Expecting More For Doing One's Share: Canada and IO's

Two events over the past two days reminded me that Canada/Canadians tend to have overblown expectations about what it should get for its contributions to various international efforts.  Yesterday, I was at a panel run by Global Affairs Canada on the NATO and Canadian missions in the Baltics.  The key speakers were the Canadian Ambassador and the head of the military mission.  It was all Chatham House, so I will not say what they said, but I will discuss how I answered a question we were asked:
Canada has committed to its current role as Framework Nation for the NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group in Latvia until 2023.  How can Canada leverage this role to advance Canadian and common global priorities? 
I had a few reactions to this.  First, announcing that the Canadian mission will last until 2023 can send two messages: (a) we are sticking around for at least four years or (b) we plan on leaving in four years.  I pointed out that no one made such statements in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, so it is not clear why Canada would announce any dates regarding this "persistent presence".  That label is a fudge--to allow NATO to get consensus to stick around for the foreseeable future but not offend anyone (Russia) about a permanent presence.  Second, I did note that Germany might have to renew the mission every year given its constitutional constraints, but I doubt that the US or UK (the other two "Framework" countries have any notion of announcing any dates.  Third, and, most important here, I noted some caution about hoping to get heaps of goodies from this effort.  Yes, Canada is leading in Latvia (even if it were slow to make the decision), and is making a difference there.  But there will be limited leverage.  It will probably help limit the noise Canada gets for spending less than 2% of its GDP on defence, but Canada is not going to get concessions from non-Latvian countries.  They will see this mission as commendable and proof of Canadian reliability, which is cool and can help, but it is not going to lead to countries bending towards Canada's preferences very much.  Whatever the diplomatic equivalent of "monetized" ain't gonna happen that much.

A similar question was raised today at a session where I was lecturing to Global Affairs people about multinational stuff: what will Canada get out of the Mali mission?  Not that much and even less than it could have.   That is, sending 200 troops to Mali was small but valuable given that most countries do not have helos and maintenance expertise to keep thee helicopters flying in difficult conditions.  But it was just for a year and when Canada was asked to stick around a while longer, it said no. Which killed whatever good buzz Canada was getting.  Again, the initial effort made interested countries happy, but it did not move the needle that much.  Would Germany, who Canada replaced in Mali, vote for Canada in the UN Security Council competition over Ireland (an EU member) and Norway (which happens to have troops in Lithuania where Germany is a Framework nation)?  No.

To be sure, these contributions are valued, but Canada will not be able to cash in much.  They are the price of doing business, of being a good ally, of being a responsible member, and they might ease some relationships, but we should set expectations on low in terms of what we get out of it.