Kosovo Ain't Crimea, Crimea Ain't Kosovo

The standard line for Putin apologists and Russophiles is that Crimea is just Kosovo but a bit to the east.  This is lousy comparative politics, so let's list how they are different:

• The US and its friends took a decade to intervene in Kosovo (one can start the clock anytime, but I choose to start the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia) after years of both massacres and negotiations.  Crimea happened immediately after Russia's stooge fled Kiev.  Russia moved before any effort could be made to bargain, to send a peace keeping mission or preventative mission.  this really is the key
• US and its friends did not conquer Kosovo and annex it.  Russia did hold a sham referendum and annexed Crimea.  
• Oh yeah, we could compare how the decisions were made.  Kosovo's parliament voted for independence years after the local populace demanded it.  Crimea's referendum happened shortly after Russia de facto occupied Crimea, the opponents were roughed up and/or arrested, and it is pretty clear that the results were just a bit fraudulent.
• Kosovo was after ... Bosnia, where the west had dithered while genocide happened.  Oh, and Kosovo was also after Transnistria, where a Russian military unit essentially seceded from Moldova and after Russia's support for Armenian irredentism, and other Russian efforts in the former Soviet Union.  Crimea was after ... Georgia where Russia did a nice job of playing Georgia and then created not one but two de facto independent states/failed states from territory carved out of Georgia. 
• US and its friends did not use nuclear threats during the crisis or afterwards, although SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark was determined to confront Russia's moves to Pristina.  Russia has been making nuclear threats in many directions.
• The aftermath of American and Russian intervention tends to create failed states.  In the former, this is mostly not intentional.  In the latter, it is entirely intentional.
• After Kosovo, the US and its allies stopped.  There was no more armed intervention in the Balkans but the US (ok, one minor effort to stop Macedonia from imploding in 2001).  After Crimea, Russia launched a war in Ukraine, not just supporting separatists but sending its own forces, prolonging the conflict and violating ceasefires.  

Of course, the US is not blameless in the world, as one could criticize the invasion of Iraq (which I have done repeatedly since it happened).  But that does not legitimate or excuse what Russia is doing now.  Russia's behavior threatens European security in ways that Kosovo never did precisely because there was never a threat that the US/NATO would be invading anywhere else.  Russia?   It is not done with Ukraine--the conflict goes on because Russia wants it to go on.  And Russia has been making provocative moves towards the Baltics ever since.  Where is that Estonian officer that got grabbed?  Still in Russia.

One can argue that all interventions are illegal, although responsibility to protect may suggest otherwise.  Kosovo, whatever its flaws, was an effort to prevent further massacres after all other efforts had failed.  Crimea and now Donbass are efforts by Russia to destabilize a neighbor after Russia lost its grip.  Yes, we can compare the two, but the comparison reveals significant differences and only superficial similarities.

Facebook Status: Recognized But It's Complicated

Facebook has granted Kosovo recognition as an independent country.  This puts Facebook behind the United States, Canada, and many other countries but ahead of Spain, Russia, Serbia and other laggards.  Of course, now Serbia and Kosovo contest the meaning of this, with at least one Serb suggesting that “Tomorrow they will say that the Smurfs and hobbits have recognized them.”  Yet there is something to all of this. 

To be honest, it makes me glad that I finished my dissertation twenty years ago.  I studied why countries vary in their support of secessionist efforts, including giving recognition.  To do so today would now mean tracking key internet outlets?  Oy.  Of course, this is not the only case where computer companies have to deal with political disputes: Macedonia or FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 

Anyway, how can we make sense of this?  Well, much of this comes down to the dynamics of identification.  One of the books that changed the way I look at pretty much everything is Donald Horowitz’s Ethnic Groups in Conflict and his discussion of the logic of invidious comparison.   The core of it is that one’s self-esteem depends critically on the status of the groups to which one belongs.  As these groups rise and fall, so does one’s self-esteem, which can lead to jealousy, anger, hatred and all that other stuff that Yoda warned us about. 

Recognition is a competitive exercise in this context, as a recognition of a group’s state-ness improves how members of the group view themselves, and the relevant Other feels diminished by this recognition.  So, Kosovars (Albanians) are thrilled to receive recognition as it makes them feel better about themselves, their ethnic group and their country.  Serbs are upset because any elevation of Kosovar identity diminishes their own since group self-esteem is significantly shaped not by one’s absolute status but how one’s group compares with others and especially the Other. 

To be clear, recognition is more than about self-esteem and identification.  It means normal relations can ensue.  It is far easier to develop trade agreements and apply international law and all that other stuff in international relations with a “like” entity.  States have all kinds of rules and procedures for their relations with states.  These rules do not apply, and the standard operating procedures do not work the same when dealing with non-states.  So, Kosovo craves recognition as it would provide much more normalcy in its relations with the world. 

In its fight to be recognized, Kosovo will take what it can get.  It might not be getting recognition soon from the European Union, but it has now achieved recognition from one of the most important actors in our world of social media.  Facebook is not the only social media network, but it is one of the biggest and it does connect with much of the world, especially the richer parts.  So, its recognition has heaps of value for the self-esteem of Kosovars AND more, as social media/networking are connected to the material world of trade, investments and more. 

While we often joke about networking being not-working, that our time online is wasted in these virtual worlds—Facebook, Twitter, World of Warcraft, whatever, the reality is that people often take their online connections and build on them in the real world.  Perhaps if enough Kosovars develop Facebook friendships in Spain or in other recognition hold-outs, they might be able be able to develop allies in those countries that will push for recognition.  I am not saying that is a plan but perhaps an aspiration. 

Academics are just starting to try to figure out how this virtual world of social media impact politics, so we cannot say that Facebook recognition will lead to more states recognizing Kosovo.  It certainly will not lead to less.  For now, we can simply understand this as yet another battle among Albanians and Serbs  in their competitive self-esteem contest.  And this is one that the Kosovars have won.  Serbia’s losing streak continues even in the virtual world of social media.

The Freezer is Breaking

9/11 put the Balkans from the front burner of American foreign policy to the back burner.  Iraq then put the Balkans into the freezer, if you don't mind the analogy, as most of Washington (and Brussels) focused elsewhere.  Occasionally attention returned to Kosovo (rarely back to Bosnia) with NATO relenting and supporting Kosovo's independence in 2008.  Over the past several months, Serbs have been blocking roads and setting up checkpoints, a challenge not only to the government of Kosovo, such as it is, but also to the UN and NATO. 

So, we have another bit of escalation yesterday with Serb protestors injuring a number of NATO troops.  This may not get much attention since NATO also fired upon a Pakistani border post or two from Afghanistan.  Still, just because the top level policy-makers are largely ignoring a problem does not mean the problem will go away.  So, Kosovo is demanding attention again.  I doubt it will get much as there are so many other problems--Pakistan, Iran, Euro, etc. 

It does seem clear, at least to me, that NATO plans to shrink the force in Kosovo further are also going to have to be put on ice.  This is not the time to reduce the number of troops, even if the instability is largely concentrated in and near Mitrovica.  But budget cutting pressures may lead to what is quite suboptimal for regional stability.

Damn Those Wikileaks

This cable indicates that I am wrong.  One of the central points of my work (and previous blog posts) has been that countries are not inhibited by their own vulnerabilities to ethnic conflict from supporting it elsewhere.  I was outraged that the media had not read my first book when they tried to explain the recognition politics around Kosovo's independence.  Spain, notably, did not recognize Kosovo's independence, and the cable leaked suggests that it was indeed its concern about the precedent set might encourage Spain's own secessionists.

As both the GOS and the PP predicted privately to
post, Kosovo's independence has prompted numerous provocative
statements by nationalist parties in the Basque Country and
Catalonia.

Thus:

PP has maintained staunch unity in
its position against Kosovo's independence. PP founder and
elder statesman Manuel Fraga said February 19 that Spain must
not support Kosovo because one could "draw the same
conclusions about Spain in (the Basque town of) Galdakano or
in a Catalan town. Spain cannot accept that any group
whatsoever can declare itself independent with all the
complications this has implied" in the Balkans.

Of course, as I have maintained, people will read into an event whatever they want.  Separatists in Spain would, of course, be encouraged by Kosovo independence.  But the key point is that these groups existed before the recognition and the recognition would not really change things in Spain.


Ah, but wait: the problem was not so much separatists in Spain but the timing:

Sancho told the DCM that it was politically
impossible for the GOS to support Kosovo's unilateral
declaration of independence in the middle of a hotly
contested campaign, and to have expected otherwise was not
realistic.

Indeed, the funny thing about this cable is that it mentions Spanish support of UN resolutions, arguing that UNSR 1244 does not endorse a unilateral declaration of independence for Kosovo, and Spanish folks then mention withdrawal from Iraq as part of being in accord with the UN.  More importantly, the Spanish participation in KFOR suggests some contradictions, as the US diplomat notes:

the GOS is caught in a logical trap -
how to reconcile their continuing military and civilian
presence in Kosovo with their refusal to recognize Kosovo's
right to independence.

So, perhaps Spain refrained from recognition because of its vulnerability.  Does this falsify my argument?  Maybe, but the vulnerability argument faces some serious challenges from reality as well: plenty of countries vulnerable to secession supported Kosovo's independence, and not just the US (with Alaskan separatism), but the UK, France, Italy, Albania, Canada, Croatia, Belgium, Latvia, Afghanistan, Macedonia, and Somalia (?).

Of course, I am probably just suffering from confirmation bias.