Over the past few years, I have seen the term globalist on twitter many times over the past couple of years. Sure, it is mostly an anti-semitic dog-whistle--that those called globalists tend to be prominent Jews. But besides that or in addition to it, I think the core of the idea/accusation is that a globalist is someone who prefers the outside world than the homeland. So, today, I saw something about free trade/globalism vs. protectionism and it miffed me. Why? Because we already have labels and distinctions for those who prefer freer trade and those who prefer less free trade.
What I am getting at is this: "globalist" is a myth. There are few people who care more about the stuff outside their country than inside. We may care about the plight of others, wherever they are, but those who prefer not to undo globalization--the ties among countries--do so mostly because they think the gains of increased ties outweigh the losses of increased ties.
Oh, and disentangling is expensive. Brexit should demonstrate the costs of removing a country from the web of economic and political exchanges. The British have already sacrificed a hunk of economic growth, and that has happened even before firms flee, even before students and scholars are deterred from moving to the UK.
So, in the rhetoric wars, globalist means selling out one's country, I guess. And, yes, of course, folks will associate Jews with this, as any attack on cosmopolitanism tends to do. It is the case that globalization has costs, but the answer is not to avoid globalization but to figure out how governments can compensate those who pay the costs and re-train them and develop new jobs for them.
And, yes, the biggest threat to jobs recently, now and in the future ain't what is happening over there, but the automation revolution at home. It can be easy to blame free trade, but the machines are taking over many jobs, so perhaps we need to figure out how to provide meaningful employment for those displaced by automation. This is hard and not emotionally satisfying, so blame others at home and abroad...
All I really want to say is that we should not use the word globalist--because that category is empty. It can be a slur, but it has no real meaning. Let's not give it any.
Showing posts with label conceptual stretching. Show all posts
Showing posts with label conceptual stretching. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 19, 2019
Tuesday, December 29, 2015
The Beard Brotherhood
It looks like they are finally on to us--the beard wearing folk. Yep, we all have connections to radical Islamist movements. Tis true. Me, Paul Ryan, Ulysses S. Grant, Abraham Lincoln, Grizzly Adams, James Harden, Karl Marx and Charles Darwin are/were all secret Muslims.Just goes to show how incredibly ... dumb these folks are. Of course, this accusation that Paul Ryan is now somehow not conservative but perhaps a fellow traveler just shows have far much of the GOP has slid off of the left-right spectrum and into crazy town that is where the far left and far left both reside.
I wonder if conceptual stretching has a partner in crime--conceptual narrowing. Concepts become useless if they become so broad as to include everything: Canada as a great power diminishes what it means to be a great power (boy, was that fun to use in Intro to IR at McGill). Well, concepts also become useless if they are so narrow that they only apply to the purest of the pure (usually the one who is doing the defining). If Paul Ryan is not a legit Conservative Republican, then perhaps no such thing exists now?
Thursday, July 9, 2015
Pet Peeve Du Jour
One of my biggest pet peeves when I hear politician and pundits talk about threats to US or Canadian or whatever security, the phrase existential threat is often stretched to the point of meaninglessness. There are many threats to security, and they range from minor/modest to severe to, ultimately, existential.
Climate change might be an existential threat to low lying island countries such as the Maldives. It is not an existential threat to the US or Canada. Sorry, it just isn't. Something that presents significant harm does not threaten the existence of the United States or Canada.
Nuclear annihilation is an existential threat. Which is why I concurred with General Dunford in his testimony today when he said Russia is an existential threat. Why? Russia has enough nuclear weapons to lay waste to North America AND our relations are such that we have more than a just a bit of concern. Putin has been making nuclear threats to American allies--ones where the US has a commitment to defend. That defense is ultimately tied to a nuclear umbrella. So, yeah, Russia is an existential threat. France has enough nuclear weapons to destroy the U.S., but is not a threat, existential or otherwise.
China has enough nuclear weapons at this point that it is probably an existential threat as well. Right now, its assertiveness is troubling, and could start a process that could lead to things getting out of control. But China is not issuing nuclear threats left and right.
Iran is not an existential threat to the US or Canada. Even if Iran had a handful of nuclear weapons, they would not have a delivery system that would pose an existential threat to the US. Ye olde feare of a nuke in a suitcase is not an existential threat--again, harm is not equal to threatening existence. Sure, it would be an existential threat to Israel, but that is distinct from being an existential threat to the US. How is this different from Russia's threat to the Baltics? Iran ain't Russia, and the US does not have an Article V type treaty with Israel.
Cyber? Costly, inconvenient but not existential unless the hackers can turn the computers into Terminators.
Terrorism? ISIS? Not existential threats. Even if ISIS were able to get its hands on a nuclear weapon, that would not be an existential threat. The threat to the existence of some people (say, residents of NYC) is not the same as the threat to the existence of the US.
Alien invasion? Well, if they have the aims of those depicted in Independence Day, then yes, that would be an existential threat. A meteor of sufficient size to lay waste to the planet? Hell yes!
So, we need to address the serious threats, such as cyber stuff and Iran and climate change, but we need to keep things in perspective: they don't threaten the existence of the US or Canada. Calling them existential threats is fear-mongering. We have enough to be concerned about without inflating threats. That is how we got into Iraq in the first place, more or less.
Climate change might be an existential threat to low lying island countries such as the Maldives. It is not an existential threat to the US or Canada. Sorry, it just isn't. Something that presents significant harm does not threaten the existence of the United States or Canada.
Nuclear annihilation is an existential threat. Which is why I concurred with General Dunford in his testimony today when he said Russia is an existential threat. Why? Russia has enough nuclear weapons to lay waste to North America AND our relations are such that we have more than a just a bit of concern. Putin has been making nuclear threats to American allies--ones where the US has a commitment to defend. That defense is ultimately tied to a nuclear umbrella. So, yeah, Russia is an existential threat. France has enough nuclear weapons to destroy the U.S., but is not a threat, existential or otherwise.
China has enough nuclear weapons at this point that it is probably an existential threat as well. Right now, its assertiveness is troubling, and could start a process that could lead to things getting out of control. But China is not issuing nuclear threats left and right.
Iran is not an existential threat to the US or Canada. Even if Iran had a handful of nuclear weapons, they would not have a delivery system that would pose an existential threat to the US. Ye olde feare of a nuke in a suitcase is not an existential threat--again, harm is not equal to threatening existence. Sure, it would be an existential threat to Israel, but that is distinct from being an existential threat to the US. How is this different from Russia's threat to the Baltics? Iran ain't Russia, and the US does not have an Article V type treaty with Israel.
Cyber? Costly, inconvenient but not existential unless the hackers can turn the computers into Terminators.
Terrorism? ISIS? Not existential threats. Even if ISIS were able to get its hands on a nuclear weapon, that would not be an existential threat. The threat to the existence of some people (say, residents of NYC) is not the same as the threat to the existence of the US.
Alien invasion? Well, if they have the aims of those depicted in Independence Day, then yes, that would be an existential threat. A meteor of sufficient size to lay waste to the planet? Hell yes!
So, we need to address the serious threats, such as cyber stuff and Iran and climate change, but we need to keep things in perspective: they don't threaten the existence of the US or Canada. Calling them existential threats is fear-mongering. We have enough to be concerned about without inflating threats. That is how we got into Iraq in the first place, more or less.
Tuesday, July 15, 2014
Keeping Religion in Ethnicity
When I posted a few days ago about the Israel-Palestinian conflict, a friend asked about my including of religion in the definition of ethnic conflict. So, here is my explanation.
The definition of ethnicity that people in political science tend to use focuses on perceived common ancestry centering around a few markers of identity. The definition in my dissertation and first book:
Folks who study ethnicity are very aware that it is a socially constructed thing, so the boundaries are fuzzy and one's identity is not entirely up to oneself but how other see it. Note number 2 of the AMAR criteria--that the membership is defined by members and nonmembers--not by oneself.
For me, in my research, religion does much of the same causal work as language or race or kinship--creating a sense of affinity or enmity which then affects policy preferences--do we want to help group x or group y? Let's help the group with whom we share some ties--racial, religious, regional, kinship, or linguistic. When identities cross-cut, then politics is about defining which ties are the most salient. When identities converge--group x shares the same religion, language and race as group y--the politics became easier. It becomes less about defining which identity matters and more about defining oneself as the best defender of the group.
Which leads us to ethnic outbidding. When politicians compete to be the best defender of group x, each one may try to top the other, as in an auction for support from the group. The claims become more and more radical. Religious outbidding and linguistic outbidding are not that different--just the promises will vary.
For my work, the key difference between religion and other ethnic identities is really about the reach. That religious identities cross not just land borders but across oceans so that Libya supported the Moros of the Philippines, for instance. Race can have the same distance, but clan/tribe and language much less.
Each kind of ethnic tie will have different implications for politics, as I discussed early in my blogging career. Religious differences have implications for much of what governments do, whereas linguistic divides matter for employment and education more so than elsewhere. Race? The irony here is that race does not really have much in the way of logical implications for politics until/unless racial divisions have historical content. And yes, then it matters quite a bit.
Anyhow, a long answer to a simple question. When we speak of ethnic groups, ethnic ties, ethnicity in poli sci, the concept includes religion as a potentially relevant component. Why? Because it is how people identify us and them in social groups that sometimes become politically relevant.
The definition of ethnicity that people in political science tend to use focuses on perceived common ancestry centering around a few markers of identity. The definition in my dissertation and first book:
"Ethnic groups are 'collective groups whose membership is largely determined by real or putative ancestral inherited ties, and who perceive these ties as systematically affecting their place and fate in the political and socioeconomic structures of their state and society (Rothschild 1981).' These ties usually are related to race, kinship (tribe or clan), religion and language."In the intervening years, not much has changed. In a forthcoming piece of which I am one of many co-authors, the focus is very much on defining what counts and what does not count for the dataset:
Consequently, the AMAR criteria that aim to outline socially relevant groups at a given point in time are that:Why is religion part of ethnic identity when we see so often people refer to "ethnic and religious" or "ethnoreligious"? Because it is about identity and one that is seen as inherited. Sure, people can convert to a different religion, but other "markers" of identity are also more malleable than advertised. Languages can be learned and adopted. One can move to a different region and then identify with that region (I am reminded of the "Californian since 1970 or 1980 bumper stickers"). One could argue that race is fixed, but yet not so much as people of mixed race can try to identify in a variety of ways. Kinship often means multiple identities as well.
(1) Membership in the group is determined primarily by descent by both members and non-members.
(2) Membership in the group is recognized and viewed as important by members and/or nonmembers. The importance may be psychological, normative, and/or strategic.
(3) Members share some distinguishing cultural features, such as common language, religion, occupational niche, and customs.
(4) One or more of these cultural features are either practiced by a majority of the group or preserved and studied by a set of members who are broadly respected by the wider membership for so doing.
(5) The group has at least 100,000 members or constitutes 1% of a country’s population.
Folks who study ethnicity are very aware that it is a socially constructed thing, so the boundaries are fuzzy and one's identity is not entirely up to oneself but how other see it. Note number 2 of the AMAR criteria--that the membership is defined by members and nonmembers--not by oneself.
For me, in my research, religion does much of the same causal work as language or race or kinship--creating a sense of affinity or enmity which then affects policy preferences--do we want to help group x or group y? Let's help the group with whom we share some ties--racial, religious, regional, kinship, or linguistic. When identities cross-cut, then politics is about defining which ties are the most salient. When identities converge--group x shares the same religion, language and race as group y--the politics became easier. It becomes less about defining which identity matters and more about defining oneself as the best defender of the group.
Which leads us to ethnic outbidding. When politicians compete to be the best defender of group x, each one may try to top the other, as in an auction for support from the group. The claims become more and more radical. Religious outbidding and linguistic outbidding are not that different--just the promises will vary.
For my work, the key difference between religion and other ethnic identities is really about the reach. That religious identities cross not just land borders but across oceans so that Libya supported the Moros of the Philippines, for instance. Race can have the same distance, but clan/tribe and language much less.
Each kind of ethnic tie will have different implications for politics, as I discussed early in my blogging career. Religious differences have implications for much of what governments do, whereas linguistic divides matter for employment and education more so than elsewhere. Race? The irony here is that race does not really have much in the way of logical implications for politics until/unless racial divisions have historical content. And yes, then it matters quite a bit.
Anyhow, a long answer to a simple question. When we speak of ethnic groups, ethnic ties, ethnicity in poli sci, the concept includes religion as a potentially relevant component. Why? Because it is how people identify us and them in social groups that sometimes become politically relevant.
Sunday, May 25, 2014
Terrorist or Not?
I have been engaging in a discussion on twitter about whether the Santa Barbara killer was a terrorist or not. My basic starting point is: is the violence aimed to produce a political effect? Or it just aimed to kill people? Perhaps all violence is political, but I tend to see terrorism as an effort to alter a political context--to cause a government to overreact and over-reach (9/11), to compel a government to bargain (terrorist kidnapping, for instance), to spark/inspire a political movement, and so on.
There is apparently much twisted stuff in the misogynist's manifesto, including reference to ideology. He apparently did associate with those who shared his sense of grievance, focusing strangely enough on those tricksters that promise to offer tips to pick up ladies.
At this early juncture, I don't think this guy is the Timothy McVeigh of the misogyny movement. But it is early.
Why does this matter? As a non-expert on terrorism, I would still think this has practical implications and not just an academic exercise. If it is terrorism, then that affects how one thinks of prevention and of response. If it is just a crazed individual trying to go out in the most spectacular way possible (was Columbine terrorism? I don't know), then one does not have to trace who supported the effort, who benefited from the effort, how to diminish the "spark", and so on. If it is terrorism, then governments would want to do serious work to reduce the impact, deal with any networks of support, and perhaps even engage in information operations (propaganda) to offset the messaging.
Of course, I am just spitballing since I am not very well read on this stuff, and I only teach a week or so of terrorism in my Contemporary International Security course.
Your take?
There is apparently much twisted stuff in the misogynist's manifesto, including reference to ideology. He apparently did associate with those who shared his sense of grievance, focusing strangely enough on those tricksters that promise to offer tips to pick up ladies.
At this early juncture, I don't think this guy is the Timothy McVeigh of the misogyny movement. But it is early.
Why does this matter? As a non-expert on terrorism, I would still think this has practical implications and not just an academic exercise. If it is terrorism, then that affects how one thinks of prevention and of response. If it is just a crazed individual trying to go out in the most spectacular way possible (was Columbine terrorism? I don't know), then one does not have to trace who supported the effort, who benefited from the effort, how to diminish the "spark", and so on. If it is terrorism, then governments would want to do serious work to reduce the impact, deal with any networks of support, and perhaps even engage in information operations (propaganda) to offset the messaging.
Of course, I am just spitballing since I am not very well read on this stuff, and I only teach a week or so of terrorism in my Contemporary International Security course.
Your take?
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