the onus of the situation falling on the superior.

Many of the recommendations move responsibility away from where it has been laid for sexual misconduct.  I was worried that the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre [SMRC] will be buried with all of the work, but they will actually have less responsibility for fixing the CAF in part by changing the name to Resource Centre--to be focused on helping victims and survivors and that other agencies should handle everything else.  The Review Services directorate of DND will take up much of the reviewing along with a new external monitor to oversee the implementation of this and other reports. The recommendations include moving criminal code violations to civilian courts--a story today indicated that this, which Arbour had relayed earlier, hasn't happened yet.

More on SMRC: It should come under CPCC (not sure where it is under now).  CPCC should consult SMRC as they develop program content, delivery, methods of eval but SMRC should not be engaged in program delivery or monitoring.  The interesting contradiction here is that the SMRC should remain within DND and report to DM but reviewed to increase its independence, effectiveness, and to improve its place within Defence Team.

Training schools should have best people, so prioritizing those postings especially those directed at new recruits/cadets; incentivize roles as instructors, screen hem and perhaps have a new trainer/educator/instructor occupation.

Increase opportunities for senior leadership and GOFO (general/flag officer) levels to be seconded to private sector and other govt depts.  This is something I recommended in my book, but is not mine alone as it is a pretty obvious way to broaden perspectives.

The stuff on promotion and succession includes having greater access to people's past misconduct "sheets" and that instructions should be given to promotion boards on how to take past misconduct into account. In approving GOFO promotions, the minister should be assisted by senior civilian adviser who is not currently member of Defence team.  Should examine if efforts are being made to correct over-representation of white men in GOFO ranks. The new processes for psychometric evals and 360 degree reviews should be reviewed by external expert on annual basis--with aim to progressive refinement, reported to Minister. The new GOFO processes should be applied to LtCs/Commanders, CWO's/CPO's. The CAF should establish progressive targets for promotion of women at each rank, aiming for more GOFOs

In terms of reporting progress on all of this:

• The Minister should be briefed by ADM RS on all investigations related to sexual harassment, misconduct, leadership culture, including stats.
• CPCC should host online database on internal research relating to sexual harassment and misconduct, gender, sexual orientation, race, diversity and inclusion, and culture change.
• Minister should tell Parliament by the end of the year which recommendations she will not implement
• Minister should appoint an external monitor to oversee the implementation of recommendations, should be assisted by small team external to the defence team and have access to all docs, info, they deem relevant.  They should provide monthly reports to minister and bi-annual public reports
  

In the stakeholder engagement session, a retired military officer demonstrated the problems we face by talking about how to keep this stuff out of the minds and work of the ordinary folks in the CAF. 

In the Q&A, what is different?  Money to implement this effort.  More systematic keeping track of implementation.  More prevention with the Command of Professional Culture and Conduct.

I asked about what kind of civilians will be brought into fill the various "external" roles mentioned in the report.  They have no specific guidance on that yet, but they said it speaks to a shift in how much they are reaching out to external expertise.  They promise to be transparent about their engagement efforts.  

It will be interesting to see what the Minister says today and what the entire Defence Team do in the weeks/months ahead.  As everyone notes, we have had a number of these reviews and not much as changed.  I think this time might be a bit different because there is a sharp, engaged Minister of National Defence who is quite serious about this, a Chief of Defence Staff who has called this an existential crisis, and a thoroughly discredited senior officer cohort.  I doubt that the Prime Minister will expend much political capital to push this stuff through, but the opposition within the CAF will find few allies given the crisis over the past year.

Finally, I have to keep harping on a key point that this report largely omits: civilian control of the military depends not just on the military heeding civilians (which will be tough given the autonomy they have been accustomed to) but on the civilians fulfilling their roles.  Much in the recs are about external monitors and such, which is good for admitting that they need external expertise, but can also displace responsibility.  DND has to do better--to be more independent from the CAF and to have more power and influence over the CAF.  But not just them--can the Defence Committee of the House of Commons revise its understanding of its job--to hold the minister to account--to focus as much on oversight of the CAF, including having more information, so that they get in the heads of senior officers who might otherwise think of ways to evade civilian control.  One of the officers mentioned the MINDS program, and she was exactly right--that DND needs to help facilitate the development of civilian expertise.  And, yes, that is where the CDSN comes in--fostering a more diverse, inclusive, and equitable next generation of defence scholars, scientists, military officers, policy officers, journalists, and folks in the private spaces.  But to be clear, this is not really about us but about DND and the CAF.

Our next few podcasts will be addressing the report, and we will be tracking its implementation and the outcomes.  Lots to consider as none of this is easy.