The Gang That Cannot Shoot Straight

No, this is not about the Republicans, but about the Taliban--that other group of folks with closed minds and nostalgia for a past that never existed.

The NYT is running a blog about the war in Afghanistan, and apparently the Taliban are lousy shots, despite myths of being terrific fighters.  They may be brave and tactically smart, but they seem to miss the target much of the time.  This helps to explain something that I have been curious about and is quite relevant for my research--that casualties have been quite low, even as we acknowledge that each person harmed or killed in this war is serious and should not be diminished. 

Canada has lost a bit more than 140 soldiers over eight years or so, with half of those in one of the toughest provinces and the most heated battles.  That is a lot by contemporary standards, but given the high operational tempo (optempo as the jargon goes), it is somewhat surprisingly low.  Some of the explanation goes to superior equipment (flak jackets, etc), to better tactics, to better intel (UAV's make a big difference here), and to restrictions on the deployment of troops (hard to explain how Australia had zero deaths in its deployments to Iraq). 

But the enemy, as they say, gets a vote, and it seems to be the case that the Taliban cannot shoot too well.

limited Taliban knowledge of marksmanship fundamentals, a frequent reliance on automatic fire from assault rifles, the poor condition of many of those rifles, old and mismatched ammunition that is also in poor condition, widespread eye problems and uncorrected vision, and the difficulties faced by a scattered force in organizing quality training.

The article does not even mention another reality--that a good number of the Taliban's foot soldiers are locals they rent for the day or whatever.  These guys would have no training at all.

This leads to good news:

the Taliban – absent major shifts in training, equipment and logistics – are likely to remain mediocre or worse at one of the central skills of modern war

The Bad: the folks we are training--Afghan army and police--suffer from some of the same problems.

The article concludes with a reality check--bad shooting does not mean an entirely ineffective force.  The Taliban place IED's (or mines as they used to be called) where their opponents are likely to seek cover, so the shooting does not kill them but herds them to the explosives that will.  Poses heaps of dilemmas for the soldiers and marines.

This blog on the war is fascinating, although its detail is perhaps more than many folks need.  Do check it out, as it does have not just tactical and operational implications (yes, I am starting to talk like these guys I interview) but strategic ones as well. 

I am left with one last thought--does this blog provide too much intel to the enemy?  That is, the most important info any team or military unit requires is about itself--its strengths and weaknesses (thanks Mike Lombardi), and the NYT is spreading the word about the Taliban's.  The good news is that the article also discusses the reasons for these weaknesses, and these are not so easy to train.  The Taliban is unlikely to develop the organized training that develops good shooting habits nor the infrastructure to have cleaned weapons and quality ammo.