Thirty Years of Ultimate: Oh My!

Thirty years ago, I started playing competitive ultimate.  I had played ultimate informally before that--at high school and at summer camp.  In the fall of my frosh year, I took an Experimental College (EXCO) class in ultimate frisbee.  I could have started playing inter-collegiate ultimate that fall, but I waited until spring.  As a result, sometime this month thirty years ago, I began playing "serious" ultimate--first with a college team against other college teams and then on league teams against other league teams with some other kinds of tournaments along the way.

The specific date does not matter, but I am struck by the reality that I have had a longer relationship with ultimate than with my wife.  Sure, I have had periods of non-ultimate in my life (didn't play that much in grad school, hard to find in Texas, no time while in Virginia).

I will always be grateful that the folks playing ultimate when I started did not have the same kind of athleticism as the folks I encounter these days.  I would never have gotten as much playing time ... well, I did have one advantage in 1985 that might have guaranteed it--I had a car that could fit an entire team easily.

Why has ultimate meant so much to me?  Partly because I enjoyed playing a sport I could play well.  Partly because the people involved tended to be silly, sweet, fun, funny, and mighty sharp.  It is pretty telling that in my travels across North America, my friends usually came from two places: my department and the ultimate folks.  Only in Ottawa, my latest stop, has this not applied--I had friends via other sources.  But in Texas, our friends were exclusively from these two groups, and this was largely true in Montreal as well. 


Anyhow, I thought I would mark the anniversary by going through the digital pictures I have handy and noting some of the teams and moments along the way. 

I have a few pictures of my time playing at Oberlin. This one is handy:

It is on the baked fields of Ann Arbor, Michigan, as we played in the sectional tournament (we only made it to regionals one time during my four years and only because another team that was ahead of us could not make it).  One of my teammates had a couch in the back of his truck, and it was handy on these hard fields. 

This picture is of the Lubbock crew (I forget our name), playing in a distant tourney.  All of our tourneys were distant, as there were no other teams in town, and no nearby towns with ultimate.  I didn't play in many tournaments as I had a young kid at home at the time, but I did make it to one in Austin, one in Los Alamos (Atomic Blast--I still have the shirt), and one in Colorado (a costume tourney, which meant I had to get a cow costume that I have kept wearing on occasion [see below]). 

Lubbock ultimate, at Atomic Blast

In Montreal, I played with a few teams.  I played indoors at first, and found out that the Montreal frisbee community was chock full of silly folks, as you can guess from this picture.  Lindsay made an immediate impression on me.  She was not alone in making me welcome to this vibrant frisbee community.  I played ultimate three to four seasons a year for ten years, even as some of the winter leagues (displaced by youth soccer) required a 45 minute or more drive on late winter nights to get to the field.  Only at the end, with the league growing so big with so many games being played off the island, with resulting rush hour driving through the choke points, did I start shedding my ultimate commitments.  

Lindsay Bales, whose hammers are almost
as silly (and effective) as her gear.

Still, the teams I played with made quite an impression.  I played with BMFHard, which stood for Break Force, Mark Hard.  I could only do the former, not so much the latter.  But the team did let me indulge in my favorite throwing tactic, which is throwing to the side of the field the defense was seeking to deny me.   I didn't always see eye to eye with my captain, but Bobby did teach me a lot about tactics and strategy.  As a result, like Bill Belichick, I seek to start on offense in the second half. 

I played several seasons with Ultimate Angels.  A very silly team indeed.  A largely Francophone team that tolerated/made fun of/welcomed the unilingual guy.  After all, he provided some company to the oldest players on the team (yes, UA was one of the few teams after college where I was not the oldest player).  

This pic was from one of my last seasons with UA and shows an old man to old man pass as Mike K was one of the few players with whom I played with and against in Montreal who was older than me.  He was also much fitter... damn it.  This also shows that I can run and cut long, something that surprised many teams since I tended to hang back and be one of the handlers (qb/point guard)

Playing with the Grandmaster's team of Montreal, Olde Ville (or something like it) was a pleasure and an honor.  And beer from a championship cup is delightful.

In my entire career, one team stands out: General Admission.  I played steadily with them in the fall and spring every year as we helped to take over the  Concordia frisbee league.  Eventually, they developed a winter league, and I joined GA in that as well.  The team was so much fun, with so much silly, so much good ultimate, and just terrific people.  

One of my first seasons with GA

Fall games near Halloween always brought out the moo in me.

I was so very touched when they threw me a surprise game on my way out of town.  The pictures here are from before and after that game.  I laughed a lot that evening.  Not just GA players but also those whom I played against over the years.  

The start to a special night.

I really felt the love that night.  I miss those guys

Phil (on the left) overlapped with me for several years at Oberlin
and Chris (on the right) is the grandfather/godfather of
Oberlin Ultimate.

It was great to go back to Oberlin for various Reunion games including the 30th anniversary of Ultimate at Oberlin.

I have had fun bringing ultimate to the International Studies Association! 

ISA San Diego 2012

For a year or two, I had great fun watching and sometimes playing with my daughter.  Seeing Jessica play was quite a hoot.  And I am thrilled to report that she now plays with her college team. 








I ended up playing on the Junior team with Jean-Levy, the tall guy on the right in this picture--a fantastic player who has played with the the Canadian national team and on teams that have won at the national tourney.  The kids, he, and I won the C/D bracket during the end of the season tournament.  One of the older teams complained about J-L and I playing, but we were playing with 14-16 year olds against 20-40 year olds.... hee, hee. 






Finally a few pictures of highlights along the way.  I could never jump that well, so I always took pride in my ability to jump down/sideways: laying out for many disks.

Evidence I can leave the ground ... yet the other player
got the disk!

Mighty proud of my ability to throw any kind of throw accurately,
unlike many players, I remember that I have a backhand throw.

And thanks to my daughter and her keen editing skills, we have this video from 2014 proving that I may still have it. 

Patricia Weitsman Memorial Scholarship

I received this from Patricia Weitsman's sister:

Dear friends and loved ones;

We wanted to share with you the good news that The Patricia A. Weitsman Memorial Scholarship fund has officially become a permanent endowment, having crossed the $25k mark. It was so meaningful to have received this news just ahead of the first anniversary of my dear sister’s passing.

The first award will be decided in December 2015 for a student entering the War and Peace Studies Program in the 2016 academic year.

Thank you so very much for your thoughtful and loving contributions.

If you would still like to make a gift in memory of Patricia, please visit Ohio.edu/Give and note in the online form that the gift is in memory of Dr. Patricia Weitsman and request that funds be designated to The Patricia A. Weitsman Memorial Scholarship, or call 740-593-0732 to make a gift via phone.

With love,
Debbie

 So, this is good news.  I learned at the ISA more about how incredibly influential, sweet, touching and tough Pattie was, so I have been thinking alot about her as the anniversary of her death approaches.  I am glad to hear, although not surprised, that the fund-raising effort has been successful.  The new security journal at ISA, Journal of Global Security Studies, is something she shepherded, so that there will be a couple of very tangible legacies in her areas of scholarship--at Ohio U and at the ISA. 

Republican Letter-writing Silliness

Nice for Brian McFadden to take a swipe at HRC while he was at it...

NYT

My fave is Rand Paul's, I think, although Cruz writing to Canada is especially delightful as well. 

Sham-tastic Anniversary

While today is Π-day, in just two days, we will be "celebrating" the anniversary of that sham-wow event--the Crimea referendum.  Pretty much everyone, except for those with ties to Russia, saw the referendum as the sham it clearly was.  I wrote a piece that called it the way everyone saw it.  In the aftermath, the EU, the European Parliament, the Group of 7, the UN Security Council (vetoed by Russia, abstained by China), the UN General Assembly, NATO and the Venice Commission condemned it.  Even Russia's relatively stalwart friend Belarus indicated it was not thrilled.

The best way to evaluate the referendum?  By looking at those who supported it. 

• Afghanistan, with its own irredentist aspirations, and still led by a Karzai seeking to piss all over the West.
• Argentina, which saw the Crimea through the Malvinas ... although one could see it the reverse as well.  Oops.
• India opposed unilateral measures against Russia, which makes no sense since the world was anything but unilateral in its opposition.
• Kazakhstan
• Kyrgyzstan
• Venezuela
• The various semi-states that Russia has helped to create at the expense of its neighbors.

Yeah, great company.
So, let's just go to the videotape:


On the bright side, thanks to Vladimir Putin's putsch, Bill and I got the chance to write a new introduction for the new paperback version of For Kin or Country.

Perhaps Putin has disappeared because he is preparing a big party to celebrate the referendum.

Mach and Booze

The Ontario government is considering allowing the larger supermarkets to sell beer and wine, which would break the monopoly currently held by the Beer Store (run by foreign companies) and the LCBO (government booze stores).  So, the first reaction is almost funny in its over the top quality:
the public sector union basically has said that making booze easier to get means that the current administration does not care about women.  Hmmm, yes, the union cares about women, not about potential job losses.

Which is why I reached for my Machiavelli:
``It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.  For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had the actual experience of it.'' 

Sing it!

The Glass May Be Half Full

So much misery in the world, at least as the newspapers report (there is less violence and poverty than 10/20/30 years ago but whatever), and much fear of the apocalypse.  But then we have this:


I had scoffed at 3D printing, having no clue about its potential.  I still don't understand it--what goes in the machine?  But if it can do stuff like this, and other things I have seen lately, well, we live in a pretty amazing time.  Of course, this is probably all just a diversion by the intelligent computers....  this video provides quite a shot of perspective sauce to start the day.

Presidential Humor

I do love that this President can laugh at himself:


And Kimmel, along with Fallon, is on fire.

Online Media Caucus: Next Steps

The Online Media Caucus was ratified at the ISA in New Orleans. The question is: now what? First, we now have a variety of online media outlets to publicize:

• ISA's homepage for us: http://www.isanet.org/ISA/Caucuses/OMC
• Twitter: https://twitter.com/OnlineMediaISA or @OnlineMediaISA
• Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ISAOMC
• Blog to be announced later.
• Pinterest, Vine, Instragram, and other online media outlets will be developed by volunteers.

On The Bright Side

NATO's day job, providing reassurance to its members and seeking to deter Russia from attacking members, is actually pretty straightforward.... even, dare I say it, easy.  Huh?  Yes, I have been preaching humility for a while--that the lessons of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and Iraq (yes, that is deliberate) teach us that much of what NATO and various forms of coalitions have been doing can be really, really hard and that success is elusive.

How can I suggest that NATO's eastern front is "easy" while its southern front (this is the distinction I have heard from NATO types over the past few weeks) is so very hard?  Because that which NATO and coalitions x,y and z have been doing since 2001-ish has depended greatly on getting the politics right of the places where they have been operating.  That the local allies in Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, and so on have been quite unreliable, that they have had little control beyond their national capitals, that the international efforts have required extensive whole of government cooperation and intra-alliance cooperation to try to develop semi-self-sustaining political systems.  Indeed, this week, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dempsey referred to this basic problem--that whatever we do militarily in Iraq hinges on whether the Shia-dominated government can come up with a deal with the Sunnis.

The good news is that the European front is far, far less complex.  Whatever one thinks of Ukraine's government, that is almost entirely not NATO's problem.  NATO's challenge is to provide enough military force and the appearance of political commitment that such force would be used that Russia, and the ever-opportunist Putin (thanks to Kim Marten for the idea that Vlad is a judo guy looking at one move at a time and not a chessmaster), see that the potential costs of poaching further are not worth the risks.  This is not really that easy--getting consensus at NATO is difficult, but it pales in comparison to the challenges of the past fourteen or so years in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere. 

The governments of the Baltic countries and of Poland--the main countries on the frontier--are democratic, transparent, functional, stable and determined.  They are not likely to use alliance guarantees to act aggressively against Russia (unlike, say, Georgia).  They feel the threat quite intensely although Poland has much less to fear than the Baltics.  The latter have significant Russian populations that can be used by Putin as he stretches at the outer limits of plausible deniability (how implausible can one's denies be and still be plausible enough to be politically useful?).  The interests of the politicians in eastern Europe line up rather well with the US and others.  There are no Malikis or Karzais, with the possible exception of the entirely irrelevant (in this matter) Orban of Hungary. 

Sure, the Baltics need to do more to make their Russian populations feel less alienated, but if I were a Russian in the Baltics, I would compare my situation now to that of those living in the conflict zones in Ukraine.  Much better to be on this side of the bright and shiny line that divides NATO from Russia's prey. 

Again, getting consensus at NATO is hard, but even the Germans are making important commitments that tie their hands, such as agreeing to be the lead nation for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force.  Certainly, the European countries are having a very hard time meeting the 2% GDP commitment.  On the other hand, the US can place troops into the Baltics and Poland with or without NATO consensus, to re-create the tripwire that existing in West Germany in the days of the Cold War.  There is much work to do to improve the credibility of the NATO deterrent, of Article V's applicability to the Baltics, but the point here is that this is relatively simple compared to the recent past.  And it is something with which NATO has much practice, history and doctrine.  The alliance just has to go into the archives and dig this stuff up and figure out how the old plans of how to deal with salami tactics apply in the 21st century. 

Breaking Badder: Mad Men Dead Pool

In the grand tradition of the Spew, I am running a Mad Men Dead Pool for the last part of the last season of Mad Men.  Yep, we missed the chance to include Robert Morse's Bertram Cooper.  But we have a whole host of folks who might pass on before the last episode ends. 

To be clear, this is about who dies and not who lives (the who survived Breaking Bad game got complicated due to this point).  We will be holding a draft before April (the remaining episodes are televised in April and May) where people will take turns picking characters from the Mad Men universe.  The winner of the contest will be the person who picks the most characters who die during those final eight episodes.  Yes, a death montage a la Six Feet Under would count.  To count, the character has to be clearly dead--comas do not count.  As always, I am the arbitrary judge of all matters as it is my contest.

What shall we use as a tiebreaker?  Possibilities include:

• Sally's ultimate occupation? 
• the number of episodes in which Bobby has a speaking part?
• the number of times Harry is humiliated in the final eight episodes?
• the number of successful pitches Don makes (to clients, not to ladies) in the last eight?

So, I am now opening up the contest to both requests to be players and suggestions for the game itself.  So, comment here or tweet me or email me or facebook me if you want to play and if you have any suggestions before I make the final decisions on the rules.  I will take the first ten players or so (depending on bribes, successful advertising pitches, etc).

And the prize will be the same as always--a chance to post whatever you want at the Spew

Gin and tonics all around!

Not All IR Scholars

The current trend in the meta-analysis of Russia/Ukraine is to divide IR scholars and regional experts/comparativists with the former blaming NATO expansion and the latter focused more on Russia's domestic politics.  A mix is one that focuses on petro-states. I just want to scream that it is not all IR scholars who line up in the blame NATO, apologize for Putin camp.

A certain group of realists like to define their paradigm and even the IR community in a particular way, but the reality is that there is much diversity in Realism and among IR scholars.  The blame NATO crowd does not have a monopoly among realists as this Foreign Affairs summary clearly depicts. 

As the Monkey Cage piece suggests, timing matters, and last year's events did not happen because Ukraine's NATO status suddenly changed.  No, Russia's aggression began when it lost control over events in Ukraine when its favorite politician fled. 

Realists of a certain stripe have a problem with this because it suggests that domestic politics matters--that who runs Ukraine matters because different people with different constituencies will govern differently.  This is problematic for those who over-emphasize how determining a country's position is in the structure of international relations--great power/not great power; buffer state/whatever.

These Realists have another problem--in a nuclear world, what does the alliance status of Ukraine mean for Russian security?  Even if Ukraine were to become a NATO country (which was not on the horizon given European objections), Russia would have little to fear if one defines security conventionally--as the fear of an attack.  The reality of Mutual Assured Destruction would not change with Ukraine's alliance status.  So, one would have to expand the notion of security, make it broadly defined, in order for Ukraine to be a threat to Russia.  And that is a move that some of these Realists have long loathed.

One can be opposed to NATO expansion to Ukraine, as I have long been, and still find that Russia is entirely responsible for the events of late.  Putin has plenty of agency and chose this conflict.  It is, indeed, a war of choice.  A key irony/contradiction in modern (and classic) realism is to view other countries as being pushed by the international system as if they are billiard balls but that the reactions of the US (and sometimes its allies) are blunted by domestic politics.  If only the US too could react according to the clear imperatives of the international system, all would be ok, but politicians lie and lobbies lobby.  Damn.

What Happened to the Senate?

I seem to remember from my American history lessons long ago that one of the justifications of having a Senate with longer terms is that it would not be as likely to be swayed by whims and passions of the mob.  Well, it now seems like one half of the Senate is the mob.  Writing a letter to a foreign leader to advise him of their stance?  It is not clear whether this letter is more superfluous (pretty sure Iran gets FOX, CNN and the NY Times) or just more outrageous for over-stepping the body's role in the making of foreign policy.

I got miffed, so I tried to develop a meme yesterday:

Minimizing Risk vs Mitigating Risk

The Canadian government kept discussing "not combat" "troops not accompanying" and the like when it sent a handful of Special Operations Forces [SOF] to Iraq last summer/fall.  In January, they tripped over these distinctions when it was learned that CANSOF were spending something like 20% of their time near/at the front lines, including facilitating the bombing campaign by lasing (using laser designators to paint) targets.

Why?  The whole "no boots on the ground" mantra and this "not near the front lines" was an effort to minimize the risks the SOF were facing even as they acknowledged this was somewhat risky.  Not mitigate but downplay how risky their activities were.  This week, the risks--the chance of something bad happening--became costs as one CANSOF soldier was killed and three injured by the folks Canada is trying to help.

To be clear, I am not opposed to the deployment of SOF to Iraq and even to the frontlines.  Using the most experienced, most skilled, best equipped, best trained troops is a key way to be effective AND reduce the actual risks.   These soldiers are supposed to be better than the average infantry soldier--that they can do more damage and provide more support while exposing themselves to less danger.

The problem is that the government fell into its own trap--that there would be few risks and therefore the public and parliament should not mind.  But there were and are real risks--not the chimera of mission creep--but of accidents taking place on the battlefield. Friendly fire is not inevitable, but it is also not unlikely.  More British soldiers were killed in the 1991 Gulf War by American fire than by Iraqi attacks.  Canada's first casualties in Afghanistan in 2002 were due to American planes breaking their rules and dropping bombs on a Canadian unit.

This stuff is almost certainly MORE likely in a coalition operation where the relationships between the various friends on the ground are far less institutionalized, practiced and prepared. 

Is this a problem for the Harper government?  Probably not.  Why?  Because in the aftermath of the attacks in October in St. Jean and Ottawa, the Canadian public is probably willing to pay some kind of price to stop ISIS.  Given that there has been some progress in Iraq, where talks of offensives by the Iraqis, Kurds (and Iranians) indicate that the tide has turned for the moment, this suggests that the air campaign, combined with the training effort on the ground, has helped to stop ISIS's momentum.  Which makes the price being paid a bit more tolerable than if ISIS was still moving forward in Iraq.

Another reason why this week's events may not hurt the Harper government: it puts the Liberals into a tough position.  Liberal supporters are divided on this mission, so news about it is unlikely to be helpful to the Liberals as they seek unity in the face of the next election.

More casualties might change these dynamics, but at the moment, the events in Iraq are not bad for Harper's domestic political situation.  The decision to renew or not the Canadian deployment of planes is coming up, so we shall soon see if Harper wants to go to the exit.  My bet is on a renewal, but Harper has shifted quickly before, so it is possible that the Canadian Forces will come home.  The only thing that I would clearly rule out is the deployment of a larger, conventional Canadian contingent that has combat as its day job.

Update: this effort to minimize the risks is still going on:

Sunday Silliness: Obamacare Edition

Brian McFadden pulls no punches today on how one can react if the Supreme Court shoots down Obamacare:

Random Ranking: Oscar Songs

We were listening to Glory on the way to seeing a movie tonight--Hot Tub Time Machine 2, and I realized that this might be my favorite Oscar-winning song ever.  I had to check out a list and see where it stands on my top five:

1. Glory
2. Streets of Philadelphia (Neil Young's song, also nominated, for this movie is seriously underrated).
3. Chim Chim Cher-ee ... because any Mary Poppins song has to be near the top for historical reasons (got our family through toddler surgery).
4. Jai Ho
5. I Just Called to Say I Love You

Live and Let Die would be number one but it didn't win--just nominated, losing to The Way We Were.  Glory may be at the top due to recency bias, but  I doubt that any previous Oscar winning song was as moving with the possible exception of either of the two songs from Philadelphia.

Which Costs Matter

There has been much focus, and deservedly so, on the economic sanctions hitting Russia hard.  The problem is whether they hit those who support Putin or not, and whether they create economic opportunities for those who are good at evading the law (the police, organized crime) who also happen to be tied to Putin.

The latest reports focus on a different set of costs--that the Russian military is losing "large numbers" of soldiers in Ukraine.  This matters a great deal not so much because the mothers of these soldiers might become a huge political force (I am not sure their impact during Afghanistan was exaggerated or not) but because coercive political rule always, always, always depends on a key question: are the folks with the guns going to fire upon those who oppose the government?

Chenoweth and Stephan have engaged in much research on when non-violent dissent works, with one key factor being defection among the military/police.  What might cause the military to be more ambivalent about Putin?  Bearing the costs for his adventures.

I am not saying anything is going to happen soon or quickly, nor should we be thrilled that Russian young men and women are paying the price of Putin's aggression.  Also, as Bill and I argued in our book, there is nothing new about a country paying the price for a leader's ambition--the question is not what is best for the country but for the "kin".  In this case, the relevant kin are not the Russians in the near abroad (nor in any case of irredentism we studied) but those who prop up the government.

This is not going to end soon, but it may at some point end.  Hope is not a plan, but costs are integral for Ukraine's future and perhaps Russia's as well.  Does that make me favor the delivery of arms to Ukraine?  Um, still not sure about it.  It would increase the costs for everyone involved, and I am not sure that is a good thing even if it promotes dissension in Russia's ranks in the long run.  Why?  Because Ukraine will pay a higher cost in the short run as Russia has escalation dominance--it can and likely will go up and up in terms of escalating the conflict.

On the other hand, Ukrainians die while we sit by patiently.  If this were an easy problem, the answer would be obvious.....  And the last few times I have advocated the use of force, I have been not so happy with the outcomes (Libya, Afghanistan surge).   I have learned a wee bit of humility in all of this. 

Saideman's Law, part two

I have argued that stupid decisions in the past should not serve as binding precedents for stupid behavior in the present or future.  Upon reading this piece, I had a similar reaction with a modification of the rule.  Rosa Brooks argues that there are plenty of others who messed up in similar ways.  Maybe the system is broken, but Petraeus still knowingly gave highly classified info to a person who did not have the same level of classification.  His initial reluctance is rather telling. Then, of course, he lied about it.  So, he broke the law and should be penalized, just as others should have been.  And if the law is a problem, then, yes, it should be modified.

To be clear, I am not a P4 hater.  I had a brush with him in 2001-2002 when I was on the Joint Staff as I had to talk to him about something (I forget the specifics) as I was on the Bosnia desk and he was serving at the time as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations for SFOR, the NATO force in Bosnia.  I was impressed at the time, and followed him avidly when he was leading the 101st division into Iraq and into Mosul. Early reports and then Tom Rick's Fiasco indicated that Petraeus was doing the occupation stuff far better than most Americans at the time (a low bar but still).

So, I was a Petraeus fan before it was cool.  Perhaps I am pissed off now as a let down fan.  Or because he slept with his dissertation supervisee (Paula Broadwell).  But I also think that one should not think with one's penis when handing around classified material.  That she had a classification is not sufficient, as there are degrees of classification for a reason.  Well, many reasons but two are: need to know and degree of risk.  She didn't need to know, and reserved officers are a much wider group of people so no need to have as many with high classifications.

In my year on the Joint Staff, I had a Top Secret clearance.  Which was handy and it did allow me to see stuff that I didn't need to see--the daily intel circulated throughout the interagency.  But I did not get to participate in some meetings, especially those involving terrorism and the search for PIFWCs (war criminals) as that stuff involved Special Operations (what I inferred, not what I actually learned).  I knew what I was missing, but not the specifics.  And despite my desperate genetic imperative for more information--I am a very curious person, I was ok with being outside the room and not in the circle of trust.

Paula Broadwell should have understood that she was overreaching, and Petraeus should have gone with his first instinct and not give the stuff to her.  As they say, you do the crime, you do the time. 

Oh and one story about classified materials: on 9/11, I was on the way to State with two army officers.  After the plane hit, these guys were determined to get back to the building both to see if our comrades were ok and to deposit the classified materials they were carrying.  Taking stuff home is serious business and requires serious paperwork (see Erin Simpson on this).   So, we did, indeed, go back into a burning building (a very big building where the burning was on the other side) to drop off the documents.

Back to the Casino: Wagering on the Next CDS

Chief of Defence Staff Tom Lawson is stepping down, which is not great timing for NPSIA since we have him at our school on Monday.  But it does allow us to play the favorite game of: guess the next CDS.

I suck at this game, having guessed wrong before.  When Rick Hillier stepped down, I had a favorite candidate--the officer that I knew personally and whom I thought would be a good political choice given his Quebec origins--Mike Gauthier.  Gen. Walt Natynczyk was chosen, and should have been the obvious candidate, given that he is quite soft-spoken.  I tend to bet on Stephen Harper seeking to manage messaging more than most other priorities, so this choice made some sense.

Next time, Harper chose Tom Lawson, which was a bit surprising to me since the Air Force had been much trouble--F-35 and all that.  Still, Lawson has proved to be pretty good at sticking to the messaging. 

Which is why I doubt that Jon Vance, currently the Commander of Canadian Joint Operations Command, is likely to be chosen. Vance proved in Afghanistan that he was willing to push hard against the rest of the government when he thought his model village plan was better than sticking to the playbook as written.  That is, he did not care so much about the magical six priorities and three signature projects--he would build schools that did not count on the whole of government map of 50 schools.  I just don't see Harper going that route. 

Beyond that, I am not sure.  There is no formal rotation among the services, with the Navy being left out of this spot for 18 years.  However, given that the Navy has much of the focus in the years ahead with the shipbuilding program, it might make sense to put the Navy first for a change. 

I honestly don't know, but if I were in Vegas, I would wager on the Not Army line if the odds were good.

21st Century Travel

I could complain a great deal about how hard it was to get home from Berlin--that after two days of flight cancellations, I ended up driving home via rental car.  Instead, as my brother noted (I stayed overnight at his house in between the day I was supposed to fly back to Ottawa from Newark and the rescheduled day where I was supposed to fly to DC and then to Ottawa, which was then cancelled and led to a proposed flight to Chicago yesterday and then on to Ottawa today):

Messed up map--too much work, too little time

No, the point of this post is to celebrate.  What?  The modern smartphone and all of its apps.  I have FlightTrack, which along with alerts from United via email, informed me all along the way of flight changes.  This allowed me to call directly (one app has a button that spits out the United phone number) or go to the desk and start work on the next flight plan.  I got immediate service since I was just ahead of the curve.  I also got phone calls and emails from family who assisted me along the way (that the GOES card people found my lost Nexus card, that my wife could call National and rent me a car, that National informed me that I had a reservation before I stepped on the Chicago flight).  If I got on the Chicago flight, I would have called the airport Hilton to get a reservation before I landed....

The phone also has a GPS app which helped me navigate out of NYC until I was on I-80 and knew how to drive home from there. 

So, I could have been more stressed, but I was constantly informed and then reacting (keeping the illusion of control) all along.  Good times.  Woot for the 21st century smartphone plus apps!

Travel Notes In an Airport That is Easily Frightened by Snow

I thought my travel complain du jour was that I didn't get a happy ending in either Berlin or Newark, but it turns out that Newark's airport shuts down its flights to Canada pretty quickly when it snows.  In Canada, this kind of snow would not shake things up.

Anyway, it seems like it was a "random" day at security for Steve, as I got "random" attention twice.  The second time it was hardly necessary since I went through security to get to my flight and then turned around both because my flight was cancelled and because I dropped one of my ID cards in the Customs area.

Good times.  The good news about the cancellation is that I can't teach tomorrow I had plenty of time to go back and get my dropped id.  The other big of good news is that NYC is a Saideman-rich environment, so I am blogging while I wait for my brother to pick me up.  

I forgot to mention in my previous posts that something happened on the way to Berlin that I had never seen before.  The bathroom door fell off its hinge so we got to watch the flight attendants repair it mid-flight.  They turned out to be handy folks.

I am enjoying my year of United Gold as it gets me into European airport lounges, and the pretzels in Berlin were tasty and soft.  Almost as good as Philly soft pretzels.

On the way back,  I watched Big Hero 6, which was good but not as worthy as the Lego movie.  I did enjoy both the Eye of the Tiger montage moment and T.J. Miller yelling "Science, yeah!"  I am pretty sure that the movie won the Oscar because they put the animator credits before the voice cast credits.

Spoilers below

Gratuitous Effort to Reach Average

For the first time in Spew history, I think, I will average less than a post per day this month.  I have been blogging less over the past year, but this month has seen a bigger dip.  Why?

• Well, conferences and related travel make it hard to keep up.  Sure, I learn a lot and used to share more of what I learned while conferencing (such as this post two days ago), but I have much less time while conferencing these days.
• Related: I am way overcommitted.  So, while blogging does not take as much time as people usually suspect (my typos in old posts remind me how little time I spend vetting each post), it is still some time.  
• Am I burning out?  A friend was gleeful when I started blogging, saying that I would not be able to keep the pace.  Well, maybe I could not. 
• I also blame twitter.  Sometimes, I get my views out via twitter and then don't have the compulsion to express them here.  Yes, twitter still inspires more than a few posts, but it may be that twitter is eating some of my blogging energy.  

On the other hand, this was actually a good month for blogging, if one measure it less by output and more by readership.  Of course, taking swipes at IR trolls always increases my hit count, but I also had posts on my participation at PSR, on the GOP and anti-vaxxing, sexism in security studies, and sexual harassment in academia that all had decent audiences.

However, I didn't get into blogging to make my hit counts (or else I would trash the IR trolls more frequently), but to vent on a variety of topics, including many outside my lane (which junior academics probably should be a bit more reluctant to do).  Twitter does provide an alternative outlet for such venting.

I guess what I am trying to say is that I thinking about this today mostly to get my average post per month a bit higher this month. 

Berlin, Day 3

Wait, what happened to day two?  Well, as most second days in Europe for me, it was lost in a haze of jet lag.  The second day of the workshop was very interesting, but I lacked the focus to be able to keep track of what I should blog about.  The one point that seemed most important was that the promise to aspire to spend 2% of GDP on defense, one that is not just being violated by the usual suspects in 2015 but also the British, has been significant for slowing cuts, if not leading to more spending.

But day three?   Wunderbar!  Just a beautiful day (it rains on me less in Berlin than Paris).  I did much tourism the last/first time I was here, so I had to figure out the mix of repeat/new stuff.  I found the same chocolate shop as last time--Fassbender and Rausch and then I walked from there to the
Brandenburg Gate. 

From there I walked along, past Humbolt U to the German Historical Museum.  I walked past the museum the last time I was here.  This time, I spent several hours inside.  I was most struck by all of the discussion of balance of power politics, something you don't see too often inside American history museums.  Ah, Bismarck and all that.

Next to the museum were a bunch of folks selling art, food, and such.  I really liked the sign that said "I am so angry I made a sign."  Even more appropriate--the seller of said sign was miffed that I was writing this down rather than buying the sign.  Beware of anger and signs, they lead to the dark side.

I wish I had more time and stronger feet.  Still, I did get a chance to hang with some interesting analysts of politics:

Jimmy Kimmel and His Doctor Friends Are Miffed

Get your kids $^%@^*&!#@ vaccinated!

More on Germany in Article V Scenarios

I briefly discussed the German challenge in my previous post, but a conversation during the coffee break was most helpful in clarifying the confusion.  So, let me try again.

There is a big difference between Article V operations and expeditionary efforts... maybe.  That is, the German cabinet could deploy troops to deal with an attack upon NATO (not just an attack upon Germany) and then consult with Bundestag later.  The problem is that the cabinet may dither because they fear what the parliamentarians might do/say later.  This is akin to the US problem that the public is not as casualty averse as politicians think, but these perceptions of casualty aversion can cause politicians to pull back (Somalia after Blackhawk down). 

This dynamic did appear in Afghanistan in that the Bundestag did not create really tight restrictions for the German troops---the cabinet did, the German defence minister did because of their anticipation about what the Bundestag would and would not accept.

For me, the key concern is that there is still some confusion about Germany's legal constraints--what does Article V mean now as opposed to back in the day?  In the Cold War, NATO defense and Germany's defense were one and the same.  These days, an attack on Latvia or Turkey may not really endanger Germany. 

Which gets to two key dynamics.  First, an article V attack is only an article V attack when NATO agrees (consensus!) that such an attack has taken place.  An ally could be attacked, such as Turkey, and yet the alliance may not agree that it counts as an attack.  Indeed, I use the Turkish case because we have already seen this play out.  Second, article V includes opt out language--each country responds as each deems necessary.  So, still plenty of room to waffle. 

Anyhow, it seems clear to me that any NATO rapid reaction force would not be that rapid, as SACEUR is not being given authority to send troops without consulting the North Atlantic Council and without getting the consent of the countries contributing troops the force.  In other words, thus far, no pre-delegation of authority. 

And this is not just a German challenge--it is true for many/most/all members.  On the bright side, SACEUR can act with his second hat--as US commander of European forces.  But that means having some US troops nearby to throw into the mix. 

And, yes, I am having heaps of flashbacks to the Cold War.  We may not be in the Cold War 2 now, but there are lessons to learn from the past.  Russia is not the Soviet Union, but NATO is NATO. 

Berlin Day 1 2015: A Bridge Too Far?

I am at a two day workshop in Berlin with the topic of NATO after the Wales Summit.  It is a Chatham House/SWP (German Institute on International Affairs) event, so I cannot say what particular individuals (aside from myself) have said.  I can point to a few general themes/tendencies. 

Before getting into it, I have to say that while I found it somewhat strange previously to hear a Dutch diplomat say "a bridge too far," it is even stranger to hear it come from a German given the history of the phrase (Operation Market Garden). 

Anyhow, what did I say?  My job was to discuss whether the "deliverables" at the NATO Wales Summit last fall were sufficient and whether they are being, um, delivered. 

• Hope is not a plan.  That the promises made at Wales were far more aspirational than anything close to being realized. 
• The promises made to create a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force [VJTF] have been insufficient since they have not worked out the key details.   The VJTF was supposed to be able to move within 24-48 hours but is now going to be a week or so.  
• My question was answered yesterday--whether countries committing troops to this effort have figured out the domestic legal requirements of deploying such a force (the stuff that produces caveats and also causes decision-making processes to be sloooow).  That is, for those countries that need legislative approval to deploy troops, are there efforts to deal with this challenge ahead of time so that the rapid reaction force can react rapidly?  The answer: nein.  It might be that the German requirements do not apply when it comes to self-defense/NATO defense in Europe.  But we don't know.  
• And the other two countries that are making early commitments, Norway and Netherlands, also have domestic processes that need to be "fixed" if SACEUR is going to be able to move troops quickly.  That this responsibility will rotate to other countries with mixed Afghanistan does not fill me with confidence.
• I was critical of the lack of a commitment at Wales to permanently base NATO troops in those states on the frontlines with Russia.  Got some fun pushback on that--what is the difference between rotations of training and permanent bases?  Just a wee bit of credibility and commitment.
• Of the six countries committing to micro-bases (six NATO Force Integration Units), two have cut their budgets fairly dramatically (UK/France) and the other four were highly constrained in Afghanistan (Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain).
• A speaker or two suggested that the lessons of Afghanistan are not applicable since it was not really an Article V mission.  Well, Article V has an opt out clause, so excuse me for my skepticism.
• I even made the point that permanent basing might lead to American spouses and children living near the bases to create a more robust tripwire... returning to the Cold war.  
• Re pledges to support Ukraine made back in the fall, I basically hand-waved since I am ambivalent about arming Ukraine.  But that's ok, NATO is shrugging as well.  
•  I learned via people's comments that Russia's campaign to get support in Europe is working well--that many NATO allies are essentially pro-Putin, including Greece, Hungary, perhaps Bulgaria, at least one of the Slo-allies (Slovenia/Slovakia?), Mearsheimer.... not to mention Russian support of the National Front in France.  The key here is we are farther from consensus than I had thought. 
• The big commitment that all members were to aspire to spend at least 2% of GDP on defense was entirely aspirational.  There have been arguments made here that this limited the ability of countries to cut their budgets--that the cuts that have been made would have been worse.  Um, ok.  But this was not even a pie crust promise since there was very little real intent to follow through.  Indeed, this morning (day 2) I have already heard the claim that it is not how much is spent but what one gets.  Well, given that each country is mostly messing up the procurement process, it is not like there are heaps of capabilities being produced even as spending goes down.  
• I did make the Canadian point that it is more the doing than the spending.  Indeed, it may be easier to do more than spend more in the short term, although that is not so good in the long term.  

• I did point out the big lesson that everyone has implicitly or explicitly learned--humility.  That NATO efforts to improve Afghanistan, the Libyan effort, etc have had less than wonderful outcomes.

Other observations:

• Europeans are divided about whether to focus on the East (Russia) or the South (Mideast).  I would assert that NATO should focus on its old job--Russia--and let coalitions of the willing worry about ISIS.
• TRIP survey was cited by a couple of European government officials.  So, yeah, they know that academics have opinions.  Alas, the opinion cited was that Russia was five or eighth on list of concerns, so we are thus wrong and irrelevant.  Ooops.
• I was making a tripwire argument and someone used a different phrase--tethered goats!  Jurassic Park oh my!
• As always, I realize that being one of the few academics in the room, I have far more freedom/discretion/bluntness/rudeness than the people working for governments.  So, I did, of course, mention which countries are just a wee bit less reliable.

PSR Diaries, Continued

It has been a particularly combative few days at Political Science Rumors.  Folks are not pleased that some ISA goers engaged in a bit of fun as they cosplay-ed a panel on Game of Thrones and IR.  They think it hurts the profession, and got especially upset when I defended (perhaps not articulately) those who engaged in the supposedly shameful behavior. This devolved into accusations that I hurt the profession by lending legitimacy to PSR because I mod and post there under my own name (nearly everyone else is anonymous). 

I have gotten that from time to time--that I am just an attention seeking hound and that my participation at PSR is bring shame upon me and the profession.  The former is true, the latter is not.  Of course, I don't participate at PSR for the attention or for the strange and disturbing cult of Sadie that pops up.  I get plenty of attention via blogging and twitter, thanks. 

I started because people were being incredibly wrong about the job search where I was employed.  Denying the rumors didn't work so well from a position of anonymity.  After that, people asked me questions, and I felt like being a voice of reason was not a bad thing, even though it was occurring online at a place where there was much unpleasantness.  I eventually started moderating at the old site (PSJR) and then the new (PSR) so that I could delete attacks on my students as well as students elsewhere (I leave nearly all of the attacks against me alone--I post there so I accept the consequences). 

This led to some attacks upon me on the site, and when I asked the community whether I should stay or go, I got much support to stay.  So, I have stuck around.  I now get emails from people who ask for particular items to be deleted, and I do so.  So, perhaps some folks in the profession view me negatively because I am active at PSR, but others are thankful that I am there, the only moderator that is not anonymous, that can be reached.

Someone today raised the possibility that I make the place worse, that trolls are there because I moderate and post there.  My response?  Well, the place had much negativity before I started, so unless the place has a Benjamin Button kind of dynamic, the person has a bad grasp of social science.  Plus PSR is hardly alone on the internet in producing some toxicity from the brew of anonymity and a lousy job market/anxious graduate students.

I try to be myself there--a combination of earnest desire to help (which probably annoys the hell out of some folks), a weakness to trolls (I have a hard time not responding when folks poke at me or at things I care about), and a tendency to snark.  Indeed, I have been tempted to post this in response to all of the concern that cosplay at the ISA might be damaging to the profession:






I actually don't think that PSR does much damage to the profession either, although it certainly is more problematic than a handful of people dressing up at the ISA.  Any accusation that I am hurting the political science profession is giving me far more influence than I actually have.  I would argue that the Putin apologists in the NYT are doing far more damage to our kind.

My Fave Oscars 2015 Moment?

While the singing of Glory was incredibly moving, my favorite moment of the night was when the forces behind the song discussed #voterfraudfraud.  The frustrating thing with seeing Selma was to be aware that the Voting Rights Act that Martin Luther King Jr. fought for, as depicted in the film, is under attack now.  So, nice for Common and John Legend to call it out on their big night.

Extreme This!

Extremism in the pursuit of liberty or security blah blah blah (flying means tired blogger).
This says it better:

Declaring Success at the ISA

Twas a wonderful week in New Orleans for the International Studies Association meeting.  I will follow the example of a wise general and declare success:

• The ISA approved the committee's report on blogging--folks should just be responsible, blogger or not, editor or President or whatever.  
• The Online Media Caucus was approved.
• The governing council meeting also demonstrated that the future will be interesting...
• I didn't break any bones slipping on the beads on Bourbon Street.  
• I greatly enjoyed an hour of craps with Sara Mitchell.  We didn't profit, alas, but we successfully had fun.
• I had two wonderful dinners that helped to launch two new journals--Journal of Global Security Studies and the European Journal of International Security.  I am on both editorial boards. 
• I was interviewed by Sage press as they are seeking to build a library of discussions of key literatures and debates--twas fun.
• I learned much during the Academic Freedom and Social Media roundtable--I have never studied academic freedom, but I do indulge in it quite a bit.
• The Duckies were a blast!
• The second roundtable celebrated the life of Pattie Weitsman.  And, yes, I was a mess.
• The third roundtable focused on Canada and Afghanistan.  We had much consensus
• that the argument that the military hoodwinked the Prime Minister is crap
• that parliament was super lame (technical academic jargon)
• I met a heap of old friends and a few new ones.  I have been very lucky in this academic journey. 
• The OMC business meeting was very successful--a small crowd but heaps of great ideas!
• The TRIP data panel went well.
• Dinner with Team Steve was delightful.

So, yeah, I am very lucky.  I hope the good fortune continues tomorrow as I travel back home.

OMC is Alive!

Yesterday, the Governing Council met for 17 days and nights .... or about six hours to discuss the various issues on the agenda.  I will not get into the details of the meeting (I live-tweeted the highlights).    The key bits of news are this:

• I learned how to do emoji on my Ipad.
• The blogging issue from last year produced a report by the Professional Responsibilities committee, and the recommendations which became policy essentially said that we ought to expect everyone to be professional and treat each other with respect and dignity. 
• This applies to not just ISA journal editors who were the focus last year.
• They deliberately chose not to ask bloggers to put disclaimers on their blogs since everyone would have to be disclaiming pretty much everything they do.
• A clear win for the social media folks.
• The Online Media Caucus sailed through.  Through a clever bit of agenda-setting that I had nothing to do with, it was the penultimate issue considered and exhaustion was our friend.  So, come to the business meeting on Saturday at 12:30 in the Hilton's Elmwood room as well as the Duckies Thursday night at 7:30pm at the Quarterdeck rooms in the Hilton

Caveats for Sale

I find the Authorization to Use Military Force [AUMF] Obama is trying to sell quite notable for many reasons but particularly because it is the closest thing I have seen in the US to a coalition government-style caveated mandate.  In ye olde book, we found several European countries that would have legislative approval of letters/decisions that specified the length of a mission and what the troops could do. 

This AUMF has a limited time span--three years--which is far longer than those in Europe (and Canada), which are usually anywhere between six months to two years.  Perhaps even more notable--that this AUMF so that there will be no enduring offensive ground operations.  Now that is quite the restriction--caveat ahoy!  I think that is what Stephen Harper had in mind when he sent CANSOF to Iraq--no enduring ground ops.  Instead, he said combat.  Whatevs.

Brian McFadden, NYT

Good times for writers of books on civilian control of troops involved in multilateral military operations.

Trading Risks in Iraq, Maple Flavour

The debate the past few weeks since it was revealed that Canadian Special Operations Forces (CANSOF) has pondered the meanings of combat and accompanying.  My friend, Roland Paris, is most concerned about mission creep--that the CANSOF folks doing targeting on/near the front lines may not just lead to firefights but a broader engagement with much more combat.  I am less worried about mission creep because I focus on domestic politics--that any deeper involvement would raise risk for the election next fall. 

The point I want to make today is a simple one (as I have too much work to do pre-ISA to do any complex thinking/writing).  Canada is engaged in a bombing campaign in Iraq.  It seems to be the case that the air campaign has helped to blunt the ISIS offensive, even reversing some of its gains (Kobani is the visible example in Syria, I don't have a handy battle/town to cite for Iraq).  If one is going to do bombing, then risks are there to be managed: do you act to faciliate more accurate targeting, putting some of your troops at risk or do you avoid risks to your troops and thus have less accurate bombing? 

I ask this because I doubt that the CANSOF troops that have approached the front lines, whatever that means, to paint targets just for the fun of it.  Maybe so, but probably because they felt they could do the job better than the Iraqis they are training.  More accurate targeting means two things--more effectiveness from the Canadian and coalition planes above and less (albeit non-zero) risk of hitting civilians on the ground.  While drones and recon planes are handy, having eyes on the ground is generally seen as better.  Indeed, the big German mistake in Kunduz, Afghanistan was in large part because there were no eyes on the ground. 

The CANSOF do have some restrictions (a.k.a. caveats)--they are not engaging in raids or other clearly offensive operations.  They are engaged in combat, as I understand it, since they are painting targets for the planes dropping bombs, whether this leads to them being in firefights on the ground or not.  Anyone insisting that the CANSOF not facilitate the targeting process must ask themselves--would this kind of caveat be aimed at reducing the risks facing the CANSOF?  If so, at the expense of both Iraqis and effectiveness?

Despite my general criticism of caveats, some make sense.  Not engaging in raids makes sense as that significantly increases the risks not just of casualties but of capture.  Which would complicate things greatly.  But a caveat against providing support for the air campaign?  That would not eliminate risk but move it from the CANSOF to the Iraqis in ways that also harm effectiveness.  As such, tis a bad idea.

Thanks Obama

For having a sense of humor about yourself.

How Security Studies is Like Casablanca

There is gambling at Rick's?  Shocking.  There is sexism in security studies equally not so shocking.  I have been in this business for more than twenty years and you can add grad school to that.  Ever since I have been in it, I have heard stories and also witnessed a significant degree of sexism in this area (I am not as attuned to the sexism in other parts of IR or other parts of poli sci).

So, I found it particularly frustrating last night to be involved in one thread at PSR and another on twitter addressing the issue of women in poli sci and IR in very different ways.  At PSR, there are a bunch of folks repeating the same myths that women get heaps of jobs because of affirmative action.  On twitter, folks got riled up because there was not a single woman listed on the program of the next Aspen Security Forum.  A nice juxtaposition of myth and reality.

The reality is that both men and women are getting jobs and both men and women are not being placed and are frustrated about the academic job market.  In all of the searches I have been involved in at universities in the US and Canada, I have seen it happen one time that a women was offered a job because of her gender ... maybe.  That it was a situation where two candidates were quite good and the tie went to the woman.  Otherwise, my anecdata goes the other way--that I have seen colleagues say things like: "well, her husband has a job, so she doesn't need this one."

In security studies, there has always been a perception that there was an old boys network that favored men and the misogynists.  Perhaps feeling free to express nostalgia for the old boys network is some evidence of this.

I posted a list of books written by women about 18 months ago, mostly in the security area, as a list of my favorite books both to prove a point and because it was largely true. I was responding to a post somewhere (I forget) that listed the best books and omitted female authors.  It didn't take more than five minutes of thinking to come up with a list of ten (or more) books written by women that are among my very favorites.  I didn't label it as a list of ten great books written by women, just my ten favorite books.

As Aspen Security Forum proved, perhaps inadvertently, sexism is quite alive and well in the field of security despite the fact that women are doing excellent work in academic and making a difference in policy positions.  Getting the best speaker or the best person for the job should mean that women are among those chosen--not because they are women but because they are among the best.

Need a conference on private military contracting?  You better invite Deborah Avant.  Working on non-violence?  You better read and cite Erica Chenoweth.  Terrorism?  Chenoweth again, Mia Bloom, etc.  Pakistan?  Christine Fair.  Identity and violence?  Stacie Goddard, Erin Jenne, Monica Toft.  Alliances?  Invite Sarah Kreps and Stefanie Von Hlatky and read Patricia Weitsman. The US national security apparatus?  Amy Zegart. Civil-military relations?  Avant again.  Crime and international security?  Louise Shelley.  Nuclear taboo?  Nina Tannenwald.  Canadian defence?  Elinor Sloan and the aforementioned Von Hlatky.  Quantitative work on war?  Sara Mitchell.

I could go on and on.  It really is not that hard.  Indeed, as others have noted, leaving women out might actually require some work. 

I do think there has been a hell of a lot of progress made, but dammit, it is clear that there is still so much room for improvement.  Thanks to the Aspen Security Forum for reminding us not to take for granted that we need to more and better.

Exceptional Exceptionalism

I was out today so I missed an epic rant by Ben Denison about the lousy arguments people use to argue that the Balkans had conflict because of artificial boundaries.  The good news is that we have both Storify and the Storify master, Kelsey Atherton, which means we have this.

The only things I would add to this are:
Boundaries are damn near always "artificial", given that the world did not emerge spontaneously with maps with handy dandy lines dividing people.  Politics among and within groups of people produced these magical lines.  Some of these lines appear more natural than others, but the reality is that most are quite artificial and yet .... conflict is rare.  While most war does involve territorial disputes, most territorial disputes ... do not involve war.  Ooops.  There are many, many quite artificial boundaries over which there is currently little conflict.  But we don't notice the non-events.

Which gets us to another basic reality: the artificiality of borders is pretty constant--borders don't change much--but conflict varies.  And basic social science says you cannot explain some thing that varies with something that is constant (and vice versa).

Indeed, For Kin or Country (the new paperback version with a new intro is coming out this summer) started with the puzzle that there was both more and less violence in Eastern Europe than we expected.  The least legitimate, most artificial border in Europe?  Probably that separating Moldova from Romania as it was drawn by Molotov/Ribbentrop but really Stalin/Hitler.

Anyhow, if anyone says that a conflict happens because of an artificial boundary, you have my permission to run screaming from the room.

Deja Vu Du Jour

Perhaps it is really unfair to consider Europeans as sell-outs.  However, the European effort too bargain over Ukraine's fate reminds me of Bosnia.  Early in the Balkan wars, the Europeans were pretty willing to agree to anything that would end the conflict quickly, including giving Serbia its desired chunks of Bosnia.  That it would reward the ethnic cleansers as it would mean that the refugees from Yugoslavia could then go home quickly.

These days, it seems to be that European leaders would like to end Ukraine's war as quickly as possible so that they could get their energy cheaply and certainly from Russia.  Is this fair to Merkel?  Well, it depends on the deal.  If it creates a demilitarized zone that essentially cements Russian (one could say separatist but let's be serious) gains, then "peace in our time" will be provided by selling out the Ukrainians.  If it allows the Ukrainians to actually govern throughout the country (minus Crimea because that ain't coming back), then maybe the Europeans are not selling out Ukraine.

Let's just say I don't have a heap of confidence that Putin will settle for anything that allows Ukraine to stabilize.

Flawed Hero or Villain with a Heart of Gold

Someone put all of the major Snape segments of the HP movies in chronological order:


Which causes us to return to the big question: Snape bad?  Snape good?  On the whole, I think Snape was a bad person who had one soft spot, as he did buy into the Mudblood stuff when he was young, making friend with awful Slytherin people, causing Lily to be alienated.  She proved to be an excellent judge of character.  Yes, Snape was a good double/triple agent for Dumbledore because of his remorse, but he was still mostly an awful person.  His jealousy/bitterness towards James infected everything ever since, including being on the wrong side of the Sirius story in Prisoner of Azkaban. 

Of course, Snape redeemed himself by sacrificing everything for the ghost of Lily, but he was not a good person otherwise.  Alan Rickman did a fantastic job, of course, capturing the complexity of the character.  And the character gave me one of my favorite lines at the start of Intro to IR: that a professor who spent a year in the Pentagon would teach Intro to IR is like Snape teaching Defense Against the Dark Arts.

When Realism is Unrealistic

One must always admire the Realists for their confidence* as they boldly state their preferred policy choices without much equivocation.  Me?  I am not uncertain about what the US and Europe should do in the Ukrainian crisis.  I don't see giving arms to Ukraine to materially change the situation on the ground--Russia has plenty more it can throw at Ukraine and Ukraine is not bereft of military hardware.  On the other hand, there is something to be said for increasing the costs.

Anyhow, this post is about the confidence confident men* who call themselves Realists.  John Mearsheimer has an op-ed in today's NYT, pleading that the US should not arm Ukraine.**  I tend to agree that arming Ukraine would not really do that much.  But as others have pointed out, there are some key contradictions such as the supposedly existential threat facing Russia despite its nukes.  I have wondered about the stability-instability paradox--that strategic nuclear deterrence might free up folks to use force at lower levels.  Why is it that this is only an opportunity for Putin and not for the West?

The big policy proposal is what has drawn most of my ire: "the West should seek to make Ukraine a neutral buffer state between Russia and NATO... like Austria during the Cold War."  Yes, Ukraine should be treated like a hunk of the defeated power?  While I agree that NATO expansion to Ukraine was and remains a bad idea, the neutrality of Ukraine happens to partially reside in Ukraine's hands.  The country can choose to lean West and join various partnerships even if it is not invited to join NATO.  After losing a significant hunk to Russia via Crimea and after paying a steep cost in lives and money due to Russia's war in the supposedly separatist regions, it is hard to see how any Ukrainian politician in the future could do anything but lean west.  Neutral?  Only kind of, sort of.  Buffer?  Only if Ukraine is denied agency.  Not only does its domestic politics come into play here, but the day that Great Powers can impose their will like this is mostly gone.  Hence this tweet last night:

I'd name it the Arrogance of Great Powers. "Hey! You are going to be a buffer state, and you are going to like it!" pic.twitter.com/fTUESJx8m1
— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) February 9, 2015

"It is essential that Russia help end the fighting in eastern Ukraine and that Kiev regain control over that region."  Sure, sure.  "Help" since this suggests that the separatists have heaps of agency.  Hmm, agency for the separatists but not for the state fighting them?

The truly strange thing about all of this is that it ignores a key reality that I referred to earlier: that alliance dynamics are different in a nuclear world.  Why is Russia so concerned with "buffer" states and a Ukraine that is not in its orbit if Russia's security is assured by its nuclear weapons?  It is not so much a Ukraine in NATO that threatens Putin, but a genuinely democratic Ukraine that is outside of Russia's dominance that seems to be the key.  This all happened after a regime change in Kiev with NATO membership not a realistic possibility anytime in the near to medium future.  Only those with Ukrainian immigrants were yammering for NATO membership (Canada/US).   Ah, there is domestic politics again.  Why should regime change matter to a Realist?  Since it did not portend a sudden inclusion into NATO, its meaning might be something else.  But that would be operating in places that old time Realists know not--domestic politics.

*  Men?  Yes, there are women who consider them realists, but the real Realists have much nostalgia for the old boys clubs of the past.   
** Seems strange that for all of the complaining that Mearsheimer does about being ignored in 2003 during the Iraq invasion debate and how "marginalized" he has been as a result that he would still bother to write op-eds like this.  After all, secret lobbies and lying politicians and all that.