We Have Left the Dodgeball Phase of Trump's World Order: Allies Are Now Acting

 For the entire first Trump term and the second term's first year, America's allies have basically engaged in the five d's of dodgeball: dodge, dip, duck, dive, and dodge.  They have tried to avoid a major break with US, seeking mostly to soothe Trump's ego.  This week may mark the end of that.  First, there is the news of a number of European countries loudly participating in a Danish military exercise in and near Greenland.  Second, Canada just made a deal with China over electric vehicles and canola oil.  These are, as the literature I read long ago and am far from an expert in would say, costly signals.  Let me explain.

In international relations, talk is mostly cheap (although folks do argue cheap talk also matters).  How do we know a country is really committing to a course of action?  They engage in a costly signal--they do something that hurts themselves or risks real costs.  Economic sanctions are often not very costly signals because they signal precisely that a country is not willing to put their own people on the line.  Drone strikes do the same kind of thing, which is why boots on the ground is always seen as so important--they are credible signals.

In these two cases, the actors are risking seriously Trump reactions--they aren't disguising what they are doing.  They may have other interests as well, but they are clearly sticking it to Trump.  

First, let's discuss Greenland.  Sure, most of the Euro troops heading there for exercises may be part of decisions made long before Trump's latest threats, so this may not be a deliberate step this week to create a tripwire to deter American aggression.  But it sure looks like that, doesn't it?  That these countries are loudly sending these troops, that they are signalling that they are putting their troops bodies in the way is a very loud signal that they don't mind offending Trump.  Given all the work done previously to avoid so openly defying and seeking to deny Trump (see the five para NATO summit communique last summer as key example and the 5% bullshit), this is a huge turn for the Europeans.  

Why now?  Maybe they are looking at the US domestic stuff and Venezuela and realizing that Trump is actually serious about Greenland despite the utter stupidity of it all.  Maybe the Danes are terrific diplomats who have used every means at their disposal to get the Europeans on side.  Maybe the 1938 resonance is getting too strong.   Maybe the constant references in the US involvement in Ukraine negotiations of NATO and the US as two separate actors flipped a switch. I am guessing it is because they understand that the moment has come--if Trump aggresses against a NATO member's territory, the alliance is done.  Best to avert that outcome for however long, and maybe NATO's fate will be determined a bit further down the road. 

Second, let's get to Canada-China.  People have been critical of Mark Carney betraying his Elbow's Up campaign promise to fight hard against Trump's coercive tactics and bombastic threats that challenge Canada's very identity.  Well, there are few things that are more Elbow's Up than making a deal with China over EVs.  One key component of the very undisciplined, hardly a doctrine Donald Doctrine is to keep China out of North American markets.  So, this is very much in the face of Trump.  And it is a risky as hell step because the Chinese are shitty trading partners* with whom Canada has had a very fraught relationship.  But diversifying markets when the biggest trading partner is threatening to throw away the key trade agreement becomes more than just a priority but a mission.  Some will say that this will force Trump to toss away NAFTA 2.0 (USMCA or CUSMA or whatever you want to call it).  My take: if someone is punching you in the face whether you accede to their demands or not, then you might as well take the pain and do what is best for yourself.  

The other side of costly signals is restraint.  For coercive diplomacy to work, you have to keep both sides of your promises--to do the painful thing if the other side doesn't do what you want AND to refrain from doing that thing if the other side does what you want.  Trump's behavior was going to lead to these kinds of responses because he never restrained, only escalated.  Kept punching the Europeans and Canadians in the face even as they tried to go along with his unnecessary and unreasonable demands.  

That apparently ended this week.

Next steps?  Oh my.  I am just glad I closed most of my US dollar accounts... 

 

 

 

* I worry about giving into China's coercive diplomacy as well, but at least China is likely to keep a promise for more than a few hours. 

Intro to IR For Trumpers: Power, Soft Power, and Coercive Diplomacy

Back in Trump 1.0, I wrote posts explaining basic stuff like how the NATO 2% thing is not a tax that NATO members pay the US, but an expectation of what they are supposed to spend on their own defense--the equivalent of 2% and now 3.5% of their gross domestic product.

In the past week, I have seen so much dumb and wildly ignorant stuff that I think this might become an ongoing series.  I did already write about how Stephen Miller is a shitty realist, but let's go back to basics. Power is mentioned 13 times in the NYT summary of the interview.  I doubt we would find any President of the past 50 years being so focused on power.  "On topic after topic, he made clear that in his mind, U.S. power is the determining factor — and that previous presidents have been too cautious to make use of it for political supremacy or national profit."

To be clear, all Presidents understand that power is important, but what is it and how does one amass it or lose it?  The basic poli sci definition of power: the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  We tend to focus on stuff we can measure: the size of one's military, how advanced in tech it is, the size of the economy, how dependent others are on it, and so on.  A bully making threats is not by itself powerful.  One of the ingredients of power is one's reputation for using power, so, yes, bullying can increase one's power.  But it can also weaken it.

How so? Bullying can reduce a country's power in several ways:

1. Wasting resources on lesser priorities so that fewer resources are available elsewhere.  A US aircraft carrier near Venezuela is not someplace else--they move but slowly.  Spending ammunition on tiny boats may reduce the available stocks for elsewhere.  Exhausting personnel on tertiary missions may mean less effectiveness in more important places.  
2. Bullying exacerbates the security dilemma--that others will respond by building up their own defenses against American power (speculation this morning about nuclear proliferation is not that wild), may look to other countries to ally with, and so on.  Countries, for instance, are going to find alternatives to US financial instruments so that future US sanctions don't bite as hard.  Trump's sanctions against ICC personnel may ultimate cause Europe to develop email/online alternatives.  If Trump breaks NATO through his aggression against Greenland, the US will have less power.  Greenland would not give the US more power than that which NATO does.  That can be an entire post or three.
3. If bullying fails, if a bullied actor resists, like maybe Denmark, others will see the bully as weak and resist as well.  
4. Then there is soft power, which I have to break out since it is so misunderstood. 

Soft power does not refer to economic sanctions and other less kinetic forms of coercive efforts.  No, it refers to the attactiveness of a model, the persuasiveness of one's ideology and brands, and the like.  The US had much soft power because it was so successful, so attractive in so many ways.  People around the world wanted to buy coca-cola and wear Levis, to imitate Americans.  This mattered not just for those American brands but also because it made it easier for the US to .... get others to do what the US wanted.  It didn't quite make diplomacy to be like pushing on an open door, but it did grease the wheels of many American efforts around the world for decades.  But bullying erodes soft power.  People hate bullies so they then hate anything associated with them.  Trump is destroying American soft power at a rapid rate, as the rest of the world is now finding the US to be gross, grotesque, and absolutely not attractive or a model.  

Final topic for today: coercive diplomacy.  Being coercive and negotiating is not coercive diplomacy.  Coercive diplomacy involves using threats and force in credible ways to get others to change their stances (compellence) or refraining from doing stuff the coercer does not want (deterrence).  The most important but underrated aspect of coercive diplomacy is restraint: that if the target does what you want, you will not do the thing that you have threatened.  If the target is deterred, then they are not attacked.  If the target complies and does the thing they are not attacked.  The problem with Trump and coercive diplomacy (other than everything else) is that his word is not good.  He does not worry about whether his threats or promises are credible.  As an uncertainty engine, Trump simply cannot assure anyone that his next move will be what he says it will be.  Trump is, alas, not a TACO, as he often chickens out but not always.  But when he is successful, he will often demand that an actor, such as a university, to give up more than what he had previously demanded, reminding us of Darth Vader and Lando Calrissian. 

Finally, to go back to the Trump quote about power being the determining factor, a couple more reactions:

a)  impunity is not power
b)  what determines Trump's foreign policy behavior is not either his thirst for power or the American thirst for power, but Trump's ego, resentments (which includes racism and sexism and xenophobia), and greed.  He wants Greenland because it would make him feel good.  That's it.  That's the entirety of it.  It is not about critical minerals or Russian/Chinese interests or ships.  

"When asked why he needed to possess the territory, he said: “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.'” 

Sometimes he does not lie.  This is one of those times. 

 

 

 

 

 

Stephen Miller Is Too Much of a Schmuck to be a Lousy Realist: Greenland edition

Stephen Miller is the most powerful and malevolent actor in the Trump Administration other than Trump himself.  His personal history is chock full of hate and resentment.  While most of his rhetoric is nakedly white supremacist and betrays his own family history (a self-hating Jew is an over-used accusation but he is the poster boy), Miller sometimes advances claims based on other reasons.  Which gets us to Greenland.

"Nobody’s going to fight the United States militarily over the future of Greenland. ...The real question is, by what right does Denmark assert control over Greenland? Obviously, Greenland should be part of the United States," he said. 

People are suggesting that Miller is invoking the Melian Dialogue from Thuycidides's History of the Peloponnesian War, where the Athenians provide an ultimatum to the Melians, telling them that the strong do what they want, and the weak do what they must.  First, that is probably giving Miller too much credit--that he is not so thoughtful as to try to invoke the supposedly original Realist text.  Second, the Athenians in this account are not just the bad guys, but they ultimately go on to pay a huge price for this war.  But his language suggests that he is a "Realist" as he is saying the "US is the power of NATO" which entitles it to do what it wants.  

The problem here is that Realism has many flavors and none really work here.  My favorite flavor, Neo-Realism a la Ken Waltz, argues that countries pursue security, which then leads to all kinds of behavior including the security dilemma, where the efforts by one country to unilaterally improve its security, which causes others to respond in kind, so that the first state is left off as or more insecure.  This helps to explain things like arms races.  In this case, how does poaching Greenland improve US security?  At this moment in time, the US already has heaps of access to Greenland, and attacks upon it or through it are already deterred by Denmark's membership in NATO and the US nuclear umbrella.  There is no threat to US from Greenland's status as a dominion of Denmark.  However, seizing Greenland or coercing Denmark into giving it up will weaken US security as it is likely to break NATO--the biggest ally threatening and even warring against one of the most reliable allies will end the alliance.  And this will make the US less secure as it will have less help when the US needs it, it will have greatly increase the chances of a war beyond Ukraine in Europe (American security has always, always been affected by war in Europe going back to the Revolution itself and the War of 1812).  

A more rancid flavor of Realism that focuses on the quest for power also can't explain the Greenland effort. The US will be less powerful after a successful annexation of Greenland.  Yes, the US will have more territory, but it will have face economic sanctions and have fewer allies, which means it will not be as able to exert influence in the world.  That is what power is: the ability to get others to do what they would otherwise not do.  

A third way to think about Realism is realpolitik--which focuses on how best to use judiciously one's power to achieve one's ends--more as policy prescription than as grand theory.  How is seizing Greenland a judicious use of power?  This means we have to figure out what are the ends of this, rather than just assuming the accumulation of power or security.  What is the point of annexing Greenland other than Donald Trump's 1970s real estate mindset?  That he would feel better about himself if he expands the territory of his holdings?  And, yes, he does look at the US through a monarchical lens where the US is his real estate holdings and growing that makes him feel more powerful.  But again, alienating powerful countries, and, yes, Europe has much power, even if it is not always harnessed, for a vanity project is not very judicious.

So, there is no way that Miller's and Trump's designs on Greenland match up with any version of realism--the idea is just too dumb and counter-productive.  I would guess that some players within this administration might see the destruction of NATO as a cool consequence of this effort, but that is not driving this train.  

What Realism does tell us is that countries will react to this in ways that are inimical to the American national interest.  However, Trump does not have any conception of the national interest, just his own interests.  What are those?  Greed and resentment and ego.   

Miller? He's Trump's Iago but without a real plan and none of the charm. 

Greenland and NATO: Is It All On the Table?

 With the Danes being super-concerned about American threats about Greenland (imagine if someone was making similar claims about Hawaii or Alaska), folks are talking about Article 5 of the NATO alliance.  So much is misunderstood about this key clause--an attack upon one equals an attack upon all. 

Ooops, that is incomplete: a) it requires consensus, like all NATO decisions of any consequences; b) each country can respond as each deems necessary.

In an intra-alliance spat, such as Greece vs. Turkey, which has happened, NATO can't respond because it can't come to a consensus.  So, the Danes could try to bring the issue to the North Atlantic Council, NATO's decision-making body, but the US would block consensus.  Part b is less relevant in this case (very relevant in a certain book, with a sale on the ebook!).  

Of course, the US hasn't attacked .... yet, so A5 is not relevant at all.  

BUT there is something else here: that any failed attempt to invoke Article 5 could break the alliance.  Any member that has been attacked that fails to get help will have good reason to withdraw--what's the point if help will not come when it is requested?  So, the threat to try to get the alliance to invoke A5 is an attempt to say: if you don't support us, the alliance is dead.

This is why countries, when attacked, haven't tried to invoke Article 5--cyber attack on Estonia, Syria hitting Turkey, Russia breaking sea cables, etc--because a failed effort may be fatal to the alliance.

In semi-normal times, one could look at the Danish hints at A5 discussions* as a way to increase the stakes to get more support.  The problem is: these times aren't normal.  Trump might just leap at an opportunity to break the alliance.  His hostility to it is well known, and his ignorance of how most of it works is also well known.  But if his advisers tell him that initiating a Greenland crisis might be a pathway to breaking NATO, Trump might just grab that chance.  

And then Putin's investment in Trump will pay off in the biggest way possible.

This is all scary and awful, but it is not out of the realm of the possible at this point.  The stakes involved in Greenland, where the US is already getting all the access it needs, are huge.  The very foundations of security in Europe and beyond are at stake.  A much bigger deal, ultimately, then Venezuela, which is already pretty important. 

 

*  Or the Danish PM is referring to NATO to make the obvious point--that there is no need for the US to take over Greenland since it is already under the US security umbrella via Denmark's membership in NATO.  Too bad Trump is a bad faith actor and this bit of reality is irrelevant.