Confused by Schelling Some More

Let me get this straight:

1. The US spends much time waffling;
2. Obama goes to Congress to get support and finds damn near none, which means that whatever threats he was issuing become less credible (although not incredible).  Indeed, the audience costs might work in the opposite direction, as defying Congress would be costly.
3. Russia and Assad offer up a deal that acknowledges that Syria has chemical weapons and will hand them (or some of them) over through a process that will require a fair amount of intrusive verification.  Amidst a civil war... Ok, that last part complicates things just a bit.

The key here is this: the US did its best to signal that it was irresolute and then got a deal that would allow it to declare victory (not an end to the war, not a guarantee that Assad will not keep some stuff for a rainy day--although I think chemical weapons work best when it is not raining).

How does Schelling's work make sense of this?  Irresolution should not lead to coercive diplomacy success.  It could be, as @dhnexon is tweeting me right now, that Assad and Putin don't really understand American politics, but, jeez, how much clearer could it be?

@smsaideman @filarena psbl ans (1) autocratic regimes hv trbl grok way US gvt works; (2) worried Obama wld event prvl = window of opty 1/2
— Daniel Nexon (@dhnexon) September 14, 2013

@smsaideman @filarena (3) wrd Obama wld compensate w/ big inc arms to rebels, (4) wrd future CW attacks ld to US bomb, (cont)
— Daniel Nexon (@dhnexon) September 14, 2013

@smsaideman @filarena (5) France, (6) current calculus theory. Overall, might hv taken congress disposit as opty tavoid strikes, not (cont)
— Daniel Nexon (@dhnexon) September 14, 2013

@smsaideman @filarena not as reason strikes wouldn't eventually have happened.
— Daniel Nexon (@dhnexon) September 14, 2013

Maybe, maybe. But sure as hell does not sound like Schelling and all that I remember about coercive diplomacy.

NATO Question Du Jour, Pre Summit Edition

Why?  Oh why are folks obsessed with getting Georgia into NATO?  This morning, Senator Sheehan was quoted as saying this:

Sen: @Chicago NATO must "demonstrate, through the formal summit communiqué, some advancement toward the country's ascension to NATO" Georgia
— NATOSource (@NATOSource) May 18, 2012

Shoot me now!  Why this rush to get Georgia in?  Could someone explain to me the domestic politics, the political imperatives, that causes Senators and others to ask to admit a country into NATO that would erode Article V?

What I mean by that is the challenge posed by this combination: (a) a country willing to provoke conflict with Russia (even if Russia is very much a bad guy in all of this; (b) a country so far away from the rest of NATO that it is HIGHLY UNLIKELY that NATO would come to its defense.   In Georgia, you get an ally that is most likely to trigger a crisis that will most likely reveal that the promises made to it are empty, undermining NATO credibility.  Oh, and by making these incredible promises, NATO might actually encourage Georgia to provoke more conflict. 

So, what is the urgency here with Georgian membership in NATO?  I can understand that no Senator has read anything in Alliance Politics, but perhaps one of their aides might have bumped into someone who has read such stuff.  Or perhaps just have some common freakin' sense!

Yes, I get why someone from Ohio or other part of the US with a significant Ukrainian diaspora population would want Ukraine to get membership, but is there a Georgian diaspora of note that I am simply overlooking?

I would much rather buy into the hopes and dreams of Smart Defense than consider membership for Georgia (or Ukraine).

In Together, Out Together

The mantra during the Balkan interventions was "in together, out together."  This was often matched the logically compatible but empirically contradictory: "hasten the day" to get out.  The reality was that we did not come out of Bosnia together--we just re-flagged the effort from NATO to EU and the North Americans left.  I am sure that not all of the folks who entered Kosovo in 1999 are still there now unless being outnumbered by Luxembourg counts as "in".

I raise this now because of this tweet by NATO's Secretary-General Anders Fogh  Rasmussen who is in Berlin today:

On #Afghanistan Chancellor Merkel and I agreed to stick to our Lisbon timetable. And the principle in together out together.
— AndersFogh Rasmussen (@AndersFoghR) May 4, 2012

That the Dutch and the Canadians left their combat missions in southern Afghanistan should mean that in together, out together has been severely breached, even if they came back in non-RC South training missions.  It is clear that other countries will be leaving sooner rather than later, ahead of the 2014 deadline.  Australia has made that clear, and the French Presidential election may speed up the French exit if Hollande wins and then keeps his promises.

I understand why Rasmussen repeats the mantra and tries to get countries to feel bound by it.  It does raise the stakes of leaving if it appears to a country that it is breaking the norm and upsetting NATO.  But given who has left already and given the deep financial pressures and political stakes, I am pretty sure the promise to leave only together is now approaching the pie crust promise end of the pop culture promise spectrum.  I just feel it is my duty to point out when phrases from the international intervention drinking game may be deployed without much sincerity.