I love ilovecharts. So much truth in one snarky figure.
Saturday, March 3, 2012
Problematic PQ
I blogged recently about the lack of diversity within the Parti Quebecois and raised doubts about its future. This sociology phd student does it better.
The funny thing, as Don MacPherson argued this morning, the Liberals of Quebec desperately need a sovereigntist PQ since the Liberals can only really stand on their federalist stance (while still selling out the Anglophones whenpushed nudged).
And people wonder why I am leaving Quebec!? Of course, there is more to my departure than Quebec politics (not that Ontario's is terrific), but I will be glad to be out of Quebec before the next provincial election.
The funny thing, as Don MacPherson argued this morning, the Liberals of Quebec desperately need a sovereigntist PQ since the Liberals can only really stand on their federalist stance (while still selling out the Anglophones when
And people wonder why I am leaving Quebec!? Of course, there is more to my departure than Quebec politics (not that Ontario's is terrific), but I will be glad to be out of Quebec before the next provincial election.
Friday, March 2, 2012
Iranian Options
I was very tempted to leave this post blank to indicate the lacuna of options, but it would have been as confusing as the ending moments of the Sopranos. Ok, not quite that confusing.
So, let's run through the options, shall we?
Abetting an Israeli attack is just as problematic as the US doing it on its own.
I am reluctant to admit it, but I may have adopt a modified Waltz position: North Korea got nukes, and has not used them. Yes, it complicates the politics of the region, but disarming NK or invading it were not feasible. So, we are stuck with a nuclear North Korea. Iran may or may not weaponize, but if it chooses to do so, I really do not see anyway of stopping it. Iran is not as easy to invade as Iraq, nor is the US as able to do so. Iran has learned from Iraq's experiences and the US bombing campaigns of the past to put the important projects deep underground.
So, when Peres demands that the US puts all Iran options on the table, I have to ask two things: who are you to make demands of the US? and what freakin' options? I am not a Realist (I don't think it is all about anarchy and insecurity), but I am realistic. When there are no good options, jumping at any of them is probably not the way to go. When people ask me what options we should choose, my answer at the moment is: more of the same--sanctions, international coalition to oppose, maybe some cyberwarfare, but not much more than that. A nuclear Iran is undesirable, certainly, but unavoidable? The Israeli nuclear force will have a job to do--deter an Iranian nuclear attack. I agree with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Iran's leaders are not irrational. They seek to survive and they want their political system to survive. A nuclear exchange is to be avoided. A nuclear Iran would be problematic in the extreme, but we have learned over the past 60 years how to manage relations with countries that have nuclear weapons. It is not easy, and it may go wrong some day, but there are no options that are likely to prevent Iran from going nuclear.
So, let's run through the options, shall we?
- Invasion: No thanks. Not feasible, not affordable, not again.
- Special Operations: A suicide mission that is unlikely to work? Not so nifty despite the apparently cool movie
- Air strike: Unlikely to have a significant impact since the key sites are buried. Unlikely to do more than just delay by a few years at best while creating more support for the government and providing more incentives for developing the weapons.
- How about just bombing to create costs and provide incentives to stop--compellence? Because it only really works when you have a force on the ground helping out--the Kosovo Liberation Army. I just don't see the US willing to bomb for six months or more. And a weekend of bombing is vastly over-rated, as Madeline Albright found out.
- Naval Embargo: Would reduce ability to sell oil but would likely lead to closure of Strait of Hormuz for short time and much more difficult flow of oil from that part of world for quite a while--do any of the economies in the world need an escalation in oil prices?
- Sanctions: Doing that.
- Killing Iranian scientists: somebody is doing that.
- Cyberwarfare: Stuxnet. Somebody is doing that.
- Regime change: How would that work?
Abetting an Israeli attack is just as problematic as the US doing it on its own.
I am reluctant to admit it, but I may have adopt a modified Waltz position: North Korea got nukes, and has not used them. Yes, it complicates the politics of the region, but disarming NK or invading it were not feasible. So, we are stuck with a nuclear North Korea. Iran may or may not weaponize, but if it chooses to do so, I really do not see anyway of stopping it. Iran is not as easy to invade as Iraq, nor is the US as able to do so. Iran has learned from Iraq's experiences and the US bombing campaigns of the past to put the important projects deep underground.
So, when Peres demands that the US puts all Iran options on the table, I have to ask two things: who are you to make demands of the US? and what freakin' options? I am not a Realist (I don't think it is all about anarchy and insecurity), but I am realistic. When there are no good options, jumping at any of them is probably not the way to go. When people ask me what options we should choose, my answer at the moment is: more of the same--sanctions, international coalition to oppose, maybe some cyberwarfare, but not much more than that. A nuclear Iran is undesirable, certainly, but unavoidable? The Israeli nuclear force will have a job to do--deter an Iranian nuclear attack. I agree with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff--Iran's leaders are not irrational. They seek to survive and they want their political system to survive. A nuclear exchange is to be avoided. A nuclear Iran would be problematic in the extreme, but we have learned over the past 60 years how to manage relations with countries that have nuclear weapons. It is not easy, and it may go wrong some day, but there are no options that are likely to prevent Iran from going nuclear.
Thursday, March 1, 2012
Numbers, Numbers, Numb
Secretary-General Rasmussen (of whom I am a big fan) said this (according to tweets by NATOSource):
Notice that Austria has 3 troops in theater, Iceland 4, Ireland 7, Luxembourg 11, El Salvador has 24, Malaysia has 46, Montenegro has 39, Urkaine has 23, UAE as 35. Greece looks better than it once did since it has 153 now but had 15 for much of the conflict. While maybe one or two of these smaller contingents might be in harm's way and providing some added value, most of these and some of the larger ones are mostly symbolic. They might be filling some holes in the "Combined Joint Statement of Requirements" or CJSOR, but Rasmussen undercuts his own credibility to emphasize the number 50. The total number of participants exaggerates what it means to be a participant and what "the biggest coalition in history means" when in the past membership probably meant more than showing up.
If I had to choose coalitions as big and meaningful, I would take the anti-axis side in WWII over ISAF. Fewer countries existed then but a greater percentage of the world's population was involved on one side (and the right side).
I should not pooh-pooh ISAF since my book project is on that coalition/alliance effort. But as I learned in the research, the numbers are just a wee bit deceptive. For instance, is the Danish 750 much more meaningful than Spanish 1526 in added value? Helmand and few caveats vs. RC-West and heaps of restrictions so assuredly so. Oh, and the numbers countries report to NATO and the numbers actually there are correlated but not identical.
Oh what a fun book project this has been.
50 nations are part of the ISAF mission – that’s one quarter of the countries of the world, and the biggest coalition in historyObjectively true but also damn near meaningless (for a great book on numbers and IR, see Andreas and Greenhill). Here is the NATO "placemat" from October 2011 (the most recent is here and the archive is here):
Notice that Austria has 3 troops in theater, Iceland 4, Ireland 7, Luxembourg 11, El Salvador has 24, Malaysia has 46, Montenegro has 39, Urkaine has 23, UAE as 35. Greece looks better than it once did since it has 153 now but had 15 for much of the conflict. While maybe one or two of these smaller contingents might be in harm's way and providing some added value, most of these and some of the larger ones are mostly symbolic. They might be filling some holes in the "Combined Joint Statement of Requirements" or CJSOR, but Rasmussen undercuts his own credibility to emphasize the number 50. The total number of participants exaggerates what it means to be a participant and what "the biggest coalition in history means" when in the past membership probably meant more than showing up.
If I had to choose coalitions as big and meaningful, I would take the anti-axis side in WWII over ISAF. Fewer countries existed then but a greater percentage of the world's population was involved on one side (and the right side).
I should not pooh-pooh ISAF since my book project is on that coalition/alliance effort. But as I learned in the research, the numbers are just a wee bit deceptive. For instance, is the Danish 750 much more meaningful than Spanish 1526 in added value? Helmand and few caveats vs. RC-West and heaps of restrictions so assuredly so. Oh, and the numbers countries report to NATO and the numbers actually there are correlated but not identical.
Oh what a fun book project this has been.
I Am So Confused
My morning succumbed to frustration. So, no blogging today until inspiration overcomes frustration.
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