Recognize The Tainted Legitimacy

A list caught my eye this morning: those countries that recognized Crimea's union with Russia:

Reminder of the 14 nations who recognize the Crimean "annexation": pic.twitter.com/UUX7n4jyxV

— Casey Michel (@cjcmichel) June 16, 2015

Hmm, what unifies most of these folks? ah, yes, deep love of self-determination. https://t.co/jYd9EiSSdH

— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) June 16, 2015

What do these folks have in common?  Democracy?  Not so much. Friends of the U.S.?  Definitely not so much.  Indeed, hostility to US is a great unifier except there are some folks who might be hostile to the US who are not on this list including Iran. 

How about irredentists?  We have a few: Afghanistan (Pashtuns do not like the Durand line), Armenia, Russia, North Korea (both as supporting irredentism and potential target of irredentism, depending on who rules a united Korea), and Sudan (if it ever tries to bring back the secessionist hunks).


My quick snark was basically suggesting that with friends like these, this particular annexation is not legitimate.  Not only is the list small, but they include mostly countries that are hostile to self-determination if one includes the ability to select one's government in that concept. 

I got some pushback from folks who said this is really about power relations--that Kosovo's recognizers are allies of the US.... And, of course, Kosovo ain't Crimea, but the point is almost valid.  Who has recognized Kosovo other than Facebook?  Over a hundred countries, including many who are not seen as neatly in the American camp.  This list includes many non-democratic states, but includes many democracies, so it does not read quite like a list of countries hostile to democracy, minority rights and the like.

The Crimean Referendum was a sham and remains so.  The list of recognizers, mostly experts on the art of fake elections, underlines the fraud that Russia has been perpetuating.  The implausible denials still work well enough, I guess, but if something quacks like a fraud, walks like a fraud, well, it is a fraud. 

Kosovo Ain't Crimea, Crimea Ain't Kosovo

The standard line for Putin apologists and Russophiles is that Crimea is just Kosovo but a bit to the east.  This is lousy comparative politics, so let's list how they are different:

• The US and its friends took a decade to intervene in Kosovo (one can start the clock anytime, but I choose to start the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia) after years of both massacres and negotiations.  Crimea happened immediately after Russia's stooge fled Kiev.  Russia moved before any effort could be made to bargain, to send a peace keeping mission or preventative mission.  this really is the key
• US and its friends did not conquer Kosovo and annex it.  Russia did hold a sham referendum and annexed Crimea.  
• Oh yeah, we could compare how the decisions were made.  Kosovo's parliament voted for independence years after the local populace demanded it.  Crimea's referendum happened shortly after Russia de facto occupied Crimea, the opponents were roughed up and/or arrested, and it is pretty clear that the results were just a bit fraudulent.
• Kosovo was after ... Bosnia, where the west had dithered while genocide happened.  Oh, and Kosovo was also after Transnistria, where a Russian military unit essentially seceded from Moldova and after Russia's support for Armenian irredentism, and other Russian efforts in the former Soviet Union.  Crimea was after ... Georgia where Russia did a nice job of playing Georgia and then created not one but two de facto independent states/failed states from territory carved out of Georgia. 
• US and its friends did not use nuclear threats during the crisis or afterwards, although SACEUR Gen. Wesley Clark was determined to confront Russia's moves to Pristina.  Russia has been making nuclear threats in many directions.
• The aftermath of American and Russian intervention tends to create failed states.  In the former, this is mostly not intentional.  In the latter, it is entirely intentional.
• After Kosovo, the US and its allies stopped.  There was no more armed intervention in the Balkans but the US (ok, one minor effort to stop Macedonia from imploding in 2001).  After Crimea, Russia launched a war in Ukraine, not just supporting separatists but sending its own forces, prolonging the conflict and violating ceasefires.  

Of course, the US is not blameless in the world, as one could criticize the invasion of Iraq (which I have done repeatedly since it happened).  But that does not legitimate or excuse what Russia is doing now.  Russia's behavior threatens European security in ways that Kosovo never did precisely because there was never a threat that the US/NATO would be invading anywhere else.  Russia?   It is not done with Ukraine--the conflict goes on because Russia wants it to go on.  And Russia has been making provocative moves towards the Baltics ever since.  Where is that Estonian officer that got grabbed?  Still in Russia.

One can argue that all interventions are illegal, although responsibility to protect may suggest otherwise.  Kosovo, whatever its flaws, was an effort to prevent further massacres after all other efforts had failed.  Crimea and now Donbass are efforts by Russia to destabilize a neighbor after Russia lost its grip.  Yes, we can compare the two, but the comparison reveals significant differences and only superficial similarities.

It Was Mine!

I got into a twitter conversation with someone who largely holds Russia blameless.  While there was much stuff we can discuss, I want to focus on one: that Crimea was Russian/Soviet until 1954, so Russia taking it back is just fine.

This is, of course, one of the seven rules of ethnic politics (see Stuart Kaufman's Modern Hatreds or this summary).  What was mine should be mine.  What was yours?  Meh.

The big problem with this argument is that we have had enough history of boundary changes that relying on past ownership clarifies nothing and legitimates everything.  While the status quo bias in international relations is over-rated, both because countries do support secession and perhaps because some boundary changes should be made, there is something to it. 

If Russia's old ownership of Crimea allows it to annex that territory, then why not India grabbing all of Pakistan, Turkey claiming not just a heap of the Mideast but also much of the Balkans, French/Spain claiming much of Western US, and on and on and on. 

Of course, the other problem with this is that Russia went further, not just taking back that which belonged to the Russian federal unit of the USSR in 1953 but also a hunk of Eastern Ukraine.  The response, of course, is that this is just a separatist movement threatened by the regime change in Kiev.  Sure.  The reality is that Russia has invaded Ukraine and is at war with it.  Saying otherwise means one has little credibility. 

While I have pooh-poohed Russian irredentism (I thought Putin would stop after Crimea), the recourse to historical claims for Russia means not just Crimea and not just Eastern Ukraine but pretty much all of the former Soviet Union.  Since three hunks of the former Soviet Union are now members of NATO--Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, letting history be one's guide to expansion is really problematic.

As I noted yesterday, Russia's moves in Crimea and Ukraine violate a key agreement and then some.  If Russia didn't want to be the bad guy in all of this, there were other ways.  The Russians could have asked the OSCE to monitor the treatment of Russians in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in the aftermath of the regime change, and pushed for international mediation to direct Ukraine to develop a federal system with assurances for ethnic minorities.  Russia could have pushed for a real referendum (not the sham they created), which would have probably would have led to annexation.  As much as I tease the Europeans about process, the course of action taken by Russia is the problem here.  A peaceful yet assertive approach would have gotten Russia much of what it wanted. 

Instead, we have violence, threats, and nuclear threats.  So, we cannot just accept what Russia has done.  It has altered the security environment in Europe (and beyond), making it clear that Russia is not a partner.

Are We Russophoboes?

Lots of words have been spilled on this Crimea thing, and so it is reasonable to ask whether our opposition to Crimean self-determination might be more about our feelings about Russia than about secession/irredentism.

Chris Blattman asked:

Bleg: Someone please explain to me why I should accept that the annexation of Crimea is a terrible thing http://t.co/Op7T0aNN7T
— Chris Blattman (@cblatts) March 20, 2014

 It raises a legitimate question: shouldn't people be allowed to choose their destinies?  Shouldn't folks be allowed to engage in self-determination?  I responded with heaps of tweets, but let me summarize my twittering here.

It is really hard to ignore the process.  That is, the way this thing was conducted taints it entirely--sham referendum, held as a pop quiz, at gun point, with much fraud.  Putting that aside, the general argument that I follow is that secession is something that is a last resort (there is a vast literature on the morality of secession--see Allen Buchanan and Margaret Moore).  Massive political change has lots of consequences so we should save it for when other solutions have been ruled out.  Part of this is because if Crimea gets to change its boundaries, what about groups within Crimea?  Quebec is facing that discussion right now--if it secedes, what about the Anglophones of various parts of Quebec?  What about the First Nations?  Part of this is that democracy only works if those who lose accept losing. 

The problem with Ukraine/Crimea/Russia is that the political changes in Kyiv were just a few weeks ago.  If the concern is that the new Ukraine government might repress Russians in Crimea, then the first step is to try to encourage the government to restrain itself, to develop new institutions that give Crimea more autonomy and all the other tools in the ethnic conflict management tool box.  When the Baltics became independent, they promised new policies that would be harmful to the Russians living there--mostly language laws that would restrict rights.  A bunch of international organizations, including the EU, NATO, and OSCE jumped on them to encourage more moderate policies.  Things are not perfect in these places, but they are better than what people initially feared.

So, the really big problem with the Crimean situation and Russia's handling of Ukraine in general is that not enough time has passed to figure out what is likely to happen, for outsiders to pressure, and so on.  What separates Kosovo and South Sudan from Crimea is that the former experienced decades of repression, where the host governments of Serbia and Sudan broke many promises despite facing significant international pressure.  It is not just that these government repressed, but that they repressed for a long time despite much pressure.  Kosovars and South Sudanese had few tools left to improve their condition besides secession.  Crimean Russians?  None of the usual tools had a chance to work yet. 

You don't have to hate or fear Russia to find the Crimean situation play out in bad ways.  Should there be a high bar for secession?  Yes.  Even higher for irredentism since irredentism usually implies war (the country losing the territory usually gives it up only after a fight).

The Irredentism Two-Step

Putin recognized Crimea today as independent.... is this anti-democratic, given yesterday's clear enunciation of Crimean thirst for union with Russia?  Nay.  It is the Irredentism Two-Step:

Step 1: Crimea becomes independent.
Step 2: Russia annexes Crimea.

So, then Russia can claim it did not violate the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  Tis a sham, right?  This denial that Russia would be engaged in such dastardly deeds is obviously as sham-tastic as the referendum.  This is for domestic audiences and committed confirmation biased folks abroad.  Otherwise, it is just as farcical as holding a pop quiz referendum, gaming the questions, and preventing dissent.

In a day or two or a few more, Russia will annex Crimea for the first act of irredentism by a great power since .... Germany in 1989 if you counted West Germany as a great power or China if you consider it to be a great power way back when it took over Tibet.  Non-great powers?  Armenia is probably still the most recent, but I could be forgetting someone.  Serbia's and Croatia's dueling irredentists both failed ultimately. 


What music goes best with the Irredentism Two-Step?

Sham-Wow! Confirmation Bias Alert!

I got a heap of grief last week for my Globe and Mail post on the Crimea referendum.  Most focused on the questionable wording.  I had to back off slightly from my original statement that the referendum wording was asking people to choose between irredentism and secession.  Instead, it was more like asking if people wanted irredentism (joining with Russia) or Quebec' 1995 unclear question.

Why is that?  Because the question focused on the 1992 Crimean Constitution and staying with Ukraine.  Well, that is more confusing than it sounds since the 1992 Crimean Constitution was actually quite controversial with much opposition from Ukraine for its secessionist elements.  Kind of like asking for sovereignty and yet not sovereignty, as confused Quebeckers may remember.

The funny thing is that folks focused on this, but that was not the only parts of the referendum that were sham-tastic that I discussed in the piece:

• Only external observers turned out to be far right folks from European Parliament.  No observers from respected election monitoring places.  And, no, the CIS folks don't count.
• The pop quiz nature of the referendum--a week?  Really, since when has any democracy held an election a week after the election's announcement?  I dare you to name one election that was held in such a short window.  Pop quizzes are to enforce attendance and reading requirements in classes, not for major political change.
• There is that whole occupation thing by Russian military folks who deny that they are Russian military folks.  Add that to opposition folks being arrested/disappearing and other forms of repression.

And so what we do get?  95% support in the referendum for irredentism.  What percentage of the Crimean Tatar and ethnic Ukrainian vote would you need to get that result?  Yeah, I am questioning the validity of the referendum's outcome.  It was a sham from the start, whether the question itself is as confusing to the voters as it was to me and to much of the coverage or not.

If you think that the referendum was perfectly democratic, then either you don't understand democracy or your confirmation bias is so strong that reality has a hard time getting through.