Treaty of Versailles 2: Electric Bugaloo

 It does not take an IR scholar or an historian to note the significance of Donald Trump signing onto a "deal" with Iran while he's at Versailles, site of the treaty that temporarily ended WW1 and set up WW2.  I have a few thoughts to add to this perfect illustration of how dumb and tragic this war has been:

The costs here are understated:

• Trump alienated allies by starting this war without giving notice.  So, it not only led to physical destruction in the neighborhood, but also harmed US relations with them.  Even Canadians were harmed since Iran hit a Canadian base in the region.
• Probably putting off any chance for the Iranian people to either put pressure on their government to reform or to get it to collapse.  The US killed potential replacements to the regime and ultimately produced a government that is probably more radical than the last.
• How many Iranians paid with their lives for Trump to get this inferior deal? 
• The US engaged in war crimes, including the recent attacks on water plants, which is significant stain that will have consequences. 
• Speaking of war crimes, this war deepened the crisis in US civil-military relations because Trump and Hegseth got the military to do some pretty awful things here.
• The cost to countries around the world of higher oil prices is not just in "global financial costs" but starving in some countries and energy crises that may have increased their vulnerability in others (the Philippines had much reduced capacity to patrol at sea and in the air to push back at China).
• Trump made the Chinese alternative more attractive--who is the reasonable country and who is the out of control aggressor now?
• Higher oil prices also help Russia.
•  The US not only depleted its stocks of missiles and smart bombs but also lost a number of expensive and relatively scarce planes--AWACS planes and tankers.
• Note that this chart does not include the costs in Lebanon.  This war gave Israel permission and space to engage in yet further unwarranted and unproductive brutality towards people who have had nothing to do with the crimes committed against Israel on October 7th, 2023.
• US gave up its role in maintaining freedom of the seas and taught every country that owns one half of a strait that they could use that geographic advantage to charge tolls for passage.  The post WW2 prosperity depended on this ability for trade to flow freely.  On the bright side, maybe China will replace the US to maintain the flow?  Oh, wait, that's not good news. 
• The big criticism of the original Iran deal, the JCPOA, was that it didn't affect Iran's missile capabilities.  No deal to limit that.  Now we have Republicans saying that the Iranians can just keep their missiles for their own defense.  So, the Party of Bad Faith betrays one of their major talking points about how bad the Obama deal was.   
• The other claim the anti-JCPOA folks kept making is that it did nothing to stop Iranian support for terrorism.  Um, and this deal did?  Nope. 

I could go on--there is no upside for this war.  Trump gave away the store and a lot more for a deal that is far inferior to one that Obama got via diplomacy.  This is all so tragic and stupid.  Remember one of the claims folks made was that they voted in 2024 for the candidate promising no more wars....  

 

A Tale of Two Lousy Allies: the US and Israel in a War of Their Own Making

 Alliances are hard all the time.  But if the allies share common values and have shared interests, they can find ways to work together.  Watching the US-Israel war with Iran proceed, I can't help but think that those of us who have criticized NATO might have been a bit unfair.  Getting consensus among 30+ like-minded countries is hard, very hard, and the alliance has to have an opt-out for any mission (in Article V, the language is "each contributes as each deems necessary).  But when you have two increasingly autocratic countries both led by criminals (ok, to be fair, Netanyahu hasn't been convicted yet, right?) who are bad faith actors who don't believe in anything but staying in power, things get a bit trickier.

While we are not privy to the actual conversations between Trump's team and Netanyahu, we have had clues in the media---that Netanyahu pushed for this war now, and Trump went along with it.  This would not be the first time a country dragged another ally into a war, as that is one of two horns of the alliance dilemma with the other possibility being a country abandons its ally.  And drag may be a strong word since Trump probably did not have to be pushed hard given his previous attacks against Iran and Iranian interests (killing Solimani, last summer's bombing) and, of course, Trump hasn't thought through the consequences such as oil price spikes and much inflation back home. 

This gets to the larger question: if allies don't agree on the goal, how does an alliance work?  What does Israel want in this war?  It seems to be the destruction of Iran as a state, which means hitting any and all targets that might help fracture the state and destroy its capacity.  For the US?  Damned if I know since the various officials--Trump, Rubio, Hegseth--have all said multiple things.  If it was regime change, the US would want Iran to have infrastructure intact (water desalination, oil refineries) so that the new regime can manage.  If it is ending the missile threat, that too would suggest more limited attacks.  If it is to complete the Christian nationalist dream of ushering in the end of times, well, oh my, I guess that means killing anyone and everyone.

There were some reports that the US was displeased with Israel hitting oil refineries, which raises a big question: how much cooperation is there over targeting?  During the Kosovo campaign, NATO allies coordinated quite a bit over what to hit when?  Libya?  Same thing.  ISIS?  I think so.  Now, hard to tell.  That the Trump regime didn't prepare for or plan for Iran threatening the Strait of Hormuz tells us a lot about American preparation or lack thereof. 

Israel?  Perhaps the epitome of tactically sound, strategically incompetent.  The Israeli military is really good at hitting its targets, but how that relates to security I have no idea.  From my trip back in 2019, I go the impression that hitting hard is not just the key tactic but pretty much the only goal.  Restraint does not make sense for them since they have already priced in world opposition: everyone hates them, everyone is anti-semitic, so they might as well do what they want.  And that has worked really well for them--they have had long periods of peace and stability.*   Oh wait, it hasn't, but the learning curve seems to tilt towards simply escalating whenever they are hit.  It creates deterrence that lasts ... hours or days.  

So, the US has been a lousy but useful ally for Israel as Trump is unreliable and fickle.  Israel is a lousy ally for the US, helping get an all-too-willing US into a war that provides no real benefits to the American people (Americans hate Iran thanks to the hostage crisis, when folks used to sing bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb Iran, yet they still hate this war--great achievement by Team Trump).  The US is an even worse ally for, well, all of its allies.  It made all of the Mideast targets for Iranian attacks--why should Iran restrain itself when its very existence is at stake?  The US radically increased oil prices for its friends, which only helps Russia and other oil exporting places (Alberta?), and it has made the coalition/domestic political games of its European allies far more difficult.  

All of this was foreseeable, which is why American presidents have refrained from attacking Iran, even, yes, the ideological and dim Bushies.  But the Trump regime hates being told it can't do something, like a toddler, and is deliberately ignorant.  Which led to being very poorly prepared for the likely Iranian responses that came to fruition. 

 

* I keep putting off writing a post that puts a significant hunk of blame on the increase in anti-semitism around the world on Israel because, yes, yowza.  The Israeli stance of pricing in hate is a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Yes, there is anti-semitism in the world, just like there is Islamophobia, and the actions of states that are seen as the homelands of such religions matter in exacerbating or ameliorating those pre-existing tendencies.  Israel will tell Jews to come home to Israel if they want to be safe, which is, alas, mighty rich given that Israel's actions have increased the danger to Jews outside of Israel and.... yes, to Jews inside of Israel.  We can identify anti-semites and hold them responsible for their own actions (say, most of the Trump regime) and still hold Israel responsible for pouring gasoline on these pre-existing fires. 

 

 

What Does Davos Mean Anyway?

 I have been asked to comment on a flippity flopish move by Prime Minister Carney re Iran: first saying, hey, we love them Americans bombing Iran to, hey now, maybe we should all be a bit more restrained.   How to make sense of this?  Hmmm.  I think the first thing to consider is that the Davos Statement is not that clear and is certainly not that prescriptive in this moment.  Second, domestic politics may play a role.  Third, bad habits may have been in play.  Let's contrast the statements:

First statement:

Canada supports the United States acting to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon and to prevent its regime from further threatening international peace and security. 

Second statement:

We take this position with regret, because the current conflict is another example of the failure of the international order. Despite decades of United Nations Security Council resolutions, the tireless work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and a succession of sanctions and diplomatic frameworks, Iran’s nuclear threat remains. And now the United States and Israel have acted without engaging the United Nations or consulting with allies, including Canada.

So where to from here? With a rapidly spreading conflict and growing threats to civilian life. Canada reaffirms that international law binds all belligerents. We condemn the strikes carried out by Iran on civilians and civilian infrastructure across the Middle East. We implore all parties, including the United States and Israel, to respect the rules of international engagement.

So, first, Carney's statement at Davos says that Canada can't always side with the US (as he likened the US-based world order to Soviet-occupied Czechoslovakia) and that Canada needs to be pragmatic, not always principled.  Okey dokey, what does that mean for this weekend?  Whatever you want, really.  The first statement complies with Davos as it is unprincipled, woot!  Second statement complies as it is more critical of the US--not consulting with allies, needed to be reminded not to do war crimes.  

On the other hand, the first statement looks sketchy as all get out because it was buying the US story immediately without waiting for any sense that the Trump administration had a plan, a justification, etc.  Supporting a bad faith actor can only go .... badly.  We should know that by now.  I was pretty outraged by the initial statement because this is a badly justified war fought badly, and Carney should have understood that.  Don't support dumb shit.*  

Second, domestic politics: supporting an attack on Iran is popular among the Iranian diaspora and among many Jewish Canadians, so why not pander to them?  Playing to ethnic groups does not always mean bad policy outcomes, but, well, disaporas rarely know best.  They tend to be more extreme than those who remained behind (leaving is a selection effect kind of thing) and become more extreme as they don't have to pay the price for what they advocate.  I used to study diasporas, so I apologize for brutally generalizing about behavior that is well, pretty general.  While Jews hate Netanyahu, they hate Iran a lot, too.  The polls in Israel are instructive on this score.  Not sure how North American Jews feel as, yes, not all Jews think the same way on things, and the schism between Israeli Jews and North American Jews has widened since October 2023.  Still, I can imagine political operatives around Carney saying quickly before people had time to think: hey, we have to support attacking this regime because our voters think it is icky (which, to be fair, it was/is).  

Third, habits and bureaucratic routines may have dominated at first.  Canada always sides with US, always has problems with Iran, so those in GAC and PM's Office went with the old scripts, not really thinking through how Davos and Trump and rank incompetence might suggest a different approach.  

Why the change in heart?  Maybe Carney noticed the other allies being a bit more circumspect.  Maybe the schoolgirls and other reckless attacks and Hegseth's repeated assurances that he will war crime had an impact.  Maybe the realization that the US is a bad faith actor run by morons who did no prep, and tying oneself to them is not great?  Maybe the realization that Elbows Up includes not siding with the US automatically?  I hope someone can get the inside scoop on why the flip flop.  The new position isn't great either, but it is better than the first one. 

Of course, this raises what Canada should have done. What a great time to distance from the US?  This would have been an opportunity to show that the heart of Davos, not being so attached to the US, is what matters and matters in a crisis.  Look at the accolades the Spanish are getting, look at the Brits initially refusing to let the US use Diego Garcia.  If Trump wants to be transactional, then be transactional.  Don't give loyalty unless you can get something for it.

* Yes, it is a bad war--the flailing for a decent justification is more than a clue.  There was no need to attack Iran this weekend.  We have lived with Iran being an obnoxious, awful regime for quite some time.  Another day, week, month, year doesn't really change anything except to the Iranians who we are not really helping (killing moderates alternatives is just about the dumbest thing since the US disbanded the Iraqi military over night).  Yes, Iran was in pursuit of nuclear weapons, but there had been diplomacy that had addressed that.  These days, the Iranians get that they can't bargain with bad faith actor Trump.  Maybe two weeks ago, but not now and not anytime soon.  So, destroying the one reasonable pathway is very dumb.  And then there is the execution of this war---no consultation with allies so people are stuck in the region.  Friendly fire incidents galore.  Dead school girls.  Allies lacking protection from the obvious Iranian reaction.

 Oh, and I realized as I talked to the media today: if you push Iran into a corner where the existence of the regime is at stake, why should they hold back anything?  It makes no sense to save any instruments of power for a more desperate future.  So, they launch missiles and drones in every direction, they may close the Strait of Hormuz, they may encourage terrorist attacks around the world.   

Thinking Comparatively About the Iranian Shootdown

Who is to blame for the Iranian shooting down of the Ukrainian plane with many Canadians on board?  Obviously, Iran is.  But folks have been wondering if Trump is to blame.  I said that he owns some of this, not a lot, but some.  How so?

Well, first, if the reports turn out to be true, and the video is pretty damning for the Iranians, then this tragedy will join a post World War list:

• MH17 over eastern Ukraine, July 17th, 2014
• Siberia 1812 over Ukraine, Oct 4th, 2001, entirely eclipsed by the post 9/11 stuff
• Iran Air 655 over Strait of Hormuz, July 3rd,1988
• KAL 007 over Soviet territory, Sept 1, 1983
• Itavia 870, over Italy, July 27, 1980, unknown missile.
• Air Rhodesian flights shot down by rebels, Sept 3, 1978, Feb 12, 1979
• Libyan Arab Airline 114, Feb 21, 1973 over Sinai
• El Al, over Bulgaria, July 27, 1955
• Cathay Pacific Vr-HEU around Honk Kong, July 23, 1954

With two exceptions, the Itavia mystery and Siberia 1812, all of these took place in an environment of severe international tensions. Some seem more deliberate than others (Air Rhodesian flights, for instance).   But the common thread is of this stuff happening in quasi-wartime.  Not wartime, but not peacetime.  The KAL flight was at the peak of the renewed Cold War, the Vincennes shot down Iran Air 655 in the middle of the Iran-Iraq war where it was seeking to protect tankers that had been targeted, Libyan Arab Airlines was shot down in one of the hotter stages of Arab-Israel tensions, etc.

If this was an accidental shootdown by anti-aircraft missiles, how could this happen?  Most likely nervous, poorly trained personnel in a time of high alert.  Why the high alert?  Because Iran had just fired upon US/Iraqi bases and was worried about a response.  What were they responding to?  The drone strike on Suleimani.  Why did that happen?  Trump was responding to attacks on Americans in Iraq.  Why was that happening?  Lots of reasons but partly Iran amping things up.  Why?  Trump's supposed strategy of maximal pressure to get Iran to negotiate over .... damn near everything.

The Trump Administration wants Iran to stop doing everything that bothers the US, which is why the JCPOA (Iran nuke deal) was not sufficient--it didn't stop Iranian support of Hezbollah and other terrorist groups and so forth.  It is not clear why Iran would assent to a deal that would constrain it greatly, especially when it is not clear the US would take yes for an answer.  Regime change has long been at the heart of US ambitions towards Iran.  Anyhow, the point here is that Trump has increased the pressure on Iran, leading to a variety of incidents (nearly striking Iran last summer in response to their downing a drone, for instance).

This short history points to the joint responsibility of Iran and US for creating tensions in the region.  Combine that with the reality that all it takes is for one of many missile batteries to do something hasty/stupid, which is more likely when things are tense, we can see that the US under Trump has some responsibility for what happened.  The timing says as much as the pattern of shooting down of civilian airlines in the past.

The striking thing about yesterday's news to me was that the Prime Minister of Canada did not rule out American responsibility.  That says a lot about the state of US-Canadian relations.  Thanks, Obama ... Trump.

NATO in Iraq: More, Same, Or Less

Trump included a semi-throw away line about NATO doing more in Iraq or Mideast.  While Justin Ling argued this is something that should be done, here's why it, like fetch, ain't happening:

1. NATO countries cannot operate without the US on the ground or in the air. The US has unique capabilities (comms), abundant capabilities (medevac helos), strong capabilities (quick reaction forces to defend/rescue allies in harm's way), and so on.  
2. Why would any NATO member want to put their troops in harm's way after Trump endangered the existing NATO troops by launching a strike against an Iranian official without notifying said NATO countries?
3. The NATO mission is one of training--the risk of green on blue (trainees attack trainers) is much greater now than it was two weeks ago.
4. NATO members have domestic politics, mostly governed by coalitions, and with hard requirements to have deployment votes for stuff like this, unlike US or Canada. 
5. The domestic politics is tougher because Trump is toxic in most countries.  Which leaders are willing to buck domestic opposition to stand next to Trump? Hungary? Sure, Orban wouldn't mind, but Hungary is also one of the crappiest allies in terms of showing up and doing heavy military lifting (the New Zealand forces in Afghanistan patrolled the Hungarian sector next door precisely because they didn't trust the Hungarians to do it themselves).   France?  Nope. Germany?  Nope. UK? Probs not.   There is a price to be paid for all of Trump's antagonizing of European countries.
6. If Justin Trudeau allows folks to think that maybe the shooting down of the plane in Iran might just be partly due to Trump's behavior, you can be pretty sure that few allies will trust Trump on anything.

So, no, NATO reinforcement in Iraq to replace the Americans.  

Nothing at NATO is Automatic Except More Meetings

Lots of speculation about responses to the Trump/Iraq/Iran situation, so let me just clarify a few basics about NATO.

1. There is nothing automatic about Article V.  Yes, it has meant that an attack on one is seen as an attack on all BUT it requires a decision at NATO HQ among the permanent representatives from the members.  That decision is not a vote but one by consensus.  And getting consensus might just be really hard for reasons I elaborate below.
2. If Article V is involved by NATO, no member will be obligated to do anything specific as "each country will respond as they deem necessary." Yes, there is an opt out clause in Article V because the US insisted long ago AND it is hard to get consensus if countries have to surrender all decision-making after that. 
3. Oh, and NATO is a defensive alliance.  So, at least a few countries would not be so thrilled to join an adventure the Americans started.

That gets us to the problem of consensus.  Few non-American leaders have been enthusiastic about the strike last week.  Justin Trudeau keeps meeting with leaders of international organization calling for de-escalation in ways that are essentially subtweets aimed at Trump, and he is hardly along.  The Europeans have been upset since Trump pulled the US out of the JCPOA and after he has threatened European countries and businesses if they refused to sanction Iran.  The whole Iranian issue is a toxic one in US-European relations.  So, getting consensus would be much harder than in other circumstances.

Moreover, rather than investing in good will with American assurances of support in case Europeans need it, Trump has been threatening the allies about mythical back payments and reaching a standard now that was semi-agreed to for 2024--2% of GDP spent on defense.  So, that also does not create a lot of support for what would be seen as a replay of 2003.

Which gets to the heart of the matter: NATO members have their own domestic politics.  To support the US in this effort would require not just looking at the polls, but, if things got serious, votes in parliaments because nearly all European countries require votes to deploy troops.  And with mostly coalition governments, those votes are hardly guaranteed.  Given that Trump is unpopular in most European countries, it would be very, very hard to get NATO members to agree to expend serious money and risk the lives of their troops especially for an administration that is not seen as particularly competent.

One last thing: with the strike on Suleimani without notifying anyone, Trump has endangered NATO troops on the ground in Iraq.  That is something that will weigh heavily in much decision-making in the capitals of NATO members.

Update: One more thing: threatening to commit war crimes (hitting cultural sites) is a great way to ensure that the Europeans do not join in.  Most of these countries are very sensitive to these kinds of issues, and will not want to be present where war crimes are being committed.  So, Trump is making it much harder for any European leader, if they wanted to, to try to join any US-led effort.

There will be meetings, because that is what NATO does.  But don't expect any policy statements anytime soon.  The members are all waiting to see how things develop.

Deterrence 101: Not Applicable to Big Brothers

Lots of talk about "re-establishing deterrence" with Iran right now.  One can argue about whether it was good or bad to hit Suleimani, but this ain't about deterrence.  The shorthand is: deterrence is about threats, not about the actual use of force.  The longhand is the Big Brother problem.

Let me explain (I am not a deterrence theorist, but I play one on TV):
The basics of deterrence are: if you do x, I will harm you and harm you in ways that are greater than the benefits of you doing x AND (here what is often ignored) I will harm you in ways that are worse than either the current status quo or where you think the status quo is shifting.  The US, for instance, sanctioned Japan in response to its aggression (cutting off oil sales, if I remember correctly) so that the situation was worsening for Japan.  This undercut deterrence because the "doing x" seemed to be more attractive, not less, compared to the shifting status quo.

Much of the focus of deterrence is on the credibility of the threat--will you do the costly thing to create harm for the target (which often creates harm for the deterring country)--but there is the other side of the question--what I call the Big Brother problem.*

For deterrence to work, one has to threaten harm if the target does something you don't want AND one has to assure the target that they will not be harmed if they do something you want.  You have to be able credibly to accept yes as an answer.  Can this administration do that, especially from the Iranian standpoint?  Iran agreed to the nuclear deal which limited its nuclear aspirations (we can argue all day about whether it was good enough, whether it complied fully), and then the Trump Administration said it was not good enough and dropped out of it, threatening maximum pressure. 

For the Iranians, it seems like the US could not take "yes, we agree" as an answer.  For the Trumpers, they can say that they cared more about other behavior, and, yes, other behavior--supporting Hezbollah, doing all other kinds of awful stuff--was problematic.  But in a bargaining situation, when you say, nope, we are not going to take yes for an answer, it changes the dynamic quite a bit.  And, yes, to engage in bargaining, you have to think not just about what you are thinking but what the other side is thinking and preferring.  The whole idea of "strategic" is about getting inside the head of the other dog adversary.

Coming back to the shorthand, to use violence is an admission that deterrence is not working.  It is still coercive diplomacy, but a harder, less successful form: compellence.  Compellence is mostly about using force to get others to change their behavior (see these handy lecture notes from Branislav L. Slantchev).  The Kosovo bombing campaign is a successful example, and there is a lot of regret about that one.  That is much harder for all kinds of reasons:

• It tends to require the other side to make a visible change in policy, losing face, whereas deterrence simply requires the other side to keep not doing something.
• It is not just about losing face--the other side had a reason to be doing what they were doing, so altering their preference structure or changing the costs they face is harder than maintaining the status quo.
• I forget the rest....

While Thomas Schelling was not always right, his classic works about coercive diplomacy remind us that threats vary in how easy/complicated they are (compellence is hard), and that restraint and empathy are required.  Given that this administration is utterly devoid of empathy, is not known for restraint, is also devoid of credibility, and is not very coherent or competent, it is hard to imagine how they can make a compellent strategy work.  This is one of the places where the uncertainty engine comes home to roost--that lying about much stuff and flip flopping a lot has consequences for persuading the Iranians not to escalate. 

So, yes, I am reminded of 2003 in that these are the wrong people seemingly planning the wrong war at the wrong time (the time thing is about how all of this undercutting the ISIS fight).  Any pleasant callbacks or analogies that I am forgetting?


*  No, my big brother didn't abuse me.  Just thinking about a well known kind of dynamic.

Syria Retrospective

The invasion of Syria by Turkey is making some folks look backwards and blame Obama for not doing more.  And I have put forth a challenge on twitter: what exactly could Obama have done?

I ruled out bombing, as hitting Assad directly is harder than folks think.  And it got harder still after the Russians got more involved.  Oh, and it would be the US mostly alone since David Cameron could not get a vote through his parliament.  And as Ben Dennison reminded me, NATO was out of bombs after Libya.

I ruled out a massive intervention, as the US was still winding down Iraq and was still stuck in Afghanistan, and the army was near the breaking point after nearly a decade of two wars.  And, as those two wars remind us, once you are in, how do you get out?  Especially with the Russians, Iran, and Hezzbollah seriously involved?

I ruled out safe havens as they are neither safe nor havens (thanks Doug Benson, as I am stealing your take on Safe House).  Srebrenica anyone?  To create a safe haven requires an invasion of one kind or another, so that a space is created in which people can gather (which kind of makes them targets).  And that space has to be large enough that Assad's artillery would have been far enough away that it would not be able to hit the people in the safe haven.  Or have enough arty in place to counter-battery fire to deter such stuff.  Again, safe havens require war. 

As a scholar of international relations, I simply do not have any ideas of what the intervention could have looked like that was politically feasible.  Remember, this was with a very hostile Congress that was not willing to vote for a new authorization and budgets fights were constantly risking the closure of the government. 

The US has essentially tried everything--doing a lot (Iraq, Afghanistan), doing something (Libya), doing nothing (Syria)--which should tell us both about the limits of American power and how hard it is to intervene in civil wars.  Which is why I repeat my plea for some humility.  These things are really hard, that mistakes are inevitable (we rely on unreliable proxies on a regular basis because ... that is often all there is), they are very expensive, and there is no easy way to leave. 

The other regret folks have is Obama pulling US troops out of Iraq (something Bush had agreed to), but that points to the big problem--once you get in, it is hard to leave.  Rumsfeld wanted Afghanistan to be "break the Taliban and leave" situation, and he expected to hand over Iraq to some random Iraqi exiles (who happened to have been Iranian agents) and have the US forces leave quickly.  Obama understood that entering Syria meant staying for the long term, I believe.  And that was problematic. 

Sure, now it seems like intervening would have prevented the flow of millions of refugees to Europe, which has not helped Europe very much (although I still blame much of the problems European democracies have with the embracing of austerity measures after the 2008 crisis).  But if the US had intervened forcefully (again, how?), would Syrians have stuck around?  The US way of war does create a lot of collateral damage (civilian casualties), so I still think there would have been refugee flows.

Anyhow, again, the crowd of MOAR needs to tell us what more would have looked like and how it was politically feasible.  Which is kind of like the anti-JCPOA crowd--tell us another way to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons that Iran would have agreed to.  And don't tell me some bombing would have done the trick. Because bombing is wildly overrated.

So, instead of learning to blame Obama, I prefer to learn something else: humility.

Paper Tigers, Liars, and the Next War

So much happened this weekend that we don't understand.  We don't know if it was Iran that attacked Saudi Arabia's production facilities, we don't know why they would do so, we don't know if the Houthis did it, etc.

What do we know? 

1. Well, we know that the Trump Administration has no credibility--it has lied about a great many things, so even if they come out with some evidence of either Iranian complicity (and Iran is almost certainly at least complicit) or Iran guilt, it will be easy for folks to dismiss these claims.  After all, Trump is currently lying about saying that saying that he would meet the Iranians without preconditions.  
2. We know that observers have taken to seeing Trump as a paper tiger--that he makes threats that he will not back up.  Which then encourages them to push harder and harder, expecting Trump to back down.  And they will be right to do so until ... they are wrong and find that even paper tigers eventually push back.  So, if Iran did take a risk, it might have been encouraged by Trump's previous bluffs and blustering.
3. Saudi Arabia is a crappy friend of the US.  Maybe the Trumps love the Saudis for their entangled financial ties, but Saudi Arabia has benefited far more from American help than vice versa.  This, of course, is ironic, given Trump's criticism of NATO allies, as they have bled for the US.  Have the Saudis?  No, but the US has bled for them.  And because of them.  Oh, and another contrast: the US is not obligated to defend Saudi Arabia.  There is no mutual defense treaty between the US and Saudi Arabia.  The US has acted in Saudi Arabia's defense, most notably in 1990 when Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia, but I can't find anything but an agreement to sell arms. 
4. John Bolton was not the only guy in the Trump Administration who sought a war with Iran.  Pompeo is still around, and I am sure there are others.

While there must be work done to determine what happened and who is responsible, and Iran should face significant punishment by the international community, the US does not really need a war right now.  And Iran has plenty of ways to escalate in the region to make things hurt.  I am not sure a pinprick strike against Iran will not escalate. 

People have been wondering how the Trump Administration will do once it faces a real crisis, one that it didn't make.  Well, this is one that they only partly made, so, yeah, we are there now.  And I am very, very worried.  There are not too many good policy options, and I have confidence that Trump will pick a bad one AND will not do the necessary work to get allies and other countries to support the US course of action. 

I wish we could expect cooler heads to prevail, but none of those are in government these days.  So, what next?  Damned if I know.  Maybe the paper tiger will roar and then not bite, maybe Trump will overreact?  Maybe the Saudis will push for caution?  The key is the White House is dominated by the uncertainty engine in chief so no reason to be certain about any of this.  

Better Not To Be Invited

Canada has a built in FOMO syndrome with which I sympathize greatly.  Indeed, I have internalized this so when somebody says transatlantic and only refers to the US regarding this side of the Atlantic, I take umbrage.  In the latest alliance/coalition news, Canada is not being asked to join a new European effort to form a coalition fleet to protect shipping near Iran.  And I say: phew.

Why?  Because I don't want Canada to get stuck in any escalation of conflict with Iran.  This entire dispute is unnecessary.  Iran signed the JCPOA, a deal that stopped its quest for nuclear weapons (we can argue about whether the deal was perfect or not, but it went a long way towards the most important goals), and then Trump, upset that Obama's name was attached, pissed it away.  Which has led to increased tensions with a drone getting shot down, with tankers being seized.  A war with Iran wouldn't quite make the Iraq war appear smart by comparison, but, yes, a war with Iran would be dumber than the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

Canada was smart and lucky to duck out of that particular conflict.  It would be smart and might require luck to duck out of another Mideast war.  I opposed the 2003 war in part because I thought the Rummy team would screw things up (and they did).  Can you imagine a Trump team running a major war?  Just thinking of that makes me queasy. 

Anyway, the entire point of coalitions of the willing is to include folks who are willing and leave out those who are not.  I said on twitter that if this were a NATO fleet, then, yes, Canada should join as the alliance brings both obligations that Canada should respect and restraints that might limit the US a bit.  A coalition of the willing imposes no obligations on Canada and restrains no one (see the works by Patricia Weitsman and Sarah Kreps for more on coalitions vs alliances). 

One of the questions we asked during the week in Israel was where Israel stood on this stuff and why.  We kept finding folks there arguing that American bombing of Iran was preferable to the deal.  That bombing would not do much but kick the can down the road a couple of years as it could not erase Iran's nuclear program.  That this was better than a ten year delay in Iran's program (which was giving them more credit since the JCPOA is more than a ten year delay).  Why?  Something about making the Iranians hurt, I guess, which might deter further nuclear ambitions?  I found these arguments utterly uncompelling.

Iran remains a challenging country because it is more than just a nuclear program, it is also a sponsor of very serious, very dangerous proxies.  One cause for turbulence in detente with the Soviet Union was the expectation that arms control would tie the USSR's hands on many other issues, when all it did was restrain the arms race.  Asking for a deal that staves off Iran's development of nuclear weapons to do more than that shows a lack of learning and unrealistic expectations. 

Canada is smart not to get sucked into this. This is one thing Canada should not fear of missing.

Trump and a Multilateral Coalition? Um, No

This morning, Steven Metz asked:

Is the Trump administration capable of creating and leading such a multinational coalition? https://t.co/lpqNI4iBe2

— Steve Metz (@steven_metz) June 17, 2019

And sure, it might be my confirmation bias to say: hells no.  But let me explain why Trump is incapable of creating and leading such a multinational coalition.

First, Trump doesn't want to do so.  Sure, Bush and Rummy didn't want to do so either, but but fighting two wars at the same time required help in holding the fort in the lesser priority (alas, Afghanistan).  While Bush and Rummy and others seemed exasperated by alliances, Trump is far more hostile.

Second, Trump will make it very, very hard for the allies to get their domestic politics lined up.  In most democracies, legislatures need to vote in order to deploy their forces abroad.  This is hard even when the US President is popular--ask David Cameron about failing to get support for a Syria mission.  It is much harder when the US President is unpopular.  While all of these wars are seen as American wars, Iraq and Iran are very much so.  Politicians are far more likely to compete with each other in how distant they are from Trump.  This outbidding combined with coalition politics (is Canada the only Western democracy that has a single party owning a majority of seats?  That may not last past October) means it will be very difficult to get countries to join the US.

Third, this potential war with Iran is one where the US could not take yes for an answer.  Iran signed the deal, the US--under a new President--rejected it.  Last time, the US couldn't get France and Germany on board.  Who will join in now when the alternative--getting an agreement--was something the US spurned?

Fourth, um, what would the strategy be?  To be the coalition leader, the US would need to develop a strategy for winning a war against Iran and one that does not impose a very high price because, again, this is a war of choice.  How does the US defeat Iran?  Please, tell me how this war proceeds.  Because I have no clue.  Iran's military will not disappear overnight, and it is well set up to conduct an insurgency after the US eventually wins the conventional battle (who gave some Iraqi and Afghan groups really destructive IEDs?  Oh yeah).  In chatting with experts on this stuff, we are all flummoxed--what is the theory of victory? Wishful thinking?  Maybe allies will think about joining the US, but if the US can't provide a strategy, most (if not all) will stay out of it.

Fifth, having Israel involved might be toxic for many potential Arab allies.  Having the Saudis involved may be toxic for some Western allies.  And these two countries seemed to want to defeat Iran by recklessing throwing American soldiers and marines at the problem. 

Six, allies join in because they expect to get something back.  At the very least, they expect that their ally will support them in a time of need.  Can anyone count on Trump to either remember what an ally has done before or care about it?  No.   

Alliance warfare is damned hard.  It requires patience, empathy, finessing domestic tradeoffs, a decent plan for at least the first stages, and a plausible case both for the need for war and for a strategy to achieve victory.  I can't see how Trump and Bolton and Pompeo are up to providing any of this.  Do you?

Ira-2: Electric Boogaloo

Oy, so the war drums are beating with Iran the target this time.  How will this be different?
Here's a clue:

Spain pulls frigate from USS Abraham Lincoln Strike Group amid Iran differences |@Reuters https://t.co/rE6KSabN9M

— Lucas Tomlinson (@LucasFoxNews) May 14, 2019

While not all allies jumped aboard the Iraq war bandwagon, Spain showed up last time and then had caveats and left early.  But this points to a key reality when it comes to allies.  They fear two things most--being abandoned and being dragged into a war they don't want to fight.  Japan gets to experience both, but the Spanish are focused on one.  While much of the 2003 support was fairly token--the Bush Administration wanted a long list of countries for their coalition of the willing with few doing real fighting, real burden-bearing.  Spain was one of the few countries that sent enough to attempt to deal with an entire sector.

Anyhow, I expect very, very few countries to join a Trump war in Iran for a few key reasons:

• As problematic as the Iraq war was in terms of legitimacy, folks could rest on a few key things--UN resolutions, past aggression, past genocide, etc.  Iran has done bad things, but they agreed to a nuclear  arms deal that the US, not Iran, is breaking from.  So, who's going to tell their publics that they need to sacrifice blood and treasure for this war?
• As unpopular as Bush was in 2003, US relations with most potential partners were not bad except for the war.  This time, US relations with everyone except Israel and Saudi Arabia are awful.  Trade wars, breaking the Iran deal, etc.  Even relations with the UK are not great.  It is hard to see how May could get a vote through parliament.  Trump is toxic.  And that matters for when leaders try to get votes through their legislatures.  
• As incompetent as Rumseld and his folks were, they did not have that reputation until after they started to screw up the post-war phase.  Everyone knows that this administration can't do anything complicated.  Plus they are pardoning war criminals.  Which makes it even less attractive.
• Oh, and there's the whole Iran thing.  Iran is a much, much tougher opponent than Iraq.  More territory, more people, a regime that has more legitimacy, one that has not been broken by decades of sanctions and lost wars.  So, anyone thinking about this war needs to get clear that it will not be a walk in the park.  

I don't know if the Trump administration is dumb enough to go to war with Iran. I am pretty sure that few other countries will be dumb enough to join them this time.  Just because Trump and Bolton don't possess learning curves does not mean others haven't learned from the past.

Taking the War Cap Seriously

A while back, I posted how we ought to think about American wars as like the salary caps in the NFL and NBA: that at some point, there is a limit of how much you can be doing (paying in the metaphor) at one time.  The basic idea is that the US can only fight so many wars at a time.  Remember when people thought Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were stupid for opening up multi-front wars?

It is not so much that fighting in multiple theaters opens up the US to attack from multiple directions but that the US does not have infinite numbers of soldiers, sailors, pilots, ships, planes and, yes, dollars, not to mention officials to run many wars at once.  Right now, the US is fighting wars of varying sizes in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan (the drone war is still a thing, right?), and some others that I am probably forgetting.  None of these are at the levels of the simultaneous campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq that quite nearly broke the US Army.  The costs of that particular situation, two wars at once, are still being felt today in terms of readiness (how many planes and ships are crashing these days?) and will be felt for the next seventy years in terms of costs for taking care of those served and were wounded.  The question is not whether the US spent a trillion dollars but how many trillions thus far and how many left to spend. 

Yet the Trump administration seems to be moving towards not just one more war but two.  The new Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has issued a list of demands for Iran that kind of resemble the ultimatum given to Serbia before World War I--a list designed to be rejected (h/t to Ben Dennison).  We knew Pompeo to be a hawk on Iran, we knew Bolton to be one as well.  Given that the Iran deal is better than what we could possibly expect for a NK deal, their idea of "fixing the deal" seems incredibly insincere and actually a step towards war,  And, yes, this war would be harder than Iraq--a much bigger population, much greater spaces for the US military to cover, more support for the government the more the US tries to impose itself, and on and on.  Low hanging fruit this is not.  Yet, if the US had to have a new war, I would prefer a war with Iran than one with North Korea.

Yes, the diplomacy pre-summit is turning into a shitshow.  All of the traits of the Trump administration are in full display: a lack of seriousness and preparation, Trump being baited by tweets and by meetings that are as substantial as tweets, the influence of warmongers (NK is not the only ones who feel repugnance towards Bolton), and on and on.  Robert Kelly explained this all very well in a series of tweets and then another one--Moon, South Korea's President has been desperately seeking a way of out of war, which led to this moment of hope and then wildly inflated expectations over de-nuking, and now Trump feeling betrayed.  Which means war is back to being in play in a big way.

The US military is not ready for either an Iran war or a North Korea war.  Either one would disrupt the global economy with oil skyrocketing in price if there is another war involving the Persian Gulf and the destruction of one of the 11 or so biggest economies in the world and maybe the third if Japan gets hit hard if the latter war happens.  The American people are not ready either as either would produce more casualties than they have grown to expect.  A war with North Korea would kill more Americans in the first days than all of the troops lost in combat since Vietnam.  Oh, and the civilian casualties will be unlike anything the US has experienced since .... I have no idea.

Either of these words would explode the deficit even further than the misbegotten tax cut, and each one would wreak such damage as to make us forget that the US is already involved in a half dozen wars (or more).  So, not only are we already above the war cap, this government is contemplating adding one or two super-expensive yet unproductive stars to our team of wars (I am thinking of the Washington football team's free agents, but I will take nominations for other disasters).

All of this is awful and going to get even more so.  Good thing the GOP is getting what it wanted (more bad SCOTUS decisions) when it sold its soul and sold out the country.  All I know is that I wish we could fire the general manager, the coach, and the entire staff of this team.  Alas, it ain't gonna happen.

Trump and IR 101: Iran Edition

I am not an expert on Iran or on nuclear proliferation, but I have taken Intro to International Relations, so I apparently know more than Trump and his guys.  Yes, taken.  You don't have to teach Intro to IR to know more than these folks--the bar is low.  So, what did I learn in that class and what did I teach over the years that Trump,  Bolton and whoever else simply do not understand:

1. Sovereign countries have agency. Sure, countries may pay costs for disagreeing with the most powerful actor, but they have the ability to decide.  So, you can't just do X and expect everyone to go along, whether they are friends or foes.  Indeed, every country has its own domestic politics and its own national interests.  Sucks, but there it is. 
2. Which leads to: cooperation is not easy but generally required.  For instance, unilateral sanctions do not work unless one is the only supplier or buyer of a good/service.  The US sanctioning Iran can do some modest damage, but to really punish Iran, the US will need Europe and probably Russia and China to get on board.  Why should they?  Wishful thinking?
3. Strategic thinking is key.  To be clear, this means that one needs to figure out not just what one wants, but what others want, so that one can figure out ways to get others to do what you want.  My best illustration for this was always my dogs--who remain more strategic than Trump despite both dogs being dead for seven and ten years respectively.   
4. The security dilemma is a thing: unilateral efforts to improve one's security will cause others to react, improve their defenses, which ultimately leaves every less secure.  So, yeah, Iran pursuing nukes may very well lead to Saudi Arabia pursuing nukes.  Good times. 
5. Which leads to this: repeatedly issuing threats is a bad idea.  We IR folks tend to teach WWI for many reasons, but one of them is that the Germans thought they could cow everyone into bending to them.  Instead, they provoked alliances against them.  Trump thinks he got denuclearization in Korea (nope, he didn't) because he threatened a lot, so now he is going to apply "maximum pressure" everywhere.  This will only come back to bite in a big way.  I won't get into the details of Prisoner's Dilemma vs. Chicken here, but the basic idea is that if you keep on playing chicken, at some point, someone is going to escalate and it won't end well.  

Drezner blogged today (ish, since I am living in tomorrow for the moment), arguing that agreements are always flawed so the question is not whether an agreement is flawed, but do you have a better one in mind and a plan to get there.  Trump has no plan because that would require some knowledge of international relations, some ability to engage in strategic thinking, some discipline, and some work.  So, nope, not going to happen. 

One last thing: as old IR colleague of mine commented on my fb page: individuals matter.  Trump reminds us of this everyday.   Not all Intro to IR classes take individuals seriously.   I had a lecture or two on individuals, but spent most time talking about the importance of domestic politics and the dynamics of the international system.  Why?  Because the "great man" view of IR, including its inherent sexism, is what students get before they show up at college.  But if I were teaching Intro to IR these days, I would probably spend a smidge more time... not just because of Trump but also because folks are thinking more seriously about it (we did in our NATO book).  

Real Problems in The World

Trump is, well, a freaking disaster when it comes to pretty much everything but especially foreign policy.  One of the less obvious ways he is fucking up discussions of foreign policy is not the possibility that realism might become tainted, but that we don't notice important stuff.  So, a quick run of the news and what we are missing by focusing on the epic dumpster fire train wreck (imagine a train of dumpster fires derailing) that is Donnie.

• Indonesia seems ready to start a war in the South China Seas as it is promising to sink more than 70 foreign fishing boats.  I cannot claim to be an expert on anything in the Pacific, at least not until I spend a month in Japan, but, to this amateur's eyes, this does not look good.  China is already riled up over losing the adjudication decision.  This will be some kind of independence day for Indonesia--starting a war!  Woot!  No, not woot.  Most of the impounded ships are not Chinese, but some are.  Apparently destroying impounded ships is nothing new, but a grand symbolic gesture?  Right now, after China's big loss?   Not good.  The link above has a great gif showing the various claims and trends.  
• Russia just bombed Syria via planes based in ... Iran.  This is NEW and completely unnecessary.  The latter first: Russia can and has been bombing Syria from planes based in Russia and in Syria.  Russia does not need bases in Iran for that chore.  The former: no foreign troops have been based in Iran since ... 1979.  So, Iran is compromising slightly on its tradition of robust independence since the revolution by letting the Russians fly out from its territory.  A great way to say "screw you" to the US.  The Russia-Iran friendship, largely built on keeping Assad in power and a shared interest in undermining US interests in the region is now becoming an alliance.  A couple of key implications are:
• Iraq once again has let the Russians use its airspace.  Sure, Iraq has no anti-aircraft capability, but the symbolic stuff is important.  And this symbolic stuff says: Iraq is heavily influenced by Iran and is willing to do stuff that contradicts the US even though the US is spending a heap of resources helping Iraq take back its territory from ISIS.  
• It might must provide some support for ye olde Iran nuclear deal.  Remember, the sanctions required multilateral support, especially Russia's.  If there were no deal, would Russia be sanctioning Iran today?  My guess is that the sanctions regime would have broken by now.  So, we got a decent agreement before the chances for one disappeared.
• The NYT is overreaching---calling Russia the "primary broker in the region."  Please.  US still has heaps of influence, friends and allies in the region.  Russia is a significant spoiler, but the US is still the biggest player.
•  Canada is still trying to figure out where to make its new peace operations commitment with MND Sajjan on a tour of Africa.  I will try to remember to write tomorrow for why Canada should focus on Haiti and/or Colombia.
• Brexit?  I have no idea the state of play there, but then again, does anyone else?

I am sure there are heaps of other hotspots and crises that are getting too little attention, but that is a quick tour of the stuff that our Trump focus is causing us to miss.

Scholars Supporting Iran Deal

Politico has the public letter signed by a bunch of Middle East and IR scholars.  My first reaction is that I agree with Chomsky and Mearsheimer?  Yuck.  Then I see that I agree with Chenoweth and Jervis!  Woot!

Howeverr, I don't really agree with the entirety of the letter, as I am not sure this agreement will stabilize the Mideast much (where is Marc Lynch's signature? Nope).  But the deal itself is a good one--arms control to limit proliferation is good, and that US opposing a multilateral deal is bad.

I definitely believe that diplomacy and not more force is required here.  Our military options suck and have lots of nasty 2nd/3rd order effects ... not to mention that the past 15 years in the Mideast should have taught us something about the limits of the use of force.

I am not sure talking with Iran will tame it, but rejecting this agreement will certainly not contain it.

What does surprise me about this letter is that it could have gotten far more signatures had it been circulated wider.  Ah, but academic networks are funky things.

The really big question is: if the agreement goes through, will Mearsheimer finally feel like folks are listening to him, that he really matters, and that he can feel better about his role in the world?  Or will he still think the Israeli lobby is behind everything and that politicians lie and all that?  Ironically, this suggests that we may see a key hypothesis to be tested!

Vacation Bucket List: Argue About Iran Deal!

I have not blogged much this week as I am vacationing with my family this week.  However, a conversation about Iran with one skeptical relative inspired me to spew just a bit.

The primary complaint about the Iran deal is that it seemed to be just about the nuclear stuff and not about everything else.  My comeback was and is: the deal always was and is about Iran's nuclear program and not about 4 folks Iran is holding or about Iran's other weapons programs or about Iran's foreign policies.  Don't expect any arms control deal to address every problem in a bilateral relationship.  It is not how the US engaged the Soviet Union in the 1970s and it makes not much sense today.

Indeed, basic bargaining logic suggests that the more stuff you add to a deal, the more compromises you may have to make to get a deal completed.  Not addressing these other issues in this deal does not mean that they will not be addressed... just that they are not addressed in this deal.  The US relationship with Iran is multidimensional and this deal is only on one dimension.

There is another reason why the deal is only focused on the nuclear program: the deal is not a bilateral arrangement between the US and Iran but a multilateral one.  Russia, China, France, Germany and the UK do not care about four Americans held by Iran, nor do they see eye to eye on a variety of issues.  It is actually pretty amazing that the group has held together, given the tensions between the US/France/Germany and Russia and the tensions between the US and China.  The bargaining really was a three stage game: US with its allies, the group with Iran, and now Obama with the Senators.  So, expecting a deal that addressed many issues is just not realistic.

The key questions about the deal are about whether the terms actually prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons and how the verification/penalty schemes are designed.  The reporting of the deal suggests that these key issues are mostly ok but not terrific.  Which means that the deal is more good than bad, especially when compared to the alternatives.

Speaking of which, some are complaining that Obama has defined the alternatives as the deal or war with Iran.  That this is an unfair, fear-mongering depiction of the choices.  Maybe.  But maybe not given that many of the groups/individuals fighting the deal are precisely those that have advocated the use of force as their preferred policy choice.  Of course, there is another alternative: US rejects the deal, Russia and China end their sanctions, Europe follows suit, and Iran gets to keep its centrifuges spinning away while also gaining the benefits of reduced sanctions.  That does not seem attractive to me.

Which leads to a final question: why is Chuck Schumer going against this deal? Damned if I know.  Actually, I do know: that politicians do what is bad for one's country as long as it is good for the short term interests of their own career.  Still, this does not make too much sense if Schumer wants to become the Democratic Party's leader in the Senate.  I certainly would not want him in that position if he cannot support his party's leader (Obama) when his support is needed.

Iran Arguments: Cartoon or Reality

Brian McFadden of the NYT does a nice job of illustrating many of the ant-Iran deal arguments.

There is apparently not enough room for the "if Obama tried harder, we could have gotten a better deal" argument.  Still, woot for McFadden.

Iran Deal: Placeholder

I have not read the details of the deal, as I am working on some stuff I need to get out and under review with summer slip, slip, slipping away.  So, let this post be a placeholder for the time when I have the time to think about this more.

My initial takes, however, are:

Confirmation bias runs strong today.

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) July 14, 2015

I wonder if the US ever negotiated with authoritarian regimes before over nuclear wearpons.... I guess there is a first time for everything

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) July 14, 2015

And, most seriously, war is always a lousy alternative and particularly in this case.  Oh, and the US is not bargaining alone with Iran--the sanctions require international support and the deal involves other actors.  Let's not forget those key aspects.

Oh and I posted on the initial deal here and here.  I don't think my views will change much once I read more about the agreement (since I am aware of my own vulnerability to confirmation bias).  Oh, and I don't give a rat's ass what Netanyahu says....

A Slightly Less Quick Reaction On Iran Nuclear Deal

Last night, I quickly dashed off a post on the deal, so I left much out.  Critics will focus on what this does not change: that Iran is expanding its influence in the region (um, thanks GWB), that Iran supports terrorist groups, that Iran is hostile to Israel.  Yep.  There are two responses to this:

a) US arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union did not fix the US relationship with the USSR.  They mostly just slowed down and managed the arms race, while giving the US and the Soviet Union a bit of progress on the bilateral relationship.  The deals did not stop the Soviet Union's support of insurgencies the US did not like, it did not stop the USSR from controlling Eastern Europe, and it did not lead to the Soviet Union rejecting its own ideology which called for worldwide revolution (a pretty hostile ideology if you are old enough to remember.

b) The deal does not fix Iran's problems either.  The US is still seen as being mostly bent on Iranian regime change.  The US is still arming its friends in the region.  Israel gets to keep its nuclear weapons without any negotiated restrictions on its nuclear weapons program.  Pakistan (not a friend of Iran) gets to keep its nuclear weapons. 


Anyone expecting this deal to do anything other than limit Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons is just not that serious.  This deal does mean that the US stays under the war cap--that we are not adding yet another country to the US military's agenda today. 

One last thought: wasn't it Reagan who said Trust but Verify?  The deal has that hardwired in, yes?