The Arbour Review: Consultations about CAF Reform

 Today, I had an opportunity to be part of a small group roundtable with retired Supreme Court Justice Louise Arbour.  She has been charged with reviewing the Canadian Armed Forces to figure out how the CAF (and others) can be reformed to do less harm to those who join it.  It was held with Chatham House rule so I can't say who said what, but I can say that the only person who really needed the protection of said rule was me.  I think I was the only person to say something that was not well thought out--how about a truth and reconciliation process so that those in the CAF who grew up in a toxic environment can come clean about past mistakes?  The answers given  to my half-baked idea--that any kind of restorative justice should be led by the survivors and not the perpetrators, that drawing lines between minor and major misconduct very problematic, and so on--quickly made me realize I should stick to what I know.

Well, what do I know and what did I recommend?  When it comes to culture, others were more focused on toxic masculinity, and right so.  I am more focused on a different although related aspect of CAF culture--entitlement and a distorted view of professionalism.  That Sam Huntington not only gave us Clash of Civilizations, but also a view about civil-military relations which tends to teach military officers that civilians have little expertise and should not be interfering in the military's stuff.  Since moving to Canada and teaching civ-mil here, I was always struck by how Canada was far closer to Huntington's model than the US as the SecDef and his team have long been more involved in military stuff than most Ministers of National Defence.  A colleague on today's call mentioned three times where that wall was breached by the MND--after WWII when the idea of having enlisted folks getting pathways to officers (a party foul for those of the upper class), during unification in the 1960s, and after the Somalia affair in the 1990s.  Oh my, no wonder the military is concerned--the latter two are seen as awful times.  

Well, sucks to be them--the current crisis is on the military.  The civilians did not make them act in awful ways, abusing their personnel and their power.  The standard military answer--that they are the professionals with exclusive expertise on all things military--fails here as abusing one's personnel and abusing power would seemingly be unprofessional, but seems actually to be embedded in the definition/culture of professionalism in the CAF.  What is desperately needed is for outsiders, especially those up the chain but not exclusive those folks, to play a greater role in setting standards, reforming military justice and complaint procedures, and to engage in oversight.  That is: making sure that what the CAF says it will do actually gets done and also playing a more active role--vetting the officers who reach the highest levels.  Promotion was been way too much an insiders game.  

I recommended against making either Parliament or the Privy Council Office as the key superior bodies above any independent agencies.  Why?  Because parliamentarians don't think there job is to do oversight (they have told me that).  In the Steve/Dave/Phil project, Canada ranks at the bottom of the seriousness scale when it comes to legislative oversight.  Much better to engage in mindless point-scoring.  PCO?  It might make sense except I think to the public this would seem to be a blackhole--we really don't know what goes on in PCO.  I suggested imitating the review bodies that oversee the Canadian intel community.  Another suggested a minister monitoring committee.  I definitely think the Minister's office needs to be active, engaged, and empowered.

Some of the stuff the others discussed: 

• that the senior leadership of the CAF is out of touch--that bad news does not travel up and when it does, the senior leaders don't want to hear it.
• we need to be wary of culture change being a buzzword that does not really matter much--that we need to take seriously that other organizations have spent much effort and time on culture change and the military is not as unique as it thinks it is--there is much to learn form others.
• that resistance to culture change will be intense when the culture change might require changing who has power.
• Perhaps have some spots, like head of mil personnel be a civilian.  Which top jobs need to have military folks?  Apparently, at various points in time, the idea of a civilian CDS was broached, perhaps mostly as a threat to get the military to reform itself or else.
• that there should be fully funded legal representation for survivors whether they end up pursuing justice through military or civilian channels (I found this idea extremely compelling and far easier/more likely to implement, although not necessarily easy)

I am glad that the former Supreme Court justice is reading out to these sharp people.  I am lucky that I was included, as I learned a lot in that short 1.5 hour session. I am better equipped at offering criticisms than prescriptions--this stuff is really hard.  The good news is that the military can't resist as strongly as it usually can--it is thoroughly discredited.  Senior military leaders can't say--we've got this, just keep giving us autonomy, and everything will be fine.  Eyre was right to call this an existential crisis--recruitment is already hard enough.  Which means that the military will have to listen to the civilians and implement some of the reforms ... as long as the civilians keep paying lots of attention.  And by civilians, I mean not just the Minister of National Defence but also the media and the experts outside the military. 

Remembrance Day 2021

 It has been a very tough year for the Canadian military.  The abuse of power crisis has been waiting for new leadership.  Other militaries are going through similar struggles.  As we look back at past wars, and especially the one that ended at 11am on the eleventh day of the eleventh month, I keep thinking of civilian control of the military.  

This was at the Canadian base in Dubai, marking
those lost in Afghanistan.  It is now at an HQ
near where I live in Ottawa

Aussie War Museum

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

A key quote from that time: "War is too important a matter to be left to the military."

Why did Georges Clemenceau say this?  Because the military had failed the civilians?  Partly but also the civilians had failed the military.  War is politics by other means as Clausewitz argued long ago.  While generals like to do deny it (as I was reminded last week in Denmark), most decisions are political, and, yes, the civilians should have much say.  World War I saw the militaries of all sides wasting the lives of a generation in battles that were seen as successful if the attacking side gained a few yards.  

With the fall of Afghanistan, we are asking anew about leadership and the costs of war.  Was Afghanistan worth it?  What were they fighting for?  While there is much blame to be had, as civilians control democratic armed forces, much of the blame is on the civilians.  When I read military history and I see soldiers getting the highest medals for their valor, I think two things: what amazing people we have who serve and who put them in a position where they needed to be so heroic.  I am reading Wesley Morgan's book on the battles in Pech Valley, and both the heroism and the bad leadership are there on pretty much every page.  

On this Remembrance Day, I not only remember the costs paid by the soldiers, sailors, aviators, and marines, past and present, but of the civilians who could have led better and of the situation today where the civilians must exert control with greater creativity, greater accountability, and greater responsibility.  

 

More Military Politics, More Palace, More Booze

 The second day of the two day conference involved more of everything including ... alas ... more jet lag.  I missed the first half of the first panel thanks to sleeping late after much interrupted sleep.  I don't think I have done that before.  Last time I slept thru during a travel situation was probably our househunting trip in 1995 when we tried to save money by flying out of Montreal rather than Burlington to check out Lubbock.  Oh my.  That was quite a while ago.

Anyhow, the day had a few more panels.  The jet lag limited my focus a bit so I took my best notes for Lindsay Cohn's and Chris Ankersen's presentations.  Lindsay talked about the competing loyalties (and identities) that challenge any officer.  What does it mean to be professional when the profession requires loyalties in different directions--to superiors, to subordinates, to civilians, to law, to democracy, to one's own moral code, etc. How to choose among bad choices?  She used the case of the captain of the USS Teddy Roosevelt--the aircraft carrier that faced an early covid crisis that ultimately sank his career and that of the Secretary of the Navy.

Chris's computer had broken so his slides were wonderful pictures of his notes.  His was most provocative as he invoked Weber and other interesting folks to argue that senior officers can become disenchanted with how things are going and rely either on cynicism or celebrity.  That they can use their personal popularity to pursue their agendas.  He cited a number of officers--mostly American but also Hillier of Canada--to show how many tried to influence the civilians and, yes, how many ultimately failed.  I could not help but invoke the line from the Dark Knight: either you die a hero (Patton) or live long enough to become a villain (Petraeus, McCrystal, McMaster, etc).  Powell was the only one I thought of who retired while still a hero.  His "villainy" mostly came as SecState, his post-military career.

Carsten Roennfeldt discussed the civ-mil of Norway's Libya mission which brought me back to the Steve and Dave NATO book as we covered the Libya effort.  It was very interesting to see the same case from a different angle.  He argued that the Norwegian officers were given very little in the way of instructions when they were sent.  

I am sorry that my note taking failed at that time.  I did have a great lunch with a junior scholar whose talk I missed.  She is working on the legal dynamics of some of the stuff in the aforementioned Steve and Dave book, so it was great to hear how the next generation of both scholars and work are doing. 

The evening was an amazing experience--we got a tour of the Fredriksberg Palace.  It is home ot army officer training and much conferencing and used to be home to the Danish royal family.  So, I took many pics.  Former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller gave a very interesting talk on the stuff facing NATO these days. Then we had dinner with many different forms of alcohol.  I got to chat with a Danish Major who was in charge of the institution than ran our event.  After that, we had after dinner drinks and a pipe/drum moment.  

I learned a great deal over the past few days despite my jet lag/sleep deprivation.  It was great to see the civ-mil folks and meet new people in the field.  I really missed this kind of stuff.  I am hoping we can do more of it as vax rates continue to increase.  Now, time to fly home and start trying to catch up as the semester accelerates away from me and I have to start to prep the new term and, yes, write another grant.  

 

There Is Politics In Military Stuff?

 The first day of our workshop on Military Politics provided quite an illustration and contrast: the civilian academics raised key questions about military officers as political actors and the military speakers, um, proving the academics right while mostly denying everything the academic said.  You can guess which side of this discussion your humble (or not so humble) blogger was on.  

Thomas Crosbie, our host, set the table by invoking and then complicating Peter Feaver's principal-agent approach to civil-military relations.  He made Feaver's various binary choices in the original game less binary, so the game tree had 64 outcomes rather than 8.  Oh my.  As I rely heavily on Feaver (and Avant) for my understanding of civil-military relations, I found this presentation quite interesting==that militaries have more options than work or shirk.  But the terms he used will still annoy military officers.  Of course, work or shirk is super annoying to them because they tend not to understand that shirk does not mean that they don't work--it means they operate differently than the civilians expect--doing sometimes more or sometimes differently than the civs expect.  Given the senior officers' frustration with civilians expressed in a later session, they intuitively agree with the notion that they don't act as the civilians expect.  But the shirk thing wrankles.  More on that below.

Risa Brooks was the keynote speaker, and her terrific presentation unpacked "professionalism" which is the key to so much stuff in civ-mil relations.  Professionalism, thanks to Sam Huntington, has played a major role in how modern democratic militaries see themselves (yes, much of this is about identity).  The shorthand is that militaries see themselves as the exclusive experts on the management of violence, that they see other military officers as part of the same profession, and that the best way to manage civil-military relations is to divide stuff into two spheres--the civilians make the larger strategic decisions and then grant the military to manage themselves as they follow the strategic orders.  Autonomy here is key, with the notion that since the military folks are the sole experts on violence, they are best situated to make the operational and tactical decisions.  

There are more than a few problems with this as Risa identified nicely in her recent article.  Partly there is the ghost of Clausewitz--that war is politics by other means so there is much need for thinking about politics all the time and that civilians might have something to contribute to that.  Risa talked about how the conceptualization of professionalism greatly shapes how militaries think about politics--that they are apolitical [no, they are not], that different militaries have different senses of professionalism (although there are common tendencies or traits).  Risa's discussion reminded me of how I think about nationalism and identity--that a military's sense of professionalism defines who counts as a professional, who does not, and how one engages the non-professionals.  Her presentation will greatly inform how I teach professionalism next semester and forever after.

The next panel included retired and active senior Danish leaders.  It was very interesting and very frustrating, as the officers didn't really engage the civilians.  They tended to argue that there was no politics--but then often said that officers have to pick their battles when dealing with civilians.  That is a very political thing.

I spoke about multilateral stuff, and started with defining politics as the making of choices for more than oneself.  Which means yes, damn near everything is political.  Most of my talk was about how military officers face two chains of command in pretty much any multilateral operation, which means they have to navigate the differences in what they are asked to do.  This makes much of what they do obviously political.  I pointed out some strategies that officers use.  

I'd summarize the rest of the day, but I am still addled by jet lag--I missed much of the second day's first session since I overslept after not sleeping well last night.  I do remember quite well a delightful diner with a bunch of folks last night--I so missed this kind of stuff.  The day was enlightening and the evening was entertaining. I am hoping we can do more and more of this stuff.

When The Hell Am I? Traveling in the Late Pandemic

 This title refers to two things--that Denmark went back to standard time from daylights saving while I slept (and I managed to sleep) and Denmark is considering itself to be post-pandemic.  I arrived yesterday morning to a country that had mask wearing at the airport .... and nowhere else.  It was a very abrupt shift from twenty months of pandemic life.  And, damn, it feels pretty good if still quite strange.

I am here for my first out of body Ottawa workshop--a twice or thrice delayed project on military politics.  The core idea here is that it has been long argued that in democracies, the militaries have no role in politics, but the reality is that whenever there are choices to be made, there are politics.  So, the military always has some kind of politics, whether that is battling for budgets or deciding how to cooperate with other actors in "whole of government" efforts.  My role here is to talk about military politics in multilateral efforts.  Building/borrowing from the NATO book, the basic idea is that whenever units are sent abroad, their commanders face multiple masters--the home chain of command and the bosses of the multilateral effort.  With two bosses come conflicting demands--adjudicating that requires politics--making decisions that have outcomes for the various collectives.  

Because I missed a recent civ-mil conference, I really wanted to participate in this workshop.  I get to see some of the sharp folks/friends who do civ-mil stuff and get to eat/drink with them.  Last night's dinner was so terrific as we exchanged stories of pandemic teaching and research, catching up on their various lives, and sharing older stories of the pre-pandemic.  It just felt so good.  And my FOMO got reduced by 27.5%.   Oh, and the food and drink were good, too.  

I walked around yesterday after I arrived--my room was not ready--with Chris Ankersen, a prof from NYU.  We walked north along the waterfront (ok, a waterfront, as there is a lot of water in Copenhagen), with both old and new ships, past the famous Little Mermaid statue, the citadel, some of the royal buildings, and the like.  It was good post-flight fresh air, sun (really!), exercise, and chatting.  

 

 

 

 

 

I actually managed to sleep with only one interruption.  I often can't sleep past 3:30 am in Europe on the first night or two, but managed to do so.  I slept so late I thought I missed the hotel breakfast, but it went long plus the change in daylight savings time meant I didn't sleep that late.  It was bustling, and, yes, hotel breakfast buffets are back.  Again, am I livingin the pre-pandemic, mid-pandemic, or post-pandemic?  Since Canada is still mid-pandemic, one of my afternoon activities will be finding a PCR test place for my flight back in 72ish hours.  After that, the gang goes to Tivoli--one of the very first amusement parks in the world--which will be Halloween-themed.  Since it is so old, the ghosts there may be real?

While eating breakfast,
I noticed I was being watched

 

 

I am off to bike in the mist to work off the stuff I ate last night. 

A New Minister of National Defence: What's Next?

 Today, finally, the cabinet was shuffled, and we have a new Minister of National Defence: Anita Anand.  She was Minister of Public Services and Procurement, so she has ministerial experience and she has experience with procurement.  Indeed, since that spot shares responsibility with MND for big military procurement projects, that part of the MND job will be pretty familiar.  She was successful in getting Canada heaps of vaccines, which was not easy (see other countries that have failed at that task).  And, yes, she's a woman, which is symbolic given the sexual misconduct crisis that has been in the news the past eight months or so (and, of course, goes all the way back).  

To be clear, add woman and stir is not enough.  Adding super smart, experienced, competent woman is better but still not enough.  She will need much support from PMO and PCO and from the Prime Minister to address problems that are deep and wide.  The first responsibility is to understand the job--that the Minister of National Defence is the key person in Canada's civilian control of the military.  The previous officeholder didn't get that.  This means not just managing the Chief of Defence Staff but making sure that the Department of National Defence is not pushed out of matters that the CAF (or the CDS anyway) does not want it messing with.  Deputy Minister Jody Thomas said on the Battle Rhythm podcast that General Jon Vance, when he was CDS, was kept out of the sexual misconduct response.  That can't happen again.  

But getting back to managing the CDS, Anand must fix the confusion about that spot--either name Eyre as CDS rather than Acting CDS or find a new one AND tell Admiral Art McDonald to retire.  Or else?  Yes, or else he will be charged with insubordination (or whatever is the equivalent for his incredibly misconceived letter he sent around).  Anyhow, much clarity is required about the leadership at the top.  She will have to make clear to those at the top that they will be overseen more closely than they have been used to.  Folks in the CAF might complain about micromanagement, but (a) management involves the layer or two below you while micromanagement is managing very distant folks as if they are the layer below; and (b) the CAF has shown that left their own devices, they have an abuse of power and sexual misconduct problem.

What else?  Decisions have to be made on fighter replacement (F-35s or whatever), the design for the new frigates, the costs and design of modernization of the northern warning systems, etc.  So, heaps of procurement stuff.  Operations?  What role does Canada have in Iraq these days?  How can the CAF make sure it is not training wannabe Nazis in Ukraine?  Personnel?  Oy.  How can the CAF recruit and retain a more diverse force, how can it get rid of the white supremacists in its midst, etc.  The sexual misconduct crisis will require many axes of effort, including setting up more independent investigative/prosecution/judicial processes.  There have been many recommendations by previous reviews so those need to be implemented while we await Arbour's review.  Indeed, she should not wait for Arbour--that there is plenty of stuff to do that should be done without waiting for a retired Supreme Court justice to tell them to do it. 

This is a really tough job.  Unless Anand gets help, she will be set up to fail.  If she can handle this job well, she should be rewarded handsomely with not just glory but more influence in the Liberal party.  The good news for her?  There is much expertise that she can tap into as she works on this stuff. That crises provide political openings to make change.  It will be very hard for anyone in the CAF to argue that the old ways have been working just fine.  As I learned a long time ago from Peter Gourevitch's Politics in Hard Times, crises break previous coalitions allowing political entrepreneurs to build new ones to support reform.  

But there will be resistance and there will be old habits and cultures are hard to change.  It will require Anand to work really hard and to keep her eye on many different spinning plates.  I don't envy her.  I am glad that the long overdue change has been made, and I have a fair amount of confidence that the Prime Minister chose the best person for the job. 

Getting Inside the Sausage-Making: A Chat with the Chief

[This post was written before the latest news about Lt.Gen Cadieu and Admiral McDonald]

I didn't expected to be doing this much writing/talking about the Canadian military when I moved to Canada twenty years ago.  My new title was Canada Research Chair in International Security and Ethnic Conflict, which was confusing since I was neither Canadian nor did I study Canada.  Over the course of time, and perhaps inevitably, both of those conditions changed.  I have been Canadian for six years as of this month, and my work on NATO and Canada's work in NATO led me to the study of Canadian defence politics.  My work moved from the IR of ethnic conflict to civil-military relations, with a very comparative focus.  Asking questions about Canada's role in Afghanistan ultimately led to a project on legislatures across the world's democracies and the role they play in civilian oversight over the armed forces.  

In that project on NATO in Afghanistan, I ended up interviewing many senior Canadian officers including the Chief of the Defence Staff at the time, Rick Hillier, the Vice Chief who would later become Chief, Walt Natynczyk, and Major General Jon Vance, who would later become chief.  I didn't interact with CDS Tom Lawson until deep into his tour when he gave an off-the-record chat at NPSIA.*  I never met Admiral Art McDonald who lasted four Scaramooches in that role [despite his desire to return, it will stay at forty or so days].  I  did meet then-LtGen  Chief Wayne Eyre at the Kingston International Security Conference when he was just returning from his tour in South Korea and was starting his role as Chief of the Army. We then had him and Deputy Minister Jody Thomas on our podcast this past spring.  In that podcast, both he and Thomas said that they listen to our podcast.  Which is pretty cool but really?

Apparently, really, as I got contacted a few days ago by his assistant to arrange a call to chat about stuff I had raised in the most recent episode (around the 14th minute mark).  So, we then chatted for about thirty minutes about the personnel issues that Stef and I discussed in the podcast and then some other stuff.  I basically suggested in the podcast that without civilian oversight, the CDS could just appoint whoever he wanted, and that it could produce an Old Boys Network, as has been rumored about Vance's decisions.  I keep pointing to the decision to give Vice Hadyn Admiral Edmundson the spot of heading the CAF's personnel command as emblematic because Edmundson had escaped any career-harming consequences from being accused of sexual assault years ago--his nickname of Mulligan Man came from that. I found that decision particularly problematic since navies are known for firing captains for running their ships into a rock--a one-time event, but assaulting one's staff is not a career destroyer?  Eyre could not speak to Edmundson's elevation to Chief of Personnel since Vance did that.

What Eyre could speak to are the changes in the process by which senior leaders are promoted and selected for specific jobs.  He and his staff put together a set of materials--past evaluations, psychometric testing that assess character, leadership, problem-solving skills, etc.  The evaluations of past performance are different now--the so-called 360 evaluations which involve not just superiors but peers and subordinates is no longer limited to ... those the candidate chooses.  That's right, if I understand General Eyre correctly, the old system was one where the candidate could choose whose evaluations would count in their promotion process.  Now, the very new process is anonymous, random, blind, and diverse, which should produce more accurate assessments.  A board, including civilians, take these reports and assessments to build a score that is compared with the scores of the others who are eligible, which then leads to pools of folks who are eligible for promotion and those who need more time in rank.  Is there a third pool of those who should be frozen or kicked out?  I should have asked that.  Anyhow, once the pool of promotable officers is determined, they figure out who is fit for which jobs, and then that package of information is given to the minister for approval.

And there is the question I really wanted to ask but knew the general could not answer: does the Minister actually read the packages or is it a rubber stamp?  "Is the Minister doing his job?" is not a question that the General would answer, so I didn't bother asking it.  

I then asked about the case of Major General Peter Dawe, who was given a new job once his suspension was over--one that was presented in the media as the person responsible for reading the reports from the various retired Supreme Court justices and vetting recommendations for how to reform the Canadian Armed Forces.  While averring that the media didn't quite get Dawe's new job right, Eyre admitted that he made mistakes in this process, that it should not have happened.  I compared this decision with that regarding Vice-Admiral Craig Baines, the chief of the navy who had played golf with disgraced former Chief of Defence Jon Vance.  That it was pretty clear that the Baines decision involved much consultation, and when it was made, Eyre explained it.  The Dawe decision was not transparent.  Part of this was that this all happened during the election period, where folks in government do not make big announcements.**  Both decisions attracted much fire, including from the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister.***  I think Eyre was on stronger ground with the first decision because he was able to explain it as it happened.  I do think that these cases are hard decisions as the CAF can't/won't/shouldn't fire every officer who has made a mistake.  Indeed, in our conversation, Eyre said that one of the issues he is giving to Lt.General Jennie Carignan, Chief of Professional Conduct (who was on the second episode of our podcast), is to figure out how to bring back some of the people who have done wrong.  There needs to be greater accountability.  Eyre taking the blame for this decision is a good step, but they need to do better--that Dawe could be given another leadership post but not one that involved sexual misconduct issues.

I hope that when Parliament returns that the Defence Committee holds a hearing where they can ask General Eyre about this decision.  I also hope that the Prime Minister selects a new person to be Defence Minister so that we can have more confidence in the civilians who should be overseeing Eyre.  I do think that Eyre got a mighty tough hand to play, given that his two immediate predecessors are, well, disgraced.  Eyre did not get a proper handover of this job, and he has been reacting to this crisis on the fly.  From our conversation, it is clear there are changes being made, but then, so are mistakes.  The changes that need to take place are multidimensional, have to take place at all levels, and involve a lot of different actors.  It involves legal reform (the Fish report), it involves changing the culture of the CAF (our Year Ahead conference will have a session dedicated to organizational change), it involves greater exercise of civilian control, and more.  

There is still a lot I don't know and don't understand.  One of the questions a new Defence Minister will have to face is whether to keep Eyre around as CDS.  I believed before this conversation that Eyre is trying hard to do the right things and should be given more time.  I also believed before this conversation that it was not clear that chucking Eyre would solve any problems and might deepen the ones they have--that there has been so much turmoil at the top of the CAF, that it is hard to make progress in any direction.  The Vice Chief position has changed about six times over the past five years or so--and the Vice Chief is the one who is supposed to administrate the CAF.  This chat has not changed my mind, but has probably increased my bias a bit.  I can't help but feel a bit favorably to a person who lets me see inside the tent.

Reaching out to the random loud academic may be part of an information operations campaign--to make the CAF look better.  But I am not sure I am a reliable messenger, as I can be pretty critical.  This does remind me of being part of a group of academics sent to Afghanistan in late 2007--was the effort to inform us or to shape the messaging?  And, the answer, of course, is both.  That if we understood the mission better, we might be more sympathetic and at least our criticisms would be better informed.  

Anyhow, I think I understand some of the processes better, but I am still very frustrated by the state of civilian control of the military in Canada.  It is not just on the military to think about this stuff or to be blamed when things go awry.

* Lawson didn't say anything of interest that day--for an off-the-record chat, it was pretty tightly scripted.

** I have always found this to be strange.  I once was invited to give a talk to replace the Canadian Consul General to Boston during an Afghanistan event in 2011 since it fell in during the election period.  Eyre made it clear that this year's election made communicating about the withdrawal from Afghanistan quite difficult.

*** My reaction each time Trudeau and Freeland criticize the military is to remind them that they have kept around a Defence Minister who does not see oversight of the CDS as being part of his job.  So, they have no one else to blame but themselves.

20th Early Turkey Day: Happy Thanksgiving, Canadians!

 Hard to believe but this is the 20th Canadian Thanskgiving for me and Mrs. Spew.  We still don't really know how to celebrate it--do we cook the big meal on Sunday or Monday?  I forget which day is the ones Canadians tend to use as their big family gathering.  Well, for us, this is mostly moot since we tend not to go anywhere and tend not to have anyone over as we have no family in Canada.  Heaps of friends, but no family, so it is not quite the same as the annual pilgrimage (pun intended) to my family every late November (we see my wife's family over winterfest when we are not constrained by a pandemic).  But the giving of thanks is a common thing, so what are my maple-flavored, beaver-tailed thanks for this year?

I am thankful for being part of GenX-AZ-Dolly--getting the cocktail of Astrazeneca and Moderna last spring/summer. The latest news suggests Canada, either by necessity, by strategy, or by luck, got the distribution of the vaccine right.  That having a long interval between first and second may produce better results than shorter intervals and that mixing works about as well as two doses of Pfizer or Moderna.  Sure, I complained a lot about the uncertainty and the mess that was the rollout, but being fully vaccinated has made things much better, if not normal.  For that, I give thanks to Canada for getting as many contracts with as many vax producers as possible--portfolio strategies work!

I am not thankful that Canadian federalism seems to be an obstacle to doing stuff smartly during a pandemic.  While federalism helped some states protect themselves a bit from Trump's decisions, in Canada, the Trumpists are mostly at the provincial level--Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, perhaps Manitoba and Saskatchewan.  These days, federalism is an obstacle to a national vaccine certificate/passport as the provinces own the vaccine data and don't share too easily.  Grrr.

I am thankful that the worst media crap in the US and resulting division of the country into reality-based and conspiracy-based communities does not have quite the same volume here.  Yes, Rand Paul, Naomi Wolf, and others have been the vectors for anti-vax bullshit, but it is muted.  Fox and its ilk don't have as much purchase here, so Canadians are highly vaxxed--86.6% of Canadians over 12 have received one dose and 81% of that group are fully vaccinated.  The anti-vaxxers got disproportionate media coverage during the election, but they are few.  They did cause the Conservatives to tie themselves into knots over how to promote vaccination without mandates, which probably hurt them quite a bit.  

I am thankful that the election was short, and, yes, that the Liberals won a minority.  Minority government is annoying--the government of the day has a ready excuse not to get stuff done and does have to do some compromising to get stff done.  The Liberals haven't governed spectacularly, so I am glad they were not rewarded for failing to deliver on several key files, including the one I obsess about--defence.  As of right now, we still have a Minister of National Defence who does not know how to do the job, so when things happen, the Prime Minister blames the generals rather than himself or his agent.  On the bright side, minority government means that the government of the day does not control the agendas of the parliamentary committees, so there is a bit more room for oversight.  Woot, eh?  

I am thankful to the vax for allowing me to start hanging out with my friends again.  We had our first dinners over at friends and our first poker game over the past couple of months.  They provided much solace and entertainment (thanks, Roland!).  We had our first family visit to Ottawa in years when my sister and her beau came up, forces us to go out to cool restaurants, and even dragged me on a hike.

I am grateful I got to go to the semi-final of the Canadian Cup--the tourney for the three professional ultimate teams in Canada who could not participate in the larger ultimate league due to covid.  Speaking of which, I am thankful for the great people at the physio place that I visit entirely too often these days.  I am hoping my next ultimate season is not cut short by an injury.

I am thankful to Nigella Lawson, Sally's Baking Addiction, and the NYT Cooking section for giving me much inspiration and clear roadmaps to sweet success.  The latest was apple crumb crostata for turkeyfest 2021:

 

It remains a brutal year--far too much death and disease, far too much hate sponsored/spread by nihilists (thanks, Tucker!), and all that.  But we are edging back to normalcy.  I hope when we get to our new normal that I remember to give thanks on a regular basis for all the folks who got us through this madness--the doctors, nurses, scientists, cooks and delivery people, clerks, and all the rest.

Oh, I am also thankful that this tenure review letter is not due until next month so it is not overdue yet.  But back to it.

 Happy Thanksgiving, Canada and Canadians!  

 

 

 

A Nearly Great Day in American Civil-Military Relations

There have been few good days in American civil-military relations lately, so we ought to celebrate them when they happen.  Yesterday was a very good day.   General Mark Milley, along with SecDef Lloyd Austin and General Ken McKenzie, testified about the end stages of the Afghanistan mission.  While senior military officers and the SecDef testifying should not be all that notable, both my current research project and recent events have made this one worthy not just of a blog post but heaps of news coverage.

First, as I am currently interviewing Canadian parliamentarians about legislative oversight, I can't help but notice a big, big difference: Milley and McKenzie were asked about their advice to the President.  While I don't expect the President to do everything the senior officers advise (in fact, I don't want the President just to do what they say all the time), we can better understand the President's decisions if we know what advice he got.  It also helps us evaluate the military if they give bad advice.  It also allows us to see the different mindsets.  McKenzie said something that all decisions to depart should be conditions-based, which is not how politics works--time matters.  

This reminds me of my time in the Joint Staff twenty years ago when officers tried to ensure that organized crime as a target (a key military task) would be kept out of the various plans for the Balkans since one could never satisfy that condition of eliminating organized crime AND the objective the US military at the time was getting out of the Balkans.

In Canada, the advice the Chief of Defence Staff gives to the Prime Minister is a cabinet confidence.  We can't know the input into the PM's decisions.  Sure, we can hold the PM accountable (sort of) via question period and all that, but if we don't know the inputs, it is hard to evaluate. 

Second, and more obviously, it was a very good day for civil-military relations as Milley made it clear to Senator Tom Cotton (more on that in a minute) that Milley sees his job as giving advice to the President, and, as long as he receives legal orders, Milley's job is to then obey even if the President doesn't follow his advice:

Gen Milley stuff Tom Cotton in a locker today, after Cotton asks him why he didn’t resign over Afghanistan. This is one of the best answers I’ve ever heard a military officer give before Congress. pic.twitter.com/NAqbloa29w

— Ron Filipkowski (@RonFilipkowski) September 28, 2021

Milley made it clear that civilian control of the military is foundational, not something that can be challenged because the President does something he doesn't like.  This is not what Cotton wanted to hear (unless he was mostly setting up a Fox newsbite).

Milley also made it clear he was not acting outside of the chain of command when he told the Chinese military not to sweat things too much--that the US had no intentions to engage in a conflict during Trump's tantrum filled last days. 

Milley clearly has spent much time thinking about civilian control and the norms of civil-military relations since his mistakes in June 2020 during the protests in DC.  He is far from perfect, and his conversations with Bob Woodward could have been either sharper or non-existent.

The only real problem was that Tom Cotton exists.  That he has ridden his military experience to suggest he is an expert and that he is, alas, seen as a candidate for President or SecDef (his name was mentioned when Trump was looking for a SecDef).  Cotton is a fascist wannabe who has a Senate seat--which is not good for American governance.  

On the other hand, I was glad that Elizabeth Warren asked whether things would have been different if the US had left a year later.  I would have liked to have a question asked of McKenzie, who pushed the "2,500 could have stayed longer": ""General, say we kept 2,500 in Afghanistan despite our commitment to leave, do you think the Taliban would have just accepted that?" 

So, not a perfect day, but far better than what we have been used to.  If only these Senators grilled the officers and SecDef when Trump had made the Doha deal last year.

Once Again, Canada Needs A New Defence Minister

 I talked to Amanda Connolly of Global News about the speculation regarding the next Defence Minister, and she asked what would keeping Sajjan around signal.  She only used part of my quote, so here's the longer version.

It would signal:

1. The so-called Feminist government does not care about the situation of women in the CAF since Sajjan didn't pay attention to how the Deschamps Report was or was not implemented.
2. The abuse of power crisis in the CAF (this whole thing has been as much about abusing power as it has been about sexual misconduct and, yes, the two are inextricably linked) would be exacerbated since the message would be that the MND not only tolerated the abuse of power but abused power himself (by not using his authorities).
3. The Liberal government doesn't care about defence as it would be keeping a person in that position who does not know what the job entails and does not seem to be that interested in doing it.

Who should the next MND be?  I don't know.  Here are my guidelines:

• Not a former senior military officer.  I used to say not general/admiral, but Sajjan indicates perhaps that Lieutenant Colonel may be too high up--too connected, too long in the service so the mindset is pretty fixed.  
• Someone who has some experience running a department.  Defence is one of the toughest departments to run.  Learning on the job may mean getting played by folks in the building.  

Does it need to be a woman?  Not absolutely, but it would be a good idea.  It has been a very long time (nearly 30 years) since there was a woman in that spot--Kim Campbell--and she was the only.  It would have substantial as well as symbolic impact. [Update: see this article featuring smart women who know gender and the military stuff on the challenges of appointing a woman to clean up a man's mess]  However, there are other groups that have been historically excluded, and the CAF has problems with recruiting and retaining not just women but Indigeous people, visible minorities, and LGBTQ2S+.  

I don't know the Liberal bench well enough to say who would be best.  I just know who would be worst--keeping the status quo.

What I Still Don't Get (Ok, I kind of do)

 Exactly a year ago, I posted this, which enumerated much of what was going wrong with the pandemic response.  I didn't get why bars/restaurants being open was more important than figuring out schools and other parts of the economy. I didn't get why testing was so poor.  I didn't get why schools weren't prepared for the fall.  I didn't get why people couldn't wear masks over their noses.  A year later, there are lots of things that remain similar except I am not so confused.

• I get why some places have been so slow to develop vaccine mandates.
• I get why Ontario continues to screw up the schools.
• I get why Ontario's testing is just as screwed as last year, and they have given up on tracing.   
  

 If you had a kid with symptoms today (I don't—knock wood—just keep checking this in anticipatory horror) right now you could not get a testing appointment in Ottawa until Wednesday afternoon. Minimum four days out of school. Same demand as this time last year. pic.twitter.com/iMrAPmyZUm

— Shannon Proudfoot (@sproudfoot) September 20, 2021

 It turns out that there is a common answer to much of this: governance matters, and when one is governed by people who hate government, you get bad governance.  Jason Kenney and Doug Ford have stood out in Canada as the worst of the #incompetentmurderclowns.  I do think for Kenney it is probably more about pandering to the right wing of his party.  Ford?  I think it is less about ideology and more about laziness, hostility to experts, and to government.  I mean, Ontario has not spent the $2.7billion (in Canada, billion is a shit-ton of money) it got from the feds for pandemic response.  Ford wouldn't want to spend it on hiring contact tracers, on improving accessibility to vaccines, certainly not on sick pay for hourly workers, and not even on improving ventilation schools.  That testing still sucks is now deliberate negligence.  Last year, it could be written off as stupidity or the challenges of pandemic realities.  But we have had plenty of reports of unused tests.  It is not about supply chain problems, but that Ford simply doesn't want to do stuff.  

My friends who have kids are outraged, and they should be.  Delta is more dangerous to kids, and thanks to vaccination of adults, kids are now a primary vector of the pandemic.  So, there should have been much more effort to create better conditions for the kids.  Nope, not here and I guess not in Alberta.  

As I keep saying, it didn't have to be this way.  Yet, I fear that there are enough resentful voters who will keep voting for people who are hostile to government.  Why?  Because they want their services but they resent when government helps "others."  It certainly is not really about freedom since better responses earlier would have meant we would have more latitude now.  

Oh, and like my friend with kids, I am outraged.