The Challenge of Confronting Putin

 After President Zelensky spoke to parliament, we got another wave of people arguing for the No Fly Zone and other more aggressive responses.  I, of course, pushed back since a No Fly Zone = War.  As a reminder, a No Fly Zone would involve killing Russians in and above Ukraine and probably in Belarus and Russia and ... it wouldn't change much.  This is not Syria where barrel bombs and the rest were a huge part of the destruction. This is atrocities by missile and artillery, and a No Fly Zone would not stop either missiles or arty.  

Folks are rightfully frustrated, and so they end up making a bunch of arguments that I have to address.

If we don't do the NFZ, we will watch people be killed in front of us.  
--Yeah, and that is awful, but we have done that before.  Syria, Bosnia, Rwanda, Myanmar, etc.  

If we don't stop Putin now, he will keep attacking, eventually attacking a NATO country directly.
--First, it is not inevitable that he would go beyond Ukraine (more on this below)
--Second, the war in Ukraine demonstrates that the Russian army is not ready for prime time
--Third, the war in Ukraine will simply drain the Russian military so it won't be able to attack again anytime too soon.
--Fourth, thus far, Putin has treated NATO and non-NATO differently, and it is not clear why that would change.

If you let Putin win in Ukraine, you are appeasing aggression, and you can't appease dictators.
--Actually, you can appease dictators, countries do it all the time.  Not everyone is Hitler.  The US made deals with Stalin and Khrushchev, not to mention Gorbachev.  The US made deals with China in the 1970s.  Plenty of dictators don't engage in global conquest efforts.

We have to do something!
--We are doing a lot, far more than we would have expected a month ago.  Very significant sanctions, very energetic/public arms transfers, providing intelligence, giving humanitarian assistance, and more.  We are doing pretty much everything we can short of going to war.

How about a humanitarian corridor?
--Unless Russia agrees, this too involved war.  And I can't help but be reminded of the "safe havens" that the UN negotiated in Bosnia which became killing fields. 

A bigger war is inevitable so let's fight it now rather than later.
--The idea that war is inevitable is the worst self-fulfilling prophecy, making war more likely.  Let's not do that.  Because, you know what, a larger war is not inevitable.

We have been fighting limited wars since Korea where we didn't nuke China or otherwise attack the Chinese mainland (and they didn't attack Japan).  Limited war is actually more of recurrent thing in history than total wars.  Most importantly, Rule #1 of the Cold War and since has been for the US and USSR/Russia not to engage in direct conflict, and it has worked pretty well in terms of avoiding global thermonuclear war even if it mean that we watched oppression, persecution, and mass murder.  What Russia is doing in Ukraine is horrible, but intervening would probably be even more horrible as it presents a real risk of escalation.  It again sucks.  But proponents of intervention, including an NFZ, need better arguments.  Because the ones they have now are not persuasive at all.

Why No No Fly Zone?

 I made this a few days ago and it appears to be still required

Why?

Because a retired general in Canada (as well as some elsewhere) have been calling for NATO to enforce a No Fly Zone over Ukraine.  People seem not to be too concerned about the risk of, well, global thermonuclear war.  So, let's play it out, shall we, with a general X and a Minister of National Defence A:

MND A: So, what do you recommend for us to do?
General X: We should declare a No Fly Zone over Ukraine so that the Russians can't bomb civilian targets.
MND A: What about missiles and artillery?
General X: Oh, the Russians have plenty of those and use them to devastate Ukraine.
MND A: So, why enforce a No Fly Zone?
General X: It is the least we can do, we need to do MOAR!
MND A: Ok, so if we do the NFZ, that means we fly over Ukrainian air space and shoot down Russian planes and helicopters and drones, right?
General X: Well, sure, but we would also want to shoot them down while we are flying in allied airspace to take advantage of how far our weapons can fly and reduce the risks to our pilots from their fighter aircraft.
MND A: Oh, so we would be attacking from allied airspace, but keeping our attacks focused only on planes in Ukrainian airspace.
General X: oh, and anti-aircraft batteries.
MND A: In Ukraine?
General X: well, the Russians have built up anti-aircraft systems nearby--on Russian territory including Kaliningrad. 
MND A:  So, we'd leave those alone, right?  We wouldn't want to attack anything in Russian territory, right?
General X: We'd have to take them out.  To enforce a No Fly Zone, the first step is to take out the anti-aircraft systems of the adversary so that our planes could fly safely.
MND A: So, if we attack Russian weapon systems in Russian territory, what would stop them from doing the same--attacking our weapon systems in allied territory?
General X:  Well, if they did that, they would be escalating and risking a war with NATO as it would potentially lead to the invoking of Article V.
MND A: Let me get this straight, we would attack Russian units in Ukraine and probably Russia, but we would expect them to be restrained?
General X: Sure, because they wouldn't want to start World War III.
MND A: Wouldn't we be starting with our attacks on Russian military units, something that everyone has tried to avoid for about 70 years?
General X: I don't think it would raise the risk of nuclear war by that much.
MND A:  So, it would raise the risk of nuclear war.
General X: Sure, but only by ... say ... 10%. 
MND A: So we have gone from nuclear war being improbable to being possible but not likely?
General X: Well, yeah, but, see, we would be doing something more than what we are doing now.
MND A: And we would only be risking a smidge of nuclear war... General, you are fired.

End scene

 To be fair, Hillier is retired, and retired generals can spout reckless stuff all they want.  The nuclear era is a dangerous place, and one of the rules to avoid nuclear war has long been not to shoot at countries that have nuclear weapons.  Sure, we had some pilots from various opponents engage each other over the skies of Korea and Vietnam, but there was heaps of plausible deniability and no risk of allied/enemy territory being hit.  In this case, the NFZ would be most public--no deniability--and NATO/Russian territory would be implicated.

 

What Do I Think Before Going to Seoul

At the end of this week, I head off to South Korea to do the next case study in the Dave and Phil and Steve project.  The project is not about North Korea or nuclear weapons, but about how democracies oversee their militaries.  I am not an expert on nuclear proliferation or on North Korea, but as a scholar of international security, I am sure I will be talking about and thinking about the current crisis as I wander along. So, I thought I would write now about my views on the upcoming summit and the various declarations before I go since it might be fun to compare with my views after I come back--I might learn something or change my mind (or not).

What To Do With 15 Minutes?

The false alarm in Hawaii yesterday raised that very classic question: if you only had a few minutes to live, what would you do?  Tweet, of course.  Well, other than that?

It depends on where I am and who I am with.  If I am alone but near chocolate chip cookies or cinnamon buns, well, I gorge.  Same goes for beer.  Reflux be damned.  If alone, I would call Mrs. Spew and College Spew.  If at home with Mrs. Spew, we would try to reach our kid and tell her how proud we have been, and that we are sad that we will not see the stuff that she creates (or would have created if we are all going to die).    And then I would look for some beer. 

The story yesterday raised the other choice: to try to survive or not.  I got into an argument online about whether folks were overreacting by putting their kids into the storm drains (concrete is not a bad choice), and I thought it might be an overreaction or a dangerous reaction.  I had friends online saying that they would have gone to the roof to watch the missiles come in because who wants to live after that.  This is assuming, of course, the missiles are carrying nuclear weapons.  If they are conventional, they can be survived by most folks (the storm drain would then be a not bad idea).  If they are carrying biological or chemical weapons, again, most people will survive.  And if you are in Hawaii, and the inbound missiles are from North Korea, then the odds are not bad that the missiles will hit water. 

Which leads to the most important thing we must do if we have 5, 15 or 30 minutes of warning... wait.  Just wait before panicking as thus far all alarms of nuclear attacks have been false, and most alarms about missiles have been false unless one lives in Israel, Iran, Iraq, and a few other places.  And if it happens to be the one time a nuclear weapon is falling on your head, tweet at me afterwards to tell me I am wrong. 

Concluding Civ-Mil Class With Mushroom Clouds?

Today was the last day of my NPSIA Civil-Military Relations class.  For the past few weeks, the students presented their papers, asking a variety of interesting questions about the civil-military dynamics around the world.  The papers ranged from addressing 1st gen civ-mil questions--coup or no coup--to 2nd gen--why do democracies have trouble controlling their militaries--to 3rd gen--cooperation between civilians and military in the field.  I learned a great deal about many places, so, of course, I popped the joyful balloon of learning with the crisis du jour:
The lack of civilian control of the military in the US might get us all killed.

We have an active general serving as National Security Adviser, HR McMaster, saying time is running out on North Korea.  The last thing you want in a nuclear crisis with a country with vulnerable nuclear weapons is to tell them that they are in a "use them or lose them" situation.   That would be bad enough, but the US and South Korea have started an exercise with hundreds of planes including a simulation of attacking North Korea.  How will North Korea know this is not just this simulation is not actually the preparation or the start of a first strike?

Most of the civilian experts on this stuff that I am familiar with are very concerned about the combination of: fears of preemption, accidents, inadvertent escalation, and egos.  Who are the civilians in this US government who can put the brakes on these kinds of exercises?  Who can tell the President this exercise and McMaster's stances are BAD?  Tillerson?  Please, that amateur is not just the #worstsecstate but on his way out.  He has no wisdom and no sway.  Mattis?  Has anyone seen Mattis lately?  He is really well read, everyone says.  Has he read Schelling?  Jervis? Posen? The stuff on nuclear war near misses?  Oh, and he is not really a civilian, as his mindset has not had a chance to change (tis the anniversary of this post).  Oh and the key spots in State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense--Assistant Secretaries of State/Defense for East Asia--remain unfilled as far as I can tell. 

Which makes Trump the primary civilian responsible for making sure that the US military does not make any moves that might cause North Korea to launch its weapons because its leaders fear that a preemptive strike is on its way or is imminent.  I would never put "Trump" and "responsible" in the same sentence except as a question, and, yeah, we know the answer: not responsible.

So, I ended the semester scaring my students.  I guess I should not have seen Krampus recently.

Magic Lines and Escalation Ladders

A colleague asked me if there will be war between the US and North Korea.  I said maybe, which is pretty damned scary, given the likely consequences.  Why am I worried?  Basically for two reasons that intersect in bad ways, besides the Trumpiness and KJU-ness factors:

1. the US seems awfully confident that they knew where the line is between what North Korea will perceive as an exercise and what NK will perceive as the start of an attack
2. Escalation Ladders are finite.

This weekend, the US sent some bombers and fighters to fly near North Korea but not over it.  How do they know the North Koreans would not see this as the opening move of an attack?  Given that North Korea does not have MAD with the US--that a US first strike could possibly destroy NK's ability to hit the US, they are in a "use them or lose them" situation.  Not a great place to be in and why nuclear proliferation is so scary.  Mutual assured destruction is not great, but it is a least bad alternative and a stable one, mostly.  If it ain't mutual, it ain't stable, so Trump's threat to destroy NK is problematic, more so than I suggested last week.  So, my question is: how does the US now what will and will not trigger North Korean fears of preemption?  My guess is that we don't really know, and we need to remember that even under MAD, fears of attack and launch on warning were just a wee bit probelmatic (see the pieces about the death of the Lt. Colonel who prevented WWIII).

The second problem is that the flights are part of an escalation--the US is sending stronger and strong signals that it is not happy.  Likewise, the North Koreans have been escalating--more missile tests, missile tests flying over Japan, an H-bomb test.  What's next?  Maybe sending a nuclear-armed missile into the Pacific?  The US did that once a long time ago--not a great idea since much can go very wrong.  If North Korea does that, what does the US do?  If North Korea tries to or does shoot down a US plane over or near North Korea, what does the US do?  There are not infinite rungs (I originally typed infinite wrongs--Freud at work) on the escalation ladder--we are running out of steps between where we are and war.  And some of those rungs on the ladder are very war-ish and pretty slippery (can one slip up a ladder?).

So, combine those two--we are escalating and we may have more confidence than we should what will and will not trigger North Korea's first strike.  Yeah, I am deeply worried.  And then we get to considering that Trump's ego is involved.  I see folks are hoping for the US military to disobey Trump's orders if he goes too far.  So much for civilian control of the military.  Again, we are left potentially hoping for folks to make decisions that might avert disaster but undermine American democracy.

I think I need to find something to stress eat or stress drink.

The Worst Chicken Game: Trump vs Kim Jong Un

My feelings are thus:

Yes.  Yes, we can.

Trump seems determined to start two new ones on top of the several the US is already fighting (yes, way over the war cap).  First, the slightly less* catastrophic conflict would be a war with Iran after tossing out the nuclear deal.  After all, how does one stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons if one does not rely on diplomacy?  This is the war some folks have been seeking for quite some time, and Trump seems determined to start it.  While the Iran deal is not perfect and does not address all other kinds of bad Iranian behavior, thus far, they seem to be playing by the rules.  Which means that Iran is currently not on a path to become .... North Korea.

*  A war with Iran would cost the US trillions of dollars, probably break the US army, and close down the Strait of Hormuz, which, in turn, would lead to oil prices rocketing and, thus, recession, inflation, stagflation, etc.  And that is probably an optimistic evaluation that ignores Iran's ability to escalate elsewhere.

North Korea? Thanks to Trump's threats, Kim Jong Un has written his own letter, a first apparently, that has suggested he might test a nuclear tipped ICBM somewhere in the Pacific.  This would be really, really bad, and that might be my understatement of 2017.  Not only bad for the environment and for whatever ships that might be nearby, but something might go wrong, leading the missile to spread radioactive debris across a hunk of the Pacific and maybe near/over Japan. 

Worse, we are in the most dangerous stage of nuclear development--when one country has some nuclear warheads, some ability to deliver them but no assurance that these systems can survive a first strike.  Which means that North Korea is probably on a hair trigger and will launch on warning.  We know from the recent death of the Soviet official who prevented World War III that warning systems can provoke a response even when one is not needed.  To make matters worse, the President of the US is making North Korea feel as if an attack is imminent.  Use or lose?  That is the question that faces Kim Jong Un today.  He does not have to be irrational to be most concerned about Trump and his threats.  Hopefully, his Chinese friends are telling him that Trump is a paper tiger.  Oh wait, that's not good either. 

Is this the most dangerous moment in the world since the Cuban Missile Crisis?  Maybe not, but we can probably see it from here. We call it tomorrow or next week.  Trump is making this worse and worse because his ego is involved and he does not have the temperament to be President. Profoundly unqualified.  I forget what I said months ago about which war was most likely--Iran or North Korea.  I guess I would prefer the former to the latter, as the former would only push much of the world into recession and kill lots of Americans and Iranians.  The latter would be utterly devastating to Japan, South Korea and North Korea and push the world into a far deeper recession (much of the world's trade goes through the South China Sea). 

So, yeah, I am panicking now.  How are you?

Deterrence is Ugly

Sure, Donald Trump is so callous and crass that when he says stuff, it sounds awful BUT extended deterrence (or even regular deterrence) almost always threatens killing lots of civilians.  The whole idea is that if you do x, we will make you pay.  And the "you" in this is not just the leader of country A but all of country A.  Mutual assured destruction?  Kind of sounds like that destroy word Trump used.  So, the speech is not really a break in policy, as awful as it sounded.

Ethicists, moral philosophers and others have long consistently raised questions about the morality of nuclear deterrence because it requires holding innocents hostage.  I am not an ethicist or a philospher.  Instead, I focus on what seems to be the least bad alternative, and deterrence when it is successful is better than war.  So, I don't have a problem with Trump saying that the US will use heaps of force if North Korea attacks Japan or South Korea--the whole idea of the "nuclear umbrella" is that the US is potentially threatening utter destruction if someone attacks a country who is under the umbrella.  Who are those allies?  NATO + Japan + South Korea + Australia + New Zealand (maybe, the whole nuke free thing made that less clear).  That's it.  Baltics? Yes.  Sweden? No.  Mexico?  Hmmm... not quite although that kind of falls under the whole Monroe Doctrine of don't mess around with our neighborhood or else.

What is more disturbing about Trump and North Korea is that the US has made the other half of that promise problematic and Trump makes it even more so: that the US will not attack you if you don't attack its allies.  Qaadafi might have something to say about that ....  Talk of North Korean regime change is DANGEROUS because they might feel they are in a "use them or lose them" situation if they think the US is about to disarm North Korea.  Which gets to the McMaster McMess du month: saying that there are military options is reaaaaalllllllllly problematic when North Korea can kill tens of thousands of South Koreans under the best scenario and millions of South Koreans and Japanese and even Americans in the US under the worst scenario.  I would be assuring the North Koreans that the US is not going to attack unless North Korea attacks our allies.  But Trump ain't doing that, the US has a poor record on that score, and Trump cannot make a credible commitment--it is not in his nature.

Alas, deterring North Korea from developing nuclear weapons has proven to be a failure.  But deterring the development of nuclear weapons and deterring their use are two different things.  And, yes, breaking the Iran deal is a poor signal to North Korea if we want to deal with them.

So, yeah, I am worried.  I spent this afternoon giving a talk to a group of Asia-Pacific Ambassadors based in Ottawa.  I think I depressed them.  Damn.

Panic Du Jour: US Won't Protect Canada?

Today, some Canadian generals talked about the US Ballistic Missile Defence Program, and indicated that since Canada is not involved in it, that the US might not stop missiles headed towards Canada.  Oh my!  So, let me myth bust with a few caveats first:

A) I am not opposed to Canada joining the BMD program. There are good reasons to join--fear of North Korea attacking Calgary is not among them. Better situational awareness, some influence, less antagonizing of the US, and other reasons are better reasons than fear of NK nukes.  The Defence Policy Review should have addressed this head on and did not do so (if I remember correctly).
B)  I don't know much about the history of US-Canadian defence/defense commitments.
C)  I am not an expert on nuclear weapons or defenses.  I am just reasonably well read on that stuff, and have expertise on related stuff (see NATO stuff below).  More importantly, I don't really have anything at stake, unlike various generals....   It maybe that the Canadian generals are not the ones playing us, but rather, it may be the American ones who are apparently saying strange things to the Canadians. 

Ok, let's get to it:

1. Who is going to attack Canada and not the US?  Folks upset at the maple cartel?  
2. When ballistic missiles are in the air, those with fingers on the triggers of American defenses will not have hours to make the decision, but a few minutes (missiles from North Korea probably take less than thirty minutes, using the old Soviet ICBM flight time as an amateur guess).  So, are the Americans going to say, hmm, we have missiles inbound from North Korea, but they look like they are headed towards the West Edmonton Mall, so let's not worry about it?  Or will they say, missiles headed in our direction, let's launch our counter-missiles, just in case we are wrong about their final destination?
3. I used West Edmonton deliberately because any missile headed towards most of Canada's population--within 100 miles of the US border--is going to get an American response.  No American general is going to say, hey, Vancouver, not our problem when Seattle is not far away.  
4. On the other hand, what about NATO and Article V?  What about it?  There is no automatic invocation of A5 before an attack.  If an attack occurs, NATO reps must meet and agree that an attack has occurred.  This happened after 9/11 but not after a cyber attack on Estonia nor after Syrian artillery hit Turkey.  And note, this is after, not during, not before.  So, not helpful for responding to missiles in the air.  Also, Article V says that once an attack has been recognized, each country responds as each deems necessary.  Not hypothetical at all as we found out when writing our book.
5. Whatever the legacy of US-Canadian defense agreements, the US will defend Canada.  It is in its own interests to do so.  Indeed, the usual Canadian concern is that the US would be too helpful and violate Canadian sovereignty as the US protects itself.
6. Oh, one last thing: the idea that Canada is defenseless against nukes?  That has been the case since the Soviet Union developed its own nuclear-tipped ICBMs because.... the US never had an effective system for shooting down missiles.   And, guess what.... it still does not. The US system is unproven.  Indeed, when North Korea launches its tests, the US does not try to shoot them down because it would really suck if the US tried and failed.  Better to be uncertain. 

So, what are these generals doing, scaring Canadians?  I can't help but think of threat inflation.  That the threat is being played up .... because American or Canadian officers want Canada in the ballistic missile program.  While I agree with the ends mostly, I don't agree with the means.

The reality is that there is NOTHING Canada can do about North Korea.  Canada does not trade with North Korea, so sanctions are not applicable.  Canada is not able to bully China into doing anything. If the US can't get that to happen, Canada can't do it.  Canada has no ability to stop missiles from North Korea.  So, yeah, Canada is powerless and vulnerable.  That sucks, but there it is.  Canada can take some solace that North Korea does not give a rat's ass about Canada.  North Korea does not have enough nuclear armed ICBMs to waste any on Canadian cities.  It needs to have one or two so that the US is deterred from regime changing.  Maybe North Korea is aiming to create a stability/instability paradox dynamic where the US and North Korea are deterred at the strategic level, which then allows NK to mess around with South Korea at the conventional level.  That would not be good, but, again, not much Canada can do about that. Indeed, the story for the past twenty years or so is that there is precious little the US can do about North Korea.  If the US can do little, Canada can do even less.  Sorry, but let's be humble about Canadian capabilities (and US BMD capabilities).

Certainly Uncertain: Nuclear Logics Are Still In Play in Northeast Asia

Reading Andrew Coyne's piece on North Korea and the need for Canada to join the American Ballistic Missile Defence System reminded me of lots of old deterrence theory stuff.  The piece raises good questions about the reliability of the key actors, especially Trump, but confuses what is necessary for deterrence.  Still, there are some problems that we need to think about.

The big problem in the piece is that Coyne thinks that the American commitment to defend its East Asia allies is now largely unbelievable with the North Koreans developing the ability to strike the continental US (and Canada).  It is true that the US, under several Presidents, has failed to deter the North Korean effort to develop both nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.  But deterring their effort to develop some deterrence and deterring an attack on allies are two different things.  Coyne is right to point out that extended deterrence (don't attack my allies or else) is less believable than regular, vanilla deterrence (don't attack me or else).  The threat to start or expand a nuclear war is problematic in either case, but seems a bit more believable if it is in retaliation for a big attack on the homeland.

The key is that for deterrence to work, the side being deterred (North Korea in this case for the moment) does not need to be certain that a counter-strike would happen.  They just need to think that there is some possibility of such a response.  Why?  Because the costs of nuclear war are so very high, if one does the probability math (probability of x times value of x), the prospective costs of attacking first are simply too high compared to the status quo (.01 times infinity = infinity) .... as long as the status quo is bearable (which is why we have to stop threatening regime change).  We do not have to convince North Korea that a retaliatory strike is certain if North Korea attacks South Korea and/or Japan, but that it could happen.  The placement of US troops in South Korea is far more about being a tripwire to raise the probability of the US responding than actually defending South Korea in a conventional attack. 

Again, one might say that this is not sufficient, but the key to nuclear threats is that classic Schelling phrase: a threat that leaves something to chance.  One does not have to threaten, for instance, total nuclear annihilation of North Korea crosses the Demilitarized Zone--one just has to threat to start a process that might lead to things getting out of hand and ultimately leading to nuclear war.  This was the old extended deterrence logic for Europe and Asia during the cold war.

Certainty?  That is for allies.  That is, the tripwires and all the rest over the years are mostly aimed at reassuring allies.  The enemy is deterred by a modest chance of the US responding, of sacrificing Chicago for Bonn or now Seattle for Seoul.  The allies?  They are very nervous and require a great deal of assurance.  Ballistic missile defense both in the region and in the US might assure them somewhat--that the US can stick around and meet its commitments knowing that it is protected.

Except for one thing: BMD may be at best a coin flip.  We have lots of uncertainty about whether the efforts to invest in destroying missiles in flight have produced anything remotely reliable.  Again, that is ok from a deterrence perspective--uncertainty is not bad.

While I think that joining the US BMD program makes sense, my reasons do not center on the NK nuclear threat.  The US would try to stop an attack on Vancouver or Toronto since they are very close to American cities whether Canada is in or out of the BMD program.  And North Korea is not going to be gunning for Calgary or Edmonton.  North Korea barely notices Canada, and, given its small supply of nuclear arms, it will not be aiming at Canada.  The BMD arguments I buy have more to do with building a robust NORAD that addresses a variety of threats in the 21st century, and strengthening a key US-Canadian institution in these uncertain times.

While we should all doubt Donald Trump, I am far more worried about his starting a process that leaves something to chance via a small strike at North Korea's missiles or at its leadership than I am about his not responding to a North Korean attack.  Yes, we are now deterred from attacking North Korea, but that has been true since it developed the capability level Seoul with its artillery.  Yes, we have much to worry about, but then so does Kim Jong Un.  If he wants to survive, he will avoid a process that might lead to escalation.  The costs of being wrong are just too high.

North Korea, ICBM's and Lousy Policy Alternatives

The toughest thing for folks to accept is that there are often no good policy solutions to a key problem.  North Korea has been that problem for at least two decades.  With the new test where North Korea has proven it can build and launch successfully intercontinental ballistic missiles, there is now greater pressure to do something.

But what is that something and what are the risks?  This is where the Trump administration scares me the most.  Talk of regime change and denuclearization are seriously alarming (see this thread)..  Why has North Korea pursued nuclear weapons? For status, maybe.  Because it fears that outsiders want to change who rules?  Absolutely.  What use are nuclear weapons?  To deter attacks, of course.

Could the US launch a strike to disarm North Korea's limited missile force?  Maybe.  But that would not eliminate North Korea's ability to do much harm--via artillery and maybe even invasion of South Korea.  Whatever mistakes the US makes, South Korea will pay.  There are just too many artillery batteries too close to Seoul for the US to expect any conflict not to have potentially huge risks.

Even the most limited strike risks staggering casualties, because North Korea could retaliate with the thousands of artillery pieces it has positioned along its border with the South. Though the arsenal is of limited range and could be destroyed in days, the United States defense secretary, Jim Mattis, recently warned that if North Korea used it, it “would be probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s lifetimes.” NYT

And, of course, there is no guarantee that a first strike would eliminate North Korea's small nuclear capability, which would put Tokyo in play as well.  So, a first strike might risk hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of South Koreans and Japanese.

This puts us back into a familiar and uncomfortable reality--nuclear deterrence.  We are deterred from attacking North Korea, and North Korea, as long as it believes a first strike is not imminent, is deterred from attacking the US and its allies. But if it fears a first strike, it may launch first because it might fear the US could decapitate the regime and eliminate much of its arsenal.  This "use or lose" situation is very, very dangerous.  This makes talk of denuclearization and decapitation destabilizing.

I was called a coward last night on twitter by someone who thinks nuclear disarmament is the preferred option.  Is it cowardly to be realistic?  We are not going to get North Korea (or China or Russia or France or Israel or India or Pakistan or the US) to give up its nuclear arms. Believing otherwise, especially in the age of Trump, is foolish.  Also foolish is thinking that using force will produce a good outcome.  It sucks that we do not have good policy options, but this is nothing new.  For twenty years, the US has wanted to strike North Korea and has been deterred by the threats it poses to the neighbors.  For the entire cold war (and to this day), we have had to tolerate the reality of mutual assured destruction--that threatening each other is the worst policy option except for all of the others.  I'd love to find a way out, but I can't see one.

So, when it comes to North Korea, we must focus not on denuclearization but on deterrence and containment.  Unfortunately, the US is currently led by amateurs with no empathy, which means they have a hard time understanding how their signals will be received.  Which means I am scared.

Arms Races Are Great!

The President-Elect has called for expanding the US nuclear arsenal, not just modernizing it (old warheads may not be good warheads).  And when asked about whether this might lead to an arms race, he said woot!

Who wins arms races?

1. Arms manufacturers and their stockholders
2. Maybe Ken Waltz (who is already dead)
3. 
   
4. 
   

Yeah, that's about it.  How about who loses?

1. Each country that is involved
2. The taxpayers
3.  Pretty much everyone else.

Really?  Is it that bad? Yes, it is.  Why? There are two possibilities when it comes to a nuclear arms race: either the competition among nuclear powers to build more and more nuclear weapons upends the strategic stability of mutual assured destruction OR it does not.
A)  If the various sides end up building systems that may be able to wipe out much, if not all, of the other side's ability to retaliate, each side might face a "use it or lose it" temptation.  And that is really, really bad.  Some would argue that this kind of situation made it very hard to avoid World War I.  Strategic stability took much effort to achieve and recognize--that mutual vulnerability was actually a good thing to help deter each side.  Upsetting it is very dangerous, especially for an amateur who asks "why build them if you can't use them?"  Folks should be very nervous given that there really is nothing between Trump and nuclear war--as illustrated by Tom Nichols's excellent use of Friends gifs.
B) If the arms race does not upset the strategic balance, then it is a gigantic waste of money.  This is stuff that would cost hundreds of billions of dollars or trillions of dollars. How does one avoid deepening the deficits if one spends much, much more on stuff that does not really change anything?

The challenge, as Waltz and other structural realists argued, is that the system provides incentives for arms races--that the absence of a higher authority fosters a security dilemma, whereby any act to improve one's own security decreases the security of others.  The others then respond by trying to improve their security, making the first mover less secure.  Any unilateral effort to improve one's security is self-defeating--hence DILEMMA.  It requires much effort and, yes, empathy, to come to agree that mutual vulnerability is better than the alternatives.  Trump threatens to upend all of this.  Not good.  And for what gains?  None as far as I can tell.  So, we may end up being stuck with two possibilities: nuclear war or larger arsenals and wasted tax dollars. 

One last thought: if Trump is Putin's plaything, why would Putin want an arms race? Well, if the US becomes super-scary, it would make it harder for any Russians to oppose his regime.  That garrison states, built to deal with external adversaries, foster centralization of authority and undermines resistance.  Oh, and, yes, Trump, who is a fan of authoritarian regimes, would benefit from the generation of fear as well.  Lovely.


As always, when it comes to nuclear war and arms races, the go-to is:

Nuclear Launch Procedures Explained via Gifs

Tom Nichols and I often argue about stuff, as he is on the right and I am on the left, but we can agree on much stuff, including the usefulness of pop culture for explicating complex stuff:

Iran Deal: Placeholder

I have not read the details of the deal, as I am working on some stuff I need to get out and under review with summer slip, slip, slipping away.  So, let this post be a placeholder for the time when I have the time to think about this more.

My initial takes, however, are:

Confirmation bias runs strong today.

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) July 14, 2015

I wonder if the US ever negotiated with authoritarian regimes before over nuclear wearpons.... I guess there is a first time for everything

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) July 14, 2015

And, most seriously, war is always a lousy alternative and particularly in this case.  Oh, and the US is not bargaining alone with Iran--the sanctions require international support and the deal involves other actors.  Let's not forget those key aspects.

Oh and I posted on the initial deal here and here.  I don't think my views will change much once I read more about the agreement (since I am aware of my own vulnerability to confirmation bias).  Oh, and I don't give a rat's ass what Netanyahu says....

Pet Peeve Du Jour

One of my biggest pet peeves when I hear politician and pundits talk about threats to US or Canadian or whatever security, the phrase existential threat is often stretched to the point of meaninglessness.  There are many threats to security, and they range from minor/modest to severe to, ultimately, existential. 

Climate change might be an existential threat to low lying island countries such as the Maldives.  It is not an existential threat to the US or Canada.  Sorry, it just isn't.  Something that presents significant harm does not threaten the existence of the United States or Canada. 

Nuclear annihilation is an existential threat.  Which is why I concurred with General Dunford in his testimony today when he said Russia is an existential threat.  Why?  Russia has enough nuclear weapons to lay waste to North America AND our relations are such that we have more than a just a bit of concern.  Putin has been making nuclear threats to American allies--ones where the US has a commitment to defend.  That defense is ultimately tied to a nuclear umbrella.  So, yeah, Russia is an existential threat.  France has enough nuclear weapons to destroy the U.S., but is not a threat, existential or otherwise.

China has enough nuclear weapons at this point that it is probably an existential threat as well.  Right now, its assertiveness is troubling, and could start a process that could lead to things getting out of control.  But China is not issuing nuclear threats left and right.

Iran is not an existential threat to the US or Canada.  Even if Iran had a handful of nuclear weapons, they would not have a delivery system that would pose an existential threat to the US.  Ye olde feare of a nuke in a suitcase is not an existential threat--again, harm is not equal to threatening existence.  Sure, it would be an existential threat to Israel, but that is distinct from being an existential threat to the US.  How is this different from Russia's threat to the Baltics?  Iran ain't Russia, and the US does not have an Article V type treaty with Israel. 

Cyber?  Costly, inconvenient but not existential unless the hackers can turn the computers into Terminators.

Terrorism?  ISIS?  Not existential threats.  Even if ISIS were able to get its hands on a nuclear weapon, that would not be an existential threat.  The threat to the existence of some people (say, residents of NYC) is not the same as the threat to the existence of the US.

Alien invasion?  Well, if they have the aims of those depicted in Independence Day, then yes, that would be an existential threat.  A meteor of sufficient size to lay waste to the planet?  Hell yes!

So, we need to address the serious threats, such as cyber stuff and Iran and climate change, but we need to keep things in perspective: they don't threaten the existence of the US or Canada.  Calling them existential threats is fear-mongering.  We have enough to be concerned about without inflating threats.  That is how we got into Iraq in the first place, more or less.

Raising the Right Alarm

This piece raises the question I have been asking for the past week in Brussels: can we credibly commit to the defense of the Baltics?  Without a permanent NATO (or at least American) presence, is our Article V commitment (an attack upon one is an attack upon all) believable?

There are two ways to look at it.  First, to be clear, any nuclear threat is incredible.  That is--not to be believed.  At any single point, it really is not that believable that country x will use nuclear weapons since they are always so disproportional and always raise the question of a global exchange and mutual destruction.  So, the NATO commitment to use nuclear weapons to defend the Baltics is not to be believed.

However, if you summon the ghost of Thomas Schelling, he would remind us all that it is not so much the threat of global thermonuclear war that deters but "the threat that leaves something to chance."  That is, that one does enough to create a credible possibility that if the other side escalates, it may start a process by which the two sides keep reacting to other that ultimately unleashes the nuclear weapons.  Because nuclear war is so very destructive, one just needs a very, very small chance of it happening to deter.  Perhaps the mere extension of Article V is sufficient to put this into play--that attacking a NATO member has a decent probability of leading to conventional war and that might lead to escalation, making that attack too costly.

This leads us to the second way to look at this.  That NATO has not done enough to ties its hands to escalation.  That the presentation of a fait accompli, such as Russia seizing the Baltics in a day or less, may freeze NATO into not responding, putting the onus of responding and risking the escalation that ultimately leads to nuclear war in NATO's hands.  Yuck. 

Which is why I have been calling for NATO, and if not NATO then the US, to forget the obligations made under the NATO Russia Founding Act of 1997.  Since Russia has abrogated it, we should not feel bound by it.  We should have significant numbers of troops based in Poland and especially the Baltics.  These should be permanent bases and not continuous or persistent.  We need to make it clear to Putin that an attack upon the Baltics would not lead to the possibility of decisions in Brussels but an automatic reaction in Washington, DC.  That an attack upon the Baltics would more clearly be the start of a process that would leave something to chance.  The way we used to make that most credible was by putting American bodies in the way--a trip wire that would force American decision-making. 

Of course, this would make the situation seem like a new cold war.  Ok and?  More importantly, our NATO allies, especially those in the middle of Europe--far enough not to be directly threatened, close enough to have economic ties to Russia and a deep desire for the situation to return to normal--resist such steps.  The US can and should move anyway. 

Yes, this would escalate things with Russia, but it would then leave to the Russians the responsibility of not escalating further.  In this game of chicken, it is best to make sure that one's threats are credible and that the responsibility of avoiding disaster is in the hands of the other side. 

Provocative Thought About Provoking Du Jour: Baltics Edition

The stability-instability paradox is a concept from nuclear deterrence land: that if two sides both have nuclear weapons that can survive a first strike, it might just create deterrence at the strategic level AND free up both sides to engage in violence at lower levels.  Sounds just like an air-headed theory that would never happen in reality because, you know, NUKES!*

* To be clear, I have not studied deterrence theory closely since grad school, so I may not have this entirely right, but I am pretty sure I have the basics.

Well, in 1999, the Pakistani army pretty much followed the Stability-Instability Playbook by attacking India but only very selectively.  The idea was that India would not use its nukes since they would then face the wrath of Pakistan's nukes.  Well, Pakistan faced other wrath (they tend to lose every war they start with India....) including from the international community.

Anyhow, this is relevant today because of PUTIN!!!!  The fear that some folks have (the Poles, the Latvias, Estonians and Lithuanians) is that Putin might engage in some salami tactics--taking a small sliver of one of them (well, the Baltics) and then say, nyah, nyah, fait accompli, nyah. Putin could say--if you then attack me, we will blow the world up. 

Which leaves me with the following thought: why can only one side play this game?  If NATO (US/France/UK) is deterred from using nukes over Russia taking a small hunk of Estonia, then wouldn't Russia be deterred from their its nukes if NATO used just a wee bit of force to take back the hunk of Estonia?

I got to thinking about this as folks at the German Marshall Fund conference were pondering such scenarios and mentioned that this is one of the reasons why John Kennedy opted for flexible response--that there might be not just war at lower levels against the non-nuclear folks (North Vietnam) but that there might come a time where the Soviet Union might take a hunk of West Germany and say: trade you for West Berlin.  This apparently caused many nightmares for NATO in the old days. 

So, we need to be clear--the Stability-Instability paradox "works" for both sides, as long as each side is somewhat comfortable with risking just a little bit of nuclear war.  The good news is that Schelling comes in here for practiced nuclear powers: that "the threat that leaves something to chance" ameliorates the Stability-Instability paradox because you cannot be to sure that the low level violence will stay low level.  That salami tactics are not usually worthwhile because the small risk of things getting out of control multiplied by the huge costs of nuclear war offset the gains from a slice of salami/Estonia.

Still, the Baltics are worried that Putin's game of subversion may not end with Ukraine.  I tend to think it will, but as one Baltic speaker at this conference put it, it is far easier for those of us farther from the big bear to be confident.  Indeed.



The required video is, of course:

Steve's first meme

Yep, tis my first meme.  I am not impressed by Netanyahu's graphics at the UN nor, apparently, is McKayla:

Waking Up to The Nuclear Crisis

Very striking video by an expert on the Cuban Missile Crisis (H/T to Chris Albon for the link):


I am pretty much with it until the end.  Nuclear disarmament is a swell idea, but I am a firmer believer in the security dilemma and the complexity of International Relations.  A world without nukes would be interesting, but getting there from here?  I just don't see it.  I see less, as we move to a world of minimal deterrents, but none?  Nope. 

Fun way to wake up on a Sunday, eh?

Iranian Options

I was very tempted to leave this post blank to indicate the lacuna of options, but it would have been as confusing as the ending moments of the Sopranos.  Ok, not quite that confusing.

So, let's run through the options, shall we?

• Invasion: No thanks.  Not feasible, not affordable, not again.
• Special Operations: A suicide mission that is unlikely to work?  Not so nifty despite the apparently cool movie
• Air strike: Unlikely to have a significant impact since the key sites are buried.  Unlikely to do more than just delay by a few years at best while creating more support for the government and providing more incentives for developing the weapons.
• How about just bombing to create costs and provide incentives to stop--compellence?  Because it only really works when you have a force on the ground helping out--the Kosovo Liberation Army.  I just don't see the US willing to bomb for six months or more.  And a weekend of bombing is vastly over-rated, as Madeline Albright found out.
• Naval Embargo: Would reduce ability to sell oil but would likely lead to closure of Strait of Hormuz for short time and much more difficult flow of oil from that part of world for quite a while--do any of the economies in the world need an escalation in oil prices? 
• Sanctions: Doing that.   
• Killing Iranian scientists: somebody is doing that.
• Cyberwarfare: Stuxnet.  Somebody is doing that.
• Regime change:  How would that work?  

What's left?  Trying to contain Iran by building coalition of neighbors opposed to it?  Well, we blew that with the destruction of Iraq and the alienation of Pakistan.  The former is, well, Bush's fault.  The latter? Lots of blame to go around, including Pakistan and Obama

Abetting an Israeli attack is just as problematic as the US doing it on its own.

I am reluctant to admit it, but I may have adopt a modified Waltz position: North Korea got nukes, and has not used them.  Yes, it complicates the politics of the region, but disarming NK or invading it were not feasible.  So, we are stuck with a nuclear North Korea.  Iran may or may not weaponize, but if it chooses to do so, I really do not see anyway of stopping it.  Iran is not as easy to invade as Iraq, nor is the US as able to do so.  Iran has learned from Iraq's experiences and the US bombing campaigns of the past to put the important projects deep underground.

So, when Peres demands that the US puts all Iran options on the table, I have to ask two things: who are you to make demands of the US? and what freakin' options?  I am not a Realist (I don't think it is all about anarchy and insecurity), but I am realistic.  When there are no good options, jumping at any of them is probably not the way to go.  When people ask me what options we should choose, my answer at the moment is: more of the same--sanctions, international coalition to oppose, maybe some cyberwarfare, but not much more than that.  A nuclear Iran is undesirable, certainly, but unavoidable?  The Israeli nuclear force will have a job to do--deter an Iranian nuclear attack.  I agree with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Iran's leaders are not irrational.  They seek to survive and they want their political system to survive.  A nuclear exchange is to be avoided.  A nuclear Iran would be problematic in the extreme, but we have learned over the past 60 years how to manage relations with countries that have nuclear weapons.  It is not easy, and it may go wrong some day, but there are no options that are likely to prevent Iran from going nuclear.