Much of the time secession is the goal, sometimes it is just a pathway to union with a homeland. Yesterday, Crimea could be either. Today? Looking more and more like irredentism. Lots of separatist movements end up dividing over their end goals with the various Kashmiri groups being the best examples, but since Crimea's separatist movement seems more of a creature of Moscow than a genuine secessionist movement, that kind of debate of where to go is not happening.
To be clear, irredentism can be and often is inconsistent, so what Bill and I wrote for the Monkey Cage yesterday still stands. I do not think that Russia is aiming to unify all or even many of the lost Russians and their territories in a Greater Russia. Putin's own statements are contradictory, so his nationalist appeals are actually quite muddled. Also, Crimea is one thing, but Eastern Ukraine? That would not be a fait accompli and would most likely require war.
Of course, geography here raises some questions--how can Russia support Crimea if it does not have any land between Russia and Crimea? Sure, Alaska is not exactly adjacent to the rest of the US, but Alaska has its own fresh water and can produce its own power. Crimea? Apparently not so much. They could build a bridge to tie Russia proper to Crimea, but that will just help facilitate the flow of subsidies that will cost Russia a decent amount over the long run (irredentism is rarely profitable in the sense of making money--it tends to be costly, which does not necessarily deter it).
This also represents a shift for Russia from supporting quasi-independent frozen places--Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia--to actually annexing hunks of former Soviet territory. So, there is much room for concern.
But all of this seems like quite ad hoc. There is no master plan for grand reunification since Putin would have been pretty happy a few weeks ago with his man in power in Ukraine, and Ukraine remaining independent but highly influenced by Russia. With that no longer in play, then it seemed like Crimea could be used as leverage, but now it is spinning a bit beyond that.
Do we really know what is going on? Probably not, as I don't think Putin does. Still, there are plenty of insights over at Monkey Case, Duck of Minerva, and other places. This is not the first time we have seem various aspects of this crisis, so our understanding of these past events can be helpful here. Still, ours is a probabilistic science at best, and we tend to gloss over the role of individuals. In this case, the perceptions, reactions, and predilections of an individual, Putin, matter a great deal.
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Of course, geography here raises some questions--how can Russia support Crimea if it does not have any land between Russia and Crimea?
Seriously, we're talking about a 4KM gap between Kerch and Krasnodar Krai (Russia) they're building a bridge. It's only half a klik wider (at most) than the Bosphorus, makes you wonder how Turkey gets along with no land connection between East and West Istambul, eh?
It's not like we're talking about
the Kaliningrad exclave here.
They could build a bridge to tie Russia proper to Crimea, but that will just help facilitate the flow of subsidies that will cost Russia a decent amount over the long run
Crimea has a rich tourism industry, a fair amount of off-shore oil, and Russia's paying $100,000,000 a year to lease their naval base in Sevastopol (writing it off the Ukrainian debt, actually). Oh, and the geostrategic value of Sevastopol cannot be underestimated.
This also represents a shift for Russia from supporting quasi-independent frozen places--Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia--to actually annexing hunks of former Soviet territory.
There's a fair distinction to make between what you're implying and the people of Crimea choosing to re-join Russia.
While I'll grant you this is a shift from the South Ossetia incident, it's not a shift in the direction to seem to want to pretend it is. Georgia violated the cease-fire that ended the first Georgia-Ossetian war by invading South Ossetia and killing a bunch of Russian peace keepers in the process. Russia relatiated on South Ossetia's behalf.
There was an actual military conflict over Ossetia, not a single shot fired in Crimea. Ossetia was to repel an invasion, South Ossetia remains de-facto sovereign to this day, conversely Crimea is voting to rejoin Russia.
This seems like a good kind of shift, try not being so obvious with your rusophobia, it insults your reader's intelligence.
There is no master plan for grand reunification since Putin would have been pretty happy a few weeks ago with his man in power in Ukraine
Are you seriously suggesting you haven't hear of the Customs union (or the Union State of Belarus and Russia (which was proposed by the Kazakhs) that it evolved and expanded from)? A huge part of the post-Soviet space is after re-unification, and makes no effort to keep it a secret.
With that no longer in play, then it seemed like Crimea could be used as leverage, but now it is spinning a bit beyond that.
This is quite obviously about making Ukraine one hell of a poison pill for the west to swallow. Want to mess around on Russia's doorstep, it's going to cost you. Russia gets Crimea, Odessa, Kharkhiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Dnipropetrovsk look to be waiting to see how Crimea goes while gearing up to hold their own referendums.
In exchange for Crimea and the economic/industrial heart of Ukraine, as well as the natural resources and black earth, the west gets 20 million more mouths to feed, neo-fascists galore and yet another failed state for Germany to bail out -- except Germany can't afford it.
I know it's hard to imagine after so many years with Mr. Obama, but Putin reacts when red lines are crossed.
In this case, the perceptions, reactions, and predilections of an individual, Putin, matter a great deal.
Have you tried looking at it from an Eastern perspective? Every reaction has been pretty much what was expected of him, this is very by the book behavior.
Crimea is a lot more like the Cuban Missile Crisis than it is like South Ossetia. Except this time the roles are reversed. Putin is not Krushchev, and Obama isn't even Ted Kennedy, never mind JFK.
You're supposed to be a political scientist! Think Kenneth Waltz, with a healthy dose of J.J. Mearsheimer. Neo-realism and realpolitik, the east lives and dies by it (as opposed to the west, which does as well, but lies about it).
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