EU elections? Fun Posters!

As a political scientist, I could not help but notice there is an election going on.  The European Union's parliament has an election soon, so candidates and parties are putting up signs to advertise for their candidates and to oppose other parties.  The latter, of course, has been more fun.

So, I took some pictures as I walked around and google lensed my way through when I couldn't figure out what the message was.

For example, one poster was not for the campaign but for a protest: The Rent is Too High!  Must be Trudeau's fault.

 

 

 

 

The more centrist parties are, alas, boring.  Thus, no pics for the Christian Democrats or the Social Democrats.  The Liberal Democrats were so boring I had to include their poster. Sure, boomer.  Business loves freedom just like you?  For realz? 

 

Boring poster but the name alone gets my interest.  Starting with a concern about internet regulation, the party has occasionally won a few seats.  All it says is: vote for me.  Blah.

The Marxist-Leninist Party is not a fan of the far right party: Ban the AfD.  So, yes, I do agree with the communists on at least one thing.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Volt party is funky.  I noticed their posters the most.  They have one demanding "Power to the People" which is striking because it is in English.  Given that English and Scots, Americans, and Canadians can't vote in EU elections, it was a bit puzzling to me.  Elections are moments of nationalism, where parties try to put their spin on the country's nationalism.  Every American presidential candidate has to wear a pledge flag pin on their uniform suit.  So, I would expect German parties to use German.  But as a colleague here at Hertie noted, the Volt party voters are going to be bilingual at least.  It seems to be a pro-EU, relatively progress/internationalist party--pan-European.  This particular sign caught me attention--google lens made me laugh at loud.  The big question is: how best to avoid being an asshole?  Vote for Volt?  Don't vote for AfD?  Maybe as a Euro party, being a nationalist is being an asshole?  Anyhow, I will try to avoid being an asshole in my last couple of days here. Although writing fairly ignorant posts about campaign posters may count as being an asshole?

 

Zeitenwende All Over the World!

 Two years ago, Olaf Scholtz, the German Chancellor, announced that we were at a moment of Zeitenwende in the aftermath of Russia's renewed invasion of Ukraine (2014 was the start, 2022 was much deeper with greater intensity and more far-reaching aims).  The term refers to a watershed moment, a rupture, a turning point that ushers out the old way of thinking and ushers in a new one.  That alters the ideational foundations of foreign/defense policy and grand strategy.  I am lucky enough to be in Berlin and at the Hertie School as they held an event aimed at seeking to understand whether this was just a German thing or whether other parts of Europe were also changing their worldviews/mindsets.  The public event was advertised thusly.

For the Germans, a key was that rather than thinking that there is no security in Europe if it is not cooperative security with Russia, now the thinking is that there is no security in Europe if it is not cooperative security against Russia.  The big question, of course, is whether there have been changes not just in thoughts but in deeds.  And, yes, Germany is doing stuff it had not done before: spending at least for now more than 2% of its GDP on defense, sending arms to a war zone, reduction of energy dependence on Russia, etc.  But does it have a clear idea of what the new world view is?  Not so sure.  

The panelists from all over Europe were asked a bunch of questions by the organizers including: has your country or region had a zeitenwende, if so, what is it, when was it?  How is the match between the governing elites and the public on attitudes about all of this?  We folks in the audience asked whatever questions that came to us (yes, I tended to ask civ-mil questions).  And hanging over all of this was Trump potentially winning in November and the meaning of that--can there be a European NATO (with a Canadian appendage?)*

Since we had three workshop panels and one public panel essentially covering most of Europe, I am not going to repeat everything I learned.  I did learn a lot and will remember some of it.  But here are some of the highlights:

• The Baltics and Poland did not have a change in worldviews in 2022, but could simply say "we told you so," as their views towards Russia and European security were either formed around 2007-8 with Russia's cyberattack on Estonia and war with Georgia or... always saw NATO and European security as against Russia not with Russia.  UK was also in this camp, more or less, and is better able to respond as it has reduced the dependence on Russian capital in the financial sector.
  
• France has made some significant policy shifts, but providing extended deterrence if Trump pulls back the US commitment is not going to happen.  
• Lots of lag--several countries want to make adaptations but implementation is slow.  I got some knowing laughs at lunch today when I said that everyone's procurement was broken in different ways--kind of the way every snowflake is different.
• Everybody has recruitment/retention issues in their militaries--Canada is far from alone in that.
• Germany is trying to find the old playbooks from the Cold War--how did West Germany contract with the US and others about the long term bases--providing schools and infrastructure and the like--as they need to know for their plan to have such bases in Lithuania.  Yes, they are moving not just a brigade of troops but their families as the US, UK, Canada, and others did during the Cold War. This contrasts sharply with the Canadian strategy of shipping troops in and out every six months.  It shows how long term and how serious the Germans are.  Significant up front costs but probably less expensive in the long run.
• Carlo Masala's public talk started the three known unknowns that frame thinking--will Russians win in Ukraine, what will happen in the US election, what will be the future of EU/will the far right gain more ground?  
• Speaking of Trump, there is still some wishful thinking in Europe--that Trump will not follow through if elected. I kept telling folks that he wouldn't have sent forces to help an invaded ally before and he certainly won't do so in the future.
• Sweden and Finland had public opinion flip after 2022 invasion, so, yes, some zeitenwende here.  But an interesting contrast as for Finland, neutrality was a strategy, but for Sweden, it was an identity.  
• Poland having nuclear thoughts?  Irony is that this almost makes Mearsheimer right as he predicted that Germany would develop nukes after NATO falls apart after the end of the Cold War.  Instead, after the end of the after the cold war, due to the possibility of American withdrawal, Poland, not Germany, is now pondering proliferation.  Much talk in that part of the world about whether the Russian timeline for invading Poland/Baltics is 2-3 years or more like 5-7.  And yeah, I don't think that is likely, but it is easy for me to say from distant Canada.  One thing is clear in Poland--no one is wondering where the money will come from as they move beyond 2% to 3.5% or more.
• The Baltics convo started with a reminder that Trump was so ignorant he thought World War I started there and not in the Balkans.  
• The NATO-Founding Act is not dead enough.  It no longer restricts conventional deployments (see German permanent basing in Lithuania above), but it does restrict the nuke stuff.  Which enrages the Baltics who think that agreement is dead, dead, dead.
• Ethnic politics is alive in the Balkans as the various stances of countries towards Russia-Ukraine is complicated by the ethnic politics within.  Three cheers for my first ten years of research!  Serbia is pro-Russia, the Serb entity in Bosnia is pro-Russia.  This leads to actors in the region that are not pro-NATO. Of course, those that benefited from NATO intervention are pro-NATO--Albania, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia.  This discussion raised another complication from a Trump victory--NATO is still in Kosovo.  But probably would not be if Trump is President again.  
• Romania's relations with Ukraine did go through a big swing from tensions over old territorial claims to friendship as they both are threatened by Russia.
• A side discussion mines floating in the Black Sea reminded me that the consequences of this war will outlast the war, just as the Germans at the conference reminded me that construction workers discover a old bomb from WWII in Berlin every couple of weeks.
• Why is Hungary such an outlier in all things these days?  Mostly because it wants to be exactly that.  Since there is no real competition domestically, Orban can fixate on foreign policy and wants to pull Europe in his direction.  I had forgotten about the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, but, of course, an optimally obnoxious nationalist country such as Hungary (see the Steve and Bill book) would want to keep that tension alive.  
• The challenge of potential Ukrainian membership in the EU is mostly about the fact that Ukraine is big--it would have a major impact on the distribution of agricultural benefits/competition and also specific sectors like transit.  So, Portugal and Spain (and others) are more concerned about the economic impact of Ukraine joining the EU than any implications regarding Russia or anything else.
• Greece is in surprisingly good shape.  Its spending on defense is now more focused on modernizing the force, it is attempting rapprochement with Turkey, and is even participating in the US-led op in the Red Sea (if I heard correctly).  Greek support for Ukraine is ahead of where the public is. 
  

Some big themes drawn by the organizers at the end:

• Distance matters--those closer to Russia either already had shifted their stances and were in "I told you so" mode or flipped quite dramatically, changing decades of orientation (Finland/Sweden).  Those furthest away and least energy dependent on Russia didn't really have to shift.
• Everyone is holding their breath for the next zeitenwende--if Trump gets elected---what happens with NATO (Steve says it essentially dies or becomes far weaker with Europe plus Canadsa)?  
• Some ZW was a matter of time--some revolutions in thinking started with Crimea in 2014, some started in 2022, some started in 2007-08.  And some have not had a major re-thinking.

The only Canadian content was injected by... me.   During the lunch on the second day, I got some questions about whether there has been a Canadian zeitenwende, and I basically said no.  That would require some real hard thinking on Canada's role in the world and how it has changed and what should be the Canadian response.  And, no, this Canadian government is not doing that thinking (nor would a Conservative one lead by PP).  Instead, as someone asked me: is Canadian foreign policy diaspora politics, I pretty much said yes.

It was a great event for me.  First, I came to Europe in part to get European perspectives on the state of play, and this I got in a big way. Second, I met a number of people who I hope to interview for my current project, so I am a bit less anxious about getting to talk to the right people and enough of them.  I have plenty of time between this three month trip and next year's, but always good to have a more in-person, human connection with the sharp folks on the stuff I am studying.  Third, it was just fascinating.  I got into IR because this stuff engages me, and this conference did so.  Finally, the folks involved--the organizers and the speakers--are simply nice, sharp folks, and so it was fun.

European Army? No. A NATO Without the US?

One of the advantages of working at a place like NPSIA is that we have all kinds of interesting people floating through asking good questions and making me think.  Today, the topic of the European Army came up.  I asked our German post doc and she pushed it back at me.  So, what do I think?

First: deja vu.  For most of the cold war and after, the Americans simultaneously demanded that the Europeans do more and opposed efforts by the Europeans to build stronger Euro-defense institutions, fearing that would undermine NATO. So, Macron says European Army, and Trump, who has demanded Europe do more, complains.  Does this mean that Trump gets the tangled tradeoffs?  No, he just thinks the US should get paid for European defense.

Second, I am a long-time European Defence and Security skeptic.  I remember the Europeans trying to take the lead on the dissolution of Yugoslavia and that didn't work out so well.  Thus, I scoff at the idea of the Europeans getting their act together.

Third, as someone who co-wrote a book on how the domestic politics of civilian control of the military lead to difficulties in multilateral military operations, I cannot imagine a situation where the Europeans would form a single military.  They can and have engaged in bilateral efforts and then in multilateral missions where they have to do as much force generation work as NATO--begging to get contributions.  But a standing army under the command of a single officer with the ability to act and react without getting permission from more than two dozen legislatures?  No.  Remember, nearly every European country has a far more complicated deployment approval process than US/CA/UK (and the Brits showed during the Syria stuff that they have their own surprising complexity).

So, what to make of it?  Maybe aim big and then get something in between?  How about an ETO: a European Treaty Organization that looks a lot like NATO but with no US (or Canada)?  That reproduces the "attack upon one equals an attack upon all" and leans on the French nuclear deterrent and German political/economic heft, but does not rely on the US or have to be worried about a Trump blocking consensus?  Still difficult and not likely, but far more likely than a European Army.  Is this what Macron is thinking of?  Probably not, but he might stumble into it.

How does that sounds?  A European Treaty Organization??  That the UK is out of the EU makes it more likely since the UK always blocked this kind of thing.  Greece and Turkey always made EU/NATO cooperation really hard... can they continue their games in the Age of Trump?

EU Tour and then Some

I got to Brussels a day ahead of the summit, and I got a chance to see Brussels and tour the EU.  I have been to Brussels a number of times, so it is not new to me, but I always see something different.  Alas,  I saw much sadness after Belgium lost to France in the World Cup.  It was kind of exciting to be walking the street with gasps and ooos emanating from all of the bars.  Of course, there is one element of Belgium I appreciate the most....

This time I went to a small beer museum that is right on the Grand Market.

Map of breweries in Belgium--yep, a lot.

EU Commission was across
the street from where we toured

A former student of mine now works for the President of the EU Council--tis the body consisting of the leaders of each member, so it is more political than techocratic.  If I remembered my lessons well. 

The Ikea conference room

Yeah, like someone would put me in a position of power.

Happy to hang with former student Helena H. 
She reminded me of all the super-sharp undergrads and how
fun it is to see them become super responsible adults.

 Then some random shots on the way back--the standard coffee pic








The standard wacky building pic

A Non-Expert Weighs in on Greece

Picture provided by former student

I don't study International Political Economy, I am not an expert on Greece, and my only publication that has anything to do with the European Union scoffs at conditionality.  So, take what I say with a huge grain of salt--->

With those caveats in mind (I cannot help myself),  I have a few thoughts on all of the discussion about Greece.

First, as folks discussed this morning on twitter, Greece has long been Least Loved Member of the EU and of NATO.  Why?  Because Greece not only free rides but then complains and stirs the pot.  Yes, Greek politicians were mildly brave in 1999 by not blocking the decision-making at NATO over the Kosovo campaign.  But Greece, despite having one of the largest militaries in Europe, send the smallest contingent to Afghanistan.  Greece has also blocked most efforts to develop better ties between the EU and NATO on security matters because of ... Turkey.  Greece has stirred the pot in Albania with its irredentist designs.  And, of course, Greece's opposition to Macedonia's name has kept Macedonia from becoming a normal member of European institutions.  Oh, and folks on twitter noted that Greece's cozying up to Putin played poorly in the EU as the Baltics, Finland, Poland, and others are not big fans of Putin these days.

Second, people seem to be far more sympathetic about Greece's domestic politics than about the domestic politics of the rest of the relevant actors.  All EU members have domestic audiences, and few have much sympathy for Greece.  The widely shared view is that Greece has done little to reform itself, so why throw more money down a black hole?  Politicians will lose support if they bend much to help Greece.  It does not make these countries right, but it explains the stances.

Third, some basic veto-player stuff: the EU is not a single actor and is not simply Germany.  To get decisions made, there needs to be a fair degree of consensus, if not unanimity.  So, even if some politicians around Europe were brave enough to ignore their domestic audiences, they might easily be blocked by other countries who do not want to change the current stance.  When you have many veto-players, it becomes hard to change a course of action.  So, there are institutional reasons why the EU cannot bend as well.  For the complexity of collective principals, see chapter two of the Dave and Steve NATO book.  The EU is not NATO, but there are similarities.

Fourth, blaming Germany can be fun, but it can be distraction sauce as the historical analogies are most problematic.

Fifth, it is only a game of chicken if both sides are killed in a crash.  The EU and its members are not likely to be harmed that much.  Hurt?  Yes, but not compared to the costs Greece will face.

Finally, when the crisis broke out years ago, my first reaction was surprise.  Despite being a skeptic about conditionality, I never expected that Greece would be let into the Euro zone.  Italy was a reach, but Greece?  

Where will this go?  I have no idea.  I am just glad that this is happening now and not seven years ago.  As far as I can tell, the impact of a Greek default and Grexit are far lower now as everyone has reduced their exposure.   I don't think this will cause the collapse of the Euro or the European Union whether Greece stays or goes.  Why?  Because of path dependence: the existence of both the Euro and the EU have created audiences that benefit from these cooperative efforts, and these audiences have power and influence.  I do feel bad for the Greek citizens who are paying the price for the bad decisions their leaders have made over the years, but, then again, they chose them.  More benefits and less taxes is an easy promise to make, but there is a price to be paid eventually.

Process Uber Alles

I posted a pic on my facebook page and twitter today from the conference I was at last week:

My point was to illustrate the lameness of academic life--that this is an action shot in my business.  In more than a few TV interviews I have had at my office, the cameraperson wanted an action shot, which was either me reading or typing.  Woo!

My friends quickly noticed the sideways name card, or as Jacob Levy put it: saideways (see below).  This was not me being a rebel but actually fitting in.  I had forgotten but was quickly reminded at this conference that this is sort of standard procedure at European conferences--to put one's name card sideways to alert the moderator that one wants to ask a question or offer a comment. 

This speaks to a larger lesson of the conference--that Europeans care a lot about process.  That they don't want to break relations with Russia, such as completely tossing aside the NATO-Russia Founding Act, because as long the processes are processing, then all is good.  Can't have a war if the processes are allowed to process.  That the mere act of continuing the old processes is a form of conflict management/resolution, and that as long as the processes are allowed to run their course, we can get a decent outcome. 

So, that is the lesson du jour--process uber alles!

Now for the question du jour: if you had to come up with a definition for "saideways" which combines Saideman and sideways, what would your definition be?  I will ponder and get back to you on that but am willing to take suggestions.

Land for Peace, Euro Style

I hate comparisons to Munich--don't appease aggressors--as appeasement can work, and in some ways did for the British as it gave them a bit more time. 

BUT I cannot help but notice that those in West Europe tend to be comfy about trading other people's land for their peace.  During the first several years of the wars in Yugoslavia, those from the west were quite willing to give the Serbs what they wanted--division of Bosnia, ceding gains to the aggressors--as long as it meant an end to violence and, perhaps their highest priority, the return of refugees.

These days, the deal that Germany negotiated with Russia at Minsk essentially gives Russia de facto control over Ukraine's future and creates a failed state within Ukraine.  This is not just recognition that Ukraine is not getting Crimea back, but is not likely to gain control over the parts that currently are occupied by "separatists." 

I am not saying that Russia will engage in further aggression because of getting what it wants now.  I am just saying that West Europe is very casual with the lands belonging to others, giving off hunks that do not belong to the west whenever it is convenient.

Of course, the other pattern here is the US delegating to the Europeans... so the Americans cannot really complain. 

Brussels Conclusion

After more than a week in Brussels, it is time for me to come home.  What did I learn along the way other than the European Union has a heap of big, shiny buildings?

1. That the Common Agriculture Policy has its own ads?  On the side of its building(s).... okaayy.
2. Brussels has the pickiest cab drivers--you tell them where you want to go and then decide to let you in the car or not.  Good times.  
3. They strike like other Europeans.  General strike on one of my last days turned out not to be too inconvenient despite blocking one street and closing the train station.  Cabs became hard to find but not impossible.

   

   closed train station.

4. Crowdsourcing dessert on twitter is amusing--apple tart or waffle?  Nearly everyone chose the latter, but I was full so I just bought candy/chocolate on the way back to the hotel.
5. My attempts at French in restaurants here are mostly silly as everyone speaks English pretty well, and I don't want my stuff served rare or medium rare....
6. The NATO community still rocks.  Had very interesting conversations with folks from a variety of delegations, but mostly with US and Canada (double identity pays off again).  
7. Lousy TV options means grading efficiency.  Maybe I should always head out of the country when I have to grade a stack of papers.  Of course, I haven't transcribed my notes from interviews, but that is too much like.... grading.

Thanks again to all the folks who tolerated my pesky questions and hawkish opinions (trip-wire, please).  

Always Bet on Xenophobia

I have been in Brussels for several days, and was amused to find our first meetings in the shadow of the European Union.  I tweeted thusly:

I was surprised this is 1st time I have seen these EU buildings but then remembered I do security stuff #esdpskeptic pic.twitter.com/pJ5bcjzsaa
— Steve Saideman (@smsaideman) April 16, 2015

I am an ESDP skeptic because the EU tends not to move at all when there is a crisis.  Efforts to develop a common defence stance tend to fail.  Well, with one big exception.  It turns out the EU can move decisively when the threat would be migrants from North Africa.  This should not be that surprising as the Libyan mission in 2011 was shaped by the fear of Libyans fleeing Qaddafi and finding their way to European shores.  Italy and France even threatened the heart of the single market by suggesting they might suspend the Schengen border stuff.



As a scholar of xenophobia, I can only be pleased... buy our revised edition this August, please.  But as someone frustrated by the responses to the Ukraine/Russia crisis, I am, well, more frustrated.  There should be a straightforward division of labor on this: NATO does stuff to improve the credibility of the commitment to the Baltics (bases!) while the EU pours money into the Russian speaking areas of the Baltics so that the locals are unfriendly to any little green men who show up.  Alas, as far as I can tell, the EU ain't doing the latter while Germany and others are blocking the former.  FFS! 

I guess what we need to do is gin up a migration crisis--that thousands of Baltic residents are ready to flood into France.... that would do the trick, right?

Maybe not.   But it does remind me of what one person working at NATO suggested: that the US and Canada open up special immigration opportunities for the Baltics' Russian speaking populations--10-20k per year.  In ten years, the Russian speaking populations of the Baltics would not be a problem geostrategically-speaking.  Hmmm. 

So, maybe multiculturalism FTW in the long term?  Still, I would bet on xenophobia if I could.

Last Day of Canada-Germany Conference: Remaining Thoughts

Because of Chatham House rule, I cannot say what each person said, but it was very interesting to hear directly from Helga Schmid, who is the EU's negotiator at the Iran talks.  She also looked like my aunt, but that is neither here nor there.

Alas, she did not answer my question--she got a ton of them and didn't address my concern: what are the EU and Germany doing in the Baltics?  Given the threat of hybrid warfare--that Putin would stir up trouble in the Russian-speaking populations of Estonia and Latvia--shouldn't the folks with the biggest bags of cash be throwing some of it at the Russian speakers?  That is, give them a clearer/better stake in the status quo, reduce the resentment, and encourage the locals to report to their governments if there is any shenanigans going on. 

Thus far, the answer I can only infer is that the EU and Germany are not doing this.  It is bad enough that some folks are still abiding by the NATO-Russia Founding Act (that created a new council in which Russia could participate in exchange for NATO not basing troops in the east) even though that act is, how shall I say it, ....

Dead
Dead
Dead!!!!!

Indeed, one of my greatest frustrations in my short time in Europe this week is that there seem to be plenty of people who think not much has changed.  Well, they are right for the wrong reasons--Russia has been futzing around in neighboring states at the expense of the sovereignty/human rights/etc of those places since .... 1991.  I was pleased and surprised that one of the speakers this week started with Nagorno Karabak, which was taken by Armenia in a fit of irredentism but abetted by Russia.  Transnistria came a bit later and then Abkhazia, South Ossetia and now Crimea and Ukraine. 

Perhaps Germans don't mind Russia's tossing out the Helsinki Accords (no violent border changes in Europe) since German irredentism reunification was somewhat counter to the intent of Helsinki.  Anyhow, in conversations at the conference and at NATO, it has become clear that concern with Russia is curvilinear--those closest and furthest (US/Canada) are far more serious than those in between (Germany, France). 

I have some ideas about what we should do, but I don't want to spoil a potential op-ed.  If it does not get published, I will post it here.  But the basic idea is that if multilateralism does not work, then let's try some minilateralism.

The Rise of the Right

I forget who asked me over Thanksgiving, but someone was puzzled by the rise of the far right, especially Nazi-types in places that experienced the Nazis.

Well, for Greece, the answer is obvious:

What more do you need to know?  In really harsh economic times, people turn to blaming others and supporting politicians who do so.  People were surprised by the rise of xenophobia in Finland, for instance, but this figure would make that seem a bit less puzzling.  An interesting study for a comparativist would be to see where the far right did less well during these difficult times and perhaps where the far right is doing better than they should (UK, Germany). 

Of course, this is just about the state of the national economy--it does not speak to inequality within these economies nor to anything else.  Still, pretty damned instructive.

Peaceful Boundary Changing: Europe is Spiffy?

Dan Drezner's post du jour focuses on the absence of international processes for changing boundaries peaceful and asserts that Europe seems to do this pretty well.  As he poaches on my old territory--the IR of Secession, I cannot but wonder where my citations are poke at some of this.  Overall, the main point is a solid one--that we don't have a mechanism that really facilitates boundary changes peacefully in large part because there is a shared interest in not making secession too easy. 

Dan argues that Europe does this pretty well, pointing at the Czech/Slovak divorce, Montenegro's peaceful referendum/secession, and now Scotland's referendum process.  To be clear, Europe had nothing to do with the first one, as the Czechs and Slovaks agreed to disagree and go their separate ways precisely at the same time that Europe was not being all that helpful/sucessful managing the secessionist/irredentist/boundary changing crises of Yugoslavia.

People forget but the EU in its first few days of EU-ness (having recently transitioned from EEC) tried to manage the Yugoslav crisis.  They sent "ice cream men"--observers in white uniforms--to serve as monitors, and they were utterly irrelevant.  They thought that recognizing the more fit units as states might reduce the violence.  Not only did this hope lack much logic, but the EU violated their own rules.  The Badinter Commission was given the job of recommending which parts of Yugoslavia should be recognized, based on a variety of criteria, and the commission chose Slovenia and Macedonia.  The EU chose then to recognize Slovenia and Croatia--because Croatia had Germany as a friend and Macedonia had Greece as an un-friend.

To be fair, the secession of Montenegro reflected much lessons learned, with the EU serving as a key player pushing for a reasonable process including a 55% majority required qualify for independence.  Note that the Scottish referendum is not being managed by the EU, and as far as I can tell, is still going by 50% plus one (which I cannot stand--a very narrow and potentially temporary basis of support).

Dan ignores the other violent cases that have petered out--Northern Ireland and the Basques.  Which is fine, since they are less violent now.  But again, Europe has little to do with it. What does?  That magic sauce of democracy and economic development.  Canada's own secessionist movement--Quebec--has been similarly non-violent except for a quite token murder in 1970.

How does this work?  Jason Sorens has written much on this, but the basic idea is that if you give people a chance to leave peacefully, via democratic means, they do not need to choose violence, and they then often do not choose to leave.  The benefits of leaving an advanced democracy with a good economy are not so great.  The costs are always downplayed but are quite real.

Both violence and secession are far more popular where people do not have the means to address their grievances through the political system--so they opt out.  What makes Europe different is not the EU but the prevalence of strong democracies and decent economies (even now, when compared to elsewhere).

So, I would focus less on Europe and more on the stuff that has spread--democracy--and on the economics that create incentives/disincentives.

Still, Dan is right that we can think about Europe as a model for peaceful boundary change--but it is less about EUROPE and more about the characteristics of European countries. And, yes, blaming Europe for messing up the boundaries of the rest of the world is fair game.*

* Although to be fair, the Europeans drew many, many boundaries and irredentism is rather rare. 

Wrong Tweet To Go Viral? I Blame the EU

This morning I tweeted thusly:

Not Russia, not Ukrainians? Mt @ProSyn: "The blame for the outcome in Ukraine falls squarely on the EU’s leaders." http://t.co/R4EzPvJVAF”
— Stephen Saideman (@smsaideman) January 5, 2014

And it kind of went viral, getting a heap of retweets instantly.  Given that I also tweeted about the new book, which I would like to have sold and cited far and wide, I would have preferred that tweet to get more action.  Oh well.

So, about this Ukraine thing, the article itself is a bit better balanced than the headline, showing that it really is about Russia and about Ukraine more than about the European Union.  Still, the timing is good because the NYT has an article on the US and the Mideast with the same kind of disease: the Western actor (EU/US) is seen as unwilling to impose its will.  The reality, of course, is that Iraq, Afghanistan and numerous other policies that have not been super-wonderful demonstrate that it is not just the exertion of power and cleverness by the western outsiders that matter but the incentives and institutions in the countries that are in play that matter.

Which is why Andrew Exum ended his rant on the NYT article thusly:

My lesson from Iraq/Afghanistan? The US can do a lot, but long-term success is ultimately up to what people on the ground do or fail to do.
— Andrew Exum (@abumuqawama) January 5, 2014

Is First Best? Another Post on Canada-EU Trade Agreement

I am not a scholar of International Political Economy, nor do I play one on TV, but I do have a few quibbles about how the new trade agreement between Canada and the EU is being discussed.  I already posted on the Cheese issue.  The second thing getting played up today is that this is the first trade agreement between a member of the G8 and the EU.  Let's examine that one. 

First, the G8 (group of eight) includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, and the US.  Since France, Germany, Italy and the UK are members of the EU, Canada has only beaten out Japan, Russia, and the US.  Woot!  Maybe still impressive but not so sure.

Second, since an agreement is the result of a bargaining process, being the first to conclude an agreement can mean several things:

• The agreement deals with less controversial, less combative, less conflictual issues, so an agreement could be reached faster.
• The Canadian government had a great deal of leverage so it brought the EU to its collective knees faster.
• The Canadian government was in a clear position of weakness and conceded whatever it is that the EU wanted quickly (cheesy concessions?).
• The other governments interacting with the EU may have other things on their mind
• Japan: recovering from the Tsunami
• US: the joy that has been budget politics
• Russia: um, Putin is more focused on appearing shirtless and such?

The simple point here is that being first may be either meaningless--that there was no race so coming in first is irrelevant; or it may actually be a bad thing, as Canada could have conceded far more for far less.

To be clear, I am not opposed to a free trade agreement.  Indeed, I am a big fan of lowering barriers especially between advanced countries.  I would like cheaper European products, and the Canadian markets would be better off with more competition and less collusion.  I am just taking shots at a silly way to portray the agreement. The big questions are: who wins, who loses, and how and NOT who is first.  
 

Nobel Peace Prize for Indecision

The European Union just was named this year's Nobel Peace Prize winner.  My daughter, Kid Spew, was most confused, thinking this was a joke.  Her reaction was that there are so many people out there more deserving, and then she started listing them off.  Good thing we arrived at school where I had to drop her off....

There will be many posts today and tomorrow and down the road lauding or lambasting this decision (for example, see Drezner's which appeared while I was writing this), so why I should I add my voice to those of the critics?  Because I have writer's bloc?  Sure, but also because I have long been a Euro-skeptic when it came to European foreign policy.  That, and I have to explain my morning's tweets, including: "I guess the Nobel folks think there really is a European Union foreign policy?"

First, to be sure, the EU has been doing good stuff, and perhaps this is a reward for cementing the long peace.  The problem is that it is hardly clear that the EU has really kept the peace in Europe especially between Germany and France.  Which led to my second tweet: 

The funny thing about EU and long peace is that it ignores that NATO was designed to "keep the US, Germany down and the Russians out."
— Stephen Saideman (@smsaideman) October 12, 2012

If you want to give the EU an award for keeping the post-war peace, it should be behind NATO in line.

Second, perhaps the EU is deserving for cementing the transition from post-communism to joyous stable democracy in Eastern Europe in the 1990s.  Sure, but this is somewhat problematic, as:

(a) the EU's contribution is overrated, as it let countries in regardless of how well they did on the conditions (including all kinds of democratic criteria);  (b) it omits NATO's role again; and (c) Hungary is making those democratic gains seem just a wee bit temporary.

Third, when the EU has been confronted with a problem of war and peace, people suddenly realize it is a composite of countries with varying interests and commitments and not a single foreign policy-producing entity.  The EU failed its first big test when Yugoslavia fell apart. Its recognition of Slovenia and Croatia did not cause anything really but demonstrated that conditions did not matter more than intra-EU wrangling since Macedonia met the conditions more than Croatia.  The EU split over Iraq 2003, and did not do much more than twitch over Libya.  So, the EU's record as a force for peace beyond its members is pretty lame.  

My daughter's take seems to be the right one:sure, the EU is a fine organization, but aren't there those actors that have done more and need more legitimation than the EU?  Naming Obama before he did anything as President was a mistake and so is this.

Testing the EU

I am a published Euro-skeptic and have been skeptical about the EU here and at Current Intelligence many times.  But here's me hoping that the EU finally passes a key test that it might actually have some standards. 

Hungary is asking for a line of credit from the EU, which is really kind of funny: credit involves credibility, but using one's super-majority to up-end existing institutions indicates one is not particularly constrained.  So, will the EU follow its supposed standards and deny Hungary credit at a time where the Hungarian economy is weak but its politicians are in a very strong position?

I would not bet on the EU spine holding up, but I certainly hope it does.  How are the Spew readers betting?

EU Skeptic? Sure

I posted this at Current Intelligence in my last post there for 2011.  Not a good year for the European Union.  In the next issue of CI, I will have a piece reviewing the year in international organizations.  Yep, not an entirely positive one, but some did very well, especially given expectations (that would be you, Arab League).

Anyhow, take a gander.  I will have few posts this week, as I am currently in a wifi-less land except when I duck into Starbucks. 

Enjoy the rest of the holiday season.

Mocking Europe

Let the Europeans make fun of Europe.  They are so good at it:

H/T to Bill Ayres via fb.

Civ-Mil Is Everywhere

You would think that the last place we would be thinking about civil-military relations might be Greece, given that the focus ought to be on debt, sovereignty, currencies, markets, brinksmanship and all the rest.  Yet amid all of the wrangling, we see that the Defense Minister has fired the top military officials.  This just raises heaps of questions with officials quickly denying that this was an attempt to forestall a coup.  Okaaaaay.  My reactions:

1. We don't have to believe these folks.  Yes, it has been a long time since the military has ruled in Greece, but certainly within the lifetimes of some of the actors.  Greece and stability, well, we might have different standards here.
2. If not coup prevention, is the action one that might cause a coup anyway? Probably not, but certainly countries elsewhere that often ponder whether they have a crisis in civ-mil relations (US, UK, Canada to name just three) can pause for a second and realize that things are not that bad.
3. Could this be wag the dog-esque?  That is, to divert the public and media from other stuff?  Probably not since the key topic of the day, dealing with the EU/debt mess, is impervious to diversion.  

Sometimes, politicians may not make well thought out decisions.  Shocking but true. Perhaps the Greek Minister of Defense had various ideas in mind, but was not thinking about the debt crisis or how this would appear.  

All I know is we need to keep watching this particular dimension of the Greek crisis.

What is a Club?

A Club, as opposed to an association or mob, is supposed to be selective in membership.  The  joy of being in a club is to exclude some folks from joining it.  Some people get this better than others.  Full professors in certain places in Canada seem to understand this far better than the European Union.  Sure, this piece refers to just the start of a membership process for Moldova, but this process seems to be an unstoppable machine where the logic of previous promises leads to new ones, ultimately leading to membership to a country that fails to meet key conditions for membership to the organization (Cyprus anyone?). 

This is not even about map-obsession where membership is aimed at keeping the map of Europe hole-free.  Keeping out Croatia or Bosnia or Serbia would mean ugly holes in the map of the EU.  But Moldova is on the edge, so its absence should be seen as a problem.  Unless Ukraine, Belarus and Russia are down the road? 

Isn't this where the EU got into trouble?  By forgetting about standards and letting in countries in to the Euro zone even though they fell far short of admission standards (that would be Greece)?

Anyway, as a published skeptic about the EU and the power of its conditionality processes, all I can think is: hee, hee, there they go again.