Sunday, April 10, 2011

Xenophobia to the Rescue?

When one develops a set of lenses to see the world, it is hard to see the world without those lenses.  So, Bill Ayres and I wrote a book that argued xenophobia (fear/intolerance of "others") inhibits the quest for more and more territory as it would be the equivalent of a large wave of immigration.   As a result, I now see xenophobia wherever I look, including the Libya situation.  That Italy and France are now teaming up to sweep the Med of refugees from the various North African conflicts (mostly Tunisia and Libya these days) is hardly a surprise to me. 

When studying the Yugoslav conflicts, I came to the conclusion that some of the early stands were taken by those who wanted to prevent/reverse the flow of refugees, including Germany's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia and the European willingness to buy into partition of Bosnia  The basic idea is this: end the conflict no matter how it affects larger principles/precedents so that the unwanted refugees go home.

So, when it comes to Libya itself and the role played by France, it might be the case that Sarkozy has pushed ahead of the rest because of the desire to avoid another wave of immigration--that xenophobia is pushing intervention.  One of my tweets on this provoked a conversation about this idea--why we should care and whether this is a good thing.

First, we should care because it is easy to consider either selfish concerns like xenophobia pushing countries into intervention in Libya's conflict, and it is also easy to think that it might be countries finally buying into Responsibility to Protect.  We need to know which one (if only one) really matters here as that will tell us much about the future--what will be the next conflicts that engage outsiders like this or not.  My money would be on the former and not the latter, in large part because R2P can apply everywhere so it has limited ability to explain selectivity/discrimination.  Why apply R2P to Libya and not Bahrain or Syria? I would argue, that among many considerations, for the Europeans only the former poses a significant threat of refugees.

Second, the question remains whether intervention motivated by xenophobia is a good thing.  Excellent question (H/T to blencowe).  Sweeping the seas to push back the refugees or kicking them towards the rest of Europe is not such a friendly thing to do.  Moreover, such motivations may lead to interventions that are half-hearted at best.  Sure, the French were quick to act, striking tanks in Libya even before the campaign to take out the air defenses began.  But xenophobia's inherent selfishness means that no one is willing to commit to putting significant troops on the ground (just like another half xeno-motivated campaign--Kosovo), which means that the effort may do just enough to keep the conflict going rather than give the rebels a real chance to defeat Qaddafi.  It is too soon to evaluate the Libyan effort (we don't know the outcome), but it is not looking good.  It may be that xeno-intervention might be a particularly bad form of outside interference because it produces slow train wrecks rather than fast ones.  What do the readers think?

Friday, April 8, 2011

Holy Motivated Misperception, Batman!

Planned Parenthood spends most of its effort on ..... not abortions. 
Is this surprising?  Not that much, but perhaps a bit. It is really more about STDs and contraception.  That will not it very popular with the right wing as making sex less risky is seen as a bad thing.  Plus the 3% is still going to be way too much.  0 percent would be about right. 

I am not going to compare the right wing to the Taliban (the latter's ideology meant that women died in childbirth since doctors were mostly male but could not touch women), but there is something to the idea that ideology matters more than women's health.  Ok. I guess I did compare the right wing to the Taliban.  Oops.

Overstating the Fetish for Methods

A Princeton grad student, who has now successfully undermined his career, posted a letter at the school's newspaper, complaining that he had been tricked.  He complains there is "hegemony in the politics department".  I am shocked.  Yes, there has been a fetish for advanced mathematical methods (because political scientists want to be paid like/respected like economists).  This is hardly news.  Even in a department that has a name such as "politics" rather than political science. 

This debate has been going on for a long time.  The folks who feel burned by this fetish for methods have been sharing the letter via facebook and twitter.  But I have to say: spare me. 

You see, I am living on the divide.  I do mostly case studies these days--because the datasets I need to do quantitative work are being built/revised/etc.  So, my perspective has evolved over time.  I do think that there are folks that emphasize advanced methods too much.  The reality of a tight job market is that it is better to have more skills than less, that to do well in a job talk you must appeal to those who do the numbers stuff (especially because they want other people to relieve them of the responsibility of teaching these inherently, ahem, boring classes to teach).  Grad programs have learned that their students need to have the most advanced skills to maximize their competitiveness.  BUT advanced skills with no decent ideas is not going get one very far either, except if one is really, really special on the skills (like one or two a year). 

One can take solace that the last several years, at least in international relations (I have no clue as to how the Americanist or theorist job markets work), we have seen a number of "hot" candidates who have been successful because of the quality of their ideas, not their methods.  That the folks who have done the poking and soaking that this Princeton grad student has said has gone out of fashion have done very well on the job market. 

To generalize from one example (which, of course, is so wrong from the standpoint of methods), I know of one student who went to a grad school with a good but not great reputation, who had some methods skills but did not deploy them in her dissertation, but had learned Arabic, spent much time in the Middle East, developed a really cool project that focused on a hot topic (non-state actors using violence), and was a fantastic teaching assistant.  She got seven phone interviews, had four flyouts to interview (and would have had two more had she not accepted a good job), and got a good job (with a hell of a better starting package than I would have dreamt of).  And her adviser was hardly a huge name in the field--just an indiscreet blogger who knows very little of the Mideast.


Moreover, there is plenty of qualitative stuff published in most of the leading journals (except those dominated by Americanists--you know who you are).  Plus it is easier to get case study stuff published in the major presses than quant stuff since figures and tables cost the publishers more money.   

This letter also is just contradictory:
Take a very bright, young graduate student. If someone that fresh has spent the first two years of the Ph.D. program in politics taking six classes in quantitative and formal methods as well as compulsory seminar classes on the “canon,” she has little time for substantive classes that give her a theoretical background on the questions she will ultimately answer in her dissertation.
Um, isn't the compulsory seminar class on the canon where the theoretical background is supposed to developed?  Plus it has always been the case that we expect students to learn outside of the classroom--that comprehensive exams test a student's understanding of the major works in their field and much of that reading is in addition to that stuff assigned in the class. 

Moreover, when speaking of "answering" the question in one's dissertation, one of the big questions is: how do you know what you think you know?  That is methods.  Contemporary political science mostly requires folks to be able to defend their arguments--that how they do the research is important, that the choices they make must be justified.  There must be a method to the madness.  And the really big issue is this: until you know what the question is, you do not know what method you will need.  So, it is better to have mastery over the major methods before one starts asking the questions, so that one's pursuit of the answer is not limited by one's skill set, right? 

The reality is that one's understanding of the advanced methods will always be in decline after grad school, unless one spends heaps of time on that.  So, grad students then become a convenient means by which profs can do advanced work--by co-authoring with the folks with the latest training. 

Finally, what truly demonstrates how clueless this kid is about contemporary political science in the US is this:
Added to the department’s preference for certain quantitative and formal methods is the unsaid belief that empirical political science must be divorced from normative concerns. In this view, the study of politics is a purely descriptive exercise. Questions of “good” and “bad” are parceled into “political theory,” a subfield hermetically sealed from the rest of the discipline.
Forget that the student does not know what descriptive means and focus on the frustration that today's political scientists are mostly focused on understanding how the world works, not whether how it works is good or bad.  This is old, old, old news.  If this student finds this surprising, then he clearly did not do any research before going to grad school.  He should have gone to a school in Canada (not McGill) or Europe where there is more of a conflation of normative and analytical (where analytical means pursuing the why questions).  Plus we do get to sneak in the normative stuff--we call that the implications/conclusion part of the research.

I do get the frustration that math matters when political science should just be about politics.  I know that I have lost jobs in the past to folks who had better quant skills.  But I am a realist--to get a job in an American political science department, you have to get some votes from the Americanists (who tend to be a large component of most departments), and they tend to focus on methods rather than the ideas.  But if you have a really cool project that you can articulate well, you can make it past the Americanists.  And yes, there are fetishists among the Comparativists and IR types as well. 

More importantly, I fundamentally believe that curiosity should drive the research, so that one should get the most complete training in methods possible, so that one's quest is not limited by one's skills.  One reason why I co-author is to get help from those who are more skilled than I.  I learned my stats on the streets, not the best place to learn such stuff.  I know I would have been better off, not just in the competition for jobs, but in my ability to do my work if I had the kind of training that this kid is complaining about.  My grad school (UCSD) got far more systematic about how to train the methods stuff shortly after I left. And the UCSD students that I have met since then are hardly methods drones--they ask really interesting questions, come up with some fun answers, and test them using all the methods that are relevant, including case studies. 

Elections and the Random Academic

The Canadian election has been both boon and bane.  On the plus side, it means that for a month or so, Canadian officials cannot speak much.  As a result, I got the chance to substitute and be a keynote speaker* for a symposium on Canada and Afghanistan at Bridgewater State University, which has a very active Canadian studies program.  I not only got to stay at a hotel just a block or two away from Plymouth Rock (and closer still to a cupcake place!), but also got to hear some very distinct perspectives on the Canadian mission in Afghanistan.  The experience, including a long drive to and from, got me thinking about a logical next step in my research--writing more extensively (a book?) about the politics and process of the Canadian mission.  There may be heaps of books to come on this topic, but I think I have an angle or two (plus the heaps of interviews over the years) that might be useful.  We shall see eventually whether publishers agree.
*  And yes, despite many talks over the years, this is the first time I think that I was the keynote speaker at a conference/symposium, as opposed to just another panelist.  The fact that they didn't have computer projection set up for me probably worked in my favor, as I had been revising and revising since I arrived so that the talk would be short and focused on the bigger picture.  On the other hand, I think I confused people, especially the Francophones, with the word weenie.  Oh well.

The bane part is that I cannot interview Canadian officials until after the May 2nd election.  I have been invited to give a couple of talks/papers on Canada and Afghanistan, and one really pushes me beyond what I have done before by focusing much more on the civilian side of things on the ground.  This means interviewing folks at Foreign Affairs and at the Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA].  That is going to have to wait until May. 

Back to boon, I learned a great deal from Stéphane Roussel's presentation as he talked about Quebec and Afghanistan.  Interesting survey stuff, but also interesting to hear how some myths continue to get play in Quebec.  The most notable one, to me, was that Quebeckers still have the outdated view that Francophones cannot do well within the Canadian Forces.  I found this surprising because I have met so many:
  • the past commander of Canadian Expeditionary Forces Command (LtG Gauthier) and the present one (LtG Lessard);
  • one of the commanders of NATO's forces in Kabul when that was the focus: BG Lacroix (who has since then moved up);
  • one of the contingent commanders, who ran the Canadian forces in Afghanistan--BG Laroche (who then got promoted);
  • one of the deputy commanders of the entire Regional Command South--BG Hainse (who has since been promoted).
  • plus several Colonels and LtColonels.
Then again, not so surprising given how hard it is to change attitudes and beliefs--cognitive closure is very real.

These opportunities always end up providing more than I expect.  Given that I have three more guest speaking opportunities in the next couple of months, this is quite a good thing, especially since it helps to ameliorate the family discontent (going back to Australia without them!).

Wednesday, April 6, 2011

Tuition and Politics

I had a brief conversation on my latest post on tuition increases with a student.  The student linked to the student association's page on tuition and cited a bunch of research posted there along with the students' proposed ways to pay for higher education.  There is such a contrast between how professional the website is in terms of its presentation and the extremely naive idealism of the proposals that it is galling.

To be clear, I would love it if universities got more funding from their public sponsors (provinces or states).  And if they soak corporations to do so, wooo hooo!  But all political trends plus a dose of realism about the relative power of lobbying groups screams at me that the best the students can do is slow or stop tuition increases, as they have done in the past.  They are not a strong enough lobby to affect someone else's most important interests.  And taxes are the most important interest of any and all corporations (and rich people, for that matter).  So, it is unrealistic to expect that Quebec would raises taxes (ok, that part is realistic, believe me, the idea that Quebeckers are not highly taxed already, especially those over the median income, is a bit silly) and then send that money to universities.

There is at the core a real conflict of values.  The students seem to believe that higher education is a right and that it should be free.  They have an out of touch view of European higher education--not so free and far more exclusive than they would like to think.  Quebec and Canada are not Sweden with effective cradle to grave super-social welfare programs.  Quebec likes to think so, but it is not.  And the students are right that Quebec itself is a sieve--money goes in, not sure where it goes after that as we can see from the roads, schools, hospitals, etc.  In North America, where Quebec and Canada happen to be, there are these things called market forces--that people will move around to get higher wages, lower taxes, and better outcomes.  Corporations will do the same.  Ignoring them because one has a dream about higher education is not going to make them go away.

Again, I would love it if politicians would really get the concept that the best investment they could make would be in higher education since it produces multiplier effects.  I now kind of wish the students would get the same idea--that their investment now (actually, the next generation of students) has multiplier effects for them and their friends and their society.  Starving universities of cash by governments or by students (through tuition that never came close to keeping up with inflation) has been and will continue to be short-sighted. 

Demanding that governments do more does not mean that we should ask the folks who benefit from the education to do their share.

Tuesday, April 5, 2011

Social Science and Bush Policy Towards Iraq

I have already posted at the Duck and also at my blog on the spat between Tom Ricks and Peter Feaver.  Today, Feaver responded to Ricks.  I don't want to get into the he said/he said debate.  I just want to raise one point and then develop it a bit:

Feaver is not really doing social science here.  He is seeking to explain why a particular decision happened, but he is missing a huge opportunity to develop a general understanding of Presidential behavior about the deployment of troops.  He is only focused on the surge, and his narrative suggests that Bush was making some good, tough decisions to push the surge even when some (not all) of the senior military leadership opposed it.  The problem here is that Feaver could have asked a slightly different question, which would have been more interesting and more relevant beyond who gets credit for the surge: what explains the variations in Bush behavior from genial, go along, let Rummy mismanage the war to the tough decider?  In the Feaver story, Bush is pretty sharp especially with the implicit comparison to the doofus who got the US into a land war in Asia (at least Obama is getting us into an air war in Africa--no wise aphorisms about that).  So what explains that?

Let me suggest a comparison across cases: Clinton in 1995, Bush in 2006/7, Obama in 2009: all three Presidents faced roughly the same decision: to expend significant political capital to pull out troops (European for Clinton, US for Bush, US and essentially NATO+ for Obama) in a questionable, somewhat failing war effort OR reinvest with additional Americans and effort.  Once Bill Clinton committed to his European pals that he would use US forces to extract them from Bosnia if necessary, the choice of using US troops to enforce a peace became much more palatable.  With Bush facing a huge defeat in Iraq, the choice to invest just a bit further with some new generals (Petraeus and Odierno) and a new SecDef Gates and more troops, the decision was easier.  Obama did not want to send more troops into Afghanistan, but ultimately chose to do so as a last chance to find some success.

What does this scream?  Prospect theory, baby.  Gambling to avoid losses is a basic tendency according to the cognitive psychologists.  We are more risk acceptant when it comes to avoiding losses and more risk averse when it comes to gambling for gains (Jack Levy has several good pieces on this stuff including this one).  I am no expert on psychological approaches to foreign policy and international relations (that's Brian's gig), but it seems to me that we have a fairly simple (dare I say parsimonious?) explanation of Presidents making decisions about the deployment of force that is consistent across continents, economic times (good or bad), uni- or multi-lateral efforts, and so on.

The key is to think about the variation within the Bush Administration (a most similar comparison) or perhaps the similarities across Administrations (most different, more or less).  The spat between Ricks and Feaver is on the details of one case, but we can learn far more by comparing.

Pondering Oversight and Beer

I had a fairly unique experience this afternoon.  I served as Pro-Dean on a dissertation defense.  At McGill (and who knows, perhaps elsewhere in Canada), there is a person on each dissertation defense who is supposed to be the impartial referee and comes from outside not just the department but the Faculty (at McGill, Faculty = College, so think of a Business person sitting on a dissertation committee for the Education school or a Chemist on a Religious studies defense).  The idea is that there is some university oversight over the PhD defense process. 

This has always struck as strange since it (a) reflects some distrust of not just departments but faculties (why can't an Econ prof do this job for a political science dissertation); and (b) indicates a poor understanding of oversight.  Regarding the latter, I was in a room chock full of Plant Science people with a dissertation focusing on barley (hence the beer title), and I had no clue whether the person was doing good stuff or not, just that fungus on barley is bad and that resistance varies (is not futile!).  So, if they had conspired to fool me about the quality of the work, I would have fallen for it.  So, the oversight here is almost entirely symbolic.  I found the process interesting but not exactly an efficient use of my time.

McGill has heaps of distrust/oversight issues that seem to provide more trouble than oversight.  The Chair attends every dissertation defense in my department.  Which means that the chair spends about 16-20 hours a year attending these things.  Is that a worthwhile use of the Chair's time? Not so sure.  I understand that delegation implies some risks that committees might conspire, that less qualified people might get through the process, but there is more than one way to engage in oversight.  Instead of intensive police-patrol style, the university could rely upon fire alarm type oversight (yes, I sucked in this kool-aid while at UCSD despite never taking a class from the folks who pushed this view of stuff), where folks can report if they observe violations.  That is, if violations are rare and not that dangerous, do we need a constant effort to monitor?  Or can we just set up a system so that the alarm can ring when the rare violation takes place and is observed?

Despite my whining, I did enjoy the experience to see how similar/different the enterprise is in this area when compared with Political Science.  Turns out their students pay as much attention to their conclusions as mine do, despite the fact that all students prepare for comprehensive exams by reading the intros and conclusions of other people's work.  I was most interested in the big stylistic difference--these folks end their dissertations with their contributions to knowledge--a list of the major insights that are novel.  Pretty funky, in a good way.

Anyhow, I am just glad there are PhD students out there working on ways to safeguard our supplies of beer barley beer.

McGill Students Still Suck at Math

I posted a while back about the fact that McGill students have strong views about tuition that seems to be a bit reality-averse.  Well, the student newspaper is once again ignoring all the studies and is insisting that the well to do be subsidized by society:
Exclusivity in post-secondary institutions does not breed quality.  Enrolment is increasing along with tuition in order to raise revenues, potentially off-setting many improvements in quality of education and services. Under this model, our student body will grow larger, more affluent, and less diverse, and face increased competition for face-time with professors and for research opportunities.
There are so many things wrong with this statement that it is hard to know where to begin.  First, it indicates that the university is both becoming more exclusive and increasing enrollment--how does that work?  Studies have shown again and again that increases in tuition will NOT reduce access (Quebec has the lowest fees yet is among the lowest in percentage of folks going to universities).

Second, having equally low tuition for all means that the people who could pay more are being subsidized and that there is less financial aid for the poorest folks.  I remember a relative of mine was scandalized when he found out that the tuition he was paying for his kid to go to an Ivy league school was so high in part because it was paying for the education of the less wealthy.  I argued then and I argue now that we are better off admitting people regardless of income and then shifting some of the burden of the education to those who can afford it (knowing that this argument is going to bite me in exactly three years).  Otherwise, we admit people who can afford to pay the bill, which would would undermine diversity and lessen the talent pool.  The status quo is actually not that great despite the myths that the tuition-averse assert.

Third, if tuition does not increase, how would universities raise funds?  By increasing enrollment, I would guess.  So, if you do not increase tuition, how are you going to hire more faculty or keep the ones you have?  Through the magical money tree?  Aye, there is the rub: there is no way that we can really expect significant increases in funds from this province (and most of the other provinces/states are in no better shape to do so).  So, again, I ask: where is the money going to come from?  Accepting cash from dictators (the LSE solution) is no longer in fashion.

Two traditions in Canada make this especially difficult.  First, tax deductions for non-profits, such as universities, are very low so there is less incentive for folks and corporations to give to universities.  Of course, when corporations do give $$ to universities, students complain about that as well.  Second, unlike the US, in Canada there is not a tradition/expectation that parents cover the costs of a university education.  Yes, two grand or four grand (in 2017) is a lot of money to a college student, but is not nearly so problematic if parents helped out.  So, my recommendation to the students of today is either blame their parents or ignore the tuition increases since it is mostly the next group that will be paying the freight.

And, finally, I am completely aware that I am being completely self-serving here.  The biggest cost for any university is its faculty.  I could use more colleagues in my field, I could use more resources, I could use more money.  No doubt about it.  So, there you go.  Complete transparency.  Fact-based transparency.  I am still waiting for the students to provide me with some realistic math about the future of the university.  But I am not holding my breath. 

I love the idea that "with the lowest tuition rates in Canada, Quebec has the potential to be a national leader ..."  in what?  Decrepit buildings?  Worsening faculty to student ratios?

On the Meaning of Recent Events

Occasionally when I write on Afghanistan, my critics say that it is easy for me to say since I have not put my life at risk.  I think this is generally a feeble critique since less than one percent of Americans/Canadians/Brits/Germans/whoever actually serve in combat these days, and it makes little sense that only combat veterans should have opinions on the civ-mil issues of the day.   Not very democratic, eh?

Still, I feel better about my opinions on war and such when I see veterans of recent campaigns articulate similar views.  For instance, Andrew Exum, with the nom de blog of Abu Muqawama, has an excellent post today on the freedom of speech and of religion that must not be infringed even when loons like Terry Jones put lives at risk in Afghanistan due to his own ill-conceived grandstanding.  Exum, who now blogs from the Center for a New American Security, served as a US Ranger in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  He demonstrates what I found on the Joint Staff--that most of the folks serving in uniform do buy into the meaning of the Constitution,* that they are, indeed, fighting to protect freedom of speech and such even if expressions of free speech put their lives at risk.




*  This may not apply to all folks in the military, as some have pretty distinct views about religion, especially at the US Air Force Academy.

Monday, April 4, 2011

A Somnolent Spew

Steve, why so sleepy?  I am in a Karzai-induced depression.  Chris Fair has an excellent post over at ForeignPolicy.com that indicates that the Terry Jones Quran burning riots that killed peacekeepers in Mazar-e-Sharif could be considered the responsibility, in part, of our panel Hamid Karzai.  Why?  Because he was the one who took the event and played it up to distance himself from the Western folks who have been giving him billions of dollars.  Fair raises the right question--why do we expend our lives and dollars if we are investing in this cruel joke of a leader?  I guess the answer might be--what about the rest of Afghanistan?  That is, the extremists who mobilized this mob and Karzai do not represent the entirely of the populace, and if we go, these guys will benefit but the populace will suffer through another nasty civil war. 

But then the choice is to support the existing government.  There is no right answer, but I am starting to think that if we do not see some dramatic improvements this summer (winning the war, rather than not losing it), then the time has come to cut our losses and let Karzai fester in his own stew.  He might think he is being clever, but I don't expect to last very long after we leave.  Yes, this would have bad implications for the neighborhood, but I am not sure we can duck those anyway. 

So, that is why I am depressed, and when I am depressed, I get sleepy and post less.

Sunday, April 3, 2011

Those Wacky French

French President Sarkozy is getting heaps of flak for pushing the US, NATO and the rest into a  war without clear goals.  Lots of folks are drawing parallels between his low popularity and the mission to Clinton and Kosovo and Wag the Dog.  The blame is now falling on his ties to, dare I say it, French intellectuals.  Of course, with Bernard-Henri Lévy appearing all over the place and taking heaps of credit, this is not entirely surprising.  Still, most French folks support the mission:
Yet for all that, few who are familiar with the French president—whether friend or foe—question Sarkozy's concern for the Libyan people. "Even among the Socialists, everybody recognized that he did what should be done," says a leading party operative on the left, ordinarily no fan of Sarkozy's. But outside the bars and lounges of the five-star hotels in Paris, the French on the street are not so kind. Even though two thirds of the public approve of what Sarkozy has done in Libya, his personal numbers remain abysmal. "The French people do not like him," says a veteran of the presidential press corps. "They just do not like him."
As George HW Bush found out, even a very successful war has only a fleeting impact on the polls.  I do not know the man all that well, but it seems to me that there are several components that together make some sense of this:
  • The North African revolutions increased the threat of more Muslim immigrants coming to France at a time where such folks are increasingly unpopular.  One way to handle such flows is to end the conflict  a la German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in in 1991-92.
  • Asserting French leadership and trying to marginalize NATO are much more traditional French positions to take than Sarkozy's embrace of NATO in 2007.  Competing against an extreme right wing party, it makes sense that how Sarkozy pursues this effort would fit better France's Gaullist foreign policy patterns.
  • Any chance to alienate Turkey?  Sarkozy seems to grab it.
The funny thing is that  it is not so much the decision to intervene that seems to be so troublesome for observers but how.  That is, France is not alone in opposing Qaddafi.  Yes, it pushed, but others went along for their own reasons, including pretty widely shared views about responsibility to protect, immigration prevention, anti-repression promotion (not quite the same thing as democracy promotion, but in the same ballpark), regional concerns (impact on Egypt and Tunisia), the nuisance that Qadaffi had always been, and so forth.  But the French moves to go first, to try to keep NATO out of it (US insisted NATO or go alone), and doing their best to alienate the Turks made their effort to stand out so very successful.

This is the France I remember--making sure that all noticed its great power-ness even though it has not been one for quite some time and now cannot even afford to budget its defense without British coordination.  Remember, it was Mitterand who flew into Sarajevo in a grand gesture to open up the airport in 1992.  So, Sarkozy is hardly the outlier that he appears to be ... at least among French Presidents.

Saturday, April 2, 2011

Slip Sliding Away

I have been arguing for quite some time here at the Spew that the GOP was becoming the party of white, rural America, and that was going to run into some problematic math eventually as the country becomes increasingly diverse.  Nice to know that my trips into American politics may actually have a basis in fact. This post shows that the Republicans need to do incredibly well amongst whites to overcome Obama's likely advantages with everyone else.  Given that not all whites are homophobic or old, that may be pretty tricky.

The Extremist of My Extremist

The attack in Mazar-e-Sharif may or may not be a "gamechanger" but it certainly raises heaps of questions about the present and future of the UN/NATO missions in Afghanistan. One Quran burned in Florida leads to several (seven, eight or more) deaths in one of the supposedly more stable parts of the country.  The irony is that the globalization that made this transmission belt possible is exactly what these extremists on both sides are fighting--the 21st century.  Anyhow, what will be the impact of this?

First, it undercuts the transition process since this happened exactly where NATO and Karzai agreed to turn over security to the Afghans.  Even though formal responsibility may not have been turned over yet, it shows that stability means a great many things to a great many people.  But to the families of the UN workers, M-e-S does not appear to be a stable neighborhood. 

Second, it weakens even more the support in the West for the NATO/ISAF mission. One can hear people thinking "if these people value a book more than people's lives, then we will never be able to work with them."  Of course, public support for the mission is so universally low that this event might not make that much of a difference.

Third, it is not clear what this will do to the rules of engagement for the UN and its protectors.  There were folks on the ground with guns, but they chose not to shoot at ordinary citizens engaged in a vehement protest that became a riot.  If they had fired their weapons and prevented the base from being overrun, the extremists still would have won because "innocent civilians" would have been killed.  So, there may be no way to play this well.  The extremists have another card to play--mob manipulation.  Instead of having more and more openness, the elements of the international community may revert to diminished access.

Fourth, it just feeds the zealots in the US to burn more Qurans.  They got what they wanted--more press.  So, these guys are certainly not going to take responsibility.  They may not even know what the word responsibility means. 

This can only be profoundly frustrating all around.  The forces of insanity win in Afghanistan and they win in Florida.  There is no bright side to all of this.  There are too much sunk costs for the international community to pull out tomorrow.  However, I would not be that surprised that in 2015 Afghanistan returns to its pre-Taliban, post-Soviet condition--a multi-sided, vicious civil war.  With no one wanting to jump back into the mix.

Friday, April 1, 2011

Quick Hits on a Difficult April Fool's Day

Lots of stuff happening, and I spent way too much time today thinking about Iraq.  So, just some thoughts on the events of the day:
  • Eight UN staffers were killed in Mazar-e-Sharif in Northern Afghanistan in a riot that was spawned by the burning of Korans by American nutcases in Florida.  This is notable for many reasons and I am sure there will be much coverage of this.  I would just note that Mazar-e-Sharif is one of the eight spots that is supposed to be transitioned to Afghan authority.  So far, the transition is not looking too good.
  • Lots of speculation about where Petraeus will go now that his time in Afghanistan is coming to an end: head of US intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SACEUR?  He is still recovering from prostate surgery so perhaps we can let him rest a bit first?  The strange thing is that it looks like the US will be changing its entire command team in Afghanistan at the same time--Rodriguez is going to US Army Command.  Would it not make sense to move only a few pieces on the board, so that the new person can learn from the old staff?  It is probably not that problematic given that the folks who are being mentioned all have lots of experience in the area.  Still, I wish that (a) we would replace these guys more gradually; and (b) not do it during the summer fighting season.
  • Interesting item in Guatemala--avoiding the nepotism laws by getting a divorce?  Check it out.
  • Heaps of twitter reports that the Libyan National Army--the rebels--are starting to become organized, setting rules for who can come to the front (journalists better not sleep in).
I wish the first story was an April Fool's joke, but it is not.   Maybe the last one is.

Strange Interpretation of Dumb Decisions

Tom Ricks took Peter Feaver to task for a variety of assertions Feaver makes in this International Security pieceI addressed some of the big questions at the Duck of Minerva.  In the course of reading this piece, I was stunned, shocked and amazed (but not awed) by Feaver's assertion in a footnote (fn 30 for those counting at home):
My view is that the situation is considerably more complex than that. Rumsfeld had an assertive style, but his assertions do not correlate closely with military failures; the parts of the war plan he focused on—phases I, II, and III—went well, whereas the part that he did not scrutinize—phase IV—had the most serious flaws. Arguably, what was needed was more civilian supremacy, not less.
This is so wrong on so many levels.  First, let me state that I am a big fan of Feaver's work, and it has significantly informed my teaching and research on civil-military relations.  Second, I respect that he spent considerable time doing government service--working on the National Security Council.  I did one year in the Pentagon--it was exhausting.  Two years would have been very tough.  And I think Feaver went to Iraq as part of his job--that took guts.  Third, I appreciate that he is writing a piece that builds on his policy experience.  I am trying to do the same with my current book project.  So, let me attack the assertion itself, and consider it an aberration from Feaver's usual standard of excellent analysis.

Ok, what is wrong with this assertion--that the quality of US defense policy during the Rummy year's, especially the phases of the Iraq war varied with Rummy's notoriously selective attention span?

Best Military Prank of My Life

Since it is April Fool's Day, and I am inspired by the Great  Abu Muqawama and the US Army (see the new Army headgear to the right), I will relay to my readers the greastest prank I played on the US military.  Ok, my only prank. So, it is also my worst prank.  Anyhow:

During my entire year in the Pentagon, my immediate boss, Colonel C, teased me about my appearance as a typical frumpled university professor (as one Balkan official was described in one of the non-wikileaked cables).  By the time I left, I would be straightened up, he repeatedly said.  He was referring to my long hair (long for the military, short compared to the rest of the planet), my beard, my less than fully pressed suits (yes, I do know which end of an iron to use, but I tend not to bother), and that my shoes would be shined.  Neatness has never been my forte in my writing or my appearance, so I was an easy target, especially so for a career officer.

Colonel C retired towards the end of my year on the Joint Staff. For his retirement party, I showed up with a crew cut, clean-shaven, wearing a pressed set of bdu's (battle dress uniforms), and some shined boots.*  I was literally unrecognizable.  Members of my office drove past me, wondering who the new guy was that was helping out at the party.  The Colonel was stunned to realize that the new guy was the old frumpled academic minus the wrinkles, beard and extra hair.  Not quite as bold as our AF Colonel (who used to fly for Special Ops) who dressed as a bunny on Easter, but still pretty cool.
*  Yes, I could have been shot for impersonating an officer, if such folks get shot anymore.

Why did I fit in well in the Balkan pit of despair as our office was known?  Because I was quite able to take the friendly abuse of the military guys AND fire back. And I was willing to take many racquetballs in the small of my back.

Civ-Mil Relations in the 21st Century--Back to the Past

I was invited to guest post at Duck of Minerva, and I was deeply honored.  The folks over their are incredibly smart and post very sharp takes on all stuff that is IR.  I grabbed the opportunity and spewed at length about one of my favorite targets: Rumsfeld.  Actually, the point of the exercise was to make sense of a debate between Peter Feaver and Tom Ricks on the proper role of the civilians in managing the military.  Check it out and comment there or here.

And comeback later today for a super-spew: why Feaver is wrong in his footnote where he asserts that Rummy attention is correlated with success and Rummy distraction is correlated with failure.

Thursday, March 31, 2011

Holy Weapons of Mass Distraction!

I missed this at the ISA, but now it will be on the web forever:

See Charlie Carpenter's post for the home to this video.

Shockingly Naive? No, Just Deliberately Ignorant

Same title, different topic: hey, if we get rid of tenure, our costs will go down, right?  The state of Florida is moving towards eliminating tenure.  The good news is that this is just a decision by one small committee, and we all know how one small committee can be completely divorced from reality and merit, right?

The assertion by the folks behind this is that if everyone is on year to year contracts, then colleges and universities would be more flexible and can allocate resources where they are needed.  Sure, because we want our institutions of higher education to act like pandering politicians to the latest craze rather than having some sense of stability so that the students can actually get in year four what they plan in year one.  The other assumption is that having annual contracts will reduce costs by allowing universities to dump dead weight.  Sure, that might happen. Or universities would have to invest in scouting, evaluations, contracting, and the like so that they can remain fully staffed from year to year.  Plus for every dinosaur that is let go (and then sues for age discrimination) there is a young hotshot that either has to be placated with a bigger contract or lost to a school that would offer higher wages and/or job security.

Aye, there's the rub.  As it turns out, studies of tenure show that it depresses wages.  Yep, lifetime job security essentially has a monetary value--people are willing to work for less in order not to have to worry about next year.  So, if you want to get rid of tenure, you might just find it will cost more, rather than less.  But that would require someone to do the work, the science, and the reading.

I am not blind to the problems of tenure, but the idea that we should get rid of it and all multi-year contracts in education is just incredibly short-sighted based on the budget-cutting fever of the day and not on what might actually function in the real world in the medium term.  One of the reasons why I believe tenure will endure is that the states/institutions that get rid of it first will lose and those who keep it will gain, as profs move to where they are secure.  And, yes, security does matter these days with profs in at least two states now facing intrusions into their email by grand-standing, labor-crushing politicians (that would be Wisconsin and Michigan at the least).

I find it almost funny that we have an attack upon tenure exactly when profs are being investigated for presenting views on hot issues of the day.  Isn't that what tenure was for?  To protect the free inquiry of ideas?  Folks always scoff, saying that those protections are unnecessary.  Hard to scoff now, isn't it?