Yesterday, I had the chance to speak to a group of Global Affairs Canada (Canada's State Dept that changes its name every few years) who were taking a short course on security issues. My job was to discuss the various flavors of multilateralism that Canada can choose from--NATO, coalitions of the willing, UN--when intervening around the world. Of course, I talked the most about NATO since that is the one that I know the most.
Anyhow, in the course of conversation, one of "favorite" topics came up: in reaction to a question about Responsibility to Protect (a UN 'norm' that Canada promoted), I suggested that we have two choices when an R2P situation arises: regime change or come up with some kind of deal that leads to power-sharing or its alternatives. And the regime change option is mostly dead these days because we have learned that we are good at breaking regimes but not replacing them.
I have been calling for humility lately precisely because the lessons of Afghanistan and Libya include: the local leaders appointed or sponsored or supported by the outsiders have their own agendas. Whenever I hear folks criticize Obama and others over Syria, I ask: who should we have supported and how? What are the alternatives to ISIS or Assad? The Kurds? That gets complicated fast and only resolves who rules in relatively small spots, not in the entire countries of Syria or Iraq.
The good news is that folks are more aware of this problem. Hence an article on the next steps in Libya with the basic question being asked: who do we send the arms to? Good start, but even if we find suitable proxies, how do know or ensure that they use the weapons in ways that we intend?
As always, we have lousy choices. As long as we know they are lousy, we can go in with eyes wide open and try to figure out who we can support, what kind of support would be least problematic if it gets into the wrong hands (hence no ground to air missiles), and perhaps what measures to take to incentivize our "friends" to do what we would like and not do what we would dislike.
Showing posts with label R2P. Show all posts
Showing posts with label R2P. Show all posts
Friday, May 20, 2016
Wednesday, July 16, 2014
Responsibility to Protect Indeed: Srebrenica Continued
A Dutch court ruled that Dutch peacekeepers were partially responsible for the deaths of more than 300 Bosnians when the Srebrenica "safe haven" was attacked by Bosnian Serbs in 1995. This is not anything particularly new as the Netherlands has taken its responsibility in this matter far more seriously than pretty much everyone else.
In 2002, the Dutch government fell after its entire cabinet resigned due to a report on events in Srebrenica seven years earlier. Can you imagine an American or Canadian or British government reacting to events seven years earlier after a critical report is released? No. I didn't think so. Has anyone in Belgium resigned in the aftermath of Rwanda?
The Netherlands developed a series of reforms to try to prevent a similar disaster in the future. Among these reforms are the Article 100 process where the parties in parliament must approve of a letter that explains the purposes and the means of a military deployment before the troops are sent. This is an incredibly transparent process--pretty handy for the researcher that happens to be in town the week this is going on. It might mean too much legislative influence on what actually goes into a military deployment (don't send tanks, they are too aggressive looking), but the letter requires a clear statement of purpose, clarity about the rules of engagement and so on.
This latest ruling is consistent with a previous one--that the Netherlands is responsible for those Bosnian Muslims who had been in the UN compound (that the Dutch had been staffing) and who then were expelled. The courts have ruled that the Dutch are not responsible for those that never made it into the compound.
As I wrote earlier about a similar case, there is plenty of blame to go around. Obviously, the actual killers are mostly responsible, with the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia taking those cases, including Ratko Mladic, the commander of the genocidaires. Canada neatly dodged responsibility, as the Canadians had peacekeepers in Srebrenica before the Dutch but re-deployed because they saw what was going to happen and didn't want to be around.
The United Nations perhaps cannot get sued, but, in my mind, it has more responsibility than anyone besides the Bosnian Serbs in this case. The Dutch peacekeepers were willing to fight, but needed air support since they were outmanned. At the time, the NATO planes that could be sent were subject to a dual-key system. Any decision to drop bombs required approval from both the local NATO representative and the UN Secretary General's special representative, and the UN rep said no.
The lesson to be learned? Well, the Dutch learned to always bring their own airpower when they deploy, so that they can get the support they need even if the international organizations say no. That's right--the Netherlands would de-flag their planes and fight under the command of the Dutch if their multilateral bosses were to get in the way. Which is why we saw something very strange from 2011-2014--the Dutch police training mission included F-16's....
The articles on this suggest that the prospect of lawsuits might cause countries to decline participation in peacekeeping efforts. Maybe, but there are already enough deterrents to participation in such efforts, including the lesson learned from Somalia and Rwanda--that the "bad guys" may first try to kill the peacekeepers so that they go home.
What this case really reminds us is that the notion of responsibility to protect carries a very heavy burden, which is perhaps why the reality is that most countries tend not to actually bear the responsibility at all.
In 2002, the Dutch government fell after its entire cabinet resigned due to a report on events in Srebrenica seven years earlier. Can you imagine an American or Canadian or British government reacting to events seven years earlier after a critical report is released? No. I didn't think so. Has anyone in Belgium resigned in the aftermath of Rwanda?
The Netherlands developed a series of reforms to try to prevent a similar disaster in the future. Among these reforms are the Article 100 process where the parties in parliament must approve of a letter that explains the purposes and the means of a military deployment before the troops are sent. This is an incredibly transparent process--pretty handy for the researcher that happens to be in town the week this is going on. It might mean too much legislative influence on what actually goes into a military deployment (don't send tanks, they are too aggressive looking), but the letter requires a clear statement of purpose, clarity about the rules of engagement and so on.
This latest ruling is consistent with a previous one--that the Netherlands is responsible for those Bosnian Muslims who had been in the UN compound (that the Dutch had been staffing) and who then were expelled. The courts have ruled that the Dutch are not responsible for those that never made it into the compound.
As I wrote earlier about a similar case, there is plenty of blame to go around. Obviously, the actual killers are mostly responsible, with the International Criminal Tribunal on Yugoslavia taking those cases, including Ratko Mladic, the commander of the genocidaires. Canada neatly dodged responsibility, as the Canadians had peacekeepers in Srebrenica before the Dutch but re-deployed because they saw what was going to happen and didn't want to be around.
The United Nations perhaps cannot get sued, but, in my mind, it has more responsibility than anyone besides the Bosnian Serbs in this case. The Dutch peacekeepers were willing to fight, but needed air support since they were outmanned. At the time, the NATO planes that could be sent were subject to a dual-key system. Any decision to drop bombs required approval from both the local NATO representative and the UN Secretary General's special representative, and the UN rep said no.
The lesson to be learned? Well, the Dutch learned to always bring their own airpower when they deploy, so that they can get the support they need even if the international organizations say no. That's right--the Netherlands would de-flag their planes and fight under the command of the Dutch if their multilateral bosses were to get in the way. Which is why we saw something very strange from 2011-2014--the Dutch police training mission included F-16's....
The articles on this suggest that the prospect of lawsuits might cause countries to decline participation in peacekeeping efforts. Maybe, but there are already enough deterrents to participation in such efforts, including the lesson learned from Somalia and Rwanda--that the "bad guys" may first try to kill the peacekeepers so that they go home.
What this case really reminds us is that the notion of responsibility to protect carries a very heavy burden, which is perhaps why the reality is that most countries tend not to actually bear the responsibility at all.
Tuesday, February 21, 2012
Gambling at Ricks? Part 34
The Montreal Gazette is running a series of stories about "NATO's secret war against Qaddafi." Yep, those bombs were mighty stealthy last spring and summer. The series is asserting that NATO took sides and sought regime change, not just civilian protection. I am shocked. Shocked I say. Or not as I labeled a blog post "Standard Libya Post" to address the false dichotomy of civilian protection vs regime change.
Yes, NATO let arms reach the rebels. Yes, members of NATO did some of the arming directly. Yes, NATO targeted Qaddafi's forces and not the rebels. Why is any of this all that shocking in 2012?
There is a larger question that this story does not seem to address and something that the R2P folks need to figure out: how do you responsibily protect people from an irresponsible government? Can you do it without changing the regime which has proven to be unable to restrain itself from killing its people? Folks who get indicted by the International Criminal Court perhaps might not be fit to be leaders anymore, so if you are going to protect civilians, what do you do about the indicted politicians who remain in power (not just Qaddafi but thinking these days of the people running Sudan)?
R2P logically implies regime change much of the time, which is why China and Russia are opposed to applying R2P to Syria (well, this is over-determined). Pretending otherwise is just silly. Yes, NATO sent mixed messages because its mandate to protect was clearer than its mandate to change Libya's government. I dare anyone to tell me how NATO could have protected the Libyans beyond the shortest term without changing the regime of Libya. Of course, the situation now is problematic, as there was no coherent alternative government to walk in and put all the militias back in the box. Yes, NATO ended up supporting folks who were less restrained and likely to engage in revenge. In these situations, you have to dance with the folks who are at the dance or you can stay home.
Which raises questions about R2P and its implementation since the realities of intervention are always going to be far from pristine--siding with militias, supporting regime change, using violence.
And Libya was the easy case, by the way.
Yes, NATO let arms reach the rebels. Yes, members of NATO did some of the arming directly. Yes, NATO targeted Qaddafi's forces and not the rebels. Why is any of this all that shocking in 2012?
There is a larger question that this story does not seem to address and something that the R2P folks need to figure out: how do you responsibily protect people from an irresponsible government? Can you do it without changing the regime which has proven to be unable to restrain itself from killing its people? Folks who get indicted by the International Criminal Court perhaps might not be fit to be leaders anymore, so if you are going to protect civilians, what do you do about the indicted politicians who remain in power (not just Qaddafi but thinking these days of the people running Sudan)?
R2P logically implies regime change much of the time, which is why China and Russia are opposed to applying R2P to Syria (well, this is over-determined). Pretending otherwise is just silly. Yes, NATO sent mixed messages because its mandate to protect was clearer than its mandate to change Libya's government. I dare anyone to tell me how NATO could have protected the Libyans beyond the shortest term without changing the regime of Libya. Of course, the situation now is problematic, as there was no coherent alternative government to walk in and put all the militias back in the box. Yes, NATO ended up supporting folks who were less restrained and likely to engage in revenge. In these situations, you have to dance with the folks who are at the dance or you can stay home.
Which raises questions about R2P and its implementation since the realities of intervention are always going to be far from pristine--siding with militias, supporting regime change, using violence.
And Libya was the easy case, by the way.
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