The Purge Continues: Cold, Multilateral Edition

 In the aftermath of JD Vance's visit to the US base in Greenland, we learn that it is a multilateral base.  How so?  The commander of that unit, Colonel Susan Myers, sent an email to everyone under her to indicate that things at the base are going well and that the Canadians and Danes within the unit should feel part of the team. 

"I commit that, for as long as I am lucky enough to lead this base, all of our flags will fly proudly -- together,"

And then she got fired.  The hacks and around the Trump Administration will say she is too woke and that she was insubordinate.  The challenge is: what was she supposed to do?  This is a dilemma facing any officer who has a multinational command--how to keep your non-Americans included when the US turns in a unilateral direction?  Dave and I started our NATO in Afghanistan book seeking to understand how commanders balance having responsibilities to two chains of command--the national one and the multilateral one.  While they often point in the same direction, that is not always the case.  We quickly realized the national one almost always matters more since the homeland shapes promotion of the officer, most of the assets they have, and so on.

As it turns out, sometimes the commander acts more on the basis of the multilateral mission.  Myers cared more about her troops and unit cohesion (see below) than she did about her career.  Not all colonels become generals--most do not--but now she will find herself seeking a new job, I guess.  It is bad for her and bad for the force, as it teaches everyone in the military that subservience to the partisan stances of the administration are more important for one's career than doing the assigned mission well.  

Michael Robinson wrote a great book about how politicization of the military can put the officers into damned if you, damned if you don't situations.  This ain't the first one of this administration, and it ain't the last.  Standing still and not doing anything, as Rush reminds us, is still a choice.  Myers could have said nothing and would have appeared complicit with Vance's statement.  Just like if the Army had said nothing when Trump's campaign team violated the rules at Arlington National Cemetery or if the generals and admirals were silent after Charlottesville (condemning racism is only controversial for the racists, but alas, that is now who governs).  With the political system shifting, the military, even if it stands still, appears to be moving, according to Robinson.  It is up to the civilians not to put the military into these situations--but the Trump administration wouldn't recognized responsibility if it walked up to them and said hi.

One of the ironies here is that unit cohesion is usually cited by the intolerant.  It refers to the aim of keeping a unit together so that it can be more effective.  It is often cited by those who don't want Black people integrated in the military or women in the military or LGBTQ+ people in the military--that their presence will disrupt the cohesion of the unit, which will make it harder for that platoon or ship or squadron to cooperate in the face of the enemy.  But, of course, the real threat to unit cohesion was always the intolerant.  

Here, the threat to unit cohesion is the Trump Administration.  That Vance's presence and speech and the entire discourse aimed against the allies threatens to disrupt multilateral efforts around the world.  In Greenland, there are Canadians and Danes in what was Myers's command, and she had to take seriously how to make them feel part of the common mission in the aftermath of Vance's divisive appearance.  The same goes for American commanders in Europe who have NATO countries contributing to their units.  The same goes for the American commander in South Korea who in an emergency would not just command all the Americans in and near South Korea but all South Korean troops.  And on and on.  It may not have been Vance's intent, but, again, the irresponsible rarely recognize when they are doing damage to relationships.

This may not be a problem for a unilateralist administration who has been discussing the possibility of no longer having an American officer serve as the top military official in NATO (SACEUR).  Trump and his team don't play well with others and don't want to play with others.  So, we are going to see more of this at the expense of American influence, power, and security.  Congress often resisted having Americans serve under foreigners because they didn't trust them--so nearly every NATO mission with the exception of KFOR (the Kosovo mission) had an American at the top.  That will end soon, alas.  

Myers had two strikes against her--she's a woman and she believed in her mission.  The longer this goes on (and it will go on), the more officers in the US military leave, are pushed out, or conform to the administration's various dictates.  I am not saying civilian control of the military is at risk, but that the effectiveness of the military is. That is what happens when one politicizes the force, when promotion is not based on merit but on fealty to the autocrat. We know this from the comparative study of autocratic militaries (Talmadge/Roessler/etc).  Another irony---those who complain that DEI gets in the way of merit promote those who are not meritorious but are loyal (Hegseth) and fire those who are doing their jobs well because they are not sufficiently loyal--Myers today, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Charles Brown, former Chief of Naval Operations Lisa Franchetti, Commander of the Coast Guard Linda Fagan, and so on.

Those in the military will look at those who are promoted and wonder what partisan machinations they engaged in to get promoted, rather than think about their military records.  This will breed disrespect and distrust.  And it will be very, very hard to undo if there is ever a chance to do so.  Norms take generations to build, days to destroy.  Respect takes much time to be earned, but distrust can happen in a heartbeat.

We know that Trump and his ilk disrespect service, given his past blatherings about not respecting those captured in war or those wounded in combat.  So, please do not take seriously any concerns by Trump, Vance, or Hegseth that Myers or others like her are "too partisan" to be in the military.  The military does need to subject to civilian control and strong oversight, but what it does not need are loyalty tests to the individuals at the top. Do they need to be loyal to offices at the top?  Sure.  But not to any one man.

 

 

 

Steve As Fake Economist: Maybe not as Dumb As the Wannabe Oligarchs?

 I am not an economist, but so much of what is going on these days is due to faulty understandings of basic economics, so even my level of understanding may be sufficent.

I just wanted to highlight a few things that bluesky conversations forced me to think about.

First, there is the discussion of the chances of a recession happening in 2025.  In my humble opinion, the probability is not 25% or 50% but 100%.  That is, it is a certainty because IT IS ALREADY HAPPENING.  A recession is when the economy shrinks as opposed to growing.  The formal definition is when it happens for two quarters.  

Will there be less economic activity this year?  There already is less and it will continue.  That cutting hundreds of thousands of government jobs AND cutting heaps of money from flowing to various actors (cities, states, universities, etc) will reduce the economic activity.  Plus, yes, multiplier effects--those restaurants and other services that benefit from having fully operating universities, states, cities, think tanks, etc will be doing less, buying less, spending less.  

This is before we get to the tariffs, which have already started to hit the economy--that firms are pausing production because they really don't know what their inputs will cost nor will they know what kinds of prices they can charge if they hope to export into markets that are, yes, raising their prices due to retaliatory tariffs.  

The only way to avoid a recession--the technical definition--is if somehow all of this temporary for one quarter and no more than that.  Guess what?  Trump is not going to reverse all of the Musking and DOGE-ing of the government, and no matter what happens with the tariffs, it will have stirred up too much uncertainty to magically erase within one quarter.  This recession is likely to last a long time precisely because this administration does not believe in standard macroeconomics.  But standard macroeconomics believes in it--spend less money, people will buy less, economic activity will slow.  Tax cuts on the very rich may prop up some investments, but they don't actually generate as much economic activity as argued--it does not trickle down.  

Oh, and I haven't even mentioned what Trump is doing to agriculture by keeping out migrant workers or what he is doing to tourism, a very big industry, due to the fear of being disappeared.  

So, that's the first thing I wanted to get off my chest.

The second is this: before the election, business folks had to consider who would be better for them: the guy who promised tax cuts and deregulation or the woman who wasn't going to raise tariffs or create a tremendous amount of uncertainty.  It seems like most of them chose the former and not the latter.

This was, in a word, dumb.  Why?  American businesses already pay very little tax, and rich people pay historically low taxes still.  And they can evade much of it.  Yes, regulation is annoying, but if they want to export to the EU, then they will face regulations there anyway. Plus they can price in penalties and figure out ways to dodge or cheat on the regs.

What they can't finesse are trade wars or uncertainty.  Uncertainty is an absolute killer except for those who can wager on it.  For most businesses, having predictable political and economic situations is basic for making investment decisions and for good operations.  Maybe the Silicon Valley types who have fallen in love with disruption think they don't need either inputs from abroad (or to sell stuff abroad) or stable environments, but pretty much every other actor in the economy relies on foreign inputs, foreign markets, and stable situations.  

So, now, they are fucked.  Unfortunately, so are we.   

Yes, we have short-term-itis among business people--that the focus is on today's market price and not tomorrow's profits. I get that.  But damn, tomorrow turned out to be today, not five years from now.  

Again, what angers me so much is that it didn't have to be this way--just like the Brits stupidly chose Brexit, which was predictably dumb, much of American business chose Trump focusing on tax cuts and deregulation and wishful thinking away the tariffs, the trade wars, the uncertainty, the cheap labor provided by immigrants.  

Will this lead to Trump's undoing?  Maybe eventually, but as long as the GOP fears Musk's money going to primary candidates and Trump siccing his mob on those who disagree with him, I doubt that the GOP will find their backbone.  Maybe the media will stop providing cover for this as people become increasingly outraged.  So, the pain has come quickly, but I don't think it will go away anytime too soon. 

Sorry to be a doomblogger, but at this point, things just suck mightily.  The protests have already made a difference as Democrats are starting to block stuff, and most elections have gone Dem since November.  But the only way out is through--impeachment won't get rid of Trump, and if it did, we'd have Vance.  

The Purge Continues: Cyber Edition

 Trump fired the head of the National Security Agency General Timothy Haugh, who is also double hatted as head of Cyber Command.  I went on a long rant on bluesky, which I will mostly replicate here.  As military folks like to BLUF--bottom line up front--just like every other institution in the US, the military is being broken.  Making fealty to the mad king will undermine effectiveness in a number of ways.  

First, some basics: to be clear, the military is always a political actor and subject to the political dynamics of a country.  It goes back to Clausewitz--that war is politics by other means--and the basic definition of politics which focuses on any kind of decision-making that affects the public, especially the allocation of money and other stuff.  Being partisan is something else entirely.  We used to have American generals refuse to vote because that they wanted to be neutral.  In the past 30 years, some of that has broken down as retired admirals and generals began to endorse candidates, playing upon the perception that they were speaking for the active forces.  But it was not inevitable that we would get here.

During Trump 1.0, many norms (standards of appropriate behavior), were violated repeatedly.

• Trump announced the Muslim ban from the part of the Pentagon paying tribute to various heroes
• Trump kept referring to the senior officers as "my generals"
• Trump blamed the generals and admirals if things went awry rather than owning things--the buck never stopped with him
• Trump used the military to deal with protestors and wanted to do it more violently--"Can't they shoot the protestors in the leg?"
• Trump pardoned war criminals

 It got to the point where scholars of civil-military relations, who usually try to avoid advocating for any military disobedience, were tempted to root for some.  In the aftermath of Charlottesville, the senior leadership spoke out in favor of a diverse force and for tolerance.  This was seen as being partisan--because it could be viewed as an implicit critique of Trump's take on the event.  But not speaking up would have been seen as complicit. 

This is where Michael Robinson's work fits in--he wrote a great book that argues that even if the military stands still, if the observers are moving, the military will be seen as moving either towards or away--that they will be dragged into partisan politics--politicization--even if they resist it.  

As I discussed a few weeks ago, when Milley retired and spoke out about how the military serves the country and not a wannabe dictator, it was pretty clear that what might otherwise be a banal statement was a criticism of Trump.

The firing of Haugh is yet another dead canary in the coalmine (that coalmine must be packed with dead canaries at this point).  A few things stand out.  He is a white man, so the previous purge was perhaps just racist and misogynist (note I am not approving--I am incredibly angry) as Trump fired one Black general and two women four star officers. One could argue (foolishly) that this was not aimed at creating a submissive class of officers.   By firing Haugh, it is abundantly clear loyalty to Trump is the only criteria that matters.

And who decides?  Laura Loomer, who is a far right agitator.  She was briefly banned by social media for being racist.  It is quite notable that this firing happened basically at the same time as several people were purged from the National Security Council for not being sufficiently Trumpian.   

It will not stop here as Trump's fundamental insecurity produces an unquenchable thirst for loyalists.  He won't ever be confident in the loyalty of whichever people he promotes to admiral or general.  His own disloyalty gets projected in every direction.

And this happens as we have already seen many disturbances in the force--banning books at the Naval Academy, the commandant of the US Air Force Academy pondering firing civilian profs, civ-mil conferences cancelled at the Army War College. 

This will produce a less effective force.  Those who get promoted will be seen as less qualified, less meritorious, as they will be viewed as moving up due to their partisan loyalty.  The civ-mil literature shows quote clearly that when you promote on the basis of loyalty, you get bad results-Talmadge, Roessler, etc.  This will create dissension and friction within as unit cohesion will break.   [Any time a military seeks to include the previously excluded--Black Americans, gays and lesbians, trans people, the intolerant argue that this is bad for unit cohesion, and a coherent unit is necessary for battlefield success.  It turns out that the real problem are the intolerant people, as the diverse armed forces of the world have proven to be most effective.]

An officer corps of yes-men (and yes, I do mean men) may make it easier to issue orders to invade Mexico or shoot at Americans, but with disrupted unit cohesion, it will be more likely that the military will not engage in such efforts in unison--and those divides might become violent.

The only winners in all of this are those countries seen by normal people as America's adversaries--China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, ISIS, etc. 

Just like the tariffs, this is all so unnecessary, so destructive, so costly to so many individuals as well as to the country and to those who used to be America's allies.  

So that is my angry civ-mil riff du jour as another general is tossed for appearing to be not sufficiently loyal to the mad king. 

 

Big Man, Big Heart

This week, we found out that Brandon Valeriano died.  It is quite gutting as he had such a terrific spirit, and he was too damned young.  Brandon stood out from the crowd at all the conferences as he was literally bigger than most of us, and he was also one of the very few Latinos in the field of IR. But mostly he stood out because he was always surrounded by the large groups of friends and mentees he had amassed over the years, as he had so much love and friendship to give.  So his passing is a huge loss to all of us.

Notice that there are no chips in front of
Brandon. This was not an outlier.

I was mostly a conference pal with Brandon.  I would see him twice a year--once at the American Political Science Association meeting and once at the International Studies Association meeting.  I didn't see him this year as I missed the most recent ISA, and now I regret not having a last chance to hang
out with him.  I first met Brandon at the poker games we have been having at these two conferences since the early 1990s.  He joined us when he was fresh out of grad school, if I remember correctly, and made a big impression.  Brandon was simply fun to be with.  He had a great sense of humor, and he also laughed loudly and with gusto (although his laugh was never as piercing as some of his fellow poker players).  He was, well, a lousy poker player, which made him, of course, more welcome.  He simply didn't care about the low stakes games--he was far more focused not on the cards but on the players--not their strategies but their lives and stories.  

Brandon could have easily not fit in.  He was much younger than most of us.  He was single while the rest of us were mostly not (of course, his single life made him far more interesting to the rest of us).  But he was so very sweet and funny that once he joined us, he quickly belonged and became not just a regular, but a crucial member of the group.  The games in the future will not be the same without him.

As a result of the semi-annual game, we became friends.  We didn't chat that often between conferences, but we kept in touch via the usual outlets of social media.  Through the poker games and through our other correspondence, I learned how much love he had to give.  I loved that he was such a big guy but had such a teeny dog who became a focus for his affection.  He talked much of his family, and one of the great tragedies of the timing of his passing is that he was just about to start a new job in his beloved home of LA.  

One repeated theme in his social media was hunting for food in LA that he could not get in Scotland and elsewhere.  One of the things we bonded over was our dissatisfaction with the challenge of academic life--not having a lot of choice about where one lives.  He enjoyed Glasgow (more below), but it was so far from home and from decent ingredients for the food he loved the most.  I have been thinking of him a lot lately, as I can't get decent tortilla chips in Berlin.

We also bonded over our shared love of tv and pop culture.  Some of my non-poli sci friends remembered him from the games I set up via social media during the last seasons of Lost and Game of Thrones. We agreed on much stuff, but I remember him pushing me on both Band of Brothers and The Pacific--the lack of Latino representation in those World War II shows. He had family that had served during the war, and he had been proud of them, and was disappointed that these shows didn't feature people like them.  

Jaroslav and Brandon as
we wander through Glasgow.

The one time I got to see Brandon outside of a big conference was at a smaller conference in Glasgow.  He got me invited to be a participant in a conference on Scottish separatism before the referendum in the mid 2010s, and we made the most of it.  He introduced me and Jaroslav Tir to his favorite place to drink.  We rented a car, and he made me drive, and we drove through the Highlands.  On the wrong side of very narrow roads.  At no time did he panic, even when I once entered a traffic circle the wrong way.  The three of us had a great time wandering through this beautiful landscape.  Which reminds me that we both had a travel bug, another shared interest.

 

The start of Brandon's career was difficult as his home institution blew up (no fault of his own), but he managed not only to survive but thrive and succeed so very well.  He was one of the first political scientists to study cyber-security, writing a series of books and many articles.  While that area is far from my own, I can tell that his work there was quite well respected not simply because of the citations, but the invitations--to be  a fellow at multiple places.  What I appreciated most about his work was that he could have been a threat inflater--making it seem like the world would end soon due to cyber war--but he pushed back against that, developing a reputation for measured, serious analysis.  It was clear that the most important part of the job for Brandon was mentoring.  I met a number of junior scholars who had worked with Brandon, and they all had so much appreciation for him.

Over time, Brandon branched out, examining the international relations of sport, pop culture and IR (another shared interest), and the role of race and ethnicity in international relations.  One way to get to  know Brandon is to check out his old posts at Duck of Minerva.  It was a great place for him to share not just his IR but his other interests in very accessible pieces.  I will be going though some of them in the next few days.

A few years ago, Brandon had a heart attack while in Mexico and nearly died.  He joked about it, but it has been clear the past few years that he was not healthy.  I had thought things were getting better--that he was in better shape--but clearly not so much.  People are stunned at the news of his death because he was such a vital person, so full of love and humor.  We are now very sad for we lost a friend who had such a big heart.  My condolences go out to these friends and his family.

Security Clearances Fiasco 2: Another Bugaloo

 I wrote this piece a few years ago about how serious it is not to store classified documents seriously.  This week, the story is not documents but a group chat via an insecure system.  Lovely.  Now, the bullshit artists are trying to claim that the info was not classified.  Sure.  First, to be clear, the key official with authority to declassify stuff can't just say stuff was declassified after it is revealed that the info was mishandled.  There is a process by which stuff is declassified, and this ain't it.  

Ok, how does classification work?  Let's see what I remember (I learned this stuff my first week 20+ years ago and is very much burned in my head since, well, it was the only stuff that might have led to jail if I screwed up).

 Any document (and yes, a group chat counts) has a number of pieces of information.  Each bit of info, each clause or paragraph gets its own rating, so that a document may consist of unclassified stuff, some confidential info, some secret, and some top secret stuff:

(C)  Indicated confidental

(U) Unclassified

(S)  Secret

(TS) Top secret.

I guess there would also be either SCI--for need to know, compartmentalized info, but, guess what?  Since I wasn't cleared for SCI, I never saw any SCI stuff.  I inferred that mostly involved Special Ops or NSA stuff, but that is just a guess.

Anyhow, there are other classifications: NOFORN for not to be released to foreigners, NATO Only to be released to NATO countries, SFOR only to be released to countries participating in the NATO stabilization mission in Bosnia.. which included the Russians so not much secrety stuff there,  and so on.

 The key is that when a doc has a bunch of different info at varying levels of secrecy, the entire doc is rated at the level of the most secret piece.  So, a doc with lots of open source info having one bit of Top Secret in it would be classified as Top Secret.

Guess what a war plan consists of?  Heaps of Top Secret stuff.  For the Houthis group chat texts, the most secret thing there is probably the reference to the targeting of an individual.  We can't be certain of how they did that, but it probably involved a human source, given the context.  Guess who needs to know that?  Damned few people, and definitely not those on this chat.  So, probably TS/SCI--top secret, sensitive compartmentalized info.   You know what the opposite of compartmentalized is?  A 19 person chat on insecure channels.  

So, don't buy any excuse this assholes give--they were reckless because they were trying to show each other how tough they are, how cool they are.  So, they broke heaps of rules ... and laws.  But since their boss did so quite flagrantly, and since he pardons his loyalists, they can act with impunity. This is what impunity looks like.  A shit show.

Can Militaries Save Us From Democratic Backsliding?

 Last night, I participated in an event organized by the Canadian Embassy in Berlin and the Hertie School on what role do militaries have in arresting democratic backsliding (no, it was not taped).  While I am not an expert in this part of the civil-military relations field, I had views.  Ina Kraft from the Bundeswehr's Center on Military History and Social Science was my partner in crime.

What did I say?  Well, the bottom line up front, as the military likes, was, nope, the militaries of the world can't actively reverse backsliding, but they can try to avoid either being complicit or accelerating the demise of democracy.   In essence, do no harm. The timing, of course, was fantastic, as the attack on democracy in the US accelerates with every day, and the military has been a target of the arsonists under Trump. 

I first highlighted what backsliding usually refers to--the usurpation of power and authority by the executive from the courts and from the legislature, the undermining of the media, and unfairness in the elections.  South Korea is an example of an attempt to seize the power from the legislature, Poland is an example of manipulating the courts.  The US these days is exemplar of pretty much every form of backsliding--disobeying court orders, stealing the spending power from the legislature, attacking the media, undermining elections....  Of course, defining backsliding these ways raises the very question of exactly what do we want the military to do besides .... something!!!

I then went on to discuss the fundamentals of civ-mil--that civilian control of the armed forces is foundational to democracy, often taken for granted, that we don't want to give the military a vote on who governs.  That both we and they want to stay out of partisan politics, and that politicization refers to that very dynamic of either being dragged into or jumping into not just politics (all things military are inherently political, and not just because of Clausewitz).   I pointed out that being loyal to a constitution or to democracy sounds neutral and non-partisan except for when politicization is so rampant even such a statement about the sources of loyalty are pretty partisan:

Milley's statement here was labeled as a swipe at Trump, and, well, yeah, it was, even though it was essentially pretty basic and mundane--the US military swears an oath to the Constitution, not to a person.

My next step was to consider why do we look to the military for help.  First, in many democracies, it is the most respected institution--it performs most highly in surveys.  Of course, that is partly or mostly because it is not seen as attached to one party or another, although again politicization is making a dent in that.  Military officers are also seen as being honorable, motivated by duty to country.  Also, despite what the white supremacist SecDef desires, miltiaries are often more diverse, more representative of society than other actors (and if that diversity is handled well, it improves capability).  And, yes, militaries have power.  Mostly via the weapons they carry, but also via their legitimacy as a national institution.

So, what can/should militaries do?  They can't un-usurp.  They can't take power from the executive and return it to the courts or to the legislature.  They can't free the media.  They can seize power and then hand over power to ... someone.  The record of coups is not great for facilitating democracy.  So, I raised a few other alternatives:

• Don't obey illegal orders.   The lesson of World War II is that "I was just following orders" is not a legitimate excuse, and democratic militaries are told that they are obligated to disobey an illegal order.  
• The question then becomes--what counts as illegal?  Who decides?  There are lawyers all over the place--civilian agencies have lawyers, miltiary units have lawyers.  But lawyers often disagree, so how do you decide which lawyers are correct?
• In my year in the Pentagon long ago, I saw the lawyers for the Secretary of Defense saying different stuff than the Joint Staff's lawyers.  So, this is not theoretical.
• Would invading Canada be illegal?  From international law, almost certainly.  From a US legal perspective, damned if I know as the war powers stuff is contested.  Both Republicans and Democrats have used force without congressional authorization.  Plus it might not be that hard for Trump to get his lackeys in Congress to sign off. 
• Would shooting at protestors be illegal?  Probably....
• How about lawful but awful?  That is, what should the military do if the president wants them to do something that would be really bad but would be legal.  
• Again, invading Canada comes to mind.  Always fun to be talking about such stuff at an event organized by the government of Canada (yes, I do love my academic freedom, good thing I don't teach at Columbia University).  One could imagine the military telling the President that this is a very bad idea.  But then he has the right to be wrong (although that norm is not as well understood or supported as civ-mil folks would like).  So, my best guess is that the US military would slow roll: hey, Mr. President, we need a plan.  Six months later, hey, Mr. President, we need to get a lot of snow tires....
• And then this might be the kind of order that some obey and some don't, which can lead to fighting within the US military.
• Or it could be the military simply refuses to fight, staying in their barracks. There are non-coup options.  
  
•  Avoid being co-opted.   Don't appear in Lafayette Square with the President after protestors are forcefully expelled, for instance.  Make statements before elections that the military has no role--of course, that can be seen as partisan in politicized times.
• Align with the opposition?  Not by fighting alongside but by endorsing.  Oh my.  Possible but would probably damage the military for a generation or two. 

To be clear, there are real limits on what the armed forces can do.  They can't create or reinforce political norms on their own.  Military leaders have no expertise when it comes to domestic politics--Milley demonstrated that in a big way.  

These choices, the politicization of the armed forces, can break a military.  Promotion may not be viewed as a merit thing but about fealty to a person. The new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plucked from retirement, will be seen as unqualified and chosen solely because he is MAGA-ish.  The irony here is clear--that these folks complain about DEI but they appoint an unqualified and disqualified SecDef and now Chairman.  Anyhow, if asked to do something truly awful like shooting at protestors or invading Canada (invading Mexico would be bad too but may not be as divisive), the military may break apart.  

Ultimately, the challenge here is that acting disobediently to save democracy can erode democracy.  To be fair to Milley, he faced awful choices.  Ones he shouldn't have had to face--most of the responsibility for the politicization of the US armed forces is on the civilians.  And the same is true in South Korea and other places.

We received a lot of good questions from the sharp Hertie students, other attendees, and moderator Julian Wucherpfennig. Preparing for the event made me think, and I am grateful to Christoph Harig, David Kuehn, and Risa Brooks for helping me get a bit smarter on this part of civ-mil.  And then the presentation by Ina and the Q&A pushed me to think harder.   I got into this business because I like being pushed to think about important, interesting stuff.  I just wish it was not so damned relevant these days.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pop Quiz: Dystopia Edition

 Oy, things are getting dark fast.  So, yeah, ICE and DHS and other actors are trying to make the US as unpleasant as possible for foreign folks.  So much so that they pulled apart a Canadian sister act and asked each, do you prefer the US or Canada?  If I were asked, of course, I would have to be a good academic and say: it depends.  Given my dual nationalism, of course, I have some ambivalence, as each country has good and bad things.  To preview, I am not moving to the US anytime soon, so that's a hint, but let's borrow from every sitcom including a classic Friends, and list each side's advantages or disadvantages:

US

• Bagels. Yeah, 20 plus years in Canada and ten in Montreal and I am still firmly against eating smokey bricks covered in lousy seeds.
• Milk containers. Another old argument here. 
• Dairy prices.  Oh, the dairy cartel in Canada means that milk, eggs, and butter are very expensive.
• Football.  It is no contest--Canadian football just looks silly.
• Private grant money.  Heaps of foundations.
• Abundant think tanks--lots of entities generating ideas
• Chinese food.  I guess one likes what one grows up with, but I just like the Chinese food in the US better--the wonton soup is better, the fried stuff is better.
• Summer.  Hot, sure, but I had so many great summers growing up.
• Trader Joes 
• Mexican food

 Canada

• Democratic governance.  The court, while still a political actor, is not one that makes batshit crazy stuff up.  The elections are not gamed by parties, but run by non-partisan actors.  No concerns about gerry-mandering or voter suppression.
• Egg prices... for now.  That the US is gutting all public health stuff means a lousy avian flu response, among other things.  
• Better pandemic response--mostly.  Canadians did very well on the first round of vaccines, with not so great on the latter rounds.
• Government grant money--far more money for the social sciences.  Tis been bery bery good to me.
• Ultimate.  I had fun ultimate in the US, but the city leagues in Montreal and Ottawa were great to me.
• Skiing. Whistler and Lake Louise are special.  If I had more Colorado experiences, this might be a tie. 
• Winter.  Long and cold, but heaps of snow for the aforementioned skiing.
• Legal status of LGBTQ+.  The Canadian Conservatives are doing the same transphobic shit, but are less likely to be successful. 
• Few think tanks.  More is better, but few means that the government reaches out to academics and that has been mighty good to me.

 Tied

•  Costco!
• Treatment of Indigenous people.  Genocidal in both, better now but that is just because the bar is super low.
•  Senates.  Both Senates suck but for different reasons.  Canada's is unelected so it has less power/legitimacy, but the US's is, well, an obstacle to progress.
• Governors/premiers.  Those right wing folks governing federal units suck mightily in both countries.  Danielle Smith and Doug Ford give Abbott and Desantis a run for their money. 

 

So, what do I prefer?  The hint is at the top--I am not moving back to the US--I will eventually be retiring in Ottawa.  When I first moved to Canada, I thought I would eventually return to the US.  Not any more.  My friends are concentrated in Ottawa, I enjoy living here.  The people have been great to me and my family.  It, alas, is no longer about the best ultimate communities.  And, yes, I can't imagine living in the autocratic hellscape that the US is rapidly becoming.  Way too many Americans have chosen Trump three times now.  The first time, one could blame party id and the idea that he might not do so much bad stuff.  Sicne then, WTF America? More Americans don't support him or the party of bad faith, but way too many do.  Ewwwww.

Not sure this is what I would tell some border person, but this is where I stand these days--in a sea of maple, wary of the beavers and the angry geese.

NATO Is Dead, Long Live NATO? Canada Needs a Plan B

 When historians look backwards, February 2025 will mark the rupture of US-European relations.  Vice President J.D. Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference, an affront to all Europeans except the far right, was sandwiched by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s statement that the US would no longer be the primary guarantor of European security and President Donald Trump’s negotiating away all of Ukraine’s bargaining chips with no Europeans present.  The future of NATO is bleak, as the alliance relied on the US security guarantee, and that no longer seems to be in place.  The next German Chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has started conversations about adapting to the end of the US security guarantee by perhaps tying Germany to France’s nuclear deterrent.  The question then is: where does Canada fit as NATO either disappears or becomes something else entirely?   Canada actually has a vote on this and a role—the transatlantic link, the North Atlantic in NATO’s name—can be fastened on this side to Canadian territory instead of American.  While others have focused on investing more in Canada’s military or leveraging its oil, my argument here focuses on a diplomatic strategy. 

What is the threat to Canada?  To be clear, while the potential alliance of US and Russia is most alarming, the most likely threat to Canada and its sovereignty is not an American invasion but yet more economic coercion.  To deal with that, Canada needs help.  Another target of Trump’s territorial ambition, Greenland, has produced an alliance within the alliance—Denmark has gained the support of the other Nordic countries and the Baltics via intense diplomacy.  Canada should exert as much diplomatic effort as it can to get the European members of NATO do something similar—to agree that any further economic warfare directed at Canada by Trump would be met with economic sanctions by as much of the European Union as we can line up.

 There is a natural trade to be made between Canada and Europe. Maintaining a Canadian presence in Latvia and a Canadian mission at NATO helps to keep the alliance going.  It is still a North Atlantic Treaty Organization as long as there is at least one North American member.  The Europeans are already finding challenges in finding a replacement, perhaps predictably so.  Ireland’s neutrality seems to be getting in the way of turning the European Union’s security efforts into a European military.  So, the best shot Europe will have at a unified military effort is through the old machinery at Brussels and the various NATO sub-headquarters throughout the continent.  International relations scholarship asserts that it is far easier to adapt old institutions than develop new ones, which means building on the broken foundations of NATO than creating a new organization.  Canada, as a founding member, gives any post-US NATO legitimacy and a way out for European leaders who are frustrated with efforts to build an EU security organization.

As some have told the Europeans, Canada is the canary in the coal mine.  If Trump engages in a trade war with Canada, Europe is surely next.  Right now, Europe is defending its security by supporting Ukraine.  We need to convince the Europeans that supporting Canada now in these trade wars is the equivalent—better to support Canada’s trade fight now than to have to fight the US directly.

 We are still stuck in the transition as many actors are not quite willing to publicly hedge against the United States.  However, the effort by Trump to push Ukrainian President Zelensky into an awful deal—submit to the Russians and give up 50% of the country’s mineral rights—is teaching European leaders that playing the pandering, transactional strategy to survive Trump 2.0 will not work.  It is time to figure out how to realign our international institutions without the Untted States, it is time for Canada to find like-minded countries to come together to support each other in the fight ahead.  These past few weeks should make it clear to all that the break with the US is coming and coming quickly.

 So, the words of an American founder, Benjamin Franklin, apply now: “We must, indeed, all hang together or, most assuredly, we shall all hang separately.”

Serious Sweden

 I have spent the past week in Sweden as part of the Phil/Steve/Ora project seeking to understand the dynamics between defense agencies (departments/ministries of defense) and militaries in democracies around the world.  I was here in Stockholm last summer for the ERGOMAS meeting, but this trip was more like my visit to Finland last April.  One big difference, besides the weather being far more pleasant, was that I had a very well-wired reservist senior officer act as my fixer.  As a result, I met with a couple of former Ministers of Defence, a recent Supreme Commander (what they call their chief of defense), and several other high level current and former officials.  So, I got what I needed.

Another big difference is, well, the Trumpness of it all.  My fixer kept asking me to give a Canadian perspective on the state of things.  Most hadn't quite realized how serious Canadians are taking the 51st state craziness.  Once I put it into the context of how everyone around here lined up with Denmark over Trump's Greenland threats, they got it.  I did interview a Saab rep as he had previously been in defense, and I suggested that they might still have a chance to sell the Gripen to Canada as it will become very difficult politically for any Canadian leader to ship billions of dollars to the US to buy a plane when the US is increasingly becoming an adversary.

The Swedes understand that Article V of the NATO Treaty, an attack upon one is equal to an attack upon all, is either dead or in a coma while Trump is president.  They get it.  Some suggested that they need to invest more in bilateral ties since the multilateral effort may not work out so well.  

Sweden is serious about this stuff.  During my first day of interviewing, we were interrupted by a regular alarm--every Monday apparently--that, if any other time, would signal an attack (presumably Russian).  The Swedes had been cutting their military for decades and organized it around expeditionary operations (Balkans, Afghanistan, etc), and since 2014, the budget went the other way.  Sweden is now at 2.4% defense spending/gdp and is headed towards 3%.  They went from not having any planes flying on holidays to putting a regiment on Gotland.  They stopped conscription in 2010, and then restarted it, now with women being drafted as well as men.  It is not the full out conscription of the distant past--they only take 10% or so of each cohort.  The struggle is developing enough capacity to train more and more people.

There is much discussion of Total Defence--civil defence, mobilization for war, and all that.  I have been asked by the Canadian media should we do the same.  I scoffed as (a) the old civil defence people are nostalgic about involved bomb shelters that would not shelter folks from nukes, (b) the Russian military threat to Canada is inflated.  The conversation has, of course, turned to civil defence against... US attacks. And again, I am not sure if the expense is worth it.  I am still pretty convinced that the conflict between Canada and US is political and economic and not military.  And I also think that Trump might risk munity (military refusing orders, not a coup) if he tries to use force against Canada.  I think shooting protestors and attacking Canada are far likely to get more resistance than, say, grabbing Panama.

One thing that did rub me a bit the wrong way--lots of references to World War II as if they had taken a side.....  Very strange.

Anyhow, I got a lot out of this week, including freaking out some Swedes about Trump.  I didn't do much tourism as I spent most days interviewing folks, and I had seen stuff last summer.  I did go to a couple of medival kind of restaurants because I needed some silliness.  

Back to Berlin for some interviews there plus a roundtable on whether militaries can help stop democratic backsliding. I am going to have to postpone my plans to do this research later this month in Poland--I don't have my act together.  So, I will probably travel in western Germany to interview a general and see a part of the country I haven't seen thus far.  Much more work to do on this project, and I am lucky that folks are willing to talk about this stuff.  More interesting conversations ahead.

 

Zo Much Skiing: Does It Materhorn?

Zermatt is a pretty small town, not a city.
The restaurants fill up. Far more crowds
here than on the lift lines.

 I am taking advantage of my three months in Europe by taking many forms of transportation to get to Zermatt, which has, yes, many forms of transportation to get one to the top of the various peaks: big gondola, small gondola, chair lifts of varying sizes, funiculars (can't spell it without fun), and a ski train.  

 This place is massive as it comes three different mountains with the weather-affected ability to ski over to Italy and Cervinia.  My ski days have not been that long as I get worn out pretty quickly, but wow, this place is amazing.  Last year, I skied Zurs and Lech and related areas, and that seemed big and extensive.  This place has way more height and breadth--something like 50 lifts across the two countries.  

Mid mountain cafe/restaurant for
a much needed breather and
hot chocolate.

Like last year, they haven't gotten a ton of snow lately,
but there is more softer stuff here than last year at Zurs.  Still, lots of hardpack, some ice, which makes the steep stuff a bit more daunting, and invokes the old skills I learned in the mountains of Pennsylvania--how to use one's edges to ski on ice.  Over the course of the week, the conditions improved and I got better at avoiding the iciest areas, so I strained my legs less and lasted longer each day.

I was eager to get over to the Italian side on my first day because weather often interrupts that connection, and my basic skiing desire is to ski as much of a place as I can--a FOMO on skis, if you will.  I got to the gondola early--first one, and as I remarked to a bunch of Americans who were behind me, best to wait 30 minutes in the front of the line than 30 minutes in the back of the line.  It took about 40 minutes to get to the top, and required not just the gondola stopping several times at stops along the way, but another, much bigger gondola to get to the very top.  So high that the Materhorn was mostly next to rather than above us. 

The view of Italy from the top of Cervinia's slopes

Then I skied in Italy's direction--the pass I bought covers both sides.  One of my fears every first day anywhere is whether my pass has been processed ok or not, but I got through without a problem.  I then decided to go to the very end.  The village of Valtournenche is at the end of the longest run in the world apparently 22km.  And it felt like it--the skiing itself was not too challenging--all red runs (intermediate) with just a pretty steep icy bit to start the descent.  The signage was pretty good, although I wish I had gotten prescription inserts for my goggles so that I could see the numbers more clearly--each trail has a number that is posted, while the names are only on the maps.  It was a pretty bright, clear day as I kept going and going.  It took me about an hour, with many stops along the way to catch a breath and apologize to my thighs and my feet.  In many spots, I could get a good rhythm, in some I was mostly turning and sliding to avoid going too fast down a narrow traverse.  Again, not enough fresh snow in some parts. Once I got down, I then had to take a series of lifts--gondolas and chairs to get back up far enough that I could then ski to the other village--Cervinia.  My original intent for this trip was to stay there and then occasionally ski into Zermatt, as Cervinia has great intermediate runs and lot of them and lots of good food.  But I couldn't find an affordable place that was convenient to the slopes.

So many restaurants and cafes all over these mountains.  So, I stopped off at one near a lift on the Italian side and had a monster slice of pizza--it was thick and wide and pretty tasty.  I took my time as I was pretty tired.  When I ski Whistler or Lake Louise, I tend not to go top-to-bottom, usually just skiing part of the mountain.  So, two top-to-bottom runs took a lot out of me.  Just amazing views and some fun terrain along the way.  I then grabbed a series of lifts to get me back to Switzerland (I ended up paying an extra day of roaming since my phone was in Italy and Switzerland).  I then started skiing down the Matterhorn Glacier Paradise--well named as it is indeed a glacier and is a skier's paradise.  It was here where I made my only mistake--I ended up at the wrong lift, so I had to go up a small one (next to a nice slalom run that tempted me, but I was too tired--but I did that my last day, see below), and then took the gondola back to the bottom.  I was just too tired to ski out.   

Ski train at the top of Gornergrat,
a working observatory is at the peak

Wow, that was long.  Well, I will be faster about days 2-4.  Day two started with the ski train--yes, a train that exists to go up to the top of Gornegrat, which is the middle peak on the Zermatt side.   There were good runs that took me halfway down and then I wanted to check out the next peak over--Rothorn.  It was a long run, mostly fun, a bit of annoying narrow traverses.  But I was glad to do it, as Rothorn has some of the best cruisers.  Also, I found a great restaurant/bar along the way that had great hot chocolate and a sweet dog awaiting guests.  Skiing out at the end was fun.  The weather that day and the next closed the border with Italy (the lifts more than the border).  We didn't get as much snow as I had hoped.  

That night, I couldn't get into my first choice restaurant, so I went to a Swiss place.  The guys next to me were speaking English, and then when I heard "Trudeau," I realized they are Canadians. Turns out they are based in Manotick, the town next to my suburb, the one I go biking through for bice cream.  I kept bumping into these guys--once the third day on the furnicular and once on the fourth day at the gondola station on the Matterhorn glaciar.  Similar bumpings happened with a Canadian I met this morning who ended up at the same restaurant for lunch on the Italian side and with some young French women who were on the gondola this morning and then at the
same bar on the run out at the end of the day.  Zermatt is both big and small?  Oh, I bumped into the Americans who waited with me on day 1 at the gondola before it opened at a cafeteria in the middle of Gornergrat on day 2.

Day three was the reverse of day two--I started on Rothorn and then went to Gornergrat.  I just liked the runs at the top of Rothorm so much.  I explored more of the middle including finding a village I skied through.  I also found a restaurant that had its own trail to access it that had some great hot chocolate and a wonderful apricot strudel.  I always get apple, but the waitress said this was fresh out of the oven, and she earned her tip with that great advice.  My trip down Gornergrat was interrupted by a helicopter than landed on the trail right after I passed that spot. Not sure what happened there.  But the way down to the bottom after that was pretty sweet.  It was my first of two times going down the run out from the first gondola stop up the mountain past a bunch of bars.

The Matterhorn went from
brown to white due to
some fresh snow. 

 

 

 

 

 

My last day was a repeat of the first except I did more of the Swiss side before going over to the Italian side, and I didn't ski forever on the Italian side. I went with purpose--for a great Italian lunch under the Materhorn.  And I also got to try some trails on the right side of the mountain (as one looks down from the top), having done the left and the center on Monday.  I got lucky as the border is often closed due to weather.  It was closed Tuesday and Wednesday, but not Monday or Thursday.  Just provides so much more terrain, different light angles, and space.  For most of the four days, on most trails, I often felt alone.  Not as much this last day, but still plenty of times I didn't have to worry about traffic. I have become Thoreau-ian--choosing the path less traveled.

 

 

 

Random observations along the way:

• What is it with Sweet Caroline?  Last year at Lech, the gondola played it and folks sang along.  This week, on a couple of different gondolas, it was played, and people sang along.
• I mentioned above that the slopes were not that crowded (except when a huge gondola disgorges many people--then I just took pics and waited).  The mountains and the 50 plus lifts absorb a lot of people.  The worst liftline was about 20 minutes, and that happened once.  I rarely had to wait.  But the town of Zermatt is small, so walking into a restaurant and getting seated is a gamble.  I didn't make many reservations, and I ended up having to go with second choices.  Which worked out fine, meeting Canadians who live near me.  The restaurants on the slopes--very different--no problems there.  

  

  Last day, I induldged
  at one of the bars that
  line the runout.

• Oh, no need for passport to cross from Switzerland (a non-EU country) into Italy.  And, no, I didn't go through customs at the airport--Switzerland isn't in the EU but it is a Schengen country.  Makes all of this much easier.
• Strange to go skiing and not hear any Aussie accents.  I heard a lot of French, German, and Italian, and everyone could speak English, but no Aussie accented English.  
• The Trump stuff came up from time to time--no fans here.  Just Europeans marveling at how crazy things are.
• 
  People often say that American serving sizes are big, but I have to say I was most impressed with the sizes of the dishes I ordered, including this slice of pizza which was about two inches think and about the size of my head 
  
  
  
  

 Oh, and I finally grabbed the chance to do a race course--a short one--and it had automatic video!!!

 

 

Why Civ-Mil People Are Freaking Out?

 Trump bravely waited until Friday night to purge the top level of the US military.  Why are people freaking out?  We knew this was going to happen.  Trump promised this before the election, and the selection of Hegseth, a misogynist and racist, made it clear where we were heading   Yet now we are angry.  Well, not every Trump promise comes to pass although a lot of the worst ones do.  And reality just hits a lot harder.

So, for those who are not students of civil-military relations, why is this so bad?  First, a list and then a scenario or two.  And then what to expect soon.

1. The whole idea of having the top leadership of the military have terms that overlap with different presidencies is to avoid politicizing the military.  Never before has a President just erased the highest levels of the military a month into office.  Trump would have been able to change these folks within his four years--these people tend to serve 2 or 4 year terms.  So, why is he so impatient?  See some of the list below, but it might be that Trump wants to flex, show that he is a dictator right now.  Who purges militaries?  Autocrats.
2. Trump wants to prove to his base that his intent to re-segregrate the US includes the military.  All this anti-DEI stuff is really about being racist, misogynist, homophobic, and xenophobic.  No accident that they are replacing a Black man with a white one and getting rid of perhaps the most effective Chief of Naval Operations in a long time who just so happens to be a woman.  This move tells the force that only white straight men should lead.  That will be bad for recruitment and retention.  
   
3. Trump's replacement, Dan Caine, is a retired white dude.  This is not unprecedented as Kennedy had brought Max Taylor out of retirement.  Did that go well?  Um, Cuban Missile crisis good, Vietnam bad. But importantly, it was not aimed to make the military more loyal to Kennedy or the Democrats.  It might have been aimed to assert civilian control of the military.  What makes Caine better than all of the active generals and admirals?  That he is loyal to Trump, the person, and not to the Constitution.
4. Everything the new chairman does will be seen as partisan, not just political, no matter what he does unless he pushes back against a Trump order.  So, even relatively ordinary stuff will be tainted.
   
5. Trump also fired the Judge Advocate Generals--the lawyers.  Why fire the lawyers?  They tend to get in the way when you want to do illegal stuff.  So, Trump's intent is pretty clear.
6. This will divide the military.  Everyone will look around and ask themselves if someone is getting promoted because they are the best officer or because they are loyal, so political affiliation will be something everyone pays a whole lot more attention to. To be clear, there are at least three kinds of officers in the military: those loyal to the Constitution, those who are MAGA types who believe in this shit, and, most importantly, the careerists.  Those will do what it takes to get ahead, and have just been signaled that to get ahead, one has to do whatever Trump and Hegseth order.
7. Once you politicize the military, it becomes very hard to undo.  Let's say the GOP loses the 2028 election and leaves power peacefully (we can dream, right?).  The new President does what?  Fire all Trump appointees in the military?  That is pretty partisan--the replacements will be seen as lackeys to the Dems even if they are not.  Once the military is deeply into partisan politics, it simply will be hard to take it out of partisan politics
8.  What does Trump want to do with a more partisan, more personally loyal military?  Well, the last time Trump was in power, he wanted to use the military against peaceful protestors, and he faced some friction from the SecDef and Chairman.  Hegseth certainly is not going to get in the way, and neither will the puppet Trump just picked.
   

Ok, this does not mean that American troops will be gunning down protestors tomorrow.  First, Trump has to change who is the head of Northern Command, since that is the officer who orders troops in the US to act.  The chairman just advises the president--operational command runs from the President to the SecDef to the regional commander.   Second, they will need a pretext, but pretexts are like streetcars--there will be one coming down the road every five minutes.  With massive deportation, with the Musking of government, with everything going on, there will be protests.  Third, Trump will need loyalty all the way down.  The generals can order the troops to shoot, but the captains and lieutenants may not follow through.  The sergeants and the corporals may not follow through.  People will point to Kent State, but that was an accident.  And it stopped quickly.  It was not a situation where the troops were ordered to shoot and kept shooting.  

The thing is: if Trump orders the troops to fire and they don't, the military is disobedient and won't be trusted.  That's not great in the long term--to have a military that is contesting policy.  If Trump orders the troops to fire and they do shoot at civilians, well, that too is bad for the military and for political order as then the military is a tool of repression.  And if some troops fire and others do not, then you get a military that falls apart.  

One more scenario to fill your day with sunshine.  We are seeing states differ in how they will enforce Trump's dictats as well as their own laws. Texas wants to have abortionists in NY extradited, and NY is refusing.  Soon, you will see some states blocking massive deportation.  What happens next?  One might see the Texas governor send troops to NY or California to get the people they are seeking, and then the governors of NY or California call out their national guard to resist, and these NG's resist being federalized.  So, Trump then calls out the army to repress the dissident national guard....and that's how a civil war starts.  Either by the army fighting the California National Guard or by the army fighting itself as factions within the military take opposing sides.

Sounds like fantasy, doesn't it?  It all has become far more realistic than ever should have gotten.  Last night was the worst night in US civil-military relations since the Civil War.... but as the Simpsons cartoon would suggest 

   What happens next?  The Democratic Senators make a fuss during the confirmation hearings of the replacements.  Don't expect the GOP to raise that much of a fuss.  They confirmed Hegseth, they confirmed Patel even though he clearly perjured himself during the hearings.  Expect Trump to keep on firing generals and admirals, especially those commanding forces in the US.  Expect agent selection/moral hazard to kick in: he may promote some generals and admirals who then stick to their oaths and refuse to follow illegal orders and may refuse to implement awful but lawful orders.  Expect Trump to find compliant generals and admirals who then issue orders that are followed but not as completely or as quickly or as with as much cohesion and unity as in the past.  

Politicization of the military, bringing the military into politics and bringing politics in to the military is bad for military effectiveness, it is bad for democracy, and we are now here, deep in the middle of it.  And getting out is going to be really hard and will do lasting damage.

Among the many tragedies is that it didn't have to be this way.

A Strange Brave New World: The International Relations of Captain America

 I went to see the new Captain America movie last night in Berlin.  It is the Berlin movie festival, but, nope, this movie was not part of it.  The last Marvel movie that had this much international relations was probably Captain America: Civil War [unless one counts Black Panther 2 which had some truly dumb alliance politics] since the focus was on the UN facilitating the Sokovia Accords (another genius move by Thaddeus Ross), so I wanted to apply a bit of ye olde IR analysis to it.

 Before I get to it, just a few notes on seeing the movie here:

• 3D glasses are a Euro, and I had to ask people to find out where they were--not intuitive at all.
• the audience was super patient--even more ads than in a North American theater (including one for Bundeswehr recruitment!),  AND it was a lot of credits to get to the post-credit stinger, which was meh.
• they apparently don't clean between screenings and the previous folks were messy.   

Applying my 30 plus years of IR scholarship after the break so that I don't spoil the movie:

More Unforced Errors, NATO Edition

The only really surprising things about Trump 2.0 has been its pace and the Musk of it all.  But resegregation efforts at home (the anti-DEI stuff) and selling out Gaza were quite predictable.  Alas, so too is the destruction of NATO and the abandonment of Ukraine.  Let me focus on NATO since, yes, I co-wrote a book on it that may no longer be relevant (still my fave book).

Super unqualified and disqualified SecDef Hegseth made it clear to all at his first international meeting:

 To be as clear as I can be, there is no stark strategic reality preventing the US from being the primary guarantor of security in Europe.  Sure, the days of US national strategy documents aiming for the US to be able to fight two large conventional wars and do other stuff as well are long gone.  But guaranteeing European security does not require the ability to fight Russia and China at the same time.  It requires the ability to deter both, and that is something quite a bit different.

Going in the wayback machine, for much of the Cold War, especially the 1970s and 1980s, the US's commitment was not to defeat a Soviet invasion (only Tom Clancy's fiction suggested this), but rather that the presence of large numbers of American troops would commit the US to being at war immediately, and that possibility of that war escalating to a nuclear exchange would be sufficient to deter the Soviets.  

And it worked, as far as we can tell--I haven't looked at the Soviet archives or read post-Cold War stuff on this, but we have more recent evidence: that Putin has not engaged in any conventional attacks on NATO countries despite the flow of heaps of arms into Ukraine.  The US strategy has always been to interdict the flow of arms into the conflict zone--that is what bombing and invading Cambodia and Laos were all about.  But Putin has been restrained--that any conventional attack on a NATO ally would quite likely lead to an American response that might then lead to a process that ultimately could get out of control.  

The strategic reality that changed yesterday was not that the US can't do this anymore (indeed, defense spending is going to go up).  No, the strategic reality that changed is that the US is now led by a guy who wants to be a dictator and is far more comfy hanging out with autocrats than being in a club of democrats.  It is a matter of will not, not cannot.  And, yes, this was predictable--I made a bet last year with someone (I forget who) that NATO would not survive Trump 2.0.

Sure, the Europeans should spend more on defense, but the ironic key to collective security was depending on a single actor's credibility, the US, and not really on a collection of countries with their own convoluted dynamics.  NATO credibility/deterrence was based on a single player.  Can Europe provide a similarly convincing deterrent?  As to misquote Kissinger, who picks up the phone when you call Europe?  The statement that came out yesterday was good, but can the Baltics and the Finns and the Poles count on the resolve not just of Germany or France or the UK but on their remaining simultaneously and continuously resolved?   Oh my.  

While Hegseth is making my 3 months in Europe this winter/spring more interesting, I'd rather it not be so.  None of this was necessary.  I keep saying it didn't have to be this way.  So, one element of the tragedy of all of this is that it is entirely optional, despite what Hegseth claimed.  Indeed, the one thing this thing demonstrates is that a government of Bad Faith cannot be a good ally.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Outlandish? Hell Yeah

 I saw this and got a bit miffed:

https://www.researchgate.net/figure/
A-map-of-the-historical-territorial-expansion-
of-the-United-States-of-America-
Source_fig1_330787808

This economist is a crappy social scientist.  Yes, the US started with 13 states and is now at 50, so it is not outlandish that it could grow further, adding new states.  Indeed, I have been advocating statehood for the District of Columbia and for Puerto Rico (if the folks there want to do so).  But the context here is, of course, Canada.  I have already discussed the Trump 51st state bullshit, but since economists are spouting dumb things,* it is my duty as a political scientist to remind them that politics is a thing.

First, a quick dance through history and how the US got from 13 to 50 states:

• A good many states came from the original territory the US got as a result of the Revolutionary War--the way west to Wisconsin, Illinois, Tennessee and Mississippi.
  
• Jefferson violated his own principles because the amazing opportunity to buy the Louisana Territory appeared, so the US bought that vast tract of land from France.   This would be the best Greenland analog if not for the fact that Denmark ain't selling or ceding.
  
• The US got an even better deal when Spain wanted to get out of Florida (a pretty smart move).
• Texas.... is a complicated story leading to Six Flags parks (ewwww, I just learned what the sixth flag is).  Settled by Americans, first they tried to be independent, seizing land from Mexico, and then the US defended Texas from Mexico and got most of Texas and some chunks of a few other states as well.  
• Shortly there after, the US-Mexican war led to the US getting much of Mexico--the southwest US as we know today (if Utah and Nevada count as southwest).
  
• Another good deal--US bought Alaska from Russia.
• And then the conquest of Hawaii
  

So, much of this was European settlers giving up their claims to the US.  Is the UK going to give up Canada to the US?  Nope, it can't thanks to the UK giving up its claim to Canada (a Canadian historian can tell you better when this happened, but I believe it happened several times).

Of the cases above, the closest that comes to a pre-existing independent country was Texas.  They sought/agreed to annexation because of fear of Mexico if I remember correctly.  Is Canada so scared of Russia that it would rather give up independence?  Um, no.

So, the other model is conquest a la the southwest or Hawaii.  Yes, the US military would defeat the Canadian military in days .... if the US military followed orders to attack Canada. But controlling Canada would be hard--while much of the huge country could be ignored, controlling the cities along the border and, yes, the pipelines, would be tricky.

One of the things that is widely ignored is that most states became states only after having referenda or ratification of the state constitution (Check out this handy guide).  How would such a ratification vote go these days in Canada?  It would fail miserably as most Canadians reject the idea.

What Trump and the economist get wrong is that countries have their own domestic politics.  Being annexed by Trump's US is wildly unpopular in Canada and in Greenland.  Politicians contemplating such a merger would be risking their own careers in a big, big way.  No Canadian politician is going to advocate for merger--not if they want to have a political career in Canada.  Plus it would involve federal-provincial politics and Canada-Indigenous People politics.  Good luck sorting that out.

Oh, and the only way to make it at all imaginable is to turn Canada not into the 51st state but into states 51st-60th (or more).  No way Quebec is going to lose everything it has demanded over the years to join the US.  While one state might upset the balance of things a smidge in the electoral college (if there are ever free and fair elections again), adding 7-8 likely Democratic states is something no Republican would go along with.  

Oh, and, yes, the norms of conquest and selling territories inhabited by people have changed over the years, so the international context is very different.

So, all this 51st state is beyond outlandish.  It is ridiculous, but it will live on because Trump likes to troll people and because ideas enter his depraved, demented skull and then get stuck and mutate.

* To be fair, any person working for Trump is going to be asked to justify the most batshit, the most cruel, the most self-destructive policies, so they are usually quite desperate and have only weak responses.  Of course, no one is forced to work for Trump, so the fact that they are stuck in a crappy position is entirely on them.  My new slogan for Trump 2.0 is "Empathy for Everyone Except Trumpers"