Manila Briefings: Thinking Through Some Of the Big Implications

 After three days of briefings in Manila with all kinds of sharp people, I found myself thinking about some of the bigger implications.  To be clear, I am not an Indo-Pacific expert, so some of this might be common knowledge, widely accepted wisdom, or incredibly dim, uninformed stuff.  But that is why this is a Semi-Spew--no lit reviews, all half-baked thinking.  You let me know which ideas have merit, please.

1.  Canada could get sucked into a Philippines-PRC conflict.  People worry about a PRC-Taiwan war having global implications and rightly so, but the Philippines has been involved in a steady escalation of tensions.  It could be that despite their best efforts, things get hot.   The PRC already essentially owns the South China Sea aka West Philippines Sea, and they could push harder or ultimately cause some deaths while enforcing "their sovereignty" over this space.  With Canadian naval vessels visiting 4 times a year, it is not far fetched for Canada to be caught in the middle of something.  Canada is not an ally (only the US is), but it is a partner and a significant one.  I am not saying Canada should flee, but I am saying folks need to be thinking about this.

2.  Who is asymmetric now?  China is now the strongest player in the region with the US distracted and with China far more committed.  Plus the US Navy can't even feed itself right now.  Before Pearl Harbor, everyone in the higher levels of the US armed forces knew that if Japan attacked, it would hit the Philippines early and hard and the US would not be able to save them.  The successful first strike at Pearl made that more obvious, but it was always the case.  Now?   If China attacked the Philippines, it would take time for the US to really respond (which it wouldn't under Trump).  So, just as Ukraine was on its own in February of 2022, the Filipinos need to be creative about how to make the Chinese miserable.  Being the most powerful makes one the most extended and ironically quite vulnerable.  

3. Can they count on Canada?  One slide had a bullet on about working with the Canada in the long term with consistent planning and such, and I had to wonder: can Canada be consistent?  Not just a matter of the Conservatives coming to power and focusing elsewhere, but also the Liberals are focused on cutting spending and, yes, the car deal with China may lead Carney's government to try to avoid offending China at the expense of the interests of the Philippines.  I would not bet a lot on Canada's staying power here.  On the other hand, the same force keeping Canada engaged in Ukraine could work here--diaspora politics.  Lots of Filipino-Canadian voters--about one million Filipinos in Canada.

4.  In one briefing, the Filipinos discussed one of the things Canada brings is expertise on HADR logistiics--humanitarian assistance/disaster relief.  This runs directly counter to the priorities of the Canadian Armed Forces.  The CAF find emergency operations to be a distraction, a drain, and would like to get out the business.  The mantra of being a last responder, not a first responder.  Provincial-federal burden sharing problems will not go away, so the CAF is stuck.  So, they might just consider how their experiences doing this home and abroad is actually an important bit of capital that is handy when Canada wants to be seen as relevant.  The military is an instrumental of national power, as they all know, and it turns out a component of their power is their domestic ops/HADR experience.  Maybe value it rather than try to dodge it.

5.  Canada keeps trying to get the big trade score: China, then India, then China.  There are more than 100 million people in the Philippines, hundreds of millions in Indonesia, and so on.  Rather than putting all of Canada's trade eggs into one big unreliable, coercive basket, how about trying to have a portfolio of trading partners here.  Spend less political capital on the impossible big score and focus more on managing improved trade with a bundle of countries, none that can engage in significant coercion against Canada.  Just a thought. 

What Does Davos Mean Anyway?

 I have been asked to comment on a flippity flopish move by Prime Minister Carney re Iran: first saying, hey, we love them Americans bombing Iran to, hey now, maybe we should all be a bit more restrained.   How to make sense of this?  Hmmm.  I think the first thing to consider is that the Davos Statement is not that clear and is certainly not that prescriptive in this moment.  Second, domestic politics may play a role.  Third, bad habits may have been in play.  Let's contrast the statements:

First statement:

Canada supports the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent its regime from further threatening international peace and security. 

Second statement:

We take this position with regret, because the current conflict is another example of the failure of the international order. Despite decades of United Nations Security Council resolutions, the tireless work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and a succession of sanctions and diplomatic frameworks, Iran’s nuclear threat remains. And now the United States and Israel have acted without engaging the United Nations or consulting with allies, including Canada.

So where to from here? With a rapidly spreading conflict and growing threats to civilian life. Canada reaffirms that international law binds all belligerents. We condemn the strikes carried out by Iran on civilians and civilian infrastructure across the Middle East. We implore all parties, including the United States and Israel, to respect the rules of international engagement.

So, first, Carney's statement at Davos says that Canada can't always side with the US (as he likened the US-based world order to Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia) and that Canada needs to be pragmatic, not always principled.  Okey dokey, what does that mean for this weekend?  Whatever you want, really.  The first statement complies with Davos as it is unprincipled, woot!  Second statement complies as it is more critical of the US--not consulting with allies, needed to be reminded not to do war crimes.  

On the other hand, the first statement looks sketchy as all get out because it was buying the US story immediately without waiting for any sense that the Trump administration had a plan, a justification, etc.  Supporting a bad faith actor can only go .... badly.  We should know that by now.  I was pretty outraged by the initial statement because this is a badly justified war fought badly, and Carney should have understood that.  Don't support dumb shit.*  

Second, domestic politics: supporting an attack on Iran is popular among the Iranian diaspora and among many Jewish Canadians, so why not pander to them?  Playing to ethnic groups does not always mean bad policy outcomes, but, well, disaporas rarely know best.  They tend to be more extreme than those who remained behind (leaving is a selection effect kind of thing) and become more extreme as they don't have to pay the price for what they advocate.  I used to study diasporas, so I apologize for brutally generalizing about behavior that is well, pretty general.  While Jews hate Netanyahu, they hate Iran a lot, too.  The polls in Israel are instructive on this score.  Not sure how North American Jews feel as, yes, not all Jews think the same way on things, and the schism between Israeli Jews and North American Jews has widened since October 2023.  Still, I can imagine political operatives around Carney saying quickly before people had time to think: hey, we have to support attacking this regime because our voters think it is icky (which, to be fair, it was/is).  

Third, habits and bureaucratic routines may have dominated at first.  Canada always sides with US, always has problems with Iran, so those in GAC and PM's Office went with the old scripts, not really thinking through how Davos and Trump and rank incompetence might suggest a different approach.  

Why the change in heart?  Maybe Carney noticed the other allies being a bit more circumspect.  Maybe the schoolgirls and other reckless attacks and Hegseth's repeated assurances that he will war crime had an impact.  Maybe the realization that the US is a bad faith actor run by morons who did no prep, and tying oneself to them is not great?  Maybe the realization that Elbows Up includes not siding with the US automatically?  I hope someone can get the inside scoop on why the flip flop.  The new position isn't great either, but it is better than the first one. 

Of course, this raises what Canada should have done. What a great time to distance from the US?  This would have been an opportunity to show that the heart of Davos, not being so attached to the US, is what matters and matters in a crisis.  Look at the accolades the Spanish are getting, look at the Brits initially refusing to let the US use Diego Garcia.  If Trump wants to be transactional, then be transactional.  Don't give loyalty unless you can get something for it.

* Yes, it is a bad war--the flailing for a decent justification is more than a clue.  There was no need to attack Iran this weekend.  We have lived with Iran being an obnoxious, awful regime for quite some time.  Another day, week, month, year doesn't really change anything except to the Iranians who we are not really helping (killing moderates alternatives is just about the dumbest thing since the US disbanded the Iraqi military over night).  Yes, Iran was in pursuit of nuclear weapons, but there had been diplomacy that had addressed that.  These days, the Iranians get that they can't bargain with bad faith actor Trump.  Maybe two weeks ago, but not now and not anytime soon.  So, destroying the one reasonable pathway is very dumb.  And then there is the execution of this war---no consultation with allies so people are stuck in the region.  Friendly fire incidents galore.  Dead school girls.  Allies lacking protection from the obvious Iranian reaction.

 Oh, and I realized as I talked to the media today: if you push Iran into a corner where the existence of the regime is at stake, why should they hold back anything?  It makes no sense to save any instruments of power for a more desperate future.  So, they launch missiles and drones in every direction, they may close the Strait of Hormuz, they may encourage terrorist attacks around the world.   

Burden of Proof? Nope.

I am not a lawyer, but, then again, the topic I am discussing today is not about legal stuff but political stuff.  That is, folks may say that there is a judicial process  or that the burden of proof has not been proven yet so we can't do x.  But when it comes to political decisions, one does not need proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  One does not even, dare I say it, need due process in many cases.

Let me throw out a few less than hypothetical examples.

Example 1: Someone comes to the Minister of National Defence and says that the Chief of Defence Staff, the top person in the armed forces, is hitting on subordinates.  The MND does not need a full investigation to decide that maybe having a guy who is violating the various policies on sexual misconduct should continue to lead the military during a time where addressing sexual misconduct was one of the highest priorities. The job of oversight is not about only making decisions after investigations have been completed.

Example 2: India is suspected of assassinating a Canadian on Canadian soil.  It is then indicted for trying to do the same just a bit to the south--trying to kill someone in the US.  One does not need to wait for the legal process to play out to re-think an Indo-Pacific strategic that is partially predicated on India being a reliable partner in the effort to contain China* or what not.

The commonality in these two cases is the use of legal proceedings as a dodge from talking about or actually changing policies in light of new information.  Sure, there is no certainty about the new info--there are reports, accusations, but not confirmed stuff, but, of course, there rarely is certainty.**  So, new information should change the calculations even if the new information is not 100% certain.  

To be as blunt as possible, one does not make defence or foreign policy based on the decisions of courts most of the time.  While legal stuff matters--whether a particular option is legal or not, etc--it does not determine entirely what a country should be doing.  If, say, India's populist government appears to be acting in ways that are contrary to international law and violating Canadian/American sovereignty, then one needs to start adapting the old strategy (no matter how new/old it is) to account for that.   

The larger point, I guess, is this: we make decisions all the time based on available info and on a variety of calculations.  We do not apply a burden of proof equivalent to what is required for a prosecution for many reasons.  Promotions are not as life-changing as imprisonment, so we don't have the same burden of proof--we don't need to know for certain that certain nominees to the Supreme Court have engaged in sexual harassment or assault to decide to find someone in whom we can have greater trust.  We can take into account accusations that are yet to be proven when thinking about extending someone who is charge of the entire military because no one is entitled to that job.  We need to stop treating high office like folks are entitled to it and that we need absolute certainty before booting people.  Same goes for, say, security clearances--suspicion can be enough to deny a security clearance and thus jobs that require such clearances.  Which is why it should be easier to boot people from the armed forces if they are suspected of being white supremacist.

We need to take seriously the burden of proof when the state is taking away someone's freedom.  We can have a lower burden of proof for many other endeavors, including revising foreign policy strategies.

* Folks can claim that Indo-Pacific strategies are not aimed at containing China, and I have to loudly scoff.  If that is not what the strategy is for, then why the urgency?  And if it is not for that, then we need a China containment strategy as well.

** Not to mention that many trials do not really resolve things because the defendant had crappy lawyers or terrific ones, that the prosecution did terrific or made a hash of the case.  So, again, big policy decisions can't ride on juries and judges, etc.

India and Canada: Friends No More

 To be fair, the friendship was always either nascent or tenuous at best.  That Canada is host to the largest Sikh population outside of India, and like many diasporas, more enthused for more extreme political ends than those back home would set the tension level on "not good" anyway.  Then you add in that India is  ruled by the Hindu Nationalist Party and by Modi, so any friction becomes much hotter and much more useful for domestic political purposes back home.

One can start on either side of the Indo-Pacific region on this.  Because my own start as a scholar of the international relations of ethnic politics, which included some study of South Asia, came long before my move to Canada, I will start with the India side. Modi and his party got into power by engaging in ethnic outbidding, by promising to be the best defenders of the Hindu majority, which meant, of course, targeting minorities of all kinds as threats that needed to be put in their place. So, Muslims have paid a significant price for this in India. It has meant in foreign policy that Canada is seen as a real problem, rather than Canada's self-image as the less imperial Commonwealth country that everyone loves more than the US (Canadians take great pride that Americans will put on a Canadian flag on their backpacks when the US is governed by a Bush or Trump).  

In Modi's eyes, Canada is a supporter of Sikh separatism. That Sikhs in Canada are politically powerful and use that power to support separatism in the homeland.  Yes, Sikhs are powerful--Trudeau at one point had four Sikhs in his cabinet, far out of proportion to their population, but their population is not small.  Trudeau kept an awful Minister of National Defence because he didn't want to offend a key constituency and source of campaign dollars.  And, yes, an Air India flight was blown up by Canadian-based Sikhs.  The intelligence services and the cops messed up before and afterwards.  So, Indian fans of Modi cite that event as Canada being a base of anti-India terrorism.  The more accurate charge is that Canada continues to be lousy at stopping the flow of money to extremists of all kinds, but, no, Canada is not a place where Sikhs have bases to train for future terrorist attacks. Canada is not Afghanistan of 2001.  

Turning to the Canadian side, some folks are accusing Trudeau of playing this up and publicizing this for political gain.  And that is, well, laughable.  There are two dynamics here that are intersecting.  The first is, yes, this government (and any other) would be pandering to Sikh voters, and, yes, significant numbers of folks in this community were asking for the government to take more seriously India's role in the death of Hardeep Singh Nijjar.  The other dynamic is that the Trudeau government has faced much criticism for being slow to deal with China's election interference. So, there has been pressure for Trudeau to act faster.

Still, this government did not act precipitously in this case. They did not go public as soon as they got a hint of this.  Instead, they worked their allies, and they sent several folks over to India to get their support for an investigation, including Canada's National Security and Intelligence Advisor, Jody Thomas. They were rebuffed. It seems clear that the government would have liked to have continued to handle this quietly, but they got alerted that a reporter was going to release a story on this.  

With more stories coming out that the US was the country that had provided some signals intel to Canada that supported the India connection in Nijjar's death, I am pretty convinced that, yes, India through its intelligence services had this guy killed, directly or indirectly. I am biased in this, as I have long been suspicious of Modi and his Hindu National party.  But the pattern of events seems to make it clear that there is more than just a little something to this. 

While India can be upset that Sikhs in Canada protest against India and support Sikh separatism, and that politicians took the sides of protesters in India over changes in agriculture policy last year, none of that justifies killing a Canadian citizen on Canadian territory. This is not what friends do to each other.  Unless something happened that I am not aware of, at no point did the British whack any fundraiser in Boston seeking to support the Irish Republican Army.  Modi did this because he is arrogant, and he may be right that he can get away with it since the US needs India in its anti-China containment efforts. And, yes, he would not be the first autocratic-leaning leader to bully Canada. It has been open season for some time with China, Russia, and the Saudis taking turns, with the Iranians also engaged in election interference.

My pals in Ottawa who work in and near the intel scene are pretty outraged at how lamely this government and previous ones have dealt with such stuff. I am not sure better reactions would have mattered that much since the asymmetries in these situations are pretty stark, but, yes, Canada can do better on protecting its citizens, including those in the various diaspora communities, than it has.

I don't expect things to get better between India and Canada. Modi is scoring a lot of points on this at home. Trudeau is not, but he is stuck. I have often wondered why his government pandered so much to Sikhs when there are also other Indian-Canadians here, and that pandering to one side might be problematic for the other. In this case, where a Canadian was killed, taking this seriously is less about the pandering of the past and more of the challenge of defending Canadians from backsliding democracies. 

The Future of NATO and of Canada-German Relations

 A couple of weeks ago, I went to Berlin for an event organized by Atlantik-Brücke and Atlantik-Brücke-Canada.  These organizations aim at building transatlantic bridges with the latter reminding folks that there is more than one NATO country on this side of the pond.  It is very much an effort to build ties between Canada and Germany.  I was asked to write a paper on the future of NATO, which was to provide some fodder for discussion. It was a hard paper to write as I was to speak about the future from both Canadian and German perspectives.  I basically punted on that second part, suggesting that since the Germans were confused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and how it upset the Ostpolitik 2.0 effort,  this turning point they are calling Zeitenwende, there was no clear German perspective to provide on the various topics I addressed.  Oh, and writing about THE Canadian perspective on the future of stuff was also really challenging since I have always written about the past and have limited my speculation about trends down the road.  That was not part of my training at the Jedi temple.

Before I get into what others said at the conference, what did I write in the paper?  First, I procrastinated, which was fortunate since I would have had to scrap anything I wrote before February 24th.  Russia's invasion of NATO reminded us of what NATO can do quite well, what it can't do, and what it means.  As I oriented the paper around several key questions to invite discussion, I did suggest that the usual NATO question--the existential question--was moot.  Russia's aggression resolves, at least for the near to medium term, the question of whether NATO can or should continue to exist.  In this crisis, NATO has played its traditional and strongest role--deterring aggression against its members.  

I raised the question of how can NATO provide security and stability for non-members since NATO's day job is quite well handled.  The paper then provides two answers to that: enlargement to some and training/arming to others.  The Finland/Sweden membership train sped way past my paper, as I had to turn it in at the beginning of April.  It is a done deal, with Turkish leveraging barely slowing down the process.  The question is whether the Ukraine model can be applied to Moldova, Georgia, and others--can NATO either via multilateral or bilateral channels provide training and arms assistance to make these other neighbors less tasty and less digestible.  I did point out that a key difference between Ukraine 2022 and Iraq 2014, both targets of much military training assistance, is that the former engaged in good civilian control of the military, promoting the most capable officers and not those who were the most handy for domestic political games.  

Another theme in the paper was humility--that NATO and its members should not get too cocky.  That NATO could not survive another Trump administration, that NATO is not really all that well suited to handle China or gray zone attacks, and that as an alliance of democracies, it's not in the best of shape (Hungary, Turkey, Poland, and, yes, the US).  

The day had a number of panels, but, as a good narcissist, I focused on the one I was on, with the opening statement by Sigmar Gabriel, the former Vice Chanellor and Chair of Atlantik-Brücke; and then I spoke along with Jana Puglierin, who heads the European Council on Foreign Relations Berlin; Thomas Silberhorn, a Christian Democrat Bundestag member; and Vice-Admiral (ret) Ron Lloyd.  Jana was quite clear that the actual policies produced by the Zeitenwende may be less than advertised--that the increases in German defense spending are limited, returning back to normal in five years as the government apparently does not want to constrain future governments (more below); that there are already cracks emerging in the consensus produced by Russia's aggression; that the new money will not really advance the German military that much but just catch it up some from the underspending that has caused a readiness crisis; and that Germany needs to re-think its opposition to linking economic and security issues.  Silberhorn argued that the military strategy to non-members needs to be accompanied by an EU strategy, that we need more options fo rnon-members.  He pointed out that this is not the cold war as we will be cooperating, coexisting, and conflicting with China simultaneously.  

The give and take and Q&A were most interesting--lots of frustration with the current German government which set high expectations and seems to have been dashing them on a daily basis since then.  Similarly, Canada created high expectations by talking about a big boost in defence spending which turned out to be $8b over five years and not in any specified way.  So, much similarity between the two countries--promising big but not actually dramatically boosing defense spending.  The big difference has been Canada's willingness to arm Ukraine, whereas German promises have not always met the realities.  Both are hoping for some kind of normalcy soon, but the mood in the room was that the war was going to drag on and that normal is not going to be a thing anytime soon.  

On the bright side, I think the AB-C mission of reinforcing the transatlantic link is in good shape--the relations between Canada and Germany are pretty good.  I was surprised to learn that the EU had not ratified the CETA agreement, and Germany was one of the laggards on this.  This crisis could provide some momentum on that, but it might also distract Euro folks away from Canada as well.  But on most things, Canada and Germany are not too far apart, and Russia's aggression reminds us of what we have in common.  The eastern front is now NATO's priority, so we will see less debate about whether other areas should get more NATO focus (the southern front of refugee prevention, for instance).  I can't imagine the NATO Summit in a few weeks spending much time on anything besides Sweden/Finland membership and the confrontation with Russia. 

Finally, for Canada, Europe remains the land of easy policy decisions.  Tis in Asia, where the hard choices remain.

The New Bipolarity: Where Does Canada Fit Into US-China Rivalry

 Yesterday, one of our two Undergraduate Excellence Scholars, Safia Hafid, led a one-day conference on the changing realities in Asia-Pacific.  She applied for and received a Young MINDS grant which enabled her to bring together seven speakers from a variety of perspectives and backgrounds.  Our CDSN team helped her along the way, but this was her show and she performed wonderfully.  She not only found seven great speakers, but she did a great job of introducing the day, placing the larger question into context, managing the speakers, and moderating the question and answer sessions.  The day flowed smoothly, and I learned a great deal.  I live tweeted the afternoon so you can check out the thread here.  I will summarize some of the major points below (I will post Safia's report once she completes it).  You can watch it in English or French.

Panel 1.
Elizabeth Larus of U of Mary Washington led off by asserting that the US has not declined so much and China has probably peaked.  There was a far amount of consensus on the latter point.  I had heard the "China is going to get old before it gets rich" argument, but hadn't realized how bad their clean water problem is.
Rob Murray of McDonald-Laurier Institute discussed how Canada had spent much effort to develop a somewhat independent path from the US during the Cold War but largely stopped doing so in the US's unipolar moment.  He joined the chorus of folks seeking a strategic foreign policy review... which is not going to happen.
Thomas Christensen of Columbia University argued that the US is still far more powerful than China, but that the key flashpoints are far closer to China, mitigating some American advantages.  With the possibility of a blockade by China's navy and air force, Taiwan has to get what it needs before the fighting starts as resupply is going to be really hard.
In the Q&A, Larus explained why covid is such a threat to Xi: Xi has put much of his rep on zero covid. They vaccinated their young, not their elderly, their shots may not be as good, not as much health infrastructure, so risks of massive waves of deaths if covid breaks out. Christensen had one of the best lines of the day when talking about some far right American voices demanding MOAR: "you can't deter a war by starting one, \"referring to Pompeo's and Bolton's stances who would "love Taiwan to death."

Panel 2.
David Welch of U of Waterloo presented on China's tactics in its various territorial and maritime disputes (NPSIA has a PhD student working on this topic).  One of his most interesting findings is that China seems to be obeying the ruling about South China Seas non-islands.  We just can't say it aloud much.  He reinforced the consensus that Taiwan's term-limited president, Tsai Ing-wen, is handling this all very, very well.
Next was Lynette Ong of U of Toronto.  She argued that Xi Jinping's use of nationalism is now biting him as he is now constrained by ultranationalist forces.  She discussed the pattern of centralization and repression that is going to be challenging to ride.

Panel 3.
Stephanie Carvin, my colleague at NPSIA, discussed the absence of Canada in DC--a short flight but apparently not taken all that often, whereas the Aussies are everywhere.  We need a strategic foreign policy review (yep, she said it, too), more specifics and less vague statements, and a tech policy that is more than Huawei/notHuawei.
Last but not least was journalist Don Newman, who pointed out that the de facto ban on Huawei is less than clear to our allies.  He argued that AUKUS should not be Canada's focus but NORAD modernization. 
For the q&a, I asked whether Canada has ever been a rule maker and not a rule taker.  I was thinking in hard security, but Steph pushed peacekeeping (a long time ago), R2P (um, did that ever lead to anything), and land mine ban (which did).  In response to a question, Don argued that Canadian foreign policy got paralyzed by the two Michaels.  But I wonder if this government would have done anything on foreign policy anyhow--another consensus--this govt does not care about foreign policy.

I learned a lot, and I didn't have to do anything as Safia did all of the heavy lifting with some help from the CDSN staff.  We have another Young MINDS-sponsored event next week, organized by our other 2021-2022 Undergraduate Excellence Scholar--Alexander Rizkallah.  It will be a wildly ambitious hackathon with day one at NDHQ (Carling campus) and day two at Carleton.  

I hope y'all can join us on hackathon pitch day! 

The Ethnic Politics of Canada's Asia-Pacific Relations

 For a long time, I have criticized leaders for their efforts to develop better economic relations with China.  I always found China to be, at best, the Tony Soprano of international economic relations.  That is, if things are going well, China would be getting a large cut just for the privilege of operating.  That it made more sense to try to work with another billion person market that might be more compatible.  However, recent events have made it clear that this is not likely to work out so well, and it comes down to ethnic politics in India and how that interacts with Canada.  

This tweet captures some of the complexity but not all of it:

Within 2 hours of each other.

So much for "shared values". pic.twitter.com/PPQ3CLgvJt

— Jaskaran Sandhu (@JaskaranSandhu_) March 3, 2021

For Canada, it is not just that Modi's Hindu nationalist party is making India less democratic, which is very important and problematic, but that Modi and his party are not just exalting how wonderful it is to be Hindu.  This nationalism is aimed at a series of others--mostly Muslims in India (which is why Modi and Trump could get along so well--not just populism but shared Islamophobia) but also Sikhs.  So, when Trudeau goes to India with prominent Sikhs traveling with him or when he meets with Sikhs in India, it annoys the Hindu nationalists and gives Modi and his pals opportunities to demonstrate their sincerity about being Hindu nationalists.  Attacking Canada will be seen as a good thing since Canada is viewed as being Sikh-friendly.  After all, one of the most prominent members of Trudeau's cabinet is a Sikh--Minister of Defence Sajjan.  A core logic of ethnic politics is that the friend of my enemy is my enemy.

 To be clear, I am not asking for Trudeau or for any Canadian government to exclude Sikhs so as not to offend the Hindu nationalists of India.  Far from it, even as I am critical about Sajjan's handling the abuse of power within the Canadian Armed Forces.  Instead, I am just saying that we should not be naive or overly optimistic about Canadian relations with India at a time where India is run by a party that aims to exclude religious minorities at the expense of its democracy.  

There has been a lot of discussion of the Indo-Pacific, which has partly (mostly?) been an effort to get India to join the US and its allies to balance against China.  The good news is that India is going to do that anyway--because China poses a significant threat to India and their relationship has gotten more tense over the past year or two.  The bad news is that India is going to be a shaky partner in anything else because it is increasingly autocratic, increasingly focused on symbolic politics, and much less focused on the common good either in India or beyond.  

So, don't bet the farm on good relations with India.  There will be room for cooperation, but it will be highly circumscribed.  And, yes, embracing India will have the same kind of moral compromises as working with China, just at a slightly less intense level.

 

Whither Canada in a World of American Decline

 Alex Usher asked this:

Let's say you thought the US was in inexorable decline as a world power. Sort of like the UK post-WWI: powerful, yes but you know it'll be weaker next year, and the year after, year after, etc.

And you're Canada

What are your options? And how bad is it to explore them openly?

— Alex Usher (@AlexUsherHESA) November 21, 2020

I have been thinking about this for the past four years with no answer.  It was more about Trump being unreliable and potentially hostile and less about American decline (although Trump being President accelerated American decline).  And I have not yet figured out a good answer.  Alex used the example of Finland in the latter stages of the Cold War, but I am not sure that is the best analogy.  Findlandization was all about a forced neutrality to keep the Soviets at bay.  Canada's position before Trump was of willing partner with common interests (although not identical).  During Trump, it was perhaps more of abused partner.  With Biden as President, there will still be tensions regarding some trade issues, but the issue will be about relying on a country with declining abilities.  

So what can Canada do?  The traditional answer is Diversify Canada's trade markets.  So much dependence on selling to, buying from, and co-producing with the US.  Sure.  But what are the alternatives?

• China?  A huge market full of ... people stealing IP, holding Canadians hostage, extracting more from investments in a Tony Soprano kind of way, and so on.  Not great.  
• India?  There are many reasons why India has been a tough nut to crack for not just Canada.  India has tended to protect its markets and that is not likely to change.  That the country is now run by Hindu nationalists makes it far harder for any country with multicultural values to work with India.  India only looks good because it has not put millions of Muslims in concentration camps (that would be China).  For Canada, all of this is more complicated because Canadian leaders see their own domestic politics in India--playing to Sikh communities in Canada while in India alienates the rest of India including the aforementioned Hindu nationalist folks.  
• Japan?  There is a lot to be had in a partnership with Japan, but Japan faces a demographic cliff and it has been a long time since it was dominating trade.  
• Europe?  Um, they have their own problems and don't see Canada as a solution to any of them.  While the EU could have been as replacing or supplementing the US, Brexit has done so much damage along with the lousy response to the 2008 financial crisis that it is not a good alternative for Canada.
• Germany?  Merkel and Germany have been good partners, but, again, Canada is not a priority for Germany, and we have no idea how Germany will operate post-Merkel.
• UK?  Oh my.  What a shitshow.  And, yes, the UK's misery makes an Anglosphere (sans US) a non-starter.  Not that UK-Aus-NZ-Can would sufficient heft.

And there is security.  Bandwagoning with the new rising power--China--is not going to happen for all kinds of reasons.  Right now, there are more folks who want to confront China.  How?  Damned if I know.  One running argument this week was with folks who accused those concerns about Chinese power of being cowards.  I did not enjoy that.  Canada faces a huge problem here because it has few levers, it faces much asymmetry with China's power, and China has no conscience about using its power as a bully.  All of the stuff I have heard about what Canada can do are pin-pricks whereas China can devastate entire markets by turning off access.  In my corner of the world, universities have become dependent on tuition by Chinese students.  Turn that off and ouch!  Anyhow, Finland, at least, had some idea of the possibility of allying with Russia's adversary.  Canada has no option to ally with the US's primary adversary.

India is too far away to a helpful ally although a multilateral partnership with Japan, Australia, Indonesia and others to contain China would be cool ... well, if the US provided most of the ships/planes/logistics/glue.  How can Canada improve its security in a world where the US is in decline?  Well, it could develop its own nuclear deterrent.  Nope, not gonna happen.  

Oh, and Canada's greatest asset in international relations is, alas, not that people like us or our brand.  It has been its mineral wealth.  And guess what?  Folks are moving away from oil and especially from, dare I say it, emissions-rich oil.  So, Canada has to figure out what comparative advantages it has and try to use those more strategically.  Yes, the brand still matters and has some use, but it is not going to buy Canada a seat at the UN.  Maneuvering through a multipolar, uncertain world will require more creativity, more adaptability, and a greater understanding of the tradeoffs.  For instance, pushing human rights will risk arms sales since most of the big buyers are ... awful.   So, realize that making a choice will mean getting gored by one of the horns of that dilemma.  And, yes, even choosing not to decide is still a choice.

So, yeah, a blog post of shrugging shoulders.  I still have no answer.  Sorry.

How Many Hostages Must China Take?

I hung out with some folks who work in the government today, and I learned something strange: there are folks who don't really see great power competition as a thing right now.  Which raises the question: how many hostages must China take before folks get serious about the coercive nature of the 2020's?  How many supply chains must China disrupt?  How many allies must be destabilized by Russia (two major ones thus far via Brexit and Trump)? 

In today's Battle Rhythm podcast (link to be added once it drops), I do argue that the liberal international order isn't gone and can be salvaged, but I want to be clear that there are significant threats out there.  Liberal IR folks (which is where I identify the closest) focus less on power (although it still matters) and more patterns of interests, and it is abundantly clear that the pattern of interests these days should not cause Canadians to be complacent and comfy.  The pattern is increasingly one of conflicting interests.  What China wants and what Russia wants and what North Korea wants are in conflict with what Canada wants.  We can debate how much of what the US is doing now is going to outlast Trump (I tend to think not so much, as the fundamental pattern of interests are overlapping), but the global distribution of interests is not quite aligned with Canada. 

Canada depends on the rules-based order because the rules, dare I say it, favor Canada.  Canada has done well with norms against revisions of boundaries, with relatively free trade, stable exchange rates, and the building of institutions to solve our collective problems.  Russia wants to break this stuff down because, well, they are in decline and chaos is a ladder for them.  Judo folks (players? fighters?) prefer their adversaries off balance, and that is what Putin is.  He is not thinking five steps ahead, he is just taking advantage of countries being distracted or divided.  China?  I used to think the Chinese leaders wanted to keep the current system with some modifications.  I don't think that any more, maybe because of nationalist pressures at home, maybe because they see American weakness and are trying to take advantage of it.  Whatever it is, they are supporting more belligerent policies and some of them are aimed at Canada.

So, I have to ask those in government (not just the politicians but the folks in various agencies): just what does China have to do to make them see China as a major threat that requires some creativity to deal with?  I have no solutions right now to the problem of China, but it is clear that is what we need to be thinking about.  Russia?  We need to thwart its trolling, but its demise is in the cards.  Well, I guess I am a Realist in part since my focus is on the rising power and not the declining power.  

Anyhow, I know now what I need to say in any conversation with folks about Canada's stance in the world: how much hostility does it take to re-think things?

Putting the UN Security Council Seat Failure Into Perspective

Canadian politics twitter was in an uproar last night as Canada failed to get enough votes to get a temporary UN Security Council seat .... for the second time in ten years.  People are putting way too much on this event, and yet there is some stuff we can learn.  So, I am going to go through various aspects of the entire thing to show where Canada really stands today (mostly the same place it stood a week ago contrary to what my friend JC wrote).

First, it was not Canada's seat to lose.  One could argue that Canada could have done better, but some folks (me!) predicted long ago that Canada was not going to win, before Canada's hand got weaker via spats with Saudi Arabia and China, before the shine of the Liberals was tarnished by the SNC-Lavalin scandal, before it became clear that the Liberal government was not going to much peacekeeping, nor perhaps have a very coherent foreign policy.  I learned about five or so years ago at an embassy event that these campaigns to win these seats take eight or ten years.  So, Canada was late to the competition.  Trudeau should have aimed for a later cycle.  Being late meant being less prepared and also perhaps been seen as an interloper.  And the competition: Ireland and Norway! Two very good international citizens, that do much in terms of aid, peacekeeping, and other stuff.  This also meant that a normal constituency for Canadian votes--Europe--was largely off the table.  Have Ireland and Norway annoyed the entire Mideast by taking strongly pro-Israel stances?  So, you can see Canada entered the race late with much baggage. Why did Canada deserve a seat more than Ireland or Norway?  I have no idea.  And obviously, Canada did not and perhaps could not make that case.

Second, Canada was the victim of some unfortunate circumstances that was mostly not Canada's fault.  The election of Trump has rightfully caused the Trudeau government to focus far more attention on US-Canadian relations than on other stuff.  That is the correct prioritization given what the US means to Canada.  Which, of course, led to alienating China.  I am sure China's moves to being a more belligerent rising power would have hit Canada in some way, but the extradition of the Huawei exec has been the source of much conflict.  Countries seeking to suck up to China might not vote for Canada these days.  Same goes for the Saudis.  Given these circumstances getting 108 votes may not have been a bad outcome, less than last time, but more than one might have expected given these headwinds.

Third, one can look at Canadian foreign policy and, yes, blame Canada and Trudeau.  Canada now has the lowest number of peacekeepers deployed in decades.  When it did do something mildly significant, sending helicopters and medical personnel to Mali, Canada steadfastly refused to extend the mission when their replacements were slow to get there.  Canada's aid budget is relatively small.  Canada's biggest presence in Africa is probably via mining companies, and I am guessing those, even if relatively well-behaved, are not the best representatives of maple, moose, and the like.

People are using this loss to argue that Canadian foreign policy is largely incoherent, that Global Affairs Canada are understaffed, underresourced (how many embassies does Canada have in Africa?), and may not play well with others or themselves (there may still be an aid/foreign office split within GAC).  One could also argue that besides the seat itself, a campaign promise made long ago, Trudeau and his team don't really care that much about international relations.

Some, such as my colleague, Phil Lagassé, have argued that Canadians seem to have an entitlement attitude based on nostalgia.  That the greatest hits in Canadian foreign policy are long ago.  I am still new here (18 years is new, right?) so I don't really know what it was like long ago.  I do think Canada has a good brand in the world, still.  That Trudeau still has charisma that plays well.  But Canada never really had a chance and never really invested that much in this effort.  It chose the least risky, shortest possible peacekeeping mission, it did not invest more in foreign assistance, and it did not take a really bold stance that might have alienated some but perhaps won others over.  A no-risk strategy simply would not work if starting from behind against very deserving countries.

So, where do we go from here?  What would make sense is a comprehensive review of Canada's foreign policy.  There hasn't been one in many, many years, but doing so might identify what matters most, what tools Canada can use to be more successful in its relations, strategies for deploying said tools, and so on.  I do think that some of the critics are right--that Global Affairs Canada could do better with more engagement with academics (yes, I am always self-serving) and non-governmental organizations.  While the Defence Policy Review that produced Strong, Secure, Engaged did not produce radical change, it gave Canada's defence folks critical signposts to direct their efforts.  GAC only had the UN SC seat.  It needs new, clearer directions for the next decade or so.  And perhaps Canadian leaders could be more strategic about picking when to compete for a seat.  For that blunder, yes, Trudeau should get the blame.  For how Canada is perceived in the world, that is less the fault of the current government and more the reality of the situation it is in.

Do I expect Canada to figure out its role in the world?  For this government to invest more resources?  To do a foreign policy review?  Ah, that is a post for another day.  I am sure we are all depressed enough right now. 

Election 2019: Foreign Policy and Defence Priorities

I tweeted my thoughts this morning about the Conservative platform's pieces on foreign policy and defence policy.  There was some good, some bad, and much that was annoying.  What annoyed me most was the focus on Iran and Israel.  An then I opened up the latest Diplomat and International Canada which has each party listing its top five foreign policy priorities (the Liberals sent along a few paragraphs).  And, yes, I found much fault with the Conservatives again, but let me run through the entire piece and then suggest what Canada's real foreign policy priorities are. Yeah, I don't discuss the PPC--it ain't a real party until it wins something.  Plus the xenophobes get enough attention.

Conservatives:

1. China.  Not really number one, but definitely a major priority even if China and Canada were not embroiled in a dispute over extradition of a Huawei executive.  Major potential trade partner and rising power that might seek to undermine the rules of the system that have been so beneficial to Canada.
2. Russia and the Arctic.  Not really number two, and Russia is not as much of a threat to Canada's Arctic as people suggest.  Why?  Because it is damned hard to maintain a presence all the way up there, not to mention all the way on the other side.  Russia's Arctic investments are not about the Northwest passage but the Northern passage.  
3. Israel.  FFS. I hate to break it to folks, but (a) Israel can take care of itself without Canadian help and (b) Israel does not really help/hurt Canada's security or economy.  Last I checked, Canada is an Atlantic country and a Pacific country, but it isn't a Mideast country.
4. Iran.  FFS 2.  Ditto.  Remember, Canada was not a member of the party of six negotiating the JCPOA.  Nobody sees Canada as a major influence on Iranian behavior. 
5. Religious Freedom.  Really?  As you will see below, I will find a bunch of stuff that is more important to the security and welfare of Canadians than promoting Christianity (which is what this office did and would do again).  If the Conservatives really cared about religious freedom so much, their stance on Quebec's laws against (certain) religious garb would be a wee bit more declarative.

 New Democratic Party:

1. Climate change. Here's a major priority.  The only way to address climate change is via international cooperation.  And climate change is a major threat to Canada--it will change where the maples can grow, for instance, and it will likely lead to more immigration conflicts, and on and on.  Well done, NDP.
2. Disarmament.  Um, good luck with that.  Not sure pipe dreams should be the 2nd priority.  Given the state of the world these days with Trump undermining or leaving various agreements, Russia cheating on agreements, and so on, this is not a time to invest major resources or attention to something that is not going to pan out.  Maybe later.  Or, well, start at home--stop the sale of arms to hotspots, even if it costs you votes.  Right?
3. International development.  This makes a great deal of sense, although one needs to have some humility about the effectiveness of aid.  Or even that aid can be problematic.
4. Human rights respect and enforcement.  Sure, fits the party ideology and Canada has done good stuff in the past promoting human rights.  But the Saudi response should be kept in mind--these ideals have a price.  
5. Multilateralism and peacekeeping.  Again, makes sense, but this is risky stuff.

Liberals (taking their paras and turning into a list):

1.  Support international order via insttutions
2.  Fight climate change
3.  Support free/fair trade
4.  Stuff

Not great--just vague stuff. No points for blowing off the homework they were given

Green:

1.  Climate emergency.  Sure
2.  Global migration.  That conflict and climate change will create much migration and we need to prepare.  Good.
3.  Fight erosion of human rights.  Like for the NDP, this will come at a cost.  How will this work?
4. Achiving UN Sustainable Development Goals.  Sure.
5. Ban on nuclear weapons.  What I said above about pipe dreams for the NDP.

Bloc Québécois

1. Climate change.  Wow, the separatists can be reasonable.
2. Reset button trade.  Never mind.
3. Multilateralism.  Woot.
4. Tax base erosion.  Interesting.  
5. Give Quebec access to the world.  Ok but oy.

Steve's priorities

1. Funny how all of these folks dodge the number one priority: relations with the US.  It only appeared on the xenophobic sect's list.  Given how dependent Canada is on the US for trade, investment, and defence, the US-Canada relationship is always the most important priority.  Especially now when it is hard.
2. Climate change.  It is a clear and present danger AND it requires international cooperation.
3. China.  It is an economic opportunity, but one with tremendous downsides that can threaten Canadian values (what do we sell out to get into that market); it is threat to peace (ask the Japanese and those near the South China Sea, not to mention Tawain); it is a threat to the multilateral order that has been so fundamental to Canada's success the past 75 years.
4. India.  Just because it is hard does not mean it is not important.  India presents incredible opportunities--the market, to balance China, etc--but is also very likely to cause problems for Canada.  Canadian leaders need to stop thinking about how best to pander to some communities in Canada as they visit foreign countries (that would be Trudeau...), and focus on the larger interests such as trade and defence.
5. NATO.  Sure, my self-interest, but it is also the case that Canada gets involved in high risk, high cost endeavors thanks to its role in NATO.  So, managing NATO is important because NATO has been setting Canada's security agenda for a long, long time.  

And, yes, my list of priorities focuses on Canada's interests, not the interests of other people.  Canada should do more peacekeeping, more development assistance, and the like, but such "oughts" come after "musts" such as getting the relationship with the US right, addressing climate change, managing China and India, and influencing the next set of military obligations.

Oh, and maybe the next government should do a foreign policy review to set priorities and put up signposts for the civil servants.  The Defence Policy Review (a.k.a. SSE) worked really well doing that.

Better Not To Be Invited

Canada has a built in FOMO syndrome with which I sympathize greatly.  Indeed, I have internalized this so when somebody says transatlantic and only refers to the US regarding this side of the Atlantic, I take umbrage.  In the latest alliance/coalition news, Canada is not being asked to join a new European effort to form a coalition fleet to protect shipping near Iran.  And I say: phew.

Why?  Because I don't want Canada to get stuck in any escalation of conflict with Iran.  This entire dispute is unnecessary.  Iran signed the JCPOA, a deal that stopped its quest for nuclear weapons (we can argue about whether the deal was perfect or not, but it went a long way towards the most important goals), and then Trump, upset that Obama's name was attached, pissed it away.  Which has led to increased tensions with a drone getting shot down, with tankers being seized.  A war with Iran wouldn't quite make the Iraq war appear smart by comparison, but, yes, a war with Iran would be dumber than the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

Canada was smart and lucky to duck out of that particular conflict.  It would be smart and might require luck to duck out of another Mideast war.  I opposed the 2003 war in part because I thought the Rummy team would screw things up (and they did).  Can you imagine a Trump team running a major war?  Just thinking of that makes me queasy. 

Anyway, the entire point of coalitions of the willing is to include folks who are willing and leave out those who are not.  I said on twitter that if this were a NATO fleet, then, yes, Canada should join as the alliance brings both obligations that Canada should respect and restraints that might limit the US a bit.  A coalition of the willing imposes no obligations on Canada and restrains no one (see the works by Patricia Weitsman and Sarah Kreps for more on coalitions vs alliances). 

One of the questions we asked during the week in Israel was where Israel stood on this stuff and why.  We kept finding folks there arguing that American bombing of Iran was preferable to the deal.  That bombing would not do much but kick the can down the road a couple of years as it could not erase Iran's nuclear program.  That this was better than a ten year delay in Iran's program (which was giving them more credit since the JCPOA is more than a ten year delay).  Why?  Something about making the Iranians hurt, I guess, which might deter further nuclear ambitions?  I found these arguments utterly uncompelling.

Iran remains a challenging country because it is more than just a nuclear program, it is also a sponsor of very serious, very dangerous proxies.  One cause for turbulence in detente with the Soviet Union was the expectation that arms control would tie the USSR's hands on many other issues, when all it did was restrain the arms race.  Asking for a deal that staves off Iran's development of nuclear weapons to do more than that shows a lack of learning and unrealistic expectations. 

Canada is smart not to get sucked into this. This is one thing Canada should not fear of missing.

Expecting More For Doing One's Share: Canada and IO's

Two events over the past two days reminded me that Canada/Canadians tend to have overblown expectations about what it should get for its contributions to various international efforts.  Yesterday, I was at a panel run by Global Affairs Canada on the NATO and Canadian missions in the Baltics.  The key speakers were the Canadian Ambassador and the head of the military mission.  It was all Chatham House, so I will not say what they said, but I will discuss how I answered a question we were asked:
Canada has committed to its current role as Framework Nation for the NATO enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) Battle Group in Latvia until 2023.  How can Canada leverage this role to advance Canadian and common global priorities? 
I had a few reactions to this.  First, announcing that the Canadian mission will last until 2023 can send two messages: (a) we are sticking around for at least four years or (b) we plan on leaving in four years.  I pointed out that no one made such statements in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, so it is not clear why Canada would announce any dates regarding this "persistent presence".  That label is a fudge--to allow NATO to get consensus to stick around for the foreseeable future but not offend anyone (Russia) about a permanent presence.  Second, I did note that Germany might have to renew the mission every year given its constitutional constraints, but I doubt that the US or UK (the other two "Framework" countries have any notion of announcing any dates.  Third, and, most important here, I noted some caution about hoping to get heaps of goodies from this effort.  Yes, Canada is leading in Latvia (even if it were slow to make the decision), and is making a difference there.  But there will be limited leverage.  It will probably help limit the noise Canada gets for spending less than 2% of its GDP on defence, but Canada is not going to get concessions from non-Latvian countries.  They will see this mission as commendable and proof of Canadian reliability, which is cool and can help, but it is not going to lead to countries bending towards Canada's preferences very much.  Whatever the diplomatic equivalent of "monetized" ain't gonna happen that much.

A similar question was raised today at a session where I was lecturing to Global Affairs people about multinational stuff: what will Canada get out of the Mali mission?  Not that much and even less than it could have.   That is, sending 200 troops to Mali was small but valuable given that most countries do not have helos and maintenance expertise to keep thee helicopters flying in difficult conditions.  But it was just for a year and when Canada was asked to stick around a while longer, it said no. Which killed whatever good buzz Canada was getting.  Again, the initial effort made interested countries happy, but it did not move the needle that much.  Would Germany, who Canada replaced in Mali, vote for Canada in the UN Security Council competition over Ireland (an EU member) and Norway (which happens to have troops in Lithuania where Germany is a Framework nation)?  No.

To be sure, these contributions are valued, but Canada will not be able to cash in much.  They are the price of doing business, of being a good ally, of being a responsible member, and they might ease some relationships, but we should set expectations on low in terms of what we get out of it.